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At the heart of this dissertation sits a question: why have access to infrastructures and services 
emerged as key metrics by which people evaluate and debate the meaning of social and political 
belonging in contemporary Kenya? Part of the answer, I argue, lies in the long and entangled 
history of marketization and state-formation in this corner of Eastern Africa. The tensions 
between the public and the private, the state and the corporation, were the basis of early 
infrastructural projects undertaken by the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEA) under 
the dual mandate of “commerce and civilisation.” This marriage, I argue, formed the durable 
foundations of the austere state. Indeed, the tension between private capital and the commonweal 
did not end with the formalization of colonial rule, but critically shaped the infrastructural 
landscape of both the Kenya colony and later the postcolonial state. In understanding these 
dynamics, this dissertation addresses three infrastructures ‘in the making’—roads in the interwar 
period, radio broadcasting in the postwar period, and services offered by Safaricom, Kenya’s 
wildly successful communications company, in the present. 
Beginning in the nineteenth century, I explore how the state and Kenya’s various 
communities have negotiated the technopolitics of infrastructures enacted under durable 
conditions of austerity. As I argue, public austerity over the longer term has repeatedly 
undermined infrastructures’ purported status as public goods to which all should have access. 
Specifically, conditions of austerity not only guided the distribution of infrastructures and 
services, but critically shaped the conditions of infrastructural work.  
Considering infrastructures as multiply authored cultural and material objects, this 
dissertation pursues two lines of inquiry. First, I explore the ways in which designers and 
administrators imagined how infrastructures could materialize new economic, political, and 
social orders. Second, I trace the unforeseen ways that Kenya’s multiple publics, including 
ordinary and extraordinary experts, reshaped infrastructural networks in staking out the domain 







Introduction   
  
 
The din of an amplified voice joined the rumblings of traffic as I left the Kenya National 
Archives (KNA) one afternoon in September 2014. There was nothing particularly unusual about 
this. Everyday spectacles are a common occurrence at this spot where daily activity takes place 
under the watchful eye of Tom Mboya—Kenyan trade unionist and, in the end, vocal advocate of 
development along capitalist lines in the independence period, who was assassinated on 
Government Road in 1969. It is his imposing statue that dominates this site, one of the few open 
spaces in Nairobi, Kenya's bustling capital city.   
While in theory a public space, not all are welcome here. On many occasions, I had seen 
market women’s produce thrown onto the street by kanjo, the feared City County 
Council Askaris who routinely beat up, stab, extort, and steal the wares of the hawkers for whom 
Nairobi’s sidewalks and streets are their places of business. But they routinely return, joining 
street preachers and purveyors of herbal concoctions of various kinds, some guaranteeing weight 
loss, others the miraculous accumulation of wealth. Those who are allowed to stay, it is widely 
acknowledged, pay for the privilege. And there is always a crowd. Office workers lunch here, 
joining Nairobi’s un- and under-employed who occupy this space during the day as they engage 
in the work of “killing time,” the Kenyan shorthand for the labor of making unfilled time 
productive absent waged work.  Sitting on the concrete benches that divide the sidewalk from the 
road, these people and other passers-by are the unintentional audiences of the daily 
'entrepreneurs' that make this space their stage.   
On this day, a man with a small loudspeaker and generator stood in the center of a large, 
slightly disinterested crowd of onlookers. As I approached the group, it became clear that he was 
collecting signatures in support of a referendum. Proposed by the main opposition, the Coalition 
for Reforms and Democracy (CORD), and headed off by Raila Odinga, the referendum called for 
the abrogation of the newly written constitution. I joined the crowd and listened as the man 




“the biggest bank in Kenya is M-Shwari. One might even think it is the national bank. It doesn’t 
matter if you’re with Equity,” he continued, “they are the same. Mark my words, in five years 
there will be only one bank. Like the Monarchy, they want to control all the money.”   
He did not stop with outlining the current administration’s supposed monopoly over the financial 
sector. “What about the media,” he asked. “K24, Citizen...KBC [Kenya Broadcasting 
Corporation], these are all coming to be one. You buy The Nation, you buy The Standard, and 
what does it matter? They are all the same. They want to control all the information. Like the 
Monarchy, it is all one man, representing only one tribe.” If the speaker was soliciting the crowd 
for signatures, this was also a money-making venture. On offer that day was politics in a digital 
register in the form of a DVD for purchase. Its title: “The Uhuru Monarchy.”1   
What are we to make of the claims of this political preacher? Taken together, these 
accusations were tantamount to claiming that the presidency of Uhuru Kenyatta holds a de 
facto monopoly over the means of communication and the means of exchange, as well as the 
infrastructures undergirding them. This monopoly, the street preacher argued, benefited “only 
one tribe,” thereby excluding the rest of the Kenyan population. And yet none of the entities he 
listed are, formally, state controlled.  
K24 and Citizen are but two of the myriad television networks that emerged following 
the liberalization of the media, which came on the heels of international pressures to open up the 
country’s political and economic spheres in 1990s. KBC, for its part, began its life as Kenya 
Broadcasting Services (KBS). In 1964 it was rebranded the Voice of Kenya (VoK) and was 
largely held to operate as the mouthpiece for the government of first, Jomo Kenyatta, and later, 
Daniel arap Moi. In 1989, the entity became KBC, a parastatal supposedly no longer beholden to 
State House, though as the street preacher knew, this was widely disputed.   
M-Shwari, for its part, is a savings service offered by communications giant Safaricom. 
Safaricom began its storied life as a state entity—Kenya Posts and Telecommunications 
Corporation. In 1998 it became a parastatal, partially held by the government of Kenya “in trust” 
for the Kenyan people. In 1999, Britain’s Vodafone became 40 percent shareholder, with the 
government retaining shares. In 2008, the company went public. Safaricom, in other words, is a 
                                                




publicly traded multinational corporation, whose management is appointed by 
Britain’s Vodafone. On the face of things these entities are decidedly not state-held 
monopolies.    
This is not the narrative of neoliberalism we are primed to expect. What the preacher 
offered that day was not a story of the increasing withdrawal of the state, with the ‘public good’ 
left to the whims of the market. Nor was it a story of undue corporate interest in politics, per se. 
Instead, the preacher offered listeners a story of the state intervening in the market, of the state 
directing the corporation. Embedded in these critiques was a series of infrastructural tales that 
pivoted on this boundary crossing, highlighting how the blurred lines between the public and the 
private, the state and the corporation, had led to an abrogation of the social good, generically 
conceived.  
The chapters to follow explore the entangled infrastructural histories that help us 
understand why it is that, in Kenya today, access to infrastructures and services—core 
materializations of what people refer to as “development”—is a key metric by which people 
evaluate and debate the meaning of social and political belonging. As I argue, contemporary 
infrastructural politics tap into durable tensions regarding how the shifting balance between 
marketization and state-formation has shaped the infrastructural landscape of Kenya, in the 
process delimiting the shifting topography of social and political inclusion and exclusion.  
But access to infrastructures, and their technologies and markets, do not simply frame 
popular experiences of citizenship and its limits. Discussions about infrastructures and their 
entailments act as an occasion for people to debate the appropriate boundaries of the ethnos, 
argue over the merits and moralities of new forms of accumulation, and engage in battles 
regarding the metrics and means of social maturation. It is the task of the chapters to follow to 
explain these dynamics.  
A key concept I develop over the course of the dissertation is “infrastructural 
attachments.” I use this analytic to explore how various constituencies have mobilized 
infrastructures and their technologies to delimit and expand the scales at which individuals and 
groups are able to imagine their pasts, consider their presents, and devise possible futures. I 
conceive of infrastructural attachments as the tethers—material and conceptual—that bind 
people to scale, people to things, and people to people. But attachments are not only about warm 




Sometimes they are about severing relationships with some people, some places, some things, 
some scales, in order to secure, preserve, and extend others. This makes infrastructures and their 
attachments—real or imagined—something worth fighting over. The infrastructural tales that I 
narrate in the pages to follow, then, are stories which highlight the tensions of home.    
*** 
In the run up to the 2013 election Uhuru Kenyatta had promised a new “digital” era of market-
driven and transparent “development.” The opposition argued that the “digital” was a mere 
veneer, obscuring durable relations of patronage that are widely held to be the animus for 
"corruption." Indeed, surface appearances are popularly held to obscure relations of intimacy 
between the state and private capital. These attachments, people argue, attenuate relations 
between citizens and the state. In making his case, the street preacher worked to highlight the 
deleterious effects of these entanglements.   
If on one level the “digital” has failed, though, discursively it has been a wild success. 
Sometimes it operates as a stand in for “development.” At other times, by contrast against its 
other, the “analog,” it marks the distance between a new and forward looking generation, and the 
outmoded “analog” generation of elders of which Odinga is sometimes assumed to be a part. In 
other instances, it is more partisan, distinguishing Odinga from Kenyatta, the opposition from the 
governing party. In other instances, still, people mobilize the digital in a bid to demonstrate their 
worldliness—their connections to global elsewheres evidenced by their use of smart phones, 
Facebook, and WhatsApp.   
Whether as metonym or metaphor, the discourse of the “digital” is, in other words, both 
generic and particular, at once self-consciously global and irreducibly local. Indeed, in 
mobilizing the “digital” in his bid for the presidency, Kenyatta had conjured up these dual 
frames. Not only did Kenyatta hope to build on the miraculous ‘success’ of digital financial 
services, for which Safaricom—a multi-national corporation—is largely held to be responsible. 
But Kenyatta also hoped that by mobilizing the digital he could tap into the widely 
held perception that the success of Safaricom is due to its “peculiarly” Kenyan character. 
Kenyatta is not alone in making this argument. Indeed, these twin legacies have prompted 




moniker that grafts national icons to global trends.2 This blurring between the ‘global’ and 
the ‘local,’ the private and the public, the corporation and the state placed Safaricom at the center 
of politics in 2014. These contemporary dynamics, however, build on longer-term trends.  
As this dissertation argues, since the earliest days of the British presence in the region, 
striking a balance between capital, state formation, and the ‘public good’ has proven to be 
difficult for a state whose origins were corporate in character. In 1888, the Crown granted 
a Royal Charter to the Imperial British East Africa (IBEA) Company. In so doing, the Crown 
sought to outsource the risk and cost of administering the region by enrolling private capital to 
enact the dual goals of “commerce and civilisation.”   
The IBEA was, then, a complex entity; neither ‘private’ nor ‘public,’ the IBEA was an 
“amphibian” legal form (Ciepley 2013). These early entanglements between private capital and 
governance, I argue, formed the foundations of the austere state in Kenya. And this doubling of 
the private and the public quickly generated contradictions. While corporations, such as the 
IBEA, were responsible to sovereigns, they were not responsible to the public itself, and 
certainly not to the workers whose labor secured infrastructures as ‘public goods.’ In Eastern 
Africa, as I show, this contradictory vision of the public was compounded by the 
highly stratified racial and economic order that guided colonial administrative practices and 
shaped everyday life.  
In chapter 1, I explore this early history to demonstrate that private capital has 
historically underwritten the ostensible public good. I argue that this blurring is not an aberration, 
but was constitutive of colonial statecraft and the contradictions it produced. The effects of these 
contradictions were not abstract. Arguments over infrastructural access, bifurcated as they were 
along the lines of race and ethnicity, became key sites where conflicts between various colonial 
constituencies and the state played out. Unraveling this early history is critical to the longer-form 
argument of the dissertation. Understanding the austere origins of the state clarifies the 
contradictory place of the public at the heart of visions of infrastructures as “common goods.” In 
so doing, it enables us to situate the conflicted place of the entities lambasted on the Nairobi 
street, such as Safaricom, not as aberrations but as colonial inheritances.  
                                                
2 David Smith, “Kenya Building a Digital Future in Africa’s Silicon Savannah,” The Guardian, 30 October 2012. 




People’s perceptions of the parameters of social exclusion have, of course, shifted over 
the course of the twentieth and twenty-first centuries. In the colonial period both access to 
infrastructures and the conditions of infrastructural work were critically shaped by conditions of 
austerity, on the one hand, and the racial hierarchies and “ethnic” topographies that structured the 
Kenya colony, on the other. Since independence, conditions of austerity have continued to ensure 
that people’s experiences of infrastructures as ‘public goods’ reflects a bifurcated vision of the 
public; however, ethnicity and class have largely supplanted race as being the primary 
frameworks through which people interpret infrastructural exclusion.  
The crowd outside of the KNA drew on this more recent history as they interpreted the 
words of the political preacher. These listeners drew on their reservoirs of experience of 
a technopolitics filtered through the lens of ethnicity, and shaped less by technological 
interventions than by their absence. Kenyatta is not only the son of the first president and thus 
heir to the seat of power—heir to the “Monarchy,” as it were—but he is also Kikuyu. Those from 
Central Kenya, so popular wisdom goes, have gained access to infrastructures and services 
before, and often to the exclusion of, other ethno-linguistic groups that call Kenya home.  
In the lead-up to independence, minority linguistic groups had called for a federated 
state in a bid to protect both against uneven political representation and the uneven provisioning 
of services that are widely held to be the result. Operating under the shorthand of Majimboism, 
this vision advocated for the financial and political autonomy of the regions. KANU, the party 
that many see as being the forbearer of Jubilee, by contrast, had advocated for a strong 
centralized state. Under the leadership of Jomo Kenyatta, KANU had won the day. In the past, 
Luo constituencies, of which Odinga is a representative, had joined Kikuyu politicians in 
advocating for centralization. In the years since independence, the position of this constituency 
has, evidently, changed.   
This longer-term politics of infrastructural exclusion shaped a central reform spelled out 
in the 2010 Constitution: Devolution. Devolution promised a wholesale restructuring of the state, 
with both resource allocation and decisions surrounding “development” moving from the center 
of administrative power to the county. Advocates argued that this scalar reconfiguration could 
address concerns over the unequal allocation of resources, services, and infrastructures. 
At the national scale, then, discussions of relative “development,” of infrastructures, of 




of stratification” (Apter 2005: 37).  And with variation, this sentiment is popularly held. When I 
traveled to Kisumu, in Kenya’s west, and the region from which Odinga hails, a colleague and I 
chatted with our waiter in one of the many slightly run-down hotels in the city. Ochieng was 
born in the area and, he told us, he supported the push for a referendum. From his vantage point, 
Devolution was the only way to level out historical inequalities enabled by lumpy access to 
infrastructures and services. If Odinga were in power, he told us, he would usher in a new era for 
the region, an era wherein western Kenya would receive “some of the ‘developments’ visible 
elsewhere.”3 He offered an example: “People from this side of the country struggle to get bank 
loans.”   
By contrast to Odinga, though, Ochieng likes M-Shwari and Safaricom, he “entrusts 
them.”4 For Ochieng the algorithmic regimes that guide decision-making surrounding the 
allocation of these small loans is leveling. Safaricom, unlike national banks, discriminates on the 
basis of objective metrics. This Ochieng contrasted against the partisan metrics of ethnicity and 
region that guide the decision making of brick-and-mortar banks. Despite being from “this side 
of the country” Ochieng, though, self-identifies as “digital.” Odinga, by contrast, Ochieng 
positioned as being unequivocally “analog.” The “digital” does not simply break down along 
lines of ethnicity or region, then, but can mark attenuated relationships framed by generation as 
well.   
The uptake of the “digital” in such varied settings relies upon people’s ability to 
incorporate it into polyvalent projects of aspiration and valuation and yet, evidently, these are not 
always in accordance. In the run-up to the election, Jubilee had claimed that the “digital”—and 
the infrastructures that bear its name—was capable of enacting one scale: ‘the nation.’ Its 
opponents, by contrast, claimed that the ruling party was using the rhetoric of digital 
infrastructures to secure relations with foreign capital—‘the global’—in a bid to shore up a 
parochial project framed in ethnic terms. Ochieng, for his part, saw infrastructures being enrolled 
by various ‘Others’ from the center of the country as a means of impeding his own aspirations as 
                                                
3 Fieldnotes, 5 June 2015.  
4 For the significance of the concept of “entrustment” in this region, of which much more could be said, see Parker 
Shipton, The Nature of Entrustment: Intimacy, Exchange and the Sacred in Africa, (New Haven, Conn.: Yale 





an entrepreneur. In another frame, still, young men like Ochieng marshal their access to digital 
infrastructures and technologies in a bid to claim their participation in globally circulating trends, 
technologies, and aesthetics. On occasion, as young people forge connections with global 
elsewheres, the rhetoric of the “digital” is transformed into a terrain where generational politics 
play out.  
As this suggests, access to infrastructures, and their technologies and markets, do not 
simply frame popular experiences of citizenship and its limits. Instead, and as I argue, 
discussions about infrastructures and their entailments have acted as occasions where people 
debated the appropriate parameters of community, or argued over the effects of accumulation, or 
wrangled over the means of social maturation. In Kenya, infrastructures—and the conversations 
that assemble around them—are not neutral, nor are they banal. Both discursively and as material 
networks, infrastructures have been politically charged cultural objects.    
At the heart of this project, then, sits a question. How has it come to pass that access to 
infrastructures and their markets have emerged as key frame through which people evaluate and 
debate the meaning of social and political inclusion, both in negotiating their relationships with 
the state, and in negotiating relationships at the scale of community and household? To 
understand these histories and their contemporary reverberations, this dissertation addresses 
three infrastructures ‘in the making’—roads from the late nineteenth century through the 
interwar period, radio broadcasting in the postwar period through the 1950s, and services offered 
by Safaricom from the corporation's birth in the 1990s to the present.  
I track how various groups have tried to enroll infrastructures as scale-making 
technologies—that is, networks capable of enacting or foreclosing the scales within which 
people are able to consider their pasts, reckon with their presents, and imagine possible futures.  
Indeed, as I show, a heterodox group of actors felt themselves to have a stake in new 
infrastructural networks and the forms of circulation with which they were associated: 
administrators and missionaries, “men on the spot” and metropolitan experts, market-makers and 
shareholders, the landed elite and mobile entrepreneurs, cultural patriots and social juniors all 
made their opinions known. If these infrastructural tales are stories about the labor of state-
building (Chapters 1, 2, 4, 5, 6) and market-making (Chapters 1, 4, 6), as I show, they are also 
stories about claims for inclusion within the infrastructural state (Chapters 2, 4, 6), and domestic 




in the pages that follow I pursue two contiguous lines of inquiry. First, I explore how designers 
and administrators imagined how infrastructures could materialize new economic and political 
orders. Second, I track the unforeseen ways that Kenya’s multiple publics, and ordinary and 
extraordinary experts, mobilized infrastructural networks in staking out the domain of the 
political. Focusing on the competitive work of scale-making between and across these sites 
clarifies why infrastructures have repeatedly emerged as the platforms where moral tensions and 
anxious politics have played out.   
 A word on scale. I use scale in two distinct ways in the pages to follow. First, the 
historical actors that people these pages were engaged in explicit projects of scale-making (and 
unmaking), projects in which they imagined infrastructures could play a central role. While these 
actors did not invoke the language of scale per se in staking out their positions, the synonyms 
that they used were suggestive of their scalar aspirations. Radio enthusiasts in the 1930s hoped to 
use radio to shake people out of their supposed “parochialism” and enact a regional way of 
being. In the same period, local administrators spoke of the need to “tropicalise” broadcasting 
technologies such that they would ‘work’ in the Kenya colony. Today, Safaricom expends a 
good deal of energy reformulating globally circulating technologies in a bid to make them 
“peculiarly” Kenyan. In each instance, these aspirations have turned on a dialectical vision of the 
relationship between technology and society, a vision premised on the conviction that as 
technologies were rescaled they could, in turn, reconfigure and rescale people’s subjectivities.  
Second, I self-consciously think across scales, conjoining an exploration of the large-
scale technopolitical aspirations of states and corporations, with an exploration of the quotidian 
and everyday technopolitics of infrastructures (von Schnitzler 2016), and the moral arguments 
they engendered (Larkin 2008; Peterson 2012; White 2000). Scale in this second usage is both a 
methodological commitment, and an analytic stance. I follow Antina von Schnitzler and 
Gabrielle Hecht here in arguing that infrastructures are both sites where scale-making labors 
were enacted and contested, and are themselves "inter-scalar vehicles" (Hecht forthcoming; von 
Schnitzler 2016). Put differently, because people mobilized infrastructures in cross-cutting 
projects of scale-making infrastructures themselves act as a vantage point from which to track 
emergent conflicts over the parameters of social, political, and economic attachments. Holding 




the invisible and unremarked background of social life (Edwards 2003), have emerged as fraught 
cultural and material objects, contested and lumpy domains of disputation.   
In broad strokes, in the chapters to follow I demonstrate that since the earliest days of the 
British presence in the region, the state has mobilized infrastructural networks and their 
technological kin to reconfigure the scales of social, political, and economic inclusion. Since the 
1890s and through to the present, these aspirations have been premised on a durable faith in the 
transformative capacity of technological things. Kenya's unique material environment, in tandem 
with durable conditions of austerity, required the state and designers to mobilize a variety 
of prosthetics to enact new infrastructural networks: private capital, consumer markets, and the 
ordinary and extraordinary expertise of Kenyans. These entanglements have 
critically shaped infrastructural politics in two ways. First, infrastructural networks in Kenya 
have concurrently been wrapped up in the project of state-building and market-making. These 
twin mandates have often worked at cross-purposes, not only undermining infrastructures’ 
purported functions as public goods, but also confounding the technopolitical aspirations of the 
state. Second, as African knowledge workers and experts, as well as market-makers and users, 
leveraged their prosthetic positions within infrastructural systems, they transformed the networks 
themselves as well as the types of scalar politics and types of political claims-making for which 
they came to stand.  
As this suggests, the stories that I offer today are not simply stories about the material 
networks of infrastructures themselves. Instead, I use an exploration of infrastructures 'in the 
making,' and the discussions, disputations, and practices that they elicited and enabled, to tell 
new stories about the changing relations among capital, state formation, and notions of 
belonging; to locate new histories of expertise and skill; to gain purchase on the durable 
relationship between technologies, the politics of gender and generation, and the tensions of 
home; and to explore the long-term continuities in “developmentalist” thinking, and how people 
have reframed “development” through vernacular notions of individual and collective 
transformation (Ferguson 2013; Englund 2011; Karp 2002). In moving across these scales, 







Infrastructures as a Lens on the History of Eastern Africa  
 
Scholars have long noted that infrastructures are one means by which states materialize their 
power over space and over people (Headrick 1981). In this way, infrastructures, such as the 
postal system, electricity grids, and hydraulic networks are key sites where relations between 
states and subjects are materialized. But infrastructures are also critical networks of circulation 
that are essential to the creation of new markets (Mitchell 2002). Exploring these histories 'in the 
making,' scholars of technology have elucidated the contentious social and political pasts 
embedded in large-scale technological systems (Hughes 1993, Mukerji 2009). 
Once technological networks are stabilized, however, they disappear from experiential—and 
often analytic—purview.   
In Kenya, infrastructural politics have been shaped by somewhat more complex, and 
specifically colonial, genealogical and material inheritances. As elsewhere in the colonial world, 
early infrastructures were wrapped up in histories of violence and extraction undertaken under 
the mantle of “civilisation and commerce” (Adas 1989; Freed 2010; Masquelier 2002).  
Kenya’s material networks did not, then, mediate relations between citizens and the state, but 
between colonial subjects and the state. Indeed, for an administration that was thin on the ground 
infrastructural networks, while incomplete, joined taxation as key forms through which people 
experienced the colonial state’s interventions into their everyday lives. And yet people in the past 
did not experience state networks in terms of the generic colonial subject that theoretically sat at 
the heart of the colonial project. Nor in the present do people experience these networks in terms 
of the unmarked political subject that sits at the heart of liberal democracy.  
Instead, Kenya’s infrastructural politics have been shaped by colonial administrative 
practices that produced a divisible public. Specifically, people’s experiences of infrastructures—
both as infrastructural workers and as users—have been shaped by the racialized hierarchies and 
ethnic categories that have structured social, political, and economic inclusion and exclusion in 
Kenya more broadly. Understanding these histories is essential to unraveling the types of politics 
for which infrastructures stood, and the types of claims for social and political inclusion that 
people made when they enrolled infrastructures to pursue more desirable futures.  
As a result of these legacies, as I argue, people have rarely made claims to infrastructural 




The multiply tiered, racialized and ethnicized social order has been too complicated for this. 
Instead, people engaged in comparative work, evaluating ‘Others’ access to infrastructures as 
indexing preferential treatment at the hands of the state (Chapter 1, 4, 6).  
In Kenya, however, infrastructures have never merely been materializations of abstract 
state power. As I show in the pages to follow, infrastructures are also intimate objects; the 
everyday networks of circulation (and blockage) that structure people’s quotidian lives 
(Larkin 2008), sometimes becoming the terrain where social and political subjectivities are 
formed (von Schnitzler 2016). For this reason, it is useful to think of infrastructures as contested 
scale-making technologies. And considerations of scale have a long genealogy in Africanist 
scholarship.   
John Iliffe argued that foreign rule, capitalist expansion, and the creativity of African 
communities had resulted in the production of polities and social worlds of an increasingly 
expanding scale (1979). Drawing on these critical insights, scholars working in the twentieth and 
twenty-first centuries have demonstrated how Africans deployed pre-colonial strategies of 
mobility to address the changing contours of colonial economies (Harries 1994; White 1990). 
Others have explored how mobile itineraries were critical to the production of cosmopolitan 
cultural practices (Peterson 2012), historical and political imaginations (Cohen 
1989; Roitman 2005; Rockel 2000), and specifically urban forms of sociality (Hunt 2016).  
Infrastructures, I argue, played a critical role in this work of scale-making (and 
unmaking). Drawing on the insights of Science and Technology Studies (STS), however, I do not 
take scale to be a self-evident category. Instead, I focus on the difficult work of scale-making. 
Scale in this framing is not a given, but is an achievement. Indeed, and as I demonstrate, scale-
making was an explicit and contested project within which people mobilized infrastructures and 
their technologies, as well as infrastructural work, to both generate and critique new and 
prospective political, economic, and social attachments (Tsing 2005; Hecht 2014). The projects 
of scale-making I trace in these pages were not, then, neutral, but were technopolitical tactics 
people pursued to enact social, political, and economic goals (Hecht 2009; Mitchell 2002).  As 
Brian Larkin notes, in this regard, the “peculiar ontology” of infrastructures “lies in the facts that 
they are things and also the relations between things,” and, I would add, can come to mediate 




points from which to consider how people imagine and leverage their relations with things to 
reconfigure relations among people. 
This reorientation is important. First, focusing on the work of assembling new 
infrastructures allows me to unravel how multiple constituencies, both within and outside of ‘the 
state,’ tried to gain a monopoly over the scale-making possibilities opened up by new 
infrastructural networks. Second, it forces us to confront infrastructures not simply as 
technological networks that enable people to access new forms of circulation—of people, goods, 
and ideas—but as political and poetic objects that generate debates and anxieties about the merits 
and moralities of these new circulations.  
In pursuing these twin lines of inquiry, I build on the work of scholars who have tracked 
how technologies and infrastructures are integrated into, and transformed by, vernacular cultural 
logics, an approach that highlights their “material and epistemic instability” (Larkin 2008:3; 
Hunt 1999; Spitulnik 1996; White 2000). Infrastructures, on this framing, are not only technical 
networks but objects that encode the aspirations, fears, and desires of individuals and societies, 
often becoming the vehicles where such sentiments are made "emotionally real" (Larkin 2013: 
333). Drawing together these critical insights, this dissertation moves in new directions to 
explore how the extension of infrastructural networks, and the emergence of the new forms of 
expertise, mobility, and sociality associated with them, not only mediated people's relationships 
with the state, but became embedded in micropolitical contests over power and authority.   
This dissertation, then, narrates histories that are neither historical ethnographies of the 
state, nor histories of communities bounded in ethno-linguistic terms. Scholars of the state in 
Kenya have demonstrated that the colonial state was one that just barely "hung together" 
(Berman 1990; Mol 2004). Far from being a monolithic structure, the state was forced to 
confront contradictions as it worked to balance the demands of metropolitan capital, and the 
interests of white settlers, while retaining some measure of "legitimacy" in the eyes of its mainly 
African inhabitants. Moving away from structural analyses, later iterations on this theme 
explored how African laborers leveraged the state's anxiety about its legitimacy, and their own 
expectations of work (Cooper 1997), to secure better conditions of life and labor. This 
scholarship has productively demonstrated how workers mobilized putatively metropolitan 




Kenya’s social historians, for their part, have explored the micropolitics that emerged at 
the interstices of the fraught and uncoordinated ideological and economic project that was the 
Kenya colony. This research has shifted focus from debates between the metropole and colony to 
explore the social, political, and cultural work of African communities. Critical for my purposes, 
this research has demonstrated that material questions must be understood within the moral 
universes in which they were made meaningful. Pursuing this insight, this scholarship has 
explored how Kenya's various communities negotiated the large-scale structural changes that 
threatened to reconfigure relations of gender (Mutongi 2007; Shadle 2006; Thomas 2003; White 
1990), generation (Blunt 2010; Lonsdale 1992; Ocobock 2017; Peterson 2004; Thomas 2003;), 
and the boundaries of social and political life (MacArthur 2016; Osborne 2014; Peterson 2012). 
But these scholars have largely followed the lead of "ethnic patriots”—those men who creatively 
worked to bind communities to place under the sign of “ethnicity” (Lonsdale 1992; Peterson 
2004)—by framing their studies around territorially bounded units, often delimited in ethno-
linguistic terms.  
Taken together, then, these histories either work at the scale of empire, moving between 
colony and metropole, or work at the scale of the ethno-linguistic community. Neither of these 
scales, taken on its own, is appropriate to a study of the entangled politics of infrastructures in 
Eastern Africa. Instead, I draw together the concerns of these two literatures by following the 
technopolitics of infrastructures among and between these scales. 
Indeed, the structural transformations—urbanization, the rise and decline of wage labor, 
and land alienation—that underwrite the inquiries of Kenya’s social historians were closely tied 
to periods of infrastructural expansion. As I argue, people mobilized infrastructures and their 
technologies in responding to and negotiating these transformations. Infrastructures joined issues 
of bridewealth (Shadle 2006) and literacy (Peterson 2004) as occasions where debates over 
community, the appropriate forms of identification, and the morality of new markets were 
staged. Moreover, as social historians have long noted, these transformations in the colonial 
economy placed downward pressure on communities to shore up modes of identification 
bounded in ethno-linguistic terms. Kenya’s ethnic patriots were key architects in this process, 
writing authoritative histories of peoples increasingly defined in ethnic terms. The politics of 
infrastructural access were part and parcel of this process. As people made claims on the 




measured up against that of various ‘Others’ (Chapter 2, 3, 4). Debates over infrastructures, then, 
joined the writing of official histories as domains where categories of ethnic difference were 
produced.  
But people’s experiences of infrastructures have not been generic. For some, new 
infrastructures were sites of heightened discipline, the networks along which colonial power 
unevenly extended (Chapter 1, 2). For others, comparative work offered proof that the state did 
not recognize their cultural and linguistic particularities (Chapter 4). For those implicated in 
infrastructural work, these networks offered people opportunities to deploy infrastructures and 
technologies in their own cultural and political projects (Chapter 5, 6, 7). If, as Frederick Cooper 
argues, the power of the colonial state was arterial rather than capillary (1994), what and who 
made it hold together in its infrastructural form? As I argue (Chapters 1, 5, 6), African 
knowledge workers and experts routinely repurposed state and corporate infrastructures in 
pursuing their own projects of self-actualization. In this regard, the stories offered in these pages 
treat heretofore unaddressed colonial “middle figures” (Hunt 1999): infrastructural knowledge 
workers and experts. The work of men and women, experts of both technics and culture, I argue, 
has been essential to making Kenya’s fragile networks “hang together.” These unremarked upon 
but remarkable people joined ethnic patriots, colonial clerks, and “chiefs” in shaping the 
contours of colonial rule.  
The entangled infrastructural politics that I trace in this dissertation were produced at the 
conjuncture of these scales and conflicting aspirations. Indeed, try as they may, designers and 
administrators never had a monopoly over infrastructures as material networks, nor as vectors of 
meaning-making, nor over the scale-making projects to which they were put.  In the late 
nineteenth century, for example, the Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEA), operating 
under a charter granted by the Crown, hoped to use new road infrastructures to connect the 
hinterland to the Coast. This was in a bid to enact first, the region, then the empire through the 
creation of new markets. But IBEA engineers and administrators were forced to confront both 
different rationalities of space, and different visions of how civilization was materialized through 
work (Chapter 1). By the 1920s, these competing visions articulated in interesting ways as social 
juniors took to the road in a bid to leverage their mobility into respectable maturity, labors that 




Similar histories at the conjuncture are visible in the scale-making work of radio 
broadcasting. In the 1930s and 1940s administrators and technologists imagined radio 
broadcasting as capable of enacting the region, East Africa, and with it a new type of subject: the 
“East African” (Chapter 3). In the 1950s, people on the Coast, armed with new shortwave 
receivers, sought to leverage colonial anxieties regarding the fortification of extra-territorial 
networks as they demanded their inclusion within an expanding infrastructural state (Chapter 4). 
In these same years, African knowledge workers leveraged their position behind the microphone 
to call to order new communities bounded in ethnic and linguistic terms (Chapter 5). Safaricom 
(Chapter 6) engaged in scale-making of a particular kind as it tried to at once leverage ‘local’ 
knowledge in a bid to embed its networks and services in Kenya all the while working to 
distance itself from the state. For the corporation, this has produced contradictions as Kenyans 
called on Safaricom to act like the state from which it vigilantly worked to disentangle itself.   
However, while I address a number of scales in the pages to follow—the patria, the 
colony, the nation, Eastern Africa, the empire—I do not treat them as isomorphic. Instead, I 
suggest that people were often simultaneously juggling multiple scales of potential connection 
and critique as they sought to leverage their positions within a constantly shifting social, 
political, and economic topography. In so doing, this dissertation offers a multi-scalar analysis 
that bridges the geographic and political coordinates that typically frame Kenya’s historiography. 
Like witchcraft (Luongo 2011), and the “politics of the womb” (Thomas 2003), as empirical 
objects infrastructures were as much entangled in the politics of empire, and later, state-building, 
as they were entangled in the webs of alliance and conflict that structured relations of patronage, 
gender, generation, and the consolidation of the ethno-linguistic communities.  
If administrators and technologists, past and present, worked to deploy infrastructures as 
the material structures subtending new political, social, and economic orders, these networks 
were also intimately wrapped in scalar work of a more conceptual kind. Across the periods under 
study, designers and engineers were confident that new infrastructures and their technological 
kin were poised to bring Kenya and Kenyans forward in developmental time. Indeed, the 
infrastructures that I explore in this dissertation—roads, radio, and digital financial services—
materialized transforming ideas regarding “development.” From the 1890s through the interwar 
period, roads were intimately wrapped up in the “civilizing mission.” Beginning in the 1930s, 




development along “social welfarist” lines. Digital financial services, for their part, are routinely 
mobilized by their proponents as harbingers of a new developmentalist ethos, one that explicitly 
links marketization with the amelioration of the lives of the poor.  
Administrators and technologists, in other words, imagined these technological networks, 
as capable of enacting a conceptual scalar leap—from the “uncivilised” to the “civilised” 
(Chapter 1), from the “undeveloped” to the “developed” (Chapter 3 and 4), from the “unbanked” 
to the “banked” (Chapter 6). The long-angle view of development enabled by an exploration of 
its infrastructures, however, demonstrates that what the scholarship typically frames as discrete 
epochs in developmentalist thinking—“civilisational,” “social welfarist,” and “neoliberal”—had 
much in common as designers fantasized about how contact with new technological networks 
would generate internal transformations in users (Chapter 1, 2, 3, 4, 6). But state administrators 
and designers did not hold a monopoly over the developmentalist aspirations embedded in new 
infrastructures either. As I argue, globally circulating ideas regarding how societies change 
embedded in infrastructures and their technologies were routinely rerouted as people read these 
ideas—and their materialized kin—through existing epistemologies of individual and social 
transformation (Chapter 1, 2, 4, 5, 7) (Ferguson 2013; Karp 2002; Shipton 2011; Smith 
2008). People, as this suggests, leveraged infrastructures both to reconfigure the material and 
political dynamics operating at the scale of community and household, and to renegotiate their 
relations with the state. 
By firmly rooting people’s engagements with state infrastructural policies in the social 
lives, political languages, and cultural practices of the historical subjects that people these pages, 
this dissertation works to trace out the contradictions of colonial rule ‘on the ground.’ Conjoining 
an ethnographically informed analysis of state-building and market-making with a close reading 
of the cultural politics of Kenyan communities, I track transformations in the political economy 
as manifest in infrastructures through the micro-politics that they engendered. In drawing out this 
longer chronology of the politics of infrastructures, this dissertation challenges the periodization 
that typically frames African history. Rather than independence marking a critical rupture, I 
demonstrate how the infrastructural technopolitics of the colonial period continues to shape 
Kenya’s technopolitical landscape in the present. Indeed colonial formations, as the opening 





Kenya’s Infrastructural Technopolitics: Austerity and Prosthetic Work    
 
The infrastructural tales that I narrate in these pages are firmly tethered to the imperfectly nested 
geographies within which they unfolded—Kenya’s Central Province, the East African 
Protectorate, the Kenya colony, the region of Eastern Africa, the British empire, the independent 
state. Indeed, one of the arguments advanced in these pages is that designers and administrators 
hoped that new infrastructural projects could shore up these units as the geographic scales within 
which people’s social, political, and material lives unfolded. And yet, this research offers 
suggestive lines of inquiry relevant to scholars concerned with the materiality of politics and the 
technopolitics of infrastructures more broadly.  
In much of the global north, as scholars have long argued, infrastructures formed the 
material substrate of modernity; they were the integrative networks that enabled the reach of the 
modern state, and the foundations upon which modern citizenship was founded. Kenya’s 
technopolitics, by contrast, have been characterized by the incapacity of the state to extend 
networks complete in their reach. This has two important implications. First, in contrast to 
producing a singular public, Kenya’s networks have contributed to the emergence of a 
disaggregated public. Second, in negotiating this materially austere state, designers and engineers 
have repeatedly relied on the contributions of African infrastructural workers to shore up, and in 
the process shape, this ideologically dense but materially thin state. This prosthetic labor, I argue, 
must be understood as expert work.  
In making these arguments, I draw on and extend recent theorizations of technopolitics. 
Timothy Mitchell (2000) has used the concept to track the emergence of new a rationality in the 
twentieth century that placed techno-science at its center. Gabrielle Hecht (2009, 2009, 2012), by 
contrast, has used the concept to explore how technological assemblages materialize political 
projects and aspirations, and the unexpected ways that workers have leveraged technopolitical 
regimes in making political claims. This scholarship has usefully highlighted both the materiality 
of politics and the materiality of political claims-making.  
Building on these insights, anthropologist Antina von Schnitzler has moved away from 
large-scale technopolitical projects to explore the micro-technopolitical assemblages that are 
mediating the production of citizenship in post-apartheid South Africa. Von Schintzler 




political process have historically been inaccessible to the majority, politics have taken residence 
“in often less visible locations and in often unfamiliar technical forms” (2016: 5; 2008; 
2016). This scholarship has documented the unpredictable effects of technopolitical assemblages, 
demonstrating how technopolitics are reformed and remade as they move across space and are 
shaped by specific historical dynamics. The concept of technopolitics, then, usefully highlights 
the historical, geographic, and material contingency of the politics that assemble around 
technological systems and structures of knowledge.  
And yet, scholars working with the concept of technopolitics take as their starting point 
technological assemblages that, while unpredictable in their effects, were both ideologically and 
materially robust. The technopolitical projects that I explore in the chapters to follow offer a 
different point of entry onto the relationship between technologies and politics. Kenya’s 
infrastructural assemblages, while ideologically dense, have been materially thin. As a result, the 
technopolitical ambitions of administrators and designers were always just that—hopeful 
aspirations that were routinely tempered by material constraints borne of long-standing policies 
of fiscal austerity.  
Indeed, administrators and designers’ durable faith in the civilizing capacity of 
technological things notwithstanding, enacting infrastructures has always been complicated in 
material terms. In the chapters to follow, I argue that materiality mattered in at least two ways.   
First, administrators and technologists were forced to confront Eastern Africa as a unique 
material zone. Designers from various elsewheres came armed with visions of how these 
networks should work based on experiences and models developed abroad. These conditions 
could not be counted on in Eastern Africa. Sometimes, East Africa’s unique topography and 
meteorological conditions intervened (Chapter 4), at other times Kenya’s unique human 
geography, itself borne of policies of colonial austerity, meant that radio arrived not over the 
airwaves but along the motorways (Chapter 5). In yet another example, years of infrastructural 
neglect paved the way for digital financial services to act as infrastructural prosthetics, taking the 
place of brick-and-mortar banks whose reach was arterial at best (Chapter 6). In other words, 
expertise imported from abroad, while claiming global purchase, reached definite limits in 
practice. In both material and ideological terms, infrastructural plans and infrastructures 




language en vogue in the postwar period—if they were going to become embedded in this 
particularly Kenyan milieu (Hunt 2016).5   
Second, since the 1880s the infrastructural state in Kenya has been marked by conditions 
of austerity which perennially perforated the developmentalist aspirations of administrators and 
technologists.6 I realize that my use of the term austerity might appear to be an anachronism. 
This is a term that we typically associate with structural adjustment policies of the 1980s and 
through to the present. In this period, state indebtedness was reframed not as an investment, but 
as a problem. The solution: a retraction in public spending, and a reduction in wages, with the 
market left to fill in the gaps opened up by the state's withdrawal. Austerity on this framing is 
irruptive, applying to "situations where societies and individuals that formerly enjoyed a higher 
standard of consumption must now make do with less.” Austerity, then, is not just an 
“economically constrained static circumstance" but reveals "dynamics of reversal and the 
ongoing responses to it" (Knight and Stewart 2016: 2). And this has implications for work. As 
Laura Bear argues, and critical for my purposes, policies associated with the austere state rescale 
risk down to workers. As policies of austerity changes workers’ relationships with material 
infrastructures, workers are expected to do more with less (2015: 198).   
Not all the conditions associated with austerity were obtaining in the space that is now 
called Kenya in the years covered in this dissertation, but some of the most crucial were. This 
has never been an ideologically austere state. If anything, the years typically associated 
with policies of austerity have been marked in Kenya, as in much of the global south, by an 
efflorescence in developmentalist thinking—though, and in keeping with austerity's principles, 
this work has been left to the robust and very lucrative development apparatus (Ferguson 1994; 
Redfield 2013). But even in the heyday of "social welfarist" ideology, the state was never able to 
mobilize the capital required to execute its visions for social betterment.  
In this corner of Eastern Africa, in other words, conditions of austerity are not unique to 
the “neoliberal” present. From the dual vision of “commerce and civilisation” of the 1880s 
                                                
5 Nancy Rose Hunt uses the term “milieu” to shed light on the total social world against which people experienced, 
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purposes, the term, with its roots in a notion of the intermediate, is a useful mid-level concept for a project 
concerned with the multiple and fought over politics of infrastructures as scale-making technologies.  
6 I owe a great debt of gratitude to Joshua Grace for pointing to the durability of austerity-thinking when it came to 




(Chapter 1), to the postwar push for “social welfare” (Chapter 4, 5), to contemporary 
emancipatory visions of “value at the bottom of the pyramid” in the present (Chapter 6), the 
infrastructural state has been characterized by paucity. Durable policies of fiscal austerity 
produced a disjunctive mismatch between ideology and material capacity, critically shaping the 
forms that infrastructures were able to take, and guiding decision-making regarding how 
infrastructures and their services were distributed. And these limits shaped popular perceptions 
of infrastructures as networks putatively constructed for the public good.  
Put differently, if the public in whose name infrastructures were constructed was 
bifurcated, so too were the infrastructures themselves characterized by incomplete and uneven 
coverage, and were perennially subject to breakdown, thus requiring stop-gap solutions. The 
putative ‘failure’ of the state to realize its technopolitical aspirations did not, however, 
depoliticize infrastructures. But it did shape the technopolitical dynamics of claims-making. 
Specifically, people demanded infrastructural inclusion not as generic subjects, but as 
linguistically, culturally, and vocationally specific constituencies. 
In experiential terms, conditions of austerity ensured that people apprehended the 
extension of new infrastructures and technologies as moments of “reversal” or at the very least 
contradiction. From the famines that rode on the rails of new road infrastructures and new 
regimes of labor and taxation in the 1890s (Chapter 1), to the quashed dreams of would-be lorry 
owners in the 1940s (Chapter 2), to people's aspirations to "become digital" in the context of 
increased informalization in the present (Chapter 7), people's experiences of this austere 
infrastructural state have been riven by "dynamics of reversal and ongoing responses to it."  
Critically, incomplete networking and perennial breakdown—the materialization of the 
austere state—have had important implications for work. In particular, material austerity has 
produced a context wherein making things "hang together" has critically relied on the 
mobilization of African expertise, all the while relegating it mere labor (Mol 2004). This, I 
argue, is a form of rescaling critical to the operations of the austere infrastructural state. And 
understanding the long history of austerity in the region gives us critical analytic purchase.  
First, undertaken under durable conditions of austerity, projects of infrastructural 
expansion, and thus the projects of development in whose name they were constructed, have 
always been entangled in projects of marketization. In other words, public austerity over the 




capital being enrolled to make up for limited state budgets. In what is today Kenya, "the market" 
has always been the critical third term mediating relations between subjects and the state through 
infrastructures (Chapters 1, 5, 6).   
Tracing out these histories over the longer term helps us understand infrastructural 
politics in the present. As the opening vignette suggests, today debates over infrastructures and 
their markets turn on the popular sense that they are not for the ‘public,’ nor the ‘public good.’ In 
what follows I argue that a vision of infrastructures as ‘public goods’ has always been truncated 
as concerns over market-making and private gain mitigated against the materialization of 
infrastructures as public investments to which all should have access (Chapters 1, 5, 6). In 
Kenya, these contradictions were compounded because the category of ‘public’ itself was 
refracted through hierarchies of race, and more recently class and ethnicity. These histories 
have critically informed how people understand how their relationships with the state are 
mediated through infrastructures. Understanding these processes over the longer term clarifies 
why infrastructures in Kenya have repeatedly emerged as the terrain where battles over the 
politics of inclusion have played out. This is not to say, though, that a vision of infrastructures as 
a kind of a commons does not do work in the world. To the contrary, people have repeatedly 
mobilized visions of infrastructures as ‘public goods’ in demanding their inclusion within the 
infrastructural networks of the Kenyan state (Chapters 2, 4, 6).   
Second, if the state called on ‘the market’ to do prosthetic work—to close the gap 
between the aspirations of the state for a kind of capillary reach and material realities that 
rendered the state's presence arterial at best—African knowledge workers and experts were asked 
to do the rest. As Bear argues: "austerity capitalism...proceeds through the devaluation of labor; 
decentralized speculative planning; and improvised low-tech investments" (2015:31). Over the 
course of the histories narrated in the chapters to follow, "low-tech investments" have required 
the dynamic infrastructural work of African knowledge workers and experts. As I argue 
(Chapters 1, 5, 6), these knowledge workers and experts have routinely been asked to engage 
in prosthetic work. That is, they have routinely been called upon to fill the gap between the 
developmentalist aspirations of the state, and material realities that have been characterized by 
the interruption of unforeseen materialities, partial knowledge, and limitations in financing. This 
work, moreover, while constituting forms of expertise, has been routinely devalued—both 




But this did not render it unimportant. To the contrary, conditions of fiscal austerity, in 
tandem with incomplete networking, ensured that this work was centrally important to making 
infrastructures ‘work’ such as they have (Chapters 4, 5, 6, 7). These dynamics, moreover, did not 
end with independence. Indeed, today this infrastructural work is essential to generating the 
knowledge upon which new markets are being assembled (Chapters 6, 7). And this prosthetic 
work was (and is) not generic but was (and is) constitutive and transformative of this 
developmentally austere infrastructural state.   
A word on prosthetics. Today, developmentalist market-makers are explicit in naming 
African work with digital infrastructures prosthetic labor, referring 
to people like Nyawira (Chapter 6) who take charge of M-PESA kiosks as "Human-
ATMs." Half-human, half-machine, it is the job of these people to take the place of a largely 
absent banking infrastructure, thereby enabling the digital money-transfer system to work. This 
framing of human action is troubling. However, I think that we can gain some political and 
analytic traction by taking the claims embedded in this framing seriously.   
As conventionally defined, a prosthetic is characterized as an addition, application, or 
attachment. On this framing, a prosthetic merely executes the task of a missing limb, its labors 
leaving the whole more or less unchanged. This aspiration seems inbuilt to the designation of M-
PESA agents as Human-ATMs. Drawing on feminist science studies, in the chapters that follow I 
argue that we think of prosthetics not simply as replacements that execute the functions and daily 
tasks of the missing parts but as a "fundamental category for understanding" (Haraway 1991: 
249, n. 7). Infrastructural prosthetics, and prosthetic work, I argue, are extensions that 
fundamentally transform the systems to which they are attached, sometimes irrevocably 
changing them, at other times putting them to uses unrecognizable to designers.  As it pertains 
to technopolitics in now postcolonial Kenya, a focus on prosthetics and prosthetic work enables 
us to reframe our understanding of large-scale technological networks by placing the work of 
making them "hang together," and the transformative effects of this work, front and center. 
Accessing this expertise is difficult. Indeed, the very partial visibility of these experts in 
many of the archives with which historians work is a result of pernicious representational 
practices that frames Africa as a place without technologies, as a place without technological 
experts. Exploring the labor of assembling and enacting new infrastructures—focusing on 




an infrastructure ‘works,’ the more invisible the labor of making things “hang together” becomes 
(Mol 2004). Focusing on the difficulty of making infrastructures hang together, and looking to 
the breach that divided aspiration from reality, thus opens up new histories of work and new 
histories of expertise.   
In the early years of road-building, for example, African expertise regarding topography 
and geography critically shaped the communications network of what became the Kenya colony 
(Chapter 1). In the 1940s and 1950s, radio technologists and knowledge workers were forced to 
learn on the fly as they confronted the material stuff of broadcasting executed by an austere state 
(Chapter 4, 5). Today, M-PESA agents act as critical lay ethnographers whose work is essential 
to generating the data upon which Safaricom both locates new markets and generates new 
services (Chapter 6). In other instances, still, this expertise has come in the form of the everyday 
strategies of poor Kenyans, those at the “bottom of the pyramid” who will never be a part of 
formal labor markets (Chapter 6, 7). But in all instances the representational practices of 
technologists and market-makers have relegated this expertise as banal, making it appear to 
be merely prosthetic—Nyawira, industry insiders tell us, is simply a Human-ATM. Chapters 1, 4, 
5, 6, and 7, in particular, push against this tendency by re-centering African infrastructural work, 
demonstrating that, far from being generic or banal, this was (and is) creative work that 
constituted (and constitutes) a kind of unrecognized and under-remunerated expertise.   
This long-angle view also helps us understand how it has come to pass that African 
expertise has routinely, and through to the present, been elided; important forms of creative work 
relegated mere labor.12 This, in turn, is essential to understanding the repetitions that guide the 
workings of techno-capitalism in the present—enthusiasts’ claims to rupture notwithstanding— 
and the types of inequalities that it shores up. Proponents of contemporary developmentalist 
thinking claim that capitalism in an ‘altruistic’ register can ameliorate the lives of the poor by 
locating “value at the bottom of the pyramid.” This contemporary form of extraction, I 
argue, builds on long-standing practices.  
Since the 1880s, engineers, designers, and technologists have routinely appropriated and 
scaled-up African knowledge and expertise as sources of value, all the while eliding the centrally 
important role they have played not only in enacting infrastructures (Chapter 1, 5, 7) but in 
generating new markets (Chapter 4, 6, 7). In understanding these processes I move away from a 




are asked to act infrastructurally. This distinction is important. The first naturalizes the material 
conditions under which people as infrastructures emerges as a phenomenon. The second, and the 
one pursued here, works to parse out those conditions as a mode of critique of the particular 
articulations of capitalism—both past and present—in Kenya and beyond.   
A central argument advanced in the pages to follow, then, is that histories of technology 
and capitalism that take as their starting point this corner of Eastern Africa force us to confront a 
different genealogy of the history of technology and thus technopolitics. This genealogy must 
highlight the role played by austerity and place infrastructural work at the center of the story. In 
the process, invisibilized forms of expert work become visible.  
As Hecht argues, is this regard, technopolitics generate “unpredictable power effects” 
through the “unintentional effects of the (re)distribution of agency that they enact” (2011: 3).  
In the chapters that follow, a focus on Kenya’s austere technopolitics and their redistributive 
effects enables me to work at three contiguous scales. First, it allows me to explore the ways in 
which designers and administrators imagined how infrastructures could materialize new 
economic and political orders. Second, it enables me to track the unforeseen ways that Kenya’s 
multiple publics mobilized infrastructural networks in staking out the domain of the 
political. Third, and critically, it allows me to track the role played by Kenya’s ordinary and 
extraordinary experts whose insights and work, while perennially undervalued, played a creative 
role in consolidating the infrastructural networks of this austere state. 
Indeed, technologists’ aspirations notwithstanding, the shaping impulse of human action 
is always transformative. Erstwhile Human ATMs and their historical counterparts routinely 
transformed the networks of which they were a part into their own prosthetics. Sometimes people 
mobilized infrastructures to reconfigure existing gendered and generational hierarchies of 
authority and power (Chapter 1). Radio broadcasters in the 1950s used their position behind the 
microphone to call to order new audiences (Chapter 5). Nyawira, as we shall see, uses her 
practiced knowledge of M-PESA’s platform to ensure the loyalty of her customers (Chapters 6). 
Taken together, these histories are critical to understanding how infrastructures, ostensibly 
generic and universally applicable networks, become "tropicalised" and “peculiarly” Kenyan.  
By focusing on infrastructures ‘in the making,’ and working across scales, in 
sum, “Infrastructural Attachments” excavates both the possibilities and limits of 




technologists sought to use infrastructures as scale-making technologies, they had to confront not 
only intransigent materialities (Chapter 1, 3), but also private interests (Chapters 1, 3, 
5). Additionally, and critically, they had to confront the ideas, aspirations, and expertise of 
African communities (Chapter 1, 2), and the African knowledge workers and experts that made 
infrastructures ‘work’ in this now postcolonial space (Chapter 5, 6, 7). Taken together, the 
chapters to follow offer a series of stories about the cultural and material work of enacting 
infrastructures and the politics of scale-making (and unmaking) that they disclose.   
*** 
If working across scales is one of my central goals in writing this dissertation, this was enabled 
by a method that was itself multi-scalar, and self-consciously so. The sources for this project, and 
the modes of reading them, were as heterodox as the processes over which I have tried to gain a 
handle. In reading between and across these sources I have worked to generate a thick 
description of the politics of infrastructures in colonial and postcolonial Kenya. National 
Archives were consulted in the UK, Kenya, and Uganda. Corporate archives—namely those of 
the Imperial British East Africa Company, the British Broadcasting Corporation, the Marconi 
Archives, and the Cable and Wireless archives—were consulted in the UK. I also had the 
opportunity to work with the small remaining collection of audio-files of early radio broadcasts 
housed at the Kenya Broadcasting Corporation. Mission archives also offered invaluable 
insights. In Kenya, I worked with the archives of the Anglican Church, and the papers of 
Leonard Beecher and Louis Leakey, all of which are housed in Nairobi. These archival materials 
were read alongside oral historical research undertaken in Kenya. For me, conducting oral 
histories with old drivers and radio men was critical to understanding both the cultural politics of 
infrastructures and their complex poetics. This is important in its own historical right, but it was 
also central to getting a handle on the complex cultural politics of Kenya in the present, and for 
enabling an understanding of the consistency with which African expertise had been sidelined in 
the archives with which we construct our histories.  
 While in the pages that follow I work across multiple scales, Central Kenya and the Rift 
Valley, and the cultural and technical work of Kikuyu speakers, feature heavily. The reasons for 
this are historical. As the street preacher suggested, those from the center of the country often 
accessed infrastructures before, and sometimes to the exclusion of, other regions and 




the result of connections to the center of administrative power. In the colonial period, by 
contrast, infrastructural densities in these regions reflected not only the presence of white settlers 
in the area, but also the intensity of commodity production, and proximity to Nairobi. What is 
today framed as an unfair advantage, in other words, was in the colonial period experienced as 
the state’s over-zealous incursions into the lifeworlds of the region’s African communities. 
These formations, in tandem with a self-identified “entrepreneurialism” amongst Kikuyu 
speakers, helps us understand why debates over infrastructures and their markets not only played 
out between the state and its subjects, but also at the more intimate scale of community with 
greater intensity in this part of the country. Understanding the particularities of infrastructural 
politics among Kikuyu speakers was augmented by my exploration of the cultural productions of 
some of Kenya’s intellectuals. Often writing in the vernacular—Kikuyu—these polemical 
writings thickened my understanding of the complex cultural politics of infrastructures in the 
region.   
The importance of telling these stories of sidelined expertise, insofar as I was able, was 
heightened by the ethnographic component of my research, which mainly involved working and 
chatting with Nyawira at her small M-PESA kiosk, and working with the matatu men and 
hawkers that people the bus stage by the Fig Tree Market outside of Nairobi's Central 
Business District. It was here that I learned about Nyawira’s work, and the work of those like 
her, as well as about the struggles and aspirations of the social juniors of the matatu sector as 
they try to parlay their labor into valuable work and adult status. For what has become the final 
section of the dissertation, I also conducted interviews with digital technologists and industry 
experts. Their perspectives and insights were coupled with the anonymous voices that make 
themselves heard on Kenya’s lively blogosphere, and communications captured and preserved by 
WikiLeaks—this is, after all, and at least in part, a history of the digital in Kenya. These insights, 
in tandem with everyday talk, formed the foundations of much of the third section of the 
dissertation.  
This unorthodox method has, I think, been a boon rather than a liability. Moving between 
these source bases alerted me to the importance of being as concerned with locating continuities 
and repetitions as I was with understanding ruptures and change over time. While this is certainly 
a story about transformation, claims to change do a good deal of work in the world, especially as 




to be sure. But sometimes narratives of rupture obscure more than they reveal. In this instance, 
the ways in which infrastructures’ long history as public goods in the region has always been 
crosscut by the aspirations of capital markets; or the ways that infrastructural work has 
repeatedly been rendered mere labor; or the fought-over processes by which infrastructures have 
been enrolled to enact competing social and political goals. It is by bringing these scales together 
that I hope to have done justice to the characters and processes that animate these pages, 








Roads as the Routes of “Commerce and Civilisation”: Labor, Value, and the Politics of 
Mobility 
 
In September 2014, I had the occasion to speak to Elias Mutahi for the first time. Born in 1948 in 
Nyeri, in Kenya’s Central Province, Mutahi had been in the business of vehicles since the early 
days of independence. Having left Nyeri for Embu, Mutahi again took to the road in the 1960s, 
traveling to Nairobi where he began working as a car wash attendant, a position that allowed him 
to learn how to drive, eventuating in him getting a license in 1970 and buying a vehicle of his 
own a decade later.1 He undertook these moves, he told me, so he would not become a “failure of 
my tribe.” Mobility, even in Mutahi’s own framing, though, was not an unmitigated social good. 
Indeed, mobility as both a strategy of success and as evidence of moral failure would be a central 
theme in my conversation with Mutahi and the many other drivers I interviewed during my 
research.  
Mutahi easily moved between a description of his own morally upright itinerary to 
outlining the dangers of irresponsible mobility, the latter of which, I have come to understand, is 
defined by comparison to its inverse: notions of complete personhood that are rooted down, 
down into the soil, down into the land. We had been discussing the bad luck, or curse, that comes 
to those who sell the land they have inherited from their fathers. It was, of course, desirable to 
expand your holdings, to buy new plots of land that you could, then, leave to your sons (and 
increasingly to your daughters). But to sell your father’s plot was off limits. It was tantamount to 
disavowing his wiathi, or self-mastery and civic virtue, central tenets of what we might call a 
Gikuyu epistemology of individual and collective maturation, or “development.”2 It was, in no 
small measure, tantamount to selling your father himself, so close is the relationship between 
people and land. This, then, is an epistemology of both culture and personhood within which 
                                                
1 Interview with Elias Mutahi, 10 September 2014.  
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persons—dead or alive—who have been uprooted from the land, or find themselves without a 
plot to call their own, are lost. Without labor on the land, there is no wiathi. This is an existential 
problem for men.3 Absent access to land they will interminably remain children, social outcasts 
who will not be remembered.   
My conversations with Mutahi and other drivers I interviewed pivoted around my efforts 
to parse out the moral ambivalence that surrounds mobility. Specifically, I was trying to 
understand the ambiguity that surrounds the infrastructure of roads, the automotive technologies 
that call the road home, and the practices of those persons, conspicuously young persons, “on the 
road.” Indeed, in contemporary Kenya, “the road” is routinely invoked both as a core symbol of 
"development" and of destruction.  
That there would be ambivalence surrounding roads in Kenya today is not altogether 
surprising. Politicians routinely mobilize roads as concrete evidence that they are, in fact, doing 
the work of governance as they provision for their constituencies—Thika Super Highway, for 
example, is popularly linked to the legacy of Mwai Kibaki, who, as opposition leader Raila 
Odinga noted with no small measure of irritation, is known as the “father of modern roads in 
Kenya.”4 On the other hand, in Kenya today roads are, quite literally, the site of death, with over 
10,000 people per year estimated to die along Kenya’s lumpy road network.5 But, as my research 
with drivers such as Mutahi was revealing, this ambivalence is not limited to the present. Nor is 
it limited to Kikuyu men.  
Labani Kiliru, a Luhya man who was 71 when we spoke, and who hails from Vihiga, in 
Western Kenya, was more explicit on this point, telling me matter-of-factly: “[the] vehicle [is] 
death, land [is] life.”6 In this one sentence, Labani clarified the knotty place of roads in the 
popular imaginary. For the diverse communities of Western Kenya, like Kikuyu communities of 
Central Kenya and the Rift Valley, cultured land is the site where futurity is established. It is on 
one’s shamba that families are imagined to be properly raised, and that burial happens. It is 
through this process that one is able to extend oneself down through the generations as a 
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venerated ancestor.7 This is a landed vision of moral personhood, a vision for which mobility, 
while a routinely and historically salient practice of maturation by other means in both 
communities, constitutes an existential threat. The vehicle is thus a symbol of a limited vision of 
futurity; it is future truncated, it is mobility as a denial of work on the land, or wiathi, in Kikuyu. 
Social life and the materiality of landed labor cannot be separated here. As its inverse, then, the 
vehicle’s ambivalent moral standing must, too, be apprehended in both social and material terms. 
And yet, automobility is also a sign of having made it. As many of the drivers I interviewed told 
me, by virtue of their car ownership they were respected, “feared.”  
If the road is both a sign of youthful deviance and development, its terminus, Nairobi, is 
also both a key symbol of the “modern” and a site of the threatening forms of cultural disillusion 
historically associated both with the road and with new the patterns of mobility it enabled. These 
men, men in their 70s and 80s when I was doing my research, were not alone in linking what is 
now the hub of the continent’s so-called "Silicon Savannah" with technologies of mobility.8  
Indeed, Nairobi’s very existence was enabled by the construction of the Uganda Railway. Based 
on what we might today refer to as eminent domain, the Imperial British East Africa Company 
(IBEA), the corporation that would provide the template for colonial governance, hungrily 
claimed for itself the land that is now Nairobi, so that what Maasai laibons, or seers, referred to 
as the “great serpent,” and what Kikuyu seers referred to as the “iron snake,” might make its way 
from the port at Mombasa to its terminus at Lake Victoria.9  
*** 
This and the chapter to follow are companion chapters that together offer a wide-angle view of 
the politics of mobility in Kenya.10 Beginning in the late nineteenth century, I argue that the 
contradictions of “the road” were embedded in the very logic underwriting early road-building 
projects. The British had interests in the region but were unwilling to outlay the resources 
required to stake their claim in material terms. And so, in 1888, the Crown granted the Imperial 
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British East Africa Company (IBEA) a Charter granting the Company the right to formalize its 
presence in the region as a proxy for the state. In so doing, the state hoped to use the IBEA as a 
prosthetic, authorizing the Company to both administer the region and enact new markets. These 
entangled projects came together in new infrastructural networks. Indeed, both the Crown and 
the IBEA imagined roads as being the infrastructural basis for enacting the empire through the 
creation of new markets, and as core materializations of “civilisation.” In this, new 
infrastructures were to ensure both private gain and provision for the commonweal. The IBEA 
was a “franchise state,” and one born of austerity.11 This twinning of the public and the private 
was no accident, but formed the core of the corporation as a legal entity. And this dual mandate 
underwrote early developmentalist thinking. This was the mandate of “civilisation and 
commerce.”  
The corporation’s “amphibian” identity, while not unique to the IBEA, did produce 
contradictions.12 What were the parameters of the commonweal? Who were its beneficiaries? 
And how were the prerogatives of the public good and the bottom line of capital gains to be 
balanced? While road construction turned on assembling violent labor regimes, in ideological 
terms these contradictions were ‘resolved’ by a vision of the civilizing effect of roads and road 
labor. Infrastructures as materializations of the public good, in other words, were underwritten by 
economies of violence. And this did not end with the collapse of the IBEA but was inherited by 
the early colonial state.  
If roads, like the railway, were evidence of the “civilisation” of Britons, the engineers and 
company administrators tasked with extending new road networks into the interior confronted 
people who brought their own ideas regarding “civilization,” work, and the proper organization 
of space to bear. And these dual visions of civilization and work shaped dynamics at the 
“interface.”13 In the early years, engineers leaned heavily on the expertise of African 
interlocutors. This prosthetic work was transformative, as African experts advised as to the best 
routes to follow, often arguing that newly cut roads should mirror the itineraries laid out by 
“native paths” and existing caravan routes. The impact of these local regimes of valuation were 
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not limited to visions of space, but also critically shaped the types of work people were disposed 
to perform as agricultural rhythms intervened, shaping people’s willingness to engage in the 
strenuous but dull labor of road building. And with the road came both death and new markers of 
prestige, as communities’ increased implication in new capital markets both made them 
vulnerable to drought and epizootic disaster, and enabled new forms of accumulation.  
With the formalization of state control over the region came new regimes of taxation 
designed to offset the debts inherited from the IBEA. The treasury would not, in this period, 
accept state indebtedness as an investment. Instead, this burden was taken up by African laborers 
in the form of taxation, which both forced men into emergent labor markets and funded the 
expansion of the infrastructural state. And so, the austere state was given its second lease on life. 
People were not invited to enjoy the fruits of this labor, though, and controlled mobility and the 
unequal provisioning of road networks became a key frame through which they interpreted the 
“colonial situation.”14  
By the mid-1920s, people debated the merits of the wage labor economy, and the 
mobility and forms of accumulation that it enabled, against long-standing visions of wiathi that 
held that labor for oneself, and on the land, was the only valorized form of work. These were, at 
base, arguments about the appropriate scale of belonging, which generated conflict that was 
structured in both generational and gendered terms as successive generations of landed elite 
effaced their own histories of mobility, all the while castigating the irresponsible and 
unproductive movement of their sons and daughters.  
The first part of this chapter, then, excavates the contradictory role of infrastructures that 
began their lives in the hands of a corporation. This early history provides a critical foundation 
for our understanding of the contradictory place of infrastructures as “public goods” in Kenya, 
themes that subtend the arguments developed throughout the dissertation. As I argue in the 
second part of this chapter, the dual vision of roads as bearers of “commerce and civilisation” 
articulated with existing epistemologies as those living in the region interpreted these new 
infrastructures and labor regimes as against prevailing visions of space and work. The third 
section works at the conjuncture of these entangled processes to elucidate how, by the 1920s, the 
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road and technologies of mobility emerged as potent and durable metaphors for youthful 
disobedience and cultural disillusion.  
 
 
Of Corporate Beginnings: Roads as the Routes of “Civilisation” and Commerce  
 
In September 1888, Queen Victoria granted a Royal Charter to the Imperial British East Africa 
Company (IBEA) with William Mackinnon, a Scots shipping magnate, as President of its Court 
of Directors. The British were concerned about German, among other, interests in Eastern 
Africa. Unwilling to spend funds directly, the Crown gave the IBEA the mandate, as a “private 
enterprise,” to take up the task of “acquiring and administering new territory in the name of the 
Crown.”15 Here, the state sought to outsource the risk of a venture from which it nevertheless 
stood to profit. These were the foundations of what was to become the austere state. Working at 
the behest of the Crown, the corporation’s goals were threefold: to “open up this unknown 
region,” and to usher in both “commerce and civilisation.”16  
The origins of Britain’s presence in Eastern Africa, then, were corporate in character.  On 
one reading, the IBEA’s role in effecting “commerce and civilisation” in the region is familiar. 
Indeed, today, a tension between these two motives stands at the heart of contemporary debates 
regarding the "public good." While market makers hold that it is the private sector, not 
governments, that can most efficiently provision for the lives of citizens, their opponents posit 
that ensuring the welfare of the public ought to be the special purview of the state, arguing that 
the bottom line of capital gains will erode a commitment to an undifferentiated social good. 
These categories—the private on the one hand, and the public on the other—are today framed as 
being oppositional. But the appearance of this conceptual and material separation in the present 
is an ideological effect of legal reforms of the nineteenth century.17 Prior to this, the idea that the 
public and private, the corporation and the state, markets and government were discrete domains 
would have made little sense. And, as contemporary anxieties regarding the blurring of the lines 
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between the corporation and the state in contemporary politics attest, it perhaps does not make 
sense to assume that these are discrete domains in the present either.  
And yet, this ostensible division does work in the world. In spaces where the union of 
public and private, or state and corporate, are common, such as in much of sub-Saharan Africa, 
these entities fall under the moniker “parastatal.” In Africa, parastatals emerged in significant 
numbers in the 1970s and 1980s under pressure from foreign donors such as the IMF and the 
World Back as a response to the supposed incapacity of governments to provision for their 
citizens, the partial privatization of state assets an effort to reign in “mismanagement” and 
“corruption.” The term parastatal, then, and in reference to this part of the world, is a 
contemporary metonym for ‘dysfunctional’ states. This is, in part, because parastatals actively 
and explicitly transgress boundaries that are ideologically held to be distinct. But what is named 
in much of contemporary Africa today is simply an explicit acknowledgement of what is 
increasingly commonplace—or at least what is recognized as being increasingly commonplace—
everywhere.  
And while the existence of parastatals might appear to be unique to a neoliberal world 
order, this dual identity is not, in fact, aberrant; it is, rather, historically constitutive, leading 
political scientist David Ciepley to argue that the corporation has never been wholly private nor 
wholly public, but is an “amphibian” legal form.18 This boundary crossing, in other words, is no 
accident, nor is it unique to the present, but sits at the very center of the corporation and, in the 
case of Kenya, sits at the very center of the (post)colonial state. 
Exploring these origins is critical to understanding how it came to pass that the Company, 
and later the Foreign Office, undertook infrastructural development in the region as a means to 
pursue both “commerce and civilisation.”19 This, in turn, is an important foundation for our 
understanding of the dynamics of capital and state-building in this region, not least because it 
demonstrates how the private has always underwritten the ostensible public, this blurring being 
not an aberration, but constitutive to colonial statecraft and the contradictions it produced. These 
twin impulses, though not conceptually dissonant in the nineteenth century, often tugged in 
different directions. This was development on a shoestring, austerity underwriting the 
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commonweal. And this tension persisted throughout the colonial period. At this conjuncture, 
African work and expertise, undervalued and often woefully under-remunerated, if remunerated 
at all, was called to the task of acting as infrastructural prosthetics—Africans' knowledge of the 
region became the foundations of road-networks themselves, their taxation the engine of 
infrastructural expansion. And it is here that we can locate the contradictory place of the public 
at the heart of visions of infrastructures as “common goods.”  
*** 
When the IBEA first cut its teeth, Britons would not have apprehended the corporation as a 
private entity, per se. The existence of corporations turned the receipt of government charters.20 
For this reason, governments routinely called upon corporations to engage in projects that we 
might now deem public works, such as the building of dams and new roads. And yet, legally, 
corporations were not conceived of as being wholly public either. The capital backing them, the 
interests underwriting their ventures, and their owners were not the public, writ large, but were 
private individuals—shareholders and financiers. This distinction is important. While the 
corporation was responsible to the sovereign as a representative of the public, it was not 
responsible to the public itself, and certainly not to the workers upon whose labor the public 
good was secured.21 And yet, while the corporation was not responsible to the public, except in 
the very narrowest of senses, its rights, protected by charter, allowed it to act like a state.  
Historically, as a legal entity, a corporation's sanctions were broad. As Ciepley writes, the 
primary rights of a corporation were threefold:   
(1) the right to own property, make contracts, and sue and be sued, as a unitary 
entity (a legal ‘person’); (2) the right to centralized management of this property; 
and (3) the right to establish and enforce rules within its jurisdiction beyond those 
of the laws of the land.22 
In the case of the IBEA, the blurring of the lines between the corporation and the state were 
reproduced within the company at the symbolic level, the company’s internal structure 
mimicking the logic of nineteenth-century governance. As noted by J. Forbes Munro:  
The company radiated an aura of late Victorian respectability. With a Court rather 
than a Board, a President rather than a Chairman, its own specifically-
commissioned flag [and its own currency] ...it created for itself an image as an 
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organisation that was closer to government than to...ordinary business...it 
contributed to the general perception that the company’s purposes were more 
‘governmental’ than commercial in character.23 
This was matched by its legal rights. The 1888 Charter was as broad as it was vague, granting the 
Company the right to:  
raise taxes, impose customs dues, administer justice, make treaties, and generally 
assume the powers of government within a specified area without rendering 
themselves liable, as individuals, to prosecution in British courts for arbitrary acts 
which only governments may perform.24 
In the framing of its rights, then, the private persons backing the corporation were effaced— 
shareholders and financiers, managers and administrators would not, as individuals, be liable to 
prosecution.  
These rights functionally sanctioned the corporation to act as the reigning sovereign in 
the region. The IBEA, like other corporations in the period, was a “franchise state.”25 But in what 
would become the East African Protectorate, this would not be a state within a state, so to speak. 
By virtue of the Crown's Charter, for all intents and purposes the IBEA was the governing 
authority in the region until the Foreign Office took over in 1895. With state-like powers came 
state-like responsibilities. In keeping with the dual mandate of "commerce and civilisation," the 
Crown granted the IBEA's Charter on the basis of a twofold promise: the corporation would 
ensure the commonweal on the one hand, and secure capital gains on the other. In both domains 
infrastructures would have a central role to play.  
As a de facto private entity, though, the corporation was not technically accountable to 
the public, writ large, but to shareholders as a differentiated subset of the public. Discursively, 
this contradiction was in part remedied by the fact that the corporation received sanction from 
the sovereign as representative of the people. In a roundabout way, then, the sovereign’s Charter 
ensured that corporations did remain accountable to the public writ large. In material terms, 
public works projects, such as roads and dams, were critical to maintaining this vision. The 
construction of infrastructures in the name of the commonweal would deliver the benefits of this 
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public-private partnership, to invoke a financial anachronism, to an undifferentiated public. Both 
the corporation and the state stood to benefit from these relations of intimacy: the corporation 
mainly in economic terms, the state mainly in administrative terms.  
But this resolution, such as it was, worked out differently in the colonies. In Eastern 
Africa public works projects, such as infrastructures, were of value to shareholders in the form of 
dividends, the Crown in the form of extended territorial control, and Britons in the form of 
monies partially relocated to state coffers through the taxation of commodities.26 And 
incrementally in these years this British public was expanding as the government extended the 
franchise.27 This is important. At precisely the same moment that “the public” was expanding 
across much of Europe, in Eastern Africa, and under the mandate of the IBEA, it was taken for 
granted that the communities living in the region would not be fully folded into this growing 
public. Here, securing the commonweal in the UK turned on mobilizing new forms of coercion 
in Eastern Africa, while bringing to those same communities “commerce and civilisation.”  
So where did this leave East African populations? And how did administrators conceive 
of them in relation to the commonweal ostensibly embedded in this marriage of the public and 
private and materialized in the form of the infrastructures constructed on their lands? The answer 
was as odd as it was convenient. Africans living in the region were to benefit from the existence 
of new infrastructures and the new regimes of labor required to build them, both of which were 
held to have a civilizing effect on both persons and the landscapes they called home. These 
contradictions would not end when the Foreign Office took over the administration of the region, 
but instead became the foundational logic of the early colonial state itself. Commerce and 
civilization, civilization and commerce.  
Enacting the benefits of both commerce and civilization required securing pools of labor 
by extending new relations of indebtedness, which took the administrative form of direct 
taxation. In the East African Protectorate infrastructures as a stand-in for the common good were, 
then, underwritten by economies of coercion that forced people to take to the road, entering the 
wage-labor economy—often the Public Works Department—in order to “find their tax.” These 
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monies, in turn, as we shall see, became the engine for infrastructural expansion and state-
building. A focus on new regimes of taxation, in other words, helps clarify the contradictory 
twinning of commerce and civilization in their specific relationship to infrastructures. 
These attachments produced violent contradictions, leading to conflict not simply 
between people and the corporation nor, later, between people and the state, but also at the scale 
of community and household as old and new metrics of valuation, especially as they pertained to 
work, jostled for dominance. The ambivalent space of “the road” in contemporary Kenya, I 




Culturing Space in Two Registers  
 
The Imperial British East Africa Company (IBEA) had been active in the region for over a 
decade when it first received its charter in 1888. Administrators viewed new infrastructural 
networks as being critical to extending the reach of both “commerce and civilisation” for, as one 
company administrator noted, without “better facilities of communication and transport...the 
development of the country could not be carried far.”28 “Development” here had both economic 
and altruistic valences. Indeed, the IBEA routinely argued that the creation of new road networks 
would aid in the fight to end the slave trade, with newly cut roads bisecting the existing caravan 
routes along which slave raiders marched slaves from the interior to the coast.29 But the IBEA’s 
ambitions were broader. Like discussions of radio broadcasting that would crop up some 50 
years in the future (see Chapter 3), IBEA administrators hoped that the construction of new road 
networks would enact not the colony, but first the region, and then the empire.  
The corporation tasked IBEA engineers with constructing road networks as the major 
arteries of commerce, enabling the movement of the vast natural wealth of the region from the 
interior to the ports of the Swahili Coast. But company administrators did not hold the goals of 
commerce to be distinct from the goals of civilization, the public/private nature of this venture 
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ensuring their entanglement. And these twin projects were explicitly linked to the extension of 
new road networks. One 1878 memorandum titled “The Road from Dar-es-Salaam East Africa, 
towards the Northern end of Lake Nyanza” recounted this dual vision. Updates on the new road 
would be of wide interest, the author wrote, but would be of “special interest for all who are 
looking to the not too distant civilisation of East Africa, and the development of its vast natural 
wealth.”30 The scale at which these men operated was not, evidently, that of the colony. Their 
aspirations were for commercial, rather than administrative control. This had a different spatial 
logic, one better suited to the region. And yet, roads were not simply disenchanted routes of 
market-making. In the minds of these company administrators, new road networks were 
freighted with ideology, their very materiality capable of serving both a critical pedagogic and an 
essential material function—civilizational uplift and market-making two sides of the same coin.  
But not all paths were considered equal. The “East African Road” was described as 
“resembling a vast and beautiful avenue stretching in a straight line through the forest.”31 Right 
angles, wide road reserves, clean lines, proper grading, all were essential if the road, both as a 
material form and as a concept, was to have these civilizing effects. Road infrastructures were 
capable not only of moving people through space, then, but of literally bringing people forward 
in civilizational time. From their status of immaturity, the communities who came into contact 
with these new infrastructures would become civilizationally mature. The road, in other words, 
would civilize both space and persons. This epistemology would not have been altogether 
illegible to many of the communities living in the region, for whom both maturity and culture 
were defined by the modification of the natural world through the exertion of human labor. For 
administrators, though, it was the road, like the railway, that was “civilisation” made manifest.  
These European hopefuls were not alone in linking new infrastructural networks to 
desirable social and material transformations. On May 3, 1879, Barghash Bin Said, then Sultan 
of Zanzibar, responded to a request from MacKinnon for aid in constructing new road networks: 
As regards your asking our assistance in…joining you in your program of making 
roads in our country, we shall be glad to offer you any assistance in our power. 
From our heart we say, that we are desirous of helping anyone, who takes the 
trouble and feels interest in promoting the cause of civilisation, and commerce in 
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these countries. We fully appreciate…[the] advantages resulting to a country from 
good roads.32 
Bin Said was himself something of an infrastructural fetishist, launching vast public works 
projects in Stone Town during his tenure as Sultan. As the sovereign power on the Coast, Bin 
Said stood to benefit from an increase in trade. But he also held shares in the IBEA, and in his 
capacity as shareholder was wooed by the promised dividends.33 Bin Said’s interests in the 
IBEA’s infrastructural projects, then, were complicated, located as he was at the nexus of the 
twin logics of commerce and civilization, the corporation and the state, sovereignty and 
marketization. 
Infrastructural enthusiasts, such as Bin Said, did not simply appropriate new technologies 
and infrastructures—and the ideological baggage that they bore—tout court. The Swahili Coast 
was a cosmopolitan space of pastiche and mixture, a space where people routinely 
“domesticated” objects, technologies, and infrastructures that found their supposed origins 
abroad, firmly rescaling them such that they could be embedded in Zanzibari social processes 
and cultural universes.34  
And the Sultan was not alone in demonstrating a desire for roads. As W. Beardall wrote 
to MacKinnon: “the natives I met with all seem very pleased about the prospect of the road 
passing through their country.”35 This desire for roads, though, was not indiscriminate. Like the 
Sultan, people brought to bear their own notions regarding the relationship between space and 
authority as they evaluated the relative merits of the new infrastructures passing through their 
lands. On the Coast, people refused to give the Company permission to construct routes through 
their areas without the sanction of the Sultan.36 Others demanded payment from Company 
engineers wishing to pass through their communities, this in keeping with long-standing 
expectations that caravans pay tribute to leaders as an acknowledgement of their authority.37 
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Here the IBEA was forced to confront existing frameworks of sovereignty that laid out, in their 
own terms, a vision of the relationship between space and authority.38  
Indeed, and of course, in pursuing these projects of infrastructural expansion as a means 
of both generating new markets and generating civilization, company administrators were 
confronting lived and cultured spaces. Eastern Africa, Company administrators well understood, 
was not a tabula rasa as the prevailing trope of the “Dark Continent” might have had it, but a 
lively and changing social topography. And people brought their own ideas regarding the 
relationship between human exertion and the production of cultured spaces to bear as they 
interpreted IBEA infrastructures. If these epistemologies shared a vision of culture as nature 
reformed, however, their goals in culturing space, and the spaces subject to this cultural work, 
were often out of sync. To get at these other visions of space we need to move away from the 
Coast into the interior. We will begin in Machakos, and with a man whom we shall meet again, 
John Ainsworth.  
*** 
On the occasion of Kenya’s Jubilee, John Ainsworth put to the page some of his reflections on 
the early days of the Company’s administration of the region. In 1884, Ainsworth was tasked 
with spreading Britain’s sphere of influence through the IBEA.39 This position placed him under 
the authority of Mackinnon. By 1890, Ainsworth was managing the company’s transport and 
supply department. In 1892, he was selected to oversee the company’s post at Machakos.40 If the 
corporation and the state, the private and the public, were deeply entangled in the region, men 
like Ainsworth joined men like Bin Said in quite literally engaging in boundary-crossing work. 
When the Foreign Office took over the administration of the region, Ainsworth took up a 
position in the new government, from whence he became the colony’s first Native Commissioner 
in 1918, a position from which, perhaps predictably, and as we shall see, he advocated for the 
cultivation of new consumer desires in the region as a means of extending not simply commerce, 
but civilization as well.41 But in the days before the IBEA’s collapse, Ainsworth was responsible 
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for extending the Company’s interests throughout the territories that Kamba, Maasai, and Kikuyu 
communities called home.  
A close reading of Ainsworth’s papers reveals how African communities living in the 
area inscribed existing social relationships in space. “Wherever possible,” Ainsworth wrote, “the 
different communities left considerable strips of land unoccupied between themselves, in certain 
cases these strips were many miles wide, e.g. the Athi and Kapte plains, in places up to 30 miles 
in width, divided the A’Kamba from the A’Kikuyu.”42 Ainsworth presented these as being 
unplanned spaces. Continuing, he wrote: “These neutral zones were never the result of any 
mutual arrangement, they came about through the natural hostility of one people to another.”43 
Here Ainsworth conformed to a prevailing trope of the region as one that was characterized by 
the ‘brutality’ of warring “tribes”—which was also the justification for foreign incursions. 
However, and unlike the supposedly empty and homogenous space of capital, not all spaces were 
equally open to human intervention.44  
As Ainsworth himself noted at the end of the report: “[t]hese areas were in no way looked 
upon as lands belonging to any of the tribes concerned.”45 These zones, it appears, were 
popularly held to be spaces that fell outside of proprietary claims, but this is not tantamount to 
their being asocial. If company administrators imagined roads as lines of communication, these 
empty spaces, too, were zones of communication; spaces that were set out and protected in a bid 
to ensure the cordial relations among people—to ensure that lines of communication were not 
crossed. These empty spaces, in other words, were socialized. Indeed, as Ainsworth himself 
noted, these zones were routinely crisscrossed materially and ideationally by both robust 
networks of trade and durable practices of kinshipping. Writing in his treatise on land tenure, 
Ainsworth noted that: “It should be borne in mind that native law and custom usually provides 
for natives of any other tribe being received into and adopted by another tribe on the stranger 
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complying with certain formalities and paying his footing.”46 These zones, in other words, were 
deliberative but permeable gaps.  
And these spaces were not always empty. Shifting alliances, the ebbs and flows of 
seasons, and periodic drought, famine, and disease meant that sometimes these spaces were 
peopled, at other times left empty.47 Such was the case of the zone dividing what would come to 
be called Ukambani and Maasailand. 
The road from the shangi to the Wambikati passes [through] open and fairly easy 
country. The natives say that it was once densely populated, and the whole had 
been cleared and cultivated with good success until the time of the great famine 
which devastated and depopulated Ukambani some seven years ago. After this it 
was again peopled by a large influx of Masai during the period of the cattle 
disease…These Masai however proved to be friendly, and an appreciable number 
have settled down to cultivation with the Wakamba. I have met them, and [find] 
them to be quite reconciled to the change. Though they still retain the superior 
characteristics of their race, and are very discernable from the Wakamba. They 
are in communication with their own tribe and act as middle-men in procuring 
supplies for it.48 
Administrative representational practices notwithstanding, self-identification was, in this period, 
defined by mode of production, experience, expertise, and the virtues ascribed to them, not by 
some abstract notion of “tribe.”49 These epistemologies of space—both shifting and durable—
would, as we shall see, shape people’s willingness to engage in road work.  
*** 
Administrators’ representational practices throughout the colonial period downplayed the 
critically important role played by African knowledge and expertise when it came to 
technologies and infrastructures. In this, administrators of various stripes drew on pernicious but 
durable visions of Africa as a place without technologies, as Africa as a place without 
technological expertise. These tendencies notwithstanding, people’s knowledge of, and 
commitments to, existing spatializations of social life and networks of communication routinely 
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informed the siting of early roads. Uganda might have been the goal of IBEA administrators, but 
to get there the company’s engineers had to design roadways and recruit labor as they moved 
through these various cultured zones.  
The input of African interlocutors critically shaped the emergent infrastructural 
topography of the region. IBEA engineers’ mobilization of “native knowledge” ensured that new 
roads often followed the tracks laid out by “native paths” and existing caravan routes.50 As 
Ainsworth recalled:  
For some months previous to the Government’s taking over the administration of 
East Africa a party of Royal Engineers under Capt. Sclater had been clearing a 
track suitable for animal and wheel transport from Kiwezi on towards 
Uganda…By Number 1895 the Road party was nearing the Kikuyu forest. The 
new road lay…to the West of the Nzawi on the old safari track which was not 
possible for wheel transport.51  
Old paths were followed, though new technologies of mobility required widened routes that were 
differently graded and surfaced, and so new roads were often sited at a distance from, though 
parallel to, their older siblings.  
In making their recommendations, African interlocutors demonstrated their preference for 
retaining existing spatializations of social and material life. As W. Beardall was to report to G. 
Waller: “All the natives here are anxious that the road should follow the Wanyamioze route to 
the Kinagani…so they are all prepared to swear that every other route is bad or impassible.”52 
Beardall resisted complying with the recommendations of these men, arguing that it would take 
the road down towards the soft, “muddy” soils of the Kingani river.53 Other routes were 
proposed, but “from all native accounts,” Beardall reported to MacKinnon, “a course between 
these two routes would be impracticable, as most of the country is uninhabited the people having 
been driven out by…raids.”54 And so MacKinnon instructed the engineers to concede and survey 
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the Kingani river route, which ran adjacent to a “native path,” a path that wound “about a good 
deal.”55 These parallel routes would reflect a preference for angularity, with Beardall reporting 
that he would follow the route of the path but would “keep a straighter course with the road.”56  
The IBEA’s decision to overlay existing paths with company roads was a scalar move. As 
"native knowledge" was appropriated, communications networks were rebranded: from native 
path to IBEA road, from Safari track to Sclater’s road, from footpath to route of “commerce and 
civilisation.” In the process, the critical roles played by African interlocutors, like the paths 
themselves, were effaced.  
While administrative representational practices sidelined their reliance on African 
expertise, engineers were dependent on the input of these men to fill in the vast blank spots in 
their knowledge of the territories and its people. But these topographical experts did not simply 
enable the laying down of already existing plans. Instead, as the above suggests, they drew on 
their knowledge of the terrain, as well as their preferences for the relationship between the 
production of space and the organization of social life, as they made their recommendations.  
This prosthetic work, then, while framed as banal, was a critical source of expertise that 
fundamentally shaped the topography of the region. And their position as critical intermediaries 
enabled these advisors to retain some measure of control, their role in the siting of new roads 
ensuring the partial maintenance of existing spatializations of social life. These topographical 
and social preferences extended beyond these knowledge workers’ insistent recommendations 
that new roads follow old paths. Indeed, people routinely refused to engage in cutting new paths 
that contravened reigning organizations of space at the behest of the IBEA. In the 1890s, George 
Wilson wrote to MacKinnon on the progress of a track that African workers were cutting through 
Ukambani west towards Maasai territory:  
This is to give you early intelligence that 22 miles of road were finished on the 
23rd…Quite two miles have been completed since then and tomorrow I will cross 
the Masai road so much referred to. I am still ahead of my estimate of June...if the 
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Wakamba will be induced to cross their border...Only the Masai Road bars their 
progress.57  
Some days later, Wilson sent an update: “I greatly fear that the Masai Road is an insuperable bar 
to the further progress of the Wakamba with us. The dread of this road becomes magnified as we 
approach it…They see both myself and my men almost daily in the vicinity of the road but 
they’re not to be influenced by this.”58 This partial archive does not disclose the significance of 
the Maasai road for the Wakamba men that had been induced to work on the IBEA route. It 
seems likely, however, that it was a “route” that this “warlike tribe”—the Maasai—used “when 
raiding coastwards.”59 This “Masai Road,” then, was likely the terminus of the semi-permeable 
empty zones that crisscrossed the territory. In this instance, and no doubt under duress, these 
Wakamba men crossed the Maasai Road. As Wilson reported on August 29, 1892: “I have to 
report having carried the New Road across the Masai Road without unusual incident. It is most 
satisfactory to state that the Wakamba took their share of the work.”60  
Suffice it to say, early road networks were critically shaped by the input of Africans 
knowledgeable of the region. IBEA engineers routinely elided these contributions and, in the 
process, rendered this knowledge banal, all the while deploying it as the infrastructural 
foundation upon which the Company pursued its ambitious project of enacting “civilisation and 
commerce.” But existing epistemologies of the relationship between authority and space were 
not the only ones with which IBEA administrators had to contend. So, too, did African 
communities living in the region bring their own ideas regarding culture and work to bear as they 
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The Virtues of Labor in Two Registers  
 
“After some persuasion we got the native Elders, their headmen and people to take an interest in 
clearing tracks...We laid out the lines and the natives did the work.”61 In the early days, people 
exchanged their work for goods: namely brass wire, beads, muskets, and merekani cloth, all of 
which were in high demand by the 1840s.62 Company administrators were well aware that they 
needed to be alive to the changing tastes of the communities living in the region as they solicited 
them for favors, requested permission to cut new roads, and asked local leaders to call people up 
for work.63 As one report noted: “I had a very pleasing shauri with…[Wakamba men] at which 
they fell in at once with my wishes for their cooperation on the road. If my supplies could have 
stood the strain I could have engaged hundreds here without trouble.”64 
Administrators unreflexively linked a willingness to engage in roads-work to the relative 
civilizational status of the people who they worked to induce to labor on these routes.  
But it was not simply one’s willingness to appreciate the civilizational sign value of the road that 
was evidence of civilizational maturity. Administrators held that the labor itself would be 
generative of civilization. “With regard to the Wakamba, as workmen, I have the honor to report 
satisfactorily...They are cheerful, and can be led.”65 This capacity to “be led” was linked to the 
future. As the report continued: “with a more extended experience they should become a useful 
factor in the native labor question.”66 As another report noted: “The progress [on the road] has 
been much more rapid than I at first anticipated and the beneficial influence on the natives of the 
discipline of the work has been most marked.”67 Administrators framed the materiality of road 
labor itself as having pedagogic value. “I believe that the mere influence of the work itself would 
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do more good than any number of mere wordy negotiations.”68 But this would take time and the 
cultivation of new rhythms, rhythms that would transform work into labor: “It has to be 
remembered that this is their first experience in working for hire, other than that gained in, at 
times, carrying a few loads for Swahilis, when an exorbitant figure is demanded.”69  
By the 1840s, as Myles Osborne argues, working the Caravan routes was one means by 
which Wakamba men secured adult masculinity, analogous as it was to large game hunting. Like 
hunting, time spent with the caravan not only held out the possibility for travel, but also 
promised large, consolidated returns.70 The rhythm of the IBEA’s new labor regime was 
somewhat different.  
Unlike the excitement and prestige of long-distance work along the caravan routes, where 
young men could mobilize their skills as warriors, labor on roads was banal, routine, without 
interruption, and remuneration was incremental.  And so, people were resistant to these patterns 
of labor, which took them to parts of the territory a great distance from their communities for 
long periods of time, and offered small returns. As Wilson acknowledged, Wakamba road 
laborers were now “working miles away from their homes.” And while for Wilson this brought 
them “under the useful discipline of the Camp,” he conceded that it “caused no small measure of 
resistance.” “Naturally” this new labor regime, he wrote, caused “extreme anxiety,” the 
Wakamba:  
being like so many children; each waft of wind turns them from point to point like 
a weather-cock. Their free and carefulless [sic] life has unfitted them for steady 
toil and makes them impatient of control, and they require more tact and patience 
than four times their number of Swahili.71       
Infrastructural work was, in other words, central to the “franchise state’s” efforts to create a pool 
of laborers, which itself required reformulating people’s apprehension of time. Wilson’s 
condescension, though, was premised on a misrecognition.  
Wakamba men's ethos surrounding time and work reflected a sensibility. The nineteenth 
century had been seen the outbreak of periodic drought, famine, and disease.72 People drew on 
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their experiences of the famines of the 1870s, 1880s, and early 1890s, as well as the rinderpest 
outbreak of 1890 and the year following, when they considered engaging in roads work. These 
experiences placed a premium on people’s being attentive to the capriciousness of the rains.73 
Attention to the “waft of wind,” in other words, was essential to ensuring people’s own 
capacities to cut culture out of nature. Like the land itself, time was not empty and homogenous, 
and attending to its lively character marked the pivot between harvest and dearth, between life 
and death. And so, the moments of greatest frustration came with the planting seasons, when 
divergent visions of cutting culture out of nature came to the fore.  
Administrators conceded that labor alone would not “civilise” persons into new rhythms 
of work. What was needed was a medium that could act as an attachment, tying people to new 
regimes of labor. Administrators saw in the money economy one such attachment. In the early 
days, wrote Ainsworth, “Money as a medium of exchange was unknown among the natives of 
the interior, the buying of food, any payment for services etc. was done by way of barter.”74 
Soon after the IBEA established the station at Machakos, the Company introduced IBEA-minted 
rupees.75 Joining the Company flag, company-issued currencies suggest the state-like functions 
of the corporation.  Administrators hoped that the new currency would dislodge the Indian rupee. 
The circulation of IBEA rupees is best understood, then, as a struggle over sovereignty, the 
IBEA hoping that a monopoly over the means of payment and measure of value would secure its 
position as a “franchise state.”76   
Some people came to accept Company coins as legitimate stores of value. As Ainsworth 
wrote: “Money came to be readily accepted by the natives living in the areas adjacent to the 
Administration centres and the Railway line, and so there came about the change from the barter 
system to one of cash payment.”77 While the company—and its currency—would 'fail,' 
establishing a standardized currency was part and parcel of efforts to gain control of the territory. 
Once taxation was established in the early years of the twentieth century, having a monopoly 
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over currency ensured that payments for labor could not be made in kind, but in government 
sanctioned currencies alone. Until 1919, the Indian rupee would remain ascendant.78 And so, and 
as we shall see, colonial currencies were critical to consolidating a labor market. But at this 
stage, there was no monopoly over the medium of exchange, with multiple currencies and stores 
of value jostling for authority.79  
The consolidation of labor markets quickly, though unevenly, created consumer markets. 
As “time went on other people became quite keen,” Ainsworth wrote, in the new markets to 
which roads and road work gave rise. Having roads run through one’s area in some instances 
marked these spaces as ones of prestige, leading to “one location competing with another.”80 For 
this competition, people were rewarded, with “energetic headmen” being “given bicycles.” These 
new markers of prestige, these new symbols of newly emergent hierarchies, these new vehicles 
of cultural capital, “subsequently became quite the fashion.” And this incentivized both an 
increase in “trade and a desire to maintain good tracks.”81 Technologies of mobility and 
emergent markets joined new currencies in generating infrastructural attachments, attachments 
that bound people to the road.  
For many, though, the promise of payments in cash or otherwise was not a sufficient 
inducement to “civilise” the territory by constructing its road networks. Indeed, company 
employees routinely lamented the difficulties of recruiting and maintaining labor. As Beardall 
wrote to Waller in 1879: “You must understand” that the delays in construction have been 
considerable: 
The progress made since I last wrote is small, though this is principally owing to 
our having been unable to get day labourers the numbers of which have varied 
from about 6 to 25 during the past month. All the men that I had got together last 
September many working continuously and regularly, are now scattered up and 
down the country, some busy on their own shambas, others india-rubber hunting, 
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or gone on journeys, or at the coast and as yet they don’t seem inclined to return 
to work.82 
Work, as this suggests, was by no means generic. Wakamba brought their own systems of 
valuation—systems which held that, for men, it was mobility and hunting that brought prestige—
to bear as they considered working on new infrastructures.  
And often, as the above suggests, these difficulties in recruitment neatly mapped onto the 
agricultural rhythms of the region.83 “During the past month,” one report noted:  
I have been proceeding with the cleaning and widening of the road, which requires 
more labour and expense than I anticipated during the first fortnight of the month 
I could not get as many daily laborers as I could wish...at this season of the year 
the people are busily engaged in cleaning and planting their own Shambas.84  
As another correspondence noted: “Many are now engaged in getting in their own crops at this 
season...and labor is [as a result] somewhat scarce.”85 These correspondences were written in 
February immediately preceding the long rains that, ideally, would run from March through 
June. These months were the time of planting. While these epistemologies of civilization shared 
a vision of the need to expend human labor in order to turn nature into culture, the rhythm of the 
road was somewhat different from the rhythm of the seasons. And missing the time of planting 
could prove to be disastrous not only in the short term, but in the long term as well.  
*** 
It quickly became clear, though, that these new infrastructures were part and parcel of 
administrative efforts to create new "fiscal subjects" by enforcing new regimes of taxation.86 For 
the franchise state road work was, in other words, shaped not only by the desire to tap new 
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markets but to create a taxable base and thus a revenue pool for the Company. But what, exactly, 
were people being taxed for? In theory, they were being taxed because they would now have 
access to a “common good”—a road—which would in turn enable their entry into new markets. 
While this was taken to be common sense, administrators acknowledged that “the market” was 
not a self-evident good, but a culturally constituted form. And so, seizure in the form of taxation 
would have to be incremental.  
I am inclined to think myself that the creation of a Native road might 
advantageously be the preliminary step to more elaborate work, and although I 
am not prepared at present to actually lay down a positive opinion regarding the 
levying of taxes on shambas situated along the road contemplated in your dispatch 
I am afraid that this would offer considerable difficulty. The Natives already 
inhabiting the track through which the road is intended to run would probably in 
their present undeveloped state, fail to recognize in it such advantages as would 
warrant in their eyes the levying of a tax from them, and it appears doubtful 
whether the presence of the road would induce others to settle in its vicinity when 
they became aware that this situation entailed taxation.87 
One can imagine how communities would have apprehended this proposal. If anyone ought to 
have been the beneficiaries of these emergent proximities, it was the communities living in the 
areas through which IBEA infrastructures ran. It should have been the corporation, in other 
words, who paid its “footing” for being granted the privilege of this proximity; this in line with 
long-standing spatial practices. And so, people needed to be eased into their new status. “In 
regard to the toll to be charged over the road it is suggested by my Directors that this should not 
be imposed until the road is somewhat actively used by the natives, who having once appreciated 
its utility, would be more likely to pay the toll cordially.”88 While the IBEA largely failed in its 
efforts to fund its operations through exacting what administrators variously referred to as a toll, 
a tax, a levy from communities, this aspiration would be taken up, formalized, and extended by 
the nascent state.  
By 1892, the IBEA was functionally bankrupt, and retrenchment in investments began as 
soon as the Foreign Office took over in 1895. As Bruce Berman notes, the company’s failure 
“showed that private capital would be unable to cope with metropolitan strategic and economic 
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interests without public subsidy or, eventually, a massive public investment in a railway.”89 The 
Treasury was primarily concerned with recovering the 6.6 million pounds it had sunk into the 
railway.90 The British government, for its part, had little interest in asking Britons to help fund 
the colony. Capital sunk into the railroad emerged in this period not as an investment but as a 
problem. The monies required to offset state indebtedness would have to come from other 
sources, namely African communities. This would be experienced by communities living in the 
region as a period of acute “reversal,” a period wherein people were expected to do much more 
with much less.  
The new administration, in the meantime, really did not know how to administer the 
territory and was largely dependent on company officials, many of whom, like Ainsworth, were 
absorbed into the nascent apparatus of the state.91 It was not simply people that trafficked across 
the boundary dividing the (private) corporation from the (public) state. When the Foreign Office 
finally took over the administration of the region, the policies of fiscal austerity initiated by the 
corporation not only persisted but became more pronounced, with African communities left to 
offset the costs of this ideologically dense but materially thin austere state. In other words, 
policies that grew out of a public-private partnership, to use a financial anachronism, became the 
basic organizing logic of the colonial state. These administrative changes dovetailed with a 
period of calamitous ruin for Kenyan communities. And this ruin was firmly tethered to the road.  
 
 
The Politics of Mobility in Two Registers   
 
The first deaths on the road emerged at a troubling conjuncture. Over the course of the 
nineteenth century the region, in general, and what would come to be called Kenya’s Central 
Province, in particular—the location to which this story now pivots—had been wracked by 
periodic drought and epizootic epidemics. In 1892, rinderpest claimed the lives of approximately 
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50 percent of the herds on the land. Then, in 1897 came drought, on the heels of which came 
famine.  
Materiality here mattered in at least two interrelated ways. Not all were affected equally, 
with southern Kikuyuland significantly worse off than northern Kikuyuland. This had less to do 
with topography or variations in rainfall specific to the region than with the place of the south in 
relation to the increasingly robust infrastructural and administrative reach of this “franchise 
state.” Southern Kikuyuland had been a main grainstore for passing caravans heading west 
towards Uganda, surpassing the role of the Wakamba, which had peaked in the 1870s.92 These 
emergent markets of goods for grain had drained communities, leaving them vulnerable when the 
rains failed that year, and the year following.93  
But it was not death by famine that caused the bulk of the devastation; it was smallpox.94 
Unlike famine, which emerged at the intersection of drought and the consolidation of new 
markets, the latter demanded by new infrastructures, smallpox is a communicable disease, and 
while ‘naturally occurring,’ its history suggests it is a disease of empire and trade.95 And it, too, 
was linked to new infrastructures in critical ways, the contagion spreading along the “profusion 
of [new] routes."96 
Communities living in the region were savvy in connecting the devastation to external 
forces. “Traditional accounts of the famine years in Ulu,” writes Charles Ambler, “often 
described the period as Yua ya Panuga, ‘the famine of rice,’ or Yua ya Maguina, ‘the Gunny 
sack famine.’” These patterns of naming firmly linked the devastation to external forces. “The 
rice that was imported and distributed to the hungry by Europeans,” writes Ambler, “was then 
largely unfamiliar in central Kenya, as were the bags used to transport it. In a deeper sense, these 
and other new products were seen to have engendered the disequilibrium that led inexorably to 
catastrophe.”97 For the communities of Central Kenya, in other words, there was nothing natural 
about this calamity, its loci were evident. And it was a calamity that had grave moral as well as 
material consequences.  
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Missionaries and government agents alike reported on the scale of the death, which 
according to American missionaries claimed the lives of 49,000 people in the south.98 It was 
impossible to ignore the devastation, with corpses lying on paths, large and small, as well as new 
roads and the rail-line. Missionaries of the African Inland Mission (AIM) reported that: 
“shambas and paths are literally strewn with corpses and thousands have died and scores are 
dying daily and there seems to be little help for them.”99 AIM missionaries were not alone in 
remarking on the conspicuous visibility of these deaths. A British resident recalled that “no 
matter where one went corpses [were] strewed [on] the tracks.”100 As a settler recalled: “when I 
went up to the line, I could not get quite as far as Limuru. The railway line was a mass of 
corpses.”101 This archive does not disclose how these bodies made their way to these new arteries 
of “civilisation and commerce.” Perhaps people hoped that it would be along these networks that 
they might gain some reprieve. In this, they would not, perhaps, have been wrong. Food relief 
programs were initiated at the coast by the government in 1898, thereafter spreading inland.102  
And yet the placement of the bodies of the dead also mirrored popular understandings of 
the locus of death, and firmly situated IBEA infrastructures as uncultured, wild spaces.  
Kikuyu ideas regarding individual and collective wellbeing were intimately wrapped up in the 
painstaking work of clearing the forest, of cutting culture out of nature, of civilizing uncivilized 
zones. For these communities, the untamed forest was a cultureless and potentially corrupting 
space. In the past, the bodies of the dead had been placed in the forest, cordoning off the 
potentially polluting qualities of dead bodies from the confines of cultured life. The placement of 
the bodies of the dead during the famine suggests that, in this time of calamity, the road joined 
the forest as space outside the bounds of civilization. These placements, then, signified the road 
as a space of corruption, a cultureless place contrasted against the securely bounded ithaka or 
cultured land that householders sought to preserve and protect from death. If there was a kind of 
tragic poetics to how and where these deaths were made visible, then, they also offered a 
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powerful political indictment of the respatialization of social and material life engendered by 
external forces.   
For Kikuyu communities, the status of IBEA roads as spaces exterior to civilization, as 
sites of dangerous forms of disillusion, would have gained conceptual power by contrast against 
existing networks of mobility. Kikuyu conceptions of the paths of movement, like prevailing 
conceptions of space in general, were not generic but closely linked to their function. There was 
njira ya agendi, a ‘path of visitors,’ trod on foot from one part of the country to another. And 
there were others: njira ya mukira, side paths or diversions; njira ya rûtîmo, through paths, the 
way one sends a child to do an errand; njira ya thama, the way of migration, the path trod when 
one takes down one’s home and moves to another place.103 These patterns of naming suggest that 
travel was vocational, part of a task. And the paths themselves were named to reflect their social 
function. These routes were the means by which the people engaged in the everyday work of 
maintaining social and cultural life, not generic means to some abstract end.  
At this conjuncture, new infrastructures emerged as powerful symbols not of civilization 
but of destruction; new networks of communication not harbingers of wellbeing but of 
communicable diseases; new lines of commerce not the sign of enrichment but of scarcity. It is 
no surprise, then, that many associated the devastating famine of 1897 with new 
infrastructures.104 And people worked to protect themselves against these external forces: 
Families and communities sought to build barriers against disease by protecting 
themselves against the outsiders they saw as carriers. With appropriate rites, they 
purified the gates to their homesteads and the paths leading into their 
neighborhoods.105  
Older paths gained renewed salience as both vectors of disease and sites of potential fortification. 
Boundaries of identification became less permeable as people worked to insulate themselves 
from various others.106 This pattern of death on the road would be repeated in the 1920s when 
those engaged in forced labor on the road were reportedly dying in no mean numbers. Again, 
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their bodies were visible along the roads. Again, the road was a site not of civilization but of 
coercion and, in some instances, death.  
The material devastation of the famine years was matched in scale by the moral crisis it 
engendered, and the generational politics through which it was framed. Deprivation brought the 
abrogation of social responsibility, as elders refused their obligations to dependents, being forced 
to cast them off the land in order to provision for ever more intimate circles of people. Starving 
wives and children were pawned to the wealthy men of Nyeri to the north. This was a social 
calamity, a “terrible failure of responsibility for fathers and husbands.”107 This marked a critical 
rupture in generational relations, as social juniors used the evidence of their fathers’ generation’s 
moral failings during the famine to claim rightful authority for themselves. They called this new 
peaceable epoch utheri, and it was ushered in through ituika, a period of transition and cleansing, 
a way of “restoring social discipline.”108  
But some of the men of this new generation would have been beneficiaries of new trade 
relations. By the late 1890s, caravans routinely passed through southern Gikuyuland. Kiambu 
entrepreneurs would have supplied them with grain in exchange for beads, cloth, and brass wire, 
these new currencies posing a direct challenge to the authority of elders, whose wealth was 
measured in livestock. These mobile entrepreneurs, though, worked to domesticate this wealth 
by investing it in livestock, a way for men with “access to novel sources of wealth” to transform 
“their private property into a publicly recognized mark of virtue.”109  
In so doing, these men built on long-standing cultural practices. Mobility as a strategy of 
adaptation and differentiation has a durable history among communities that would come to 
think of themselves as Kikuyu. As the ridges that clans called home became crowded, people 
pressed on southward, clearing forest as they created newly cultured spaces.110 By the nineteenth 
century, it appears this work of expansion was linked to the acquisition of new forms of 
knowledge and access to new forms of value, and this was reflected in generational patterns of 
naming. These names, argues Derek Peterson, both marked economic transformations and 
incorporated them into Gikuyu historiography. Cuma, the “smelters;” Nedmi, the “cutters,” 
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clearers of the forest; and importantly Mwangi, “the restless ones.” These names attest to the 
incorporation and naturalization of economic transformations. Entrepreneurs sought to rescale 
and reframe new forms of wealth and expertise, effacing space and travel as the exogenous was 
reframed as endogenous. As Peterson argues, these patterns of naming were a means of 
registering “changing standards of economic, [among other forms], of value.”111 This, in other 
words, was a means of domesticating skill and embedding new value-generating work into the 
Gikuyu order of things. It is against this vernacular historical sociology, Peterson argues, that we 
must see ituika, as “a way of assessing new measures of wealth.”112 
These men’s criticisms of their fathers notwithstanding, it would have been these 
entrepreneurs that joined other new elites—often those with access to new sources of authority 
gained through proximity to missionaries and the government—as the winners of this calamity. 
Not everyone accepted these transformations. Some arguing that those who had gained power 
through suspect means had undermined the legitimacy of their claims to rightful authority.113  
As for the colonial state, the period suggested that relations of dependency would enable 
the spread of the wage labor economy, which itself would be generative of new markets, as those 
who had avoided waged work rushed to growing sites of administrative control to provision for 
themselves and their families.114 There was nothing natural about this labor market, of course, 
nor of the starvation that made it visible. 
If the famine had enabled new relations of dependency, fiscal reforms ensured these 
dynamics would continue once the rains eventually returned in 1899. The Hut Tax regulation of 
1901 and the Poll Tax Ordinance of 1910 ensured that populations were forced to bear the brunt 
of the costs of administering the territory. These taxes concurrently enabled the administration of 
communities increasingly conceived of as populations, ensured African participation as laborers 
and tenant farmers in what was becoming a settler colony, and funded the expansion of the 
administrative apparatus of the state, including its infrastructures. Fiscal technologies, then, were 
also always political technologies.115 
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New tax regimes were coupled with another form of seizure—the partial enclosure of 
lands. Building on IBEA practices, the Land Acquisition Act of 1896 “allowed the 
administration to acquire land compulsorily for the railway, for government buildings and for 
other public purposes.”116 The following year, new land regulations opened land for white 
settlement, with settlers holding 99 year leases. By 1903, this was taking place on a large 
scale.117 In 1915, the Crown Lands Ordinance rendered Africans tenants of the Crown. But it was 
debt, debt in the form of taxation, not the simple fact of lands’ partial enclosure, that ensured 
people’s participation in the wage economy.  
In the colonies—by contrast to the metropoles from whence histories of capitalism are 
usually narrated—wholly alienating people from their lands was not desirable. Leaving people in 
partial control over the means of production allowed settlers and the state to employ people at 
lower rates of pay, people at home taking up the affective and material slack of social 
reproduction. But if people retained a measure of control over the means of production, how 
were they to be forced into emergent labor markets? The question, then, was how to make people 
dependent on cash. Taxation was a means of doing this, but it was essential that this take the 
form of direct taxation. Had administrators settled on income tax, for example, only those 
already implicated in the money economy would have been beholden to wage labor. Forms of 
direct taxation like Hut and Poll tax, by contrast, could be extracted from all able-bodied men.   
This fiscal and administrative regime was crucial to forging early infrastructural 
attachments. Exacted in colonial currencies, direct taxation was the pivot that forced people into 
the wage-labor economy, all the while funding the expansion of the infrastructural state. Direct 
taxation, then, was a form of primitive accumulation, which obviated the need for wholescale 
dispossession while still forcing people to submit to the “freedom” of wage labor.118 This mode 
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of seizure operated as a critical infrastructural attachment, firmly binding people and their futures 
to the road, new paths taken as young men struck out to “find their tax.”  
This was a more pronounced form of seizure than even that imagined by the IBEA, which 
had proposed taxing people for their proximity to the road and the access to markets this 
ostensibly held out. With the formalization of colonial rule, the state would deploy direct 
taxation to subsidize its efforts to bring infrastructures to the region as the materialization of 
civilization. The notion of the common good as embedded in road networks, in other words, 
became more, rather than less, attenuated when the Foreign Office took over the administration 
of the region.  
The efficacy of this regime, which placed seizure at the center of infrastructural 
expansion, is evident in the numbers. In 1923, government revenue was 1.8 million pounds 
sterling, half a million pounds sterling, or about a third, being garnered through the taxation of 
African men. Only 10 percent of the taxes collected in African areas, though, were reinvested 
locally, and this was predominantly devoted to paying the costs of future tax collection and the 
costs of administration. The other 90 percent was taken out of African districts and redirected to 
other locations, making it “quite clear that the severity of African taxation was a direct 
consequence of the financial needs of...European infrastructure.”119 Taxation, in this period, was 
a means of extracting value without making any contribution to the "public good," generically 
conceived. This was a fiscally austere rentier state.  
If African taxation was to fund the expansion of infrastructures designed to serve a 
growing settler population, much of this tax-generating labor was, itself, infrastructural. On the 
eve of the First World War, over 10 percent of those employed in wage labor were working for 
either the railroad or for the Public Works Department.120 In Central Province, in 1915, acting 
District Commissioner of Fort Hall, E. L. Pearson, reported that the majority of laborers were 
employed on Public Works projects, specifically on road building projects, for which they 
labored for 5Ksh and rations.121 Infrastructural labor was both the prerequisite for new markets, 
creating the circulatory system upon which commodity export depended, and a means of 
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generating a capital pool through taxation. And the balance between these two imperatives was 
rarely clear-cut.  
In regions where wage labor was not readily available, local administrators often 
proposed, and were granted, permission for road development projects on the promise that the 
funds so expended would return to the colonial state in the form of tax revenues. Provincial 
Commissioner of Rift Valley Province, D. L. Morgan, made this prerogative clear in his request 
to the Public Works Department (PWD) and the Secretariat for the construction of a road from 
Kabarnet to Baringo District.  
I would...point out that this year large numbers of able bodied moran have not 
paid their tax, due to their inability to find employment on European farms, and I 
do not think I exaggerate in maintaining that at least 60% - probably more of the 
money paid as wages to the construction gang would return to the Government in 
the form of tax. 
The “immediate justification for the road,” he continued, “would be its undoubted administrative 
value [providing] the means whereby large numbers of young men can find their tax.”122 But the 
monies, in this instance, one wherein the road promised “the development of this backward 
district,” would not come from state coffers, but instead from the Local Native Council (LNC). 
In other words, and in this particular case, 60 percent of the monies doled out by the LNC in the 
form of wages would be redirected to the state through taxation. If taxation was to act as an 
infrastructural attachment, a means of getting young men on the road and into new labor 
markets, administrators played a central role in ensuring that these attachments stuck.  
But not in all cases was roads work remunerated. Indeed, if it was argued (as it often was) 
that a prospective road would mainly benefit African populations (a claim that was often 
questionable), the state, through local headman, could legally call upon compulsory labor. This 
practice was formalized in the 1912 Native Authority Ordinance, which provided the legal 
framework for the government’s use of coercion to raise labor for infrastructural projects without 
remuneration.123  
Through an impressive feat of ideological acrobatics, these violent regimes of labor and 
taxation did not detract from a vision of roads as vectors of civilization. Indeed, for 
administrators such as Morgan, the pedagogic value of labor and the ideology of civilizational 
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advancement were intimately related—the road would lead to “the development of this backward 
district” and its people. Roads not only modernized landscapes but produced modern subjects.  
Indeed, one of the main arguments justifying the use of forced labor on road works hinged on the 
instructional value such labor afforded. Colonial officials argued that coerced labor, particularly 
on the extension of road networks, which were for “the common good,” and would lead to the 
cultivation of patriotic colonial subjects.124 In other words, these policies of extreme and often 
contradictory austerity notwithstanding, infrastructures remained firmly embedded in a vision of 
the social, in a vision of the “common good.” Not limited to the postwar period typically 
associated with state-directed social welfarism, then, the roots of this discourse of development 
find their origins in a series of couplings: the public and the private; government and markets; 
the state and the corporation, that shared as their object infrastructures. It was at this intersection 
that commerce and civilization, civilization and commerce, appeared to be two sides of the same 
coin.  
These arrangements, though, were bound to produce contradictions. As the District 
Commissioner of Machakos summed up in a rare moment of clarity: “The native labourer 
look[s]…on the road, through his particular portion of the country, as a never ending source of 
hard work which seldom grows less but rather tends to increase.”125 Labor was not the dominant 
frustration, he conceded. Rather, at issue was the asymmetry in the types of roads to which 
people were given access, with people highlighting the difference in the quality of roads serving 
settled farms versus those serving African areas. Conceding the point, he concluded: “It seems 
very unfair that quite large sums of money are voted annually for roads which often only serve a 
very few occupied farms, when not a penny is available for one which taps the majority of a 
Native Reserve with a vast population.”126 When we look at how monies gained through taxation 
were reinvested, the point is well taken. “The common good” was a striated category in colonial 
spaces, but that did not detract from its rhetorical power. To the contrary, and as the above 
suggests, these contradictions became something over which people could argue.  
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The desire for roads was popularly linked in the colonial imagination to the relative 
development of the populations. This was in line with the civilizational side of the commerce and 
civilization dyad, the material and conceptual strands that underpinned colonial logics. And yet 
the material investments were rarely available to underwrite these ‘common-sense’ conceptual 
connections. Policies of colonial austerity ensured this would be the case. And people were well 
aware, it seems, of this as a kind of technopolitics, premised not on technical intervention but its 
inverse, infrastructural absence.  
If, for administrators, roads were to be the arteries of “commerce and civilisation,” they 
were popularly experienced as spaces of blockage and civilization interrupted. The Natives 
Ordinance of 1915, implemented in 1918, required every African over the age of 15 to be 
registered and fingerprinted. These registration certificates, or kipandes, were to be worn around 
the neck in metal frames and could be demanded at any time. Within two years, 194,750 
certificates had been issued. By 1924, this number had climbed to 519,056, rising to 1,197,467 
by 1931.127 Any African found outside their reserve who was unable to produce the document 
was punished with hard labor, often road labor. By 1937, people reported that police were 
demanding money as well as the kipande as they stopped people, arresting their movements 
along the road.128 If taxation was a means of ensuring the movement of men as labor, the kipande 
was a means of controlling how and where people moved.  
This, then, was the central contradiction of mobility in the region. Maintaining roads as 
the arteries of “civilisation and commerce” turned on truncating the movement of Africans. And 
people were well aware of how the state deployed the techniques of immobility to shore up this 
highly stratified racial order. The evidence was everywhere. From the uneven distribution of 
road networks across the landscape of the Kenya colony, to the different materials used to 
construct roads in settler areas versus reserves, to the everyday experiences of being stopped 
along these arteries, the road, for most, operated as a core symbol of the highly racialized social 
and economic order of the Kenya colony.   
Labor practices on the road would have heightened people’s experiences of these 
emergent networks as sites of violence. In the early 1920s provincial administrators were called 
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to the task of joining labor recruiters in procuring workers for settler farms and public works 
projects.129 The goal here was not simply to ameliorate a labor shortage, though. It was a means 
of addressing the dearth of tax revenue. These twin concerns were given full legal sanction at the 
local level by the Native Authority Amendment Ordinance, which empowered chiefs to compel 
people to work for up to 60 days per annum, at a pay rate below the wages of “voluntary” 
workers in instances where the labor required was for “state purposes,” including porterage and 
rail and road projects.130 
This Ordinance ensured that the politics of mobility would not only articulate relations 
between the people and the state, but would play out at the scale of communities. No longer 
solely in the hands of a faceless administration, local chiefs used the legal sanction of the 
Ordinance to settle old scores with local foes.131 And the punishments were severe.132 Those 
called up on roads work were tied together and forced to march from one district to another 
along the administrative routes of the colony.133 These forced marches must have been 
humiliating for persons for whom self-possessed labor was the most valorized form of work. But 
it was not, of course, merely in a symbolic register that this work was violent. Sometimes the 
conditions of this labor led to the end of biological life as well.  
In the mid-1910s, settlers living in Central Province wrote a flurry of complaints to the 
District Commissioner, protesting the sight of Africans lying dead along main roads. A letter 
signed by four settlers requested that:  
the police authorities…look into the matter and the manner of death of Kikuyus 
who are continually to be seen dying or dead in the ditches by the Nairobi Road 
between the Chania Falls and Nairobi. We, the undersigned, have known of or 
seen five (5) bodies rotting at the same time in different points of the road…Surely 
this public disgrace should be removed.134 
As the correspondence between settlers protesting this “disgrace” and the District Commissioner 
continued, the acting DC admitted that those dying were engaged in forced labor, and that their 
deaths were a consequence of malnutrition. The road again emerged in this period not as a 
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symbol of civilization but of debasement, not a symbol of commerce but of dearth, not a sign of 
mobility but of irrevocable immobility: of death. In each of these registers these deaths “on the 
road” would have chillingly echoed the devastations of the 1890s. Both conceptually and in 
material terms, then, for African communities roads were not spaces of movement but of stasis. 
If we could think of this as a form of (infra)structural violence, the nature of this violence was 
anything but invisible. 
 
 
Mobility and the Politics of Gender and Generation in Two Registers  
 
For many, the early colonial period was one marked by immobility along the road. For some, this 
placed a premium on accessing those technologies of mobility that called the road home. From 
the perspective of administrators, this would not have been out of step with the mandate of 
commerce and civilization, with the construction of consumer markets emerging as another 
means by which the administration could bequeath to African communities this hybrid ‘gift.’  
Perhaps it is no surprise that the most forceful advocate for the cultivation of new 
markets of consumers was none other than John Ainsworth, who, as we will recall, had gotten 
his start in the region as an official of the IBEA. In 1918, he was appointed the colony’s first 
Chief Native Commissioner. According to Ainsworth, the desire for commodities was not only 
evidence of the relative advancement of populations, but, equally, was critical to implicating 
Africans in the wage-labor economy. As we have seen, taxation was critical to the functioning of 
the colonial economy. But, for Ainsworth, it was Africans' desires for material goods, affected 
through “educating them to the wants of Western civilisation” that would lead Africans to seek 
out employment, rendering coercion unnecessary and thereby ensuring the reproduction of a 
laboring force.135 He was emphatic on this point, writing:  
In all the Reserves trade must be encouraged in every possible way; the greater 
the freedom and the wider the distribution the better. Trade is one of the great 
factors in teaching people to want.  
                                                




For Ainsworth, desire would lead people into the wage labor economy. As he continued: “Each 
and every native in a Reserve must be encouraged to want something which he does not produce 
himself, and in order to obtain it he must be taught to earn money.”136 Commerce as civilization 
was the argument here.  
This was the framework against which colonial officials (despite their anxieties) viewed 
the desire for technologies of mobility alongside demands for roads servicing native reserves, as 
evidence both of the relative development of individuals and communities, and of colonials’ 
relative success as civilizers. However, linking the desire for these commodities and 
infrastructures of mobility to the emergence of civilization would have unexpected 
consequences. 
Africans in increasing numbers either owned vehicles or fixed their energies on acquiring 
them by the late teens.137 By 1924, colonial officers were reporting African car ownership, 
which, when in the right hands, was reflexively linked to the civilization status of individual 
owners. The District Commissioner of Fort Hall reported the following by way of indexing 
colonial achievements in the district: 
Before leaving the subject of the Social and Economic development of the Native 
area, mention should be made of the fact that the two most enterprising chiefs of 
the district, Njiri and Muriranja, have bought motor cars, they being the first to do 
so in the district.138 
Two years later, the District commissioner more directly linked civilization to the desire for 
technologies of mobility. In 1926, he reported: 
I have been struck with the general loyalty and desire for co-operation in the great    
majority of cases. Many of the chiefs are giving an excellent lead to their peoples 
in things like the purchase of ploughes and motor lorries and work on roads has 
been pursued with considerable energy and enthusiasm. 
In a self-congratulatory tone, he concluded by noting that there were now 14 native-owned 
lorries in the district.139 Symbols of British superiority, if carefully doled out, would ensure the 
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colonial hierarchy was reproduced while reinforcing supposed native “awe” in the face of 
technological evidence of British power. This theory did not unfold unproblematically, however. 
Africans did not simply desire technologies of mobility as markers of prestige. These objects 
were, for many, emblematic of the kinds of movement that the colonial state, through its local 
proxies, denied. The materiality of these “colonial things,” their capacity to move people through 
space, in other words and as we shall see, was critical to people’s evaluation of technologies of 
mobility. And as Africans in increasing numbers possessed technologies of mobility, they 
challenged Britons monopoly over quintessential symbols of modernity. The relationship 
between object and meaning, sign and signifier, the administration was learning, was difficult to 
stabilize and even more difficult to police.  
In 1925, the DC reported with anxiety that Mission education had produced a generation 
of young men who fancied themselves “literary types” and therefore regarded themselves as 
being above manual labor.140 That these mission-educated men had developed their own ideas 
about the place of technologies of mobility in articulating their status as “readers” should not be 
surprising. The ideology connecting knowledge over, and possession of, technologies of mobility 
was one engendered in the teachings of Anglican missionaries. A quiz produced by Anglican 
missionaries in the postwar period, for example, led with the following question: “1. Name a 
modern transport which begins with L.” The answer, “lorry.” From this initial benchmark, 
students were asked three further questions related to their knowledge of technologies of 
mobility, down to some of their basic mechanics.  
Question 7, for example, read: “Part of a Motor-car beginning with C. (clutch, 
carburettor) [sic].” 
Question 8, “Part of a Motor-car beginning with W.? (Wheel, wiper)”141  
Taken individually, the items on this test, assembled and preserved in the papers of Reverend 
Leonard Beecher do, indeed, appear to be “sundry matters.” However, these questions were set 
alongside questions of a decidedly more theological nature, questions regarding “modern” 
domesticity, and questions regarding world geography. Reading the list in full, then, suggests the 
complicated means by which various threads of discourse were brought together, cross-
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referentially producing a robust image of civilization that placed technologies of mobility at its 
center. As Rudolf Marzek writes of late-colonial Dutch rule in the Indies: “the power of colonial 
culture…was in trivialities.”142 In mission schools, automotive technologies—heretofore out of 
the reach of many Africans—were intimately bound up with the ideology of civilization.  
And by the 1920s, Africans were, indeed, consuming things that they “could not 
produce” as they entered the cash economy, but the types of subjectivities, the forms of self-
fashioning, that these modes of consumption enabled could not be controlled. It is, then, perhaps 
not surprising that the DC of Fort Hall made the following observation in 1926 regarding the 
“danger” of educated men. The population of “readers,” he argued: 
constitute a potential danger as, being averse to unskilled manual labour and 
lacking employment, they… tend to sell the ranks of the discontented and 
seditious. Some of them, the best of them, become teachers at Missions School or 
traders but a large number of them rest on their cars and do nothing.143  
 
Lindsey Green-Simms has argued that “technological objects articulated the place that different 
bodies would hold on the colonial hierarchy and acted as agents in reproducing social orders that 
were constructed on ideals of difference and exclusion.” But these technologies and the authority 
and prestige associated with them could not be wholly protected against appropriation. Colonial 
officials were unable to monitor the purchasing power of Africans whose status as consumers 
was, in part, a consequence of the state’s desire to implicate them in the wage-labor economy. 
And for colonial administrators, this produced contradictions, as the popular desire for 
technologies of mobility were at once evidence of the “success” of the civilizing mission and 
evidence of the emergence of threatening forms of insubordination, with the young seemingly 
poised to reject the racial hierarchies upon which the colonial economy was premised.  
But to narrate this story as one that was produced at the conjuncture of the contradictory 
colonial ideology of commerce and civilization, of a truncated vision of the public, and thus the 
public good, would only get us part of the way to understanding Elias Mutahi and Labani 
Kiliru’s ambivalence surrounding roads, the technologies that populate them, and those people 
that worked and work on the road. To get to this vexed space we need to turn to other histories of 
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valuation, other conflicts over work, and other cultural politics that hinged on the question of 
mobility.  
      *** 
For administrators, the road was a symbol of the civilization that they imagined themselves to be 
bequeathing to African communities. Whether as a cultural form or as a result of labor, roads 
were imagined to have a pedagogic function, ushering the colony and its people forward in 
civilizational time. Within a Gikuyu epistemology, however, self-possessed labor was landed, 
requiring the painstaking work of removing stumps and roots from one’s plot, of cutting culture 
out of nature. This was an epistemology of work as culture premised on verticality, a logic that 
rooted people in place by rooting them down into the earth. Wage labor, by contrast, was 
premised on a logic of horizontality, with young men seeking out opportunities for capital 
acquisition along new routes, and often in the city.  
But forced mobility was not the only kind of movement at play in this period, the 
strictures of taxation and the kipande system notwithstanding. And capital, while increasingly 
lauded over juniors by landed elite, was not the primary promised reward for labor on the land, 
though it was naturalized as evidence that the promised reward, or wiathi, had been achieved. 
Waged work was denigrated within this framework. While it promised returns in the form of 
cash, elders claimed it did not enable the cultivation of wiathi, or self-mastery. It was disparaged, 
instead, as githukumo, or work subject to another. This the inverse of wira, or “purposeful toil 
within a web of obligations.”144  
Castigations of githukumo did not, however, stop young people from traveling along 
these horizontal pathways in search of capital. And these young people did not only move into 
labor markets to pay their taxes, government aspirations notwithstanding. Instead, young people 
chose the road as a route to achieve wiathi by other means, hoping to use the capital so gained 
through horizontal movements as a means of rooting down vertically. In this, they worked to 
bring together two ideologies of work, two ideologies of civilization. For these men, and at this 
stage in their individual maturation, these visions of civilization appeared to work in tandem. As 
John Lonsdale writes:  
Young people...wanted work for many reasons. Many had lost kin and stock in 
the great hunger; some had lost land to settlers; all had to pay tax. But the incentive 
                                                




for young men is best seen in the paradox that Kikuyu farm exports grew steadily, 
checked only by drought and disease, throughout the colonial era. To farm was 
household work. Men controlled no land before marriage; bachelor labour 
profited fathers. Elders invested livestock in their own next marriage or their sons'. 
Formerly, young men had been able to raid stock for their own bridewealth. Male 
competition for capital now forced young men out to work. The evidence is thin, 
but of ten Kikuyu workers asked by a commission of enquiry in 1912, seven said 
that they were working in order to buy goats and marry...In short, most youths 
wanted wages so as to earn the civic virtue of domestic production sooner than 
their fathers might have allowed. Wages financed entry to the married business of 
farming.145  
But the aspirations of these young people were not without contest, their itineraries generating 
generational conflict by the late teens. In 1919, the District Commissioner of Fort Hall reported 
that intergenerational struggles dominated discussions at barazas throughout the district, pitting 
native authorities against young, educated, and mobile men. “Youth” demanded a generational 
changing of the guard. In framing their claims, they mobilized a binary that drew powerfully on 
British notions of modernity. Elders, they argued, were mired in “superstition” and “tradition,” 
which not only rendered the young who “had the benefit of greater knowledge of the 
European...powerless to carry out the Government orders of progression,” but was used by elders 
to justify the unfair demands being exacted from communities. Elders, in turn, defended their 
right to retain leadership, arguing that they had paid large sums of money to “buy the country.” 
The current generation of young men, they argued, had been “spoilt” by virtue of their 
movement. This impeded the existing generation of fathers from recouping the losses of their 
initial investment.146 
Young men vociferously rejected this claim, arguing that by virtue of their broader 
experience and education, they were in a better position to hold the reins of power. Changed 
circumstances, they contended, had rendered the wisdom of their elders obsolete. Rhetorically, 
mobility was at the center of these young men’s claims, which they mobilized to contrast 
themselves, a younger generation that “wished to march with the times,” against the immobility 
and stagnation of elders.  
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Mobility emerged at the nexus of these generational conflicts. If for administrators, the 
road was a core symbol of civilization—though they, too, were highly anxious about “youth” on 
the road and in the city—in the pages of Mwigwithania, a different epistemology of mobility and 
work becomes visible. On these pages, discussions of technologies of mobility and road 
infrastructures became an occasion for people to debate the moral and material implications of 
young people’s entry into new markets. Circulating between 1928 and 1931, Mwigwithania was 
the first vernacular-language publication in Eastern Africa, with Johnstone (later Jomo) Kenyatta 
as its editor. And it is here that we can locate ambivalence surrounding the road as a dangerous 
path leading not to progress but to uncultured life in the city, the road joining urban space as a 
potent symbol not of civilization but of cultural disillusion. But it was also a site of aspiration for 
young people, a space of consumption and play, and for some, in a hopeful register, a means of 
achieving wiathi by other means. For these reasons, and through to the present, Nairobi has 
occupied an awkward space, one of both desire and disdain, a space of both possibility and the 
threat of disillusion.  
The men whose words populated the pages of Mwigwithania had an interest in 
denigrating the new generation of young men and women on the move. But if mobility was a 
core node of critique for these writers, many of these men had, themselves, cut their teeth on the 
move. Kenyatta founded Mwigwithania, the journal of the Kikuyu Central Association (KCA) of 
which he was General Secretary, in 1928 at the age of 35. Having worked for the Nairobi Water 
Board, Kenyatta was familiar with life in the city. He was a “man about town.”147 As Lonsdale 
writes, Kenyatta like other “young Christians had…taken the lead in the selfish disobedience of 
migrant wage labor and, when married, pursued another, rural capitalism, even while sensing 
that such differentiation threatened to alienate a community larger and other than class.”148  
Kenyatta was a “runway orphan” and a Christian muthomi (pl. athomi), or “reader.”149 
These athomi found for themselves and their audiences an apt analog in the parable of the 
prodigal son who pursued reckless ways abroad only to return home and be forgiven. It was as 
though the parable was a narration of Kenyatta’s own life. Having left home, he was only 
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“reconciled” when he returned with cash and a blanket in hand “after years of truancy.”150 
Mwigwithania, on one reading, then, was an effort to domesticate this itinerary. This turned on 
valorizing certain elements of these men’s trajectories—such as mission education and literacy—
while effacing the very mobility that was their condition of possibility. In this regard, the paper 
was truly designed to perform the work of Mwigwithania, it was to act as “the reconciler.”151 
And this was a scalar move. Kenyatta strove to use the paper as a space where he could 
domesticate his experiences among “foreigners,” and the accumulation of wealth that they had 
enabled, making both amenable to the incremental path to maturation of which Kenyatta and his 
social kin promised to be the new guardians.  
*** 
Mobility had rent culture asunder, leaving the Kikuyu “scattered,” George Kirongothi Nedgwa 
“of the Maina generation” wrote. “My people, it is a matter of great grief that the Kikuyu are 
scattered like goats without a shepherd.” Instead of working as a people, each man, he lamented, 
was “taking his own road.” This path, fecklessly pursued, had led to separation, and “therefore 
our affairs do not make progress.”152 The road, here, was not a symbol of development but of 
disillusion. And while mobilized as a metaphor, as we shall see, the road had a definite set of 
material coordinates in the cultural imaginations of these men.  
The potency of the road as a metaphor and material site of cultural loss gained its salience 
through contrast against its supposed other, productive labor on the land. As G. Karimu, of 
Kahuhia location wrote, the ancestors had bequeathed to the Kikuyu first the “land…[then] the 
digging pole, the digging stick, the bush-cutting knife, the axe.” These tools were required to cut 
culture out of nature. From this newly cut plot, one could pursue “the home.” The garden was the 
site of social and cultural work. It was here that men started homesteads and that their wives 
raised children.  
Social and material reproduction were indissolubly linked in this framing. As Kenyatta 
himself warned in these pages: “Trouble at home is also trouble in the field.” And it was a logic 
the held at the scale of the family, but like concentric circles, it was also held at the scale of the 
community and at the scale of the Kikuyu, an emergent category of identification. Mobility, of 
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which the road was a symbol, was the disavowal of the material qua cultural inheritance 
underwriting wiathi. In taking their “own road” the new generation had become “scattered,” a 
state of untethered personhood that led to forgetting. “These things...are those which were 
blessed to our forefathers by the Ancestor, Kikuyu, and it is these we ought to discuss lest they 
be forgotten.”153  
As the inclusion of agricultural technologies suggests, work was at the center of this 
supposedly primordial cultural and material inheritance. As one anonymous writer from Karura, 
a location in southern Kikuyuland, chastised: “cease to despise... work.” Work was the gift of 
god, the special inheritance of the Kikuyu. The “work he does today is given him by God, and 
He gives him the strength to do it.” To avoid this labor was disastrous, not only for the individual 
but for the collective. This rhetorical idler, the writer continued, would be “harming his country, 
for if he has no work, what is he to eat? And as for clothes, where will he get them?” The 
disavowal of work would lead to moral as well as material ruin. “Do you not see that (such) a 
person will go on until he becomes a thief?” Wealth was a sign of civic virtue, poverty was 
delinquent; a moral as much as a material failing.154  
But not all work, as this writer revealed, was considered equal. Indeed, “the man who 
will not work is unable to even work for himself”155 To work for oneself was the only form of 
labor that could lead to complete self-actualization. As an anonymous writer wrote: “First, I greet 
you very much indeed...I thank you very very heartily because of the way in which you weary 
yourselves and refrain from doing work for pay.” Socially sanctioned visions of labor as cultural 
work were contrasted against entry into the wage-labor economy. Working for wages was 
githukumo, labor for others. This might bring capital but it would not, these writers warned, 
bring respectable maturity. There was only one path to wiathi, and this required labor on the 
land. “Know that there is no other business (trade) so capable of advancing the country as 
agriculture (business of the field),” one writer wrote. Another echoed this sentiment, writing: 
“No other kind of work will bring good to us...except (the cultivation of) the field.”  
If these men presented the shamba as the site of the (re)productive work of both society 
and culture, urban space was the site of cultural disillusion. Town was a place of “evils (vices),” 
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which untethered people from both the land and culture. Contact with “foreigners,” thukumo, 
was the central culprit in this declension narrative of cultural loss, but “foreign” languages were 
not far behind. As an anonymous writer penned under the title “Kikuyu Time”: 
Rinse out your mouths with water, you people today…[Note. Rinsing out the 
mouth with water or beer is done ceremonially amongst the Kikuyu as a sign of 
ridding oneself of evil in the heart.]  Mark well that it appears to me that our 
former habits of speech will become forgotten...listen to the…we greet one 
another in speaking; I hear nothing but the jargon of foreigners...Unless you think 
about it quickly, your ways of speaking will become changed and you will become 
Swahilis. And you are Kikuyu pure and simple.156 
Language was, in these men’s framing, culture. Cultural loss was thus indexed by the learning of 
foreign languages, linked as it was to learning foreign ways. These men themselves were, of 
course, speakers of English.  
If speaking in foreign tongues indexed cultural abandonment in the town, it was mirrored 
in material terms by patterns of investment. The allure of town, many acknowledged, was a 
problem. “Do not incline to be drawn away (enticed) by the attractions...of other places.” This 
was a refrain that Kenyatta would repeat. But many had been “drawn away,” as these men, 
Kenyatta among them, knew from experience. “Those who are away at work forget that one 
returns to the place one came from...Many of them become Swahilis and forget their own homes; 
many become Mission people and forget that one returns to one’s home.”  
Generational deviance was at the center of this destructive but patterned mobility:  
When a Young Man has been circumcised, after remaining for a space of about 
twelve years he goes and says to his Father, ‘I want you to give me some goats to 
sell, because I wish to go to Mombasa’ or to some other place like that. When he 
has been given them and has sold them he goes off to wherever he wants, and on 
arriving in that country he establishes himself and becomes like a man who has 
reached the base or original source...of his own country. This road is the 
beginning...of willful ways (‘things of disobedience’).”157  
These were stories of normative paths to maturity started but derailed by the irresponsible 
peripatetic movement of youth. This could only lead to deformed persons, producing persons, 
like these sojourners, who merely acted “like a man.” But, as this letter suggests, these would-be 
elders were naming an existential threat that had a material counterpart: circumcised men were, 
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in fact, achieving adulthood by other means, and on the road. They would know. They had done 
so themselves. But they hoped to retain a monopoly over how and what would and could be 
domesticated. These writers, in other words, as a hopeful generation of would-be elders, feared 
that they were losing control over how adulthood was defined, over its metrics and the means of 
attaining them. And so, they warned that maturation, that wiathi, could only happen at home. 
“Realise that he who goes to be circumcised at someone else’s village has it said of him that he 
is...afraid...also that ‘at the village of another (i.e., away from home) there is circumcising, but no 
healing.”158  
But all was not lost. These waywards could be redeemed, as Kenyatta had himself been 
redeemed. Mobility had to be acknowledged as a fact of this supposedly changed environment. 
The deviance of horizontal movement could be rectified if the gains so made were socialized; 
doing so was their central responsibility as men. The locations of investments were critical to this 
work of socialization. Money made in the wage-labor economy must be invested at home. “Let 
everyone who is conscious that he is a Kikuyu, although he may be in employment at a distance, 
try very diligently to discover...where he came from, and build, if only a booth like that in a 
garden.” As another wrote: “What I say is that if they worked and when a man had got some 
money he [then]…returned and built a nice home, himself remaining at work, it is the houses of 
these people which would now be models (to others).” Money made elsewhere could, evidently, 
be domesticated. But to remove the taint of mobility one had to ensure that investments were 
made at home, and in the land, and in the community. We will recall Kenyatta again here, when 
he reminded readers of the Kikuyu proverb: “‘Trouble at home’...is also ‘trouble in the field.’” 
This was generational trouble, but as this proverb suggests, it was also gender trouble.  
If the land was the space of morally upright production and social reproduction, perhaps 
it is no surprise that market women on the move were routinely accused of engaging in 
antisocial, because non-agrarian, forms of production. These women on the move were routinely 
accused of being “prostitutes.” As one letter, titled: “The Trading of Girls and Women in 
Potatoes and other things in Nairobi,” recounted: “The trading in all these things mentioned 
above is a danger to the girls and newly-married women, being (produce which is) not from their 
                                                




own gardens. For frequently it is the road to the beginning of PROSTITUTION.”159 It is worth 
paying attention here. As a trope, the market woman as prostitute was morally suspect not 
because of her sexual behavior primarily, but because she sold vegetables that she had not 
grown. In other words, the accusation here was that she was not working for herself, was not 
engaged in self-possessed work, but in capital generating labor for others, for thukumu.  
As another writer warned, entry into the money economy had led women to burn “their 
MODESTY LIKE FIREWOOD.” Moving outside of the sphere of domestic production was also 
to move out of the site of social reproduction, the work of homesteading happening in the 
garden. Instead, these women worked for strangers, and on the road. What better metaphor to 
express the damage done to this twinned vision of production and reproduction than the 
prostitute, a figure for whom production is divorced from the goal of reproduction. While it is 
impossible to ascertain whether sex-work among market-women was on the rise, it is evident 
that some women were choosing town life over life in the reserves.160  
In 1931, the Local Native Council (LNC), Nyeri rejected a proposal to provide funds for 
the Lady Griggs home for women in Pumwani. The reason, they explained, was that the women:  
most assisted by the home were Kikuyu women who had run away from their own 
husbands in the Kikuyu reserve and joined up with detribalized natives in Nairobi 
and lived with them. When they visited the home they found several Kikuyu 
women there who would not give their father’s or brother’s name: they said they 
were Nairobi people and it was obvious that they had run away from their 
husbands in the reserve.161 
These women chose to strike out on their own, becoming “Nairobi people,” the freedom of city 
life offering welcome reprieve, perhaps, from the daily work of life in the reserves.162 The 
administration, evidently, shared with rural elders fear of the de-culturing effects of life in the 
city, “foreign ways” and “detribalization” being two sides of the same coin.  
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Elders and males claimed that this youthful female deviance was evident in new patterns 
of dress. In the pages of Mwigwithania, Kenyatta argued that market women ought to wear not 
simply a “cloth,” but a “long (Kikuyu) robe.”163 New modes of sartorial self-fashioning were 
routinely mobilized as evidence that women were adopting “foreign” ways. Here they might 
have found themselves at odds with administrators and missionaries for whom modes of 
comportment (and consumption) were sure-fire evidence that the civilizational project was 
moving along.  
This was not, though, the vision of civilization that these men set themselves the task of 
protecting. At an LNC meeting held in 1935, one Benedetto argued that they were confronting a 
new and troubling pattern, which he blamed on the publication “Mambo Leo,” a periodical 
“about women”:   
In 1929, the European women wore short skirts and later fashion changed again 
and they wore long ones. The Kikuyu girls followed these fashions and wear short 
clothes. The Elders must stop the girls becoming whores. 
Women, in this framing, were squandering their reproductive capacities. But, for Benedetto, 
women’s choice of dress not only threatened cultural disillusion, but material ruin as well. 
Indeed, it was due to women’s deviance that the community had been “punished in 1930 by 
locusts and in 1933 by dry weather.” Unbridled, female sexuality would lead to both moral and 
material ruin. Patterns of dress must be reformed, and this must be enforced. “What I want is for 
girls, if they wear European clothes to have them down to their ankles” so that they did not 
appear “like Akamba.” Another writer offered a different solution: the return to putatively 
traditional Kikuyu aesthetics. “If they wear shukas they should also wear leather aprons.”164   
These forms of deviance had definite spatial coordinates in the minds of these men: roads and the 
urban wildernesses to which they led. These days one found “a girl or a woman...in the 
road…[talking] to a strange (a man she did not know), or to a man of another tribe.” If new 
patterns of dress led women to occupy conceptual elsewheres, the road was the route that 
materialized their journey, leading women to “cohabitating with the Kavirondo and Somalis.”  
If new patterns of labor, indexed by new types of clothing, were symbols of troubling 
insubordination, the harbinger for cultural and moral collapse, new technologies of mobility were 
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its engine. Indeed, vehicles occupied a central place in these narratives of anxiety. As one writer 
penned: “Riding in Motorcars: Girls and women riding in motorcars without any reason is one 
way in which their heads are turned...we know in some degrees that since Motorcars began to 
come on (this?) side of Thika, though perhaps [sic] only a short while ago...many girls and 
women now abound IN PROSTITUTION IN NAIROBI.” In this framing, the motorcar itself 
appears to have an agency, leading women to pursue the path of moral decline. Prostitution may 
have simply been a metaphor born of masculine anxiety. Nevertheless, as District 
Commissioners in Central Kenya could attest, these vehicles of ill-repute were on the road, and 





Suffice it to say, by the 1930s the road and technologies of mobility occupied an ambivalent 
space in both the minds of colonial administrators and landed elders, and this would only 
increase in the post-WWII period. And this ambivalence had a history that was both material and 
ideological. The terms of the IBEA’s Charter in the region set the stage for durable policies of 
colonial austerity, which would form the background against which the state pursued the 
mandate of “civilisation and commerce.” If austerity ensured that this mandate’s materialization 
was contradictory, infrastructures were imagined by some as being capable of suturing together 
these two goals, of papering over the contradictions of these networks as engines of both 
commerce and the foundations of the commonweal. 
But ensuring the commonweal in extraterritorial, and soon to be colonial, spaces turned 
on mobilizing regimes of seizure and violence. And yet, a vision of infrastructures as part and 
parcel of the commonweal remained strong in the minds of administrators. It would be through 
labor on new road networks, they argued, along with new regimes of taxation, that colonial 
communities would be “civilised.” But these notions of civilization were, from the outset, 
confronted with different epistemologies of space, different epistemologies of labor, and 
different epistemologies of civilizational maturity and how it was to be attained. In the early 
years, it was these visions that guided the siting of new infrastructures, as African experts were 




practices rendered this labor banal, eliding what it really was: expertise.   
The notion of the “common good” embedded in infrastructures become more, rather than 
less, attenuated with the formalization of colonial rule, as new temporalities of work strove to 
transform work into labor. And this confronted no small measure of resistance, as African 
communities called upon to recognize the civilizational value of new infrastructures drew on 
their own visions of work and value as they considered these new infrastructural networks. 
Concurrent to these labors of revaluation came drought, and with it came famine.  
When the rains returned in 1899, it was clear that the new infrastructures were not only 
the pathways of infectious disease, but vectors of new coercive measures designed to revalue 
work. Seizure first in the form of taxation, and later, land alienation, forced men onto the road, 
often as infrastructural laborers, to “find their tax.” But new forms of mobility emerged out of 
this regime of violence, as young men took to the road in order to secure new sources of wealth 
that they could translate into adult status. As access to land tightened with white settlement, in 
tandem with the consolidation of power by the putative winners of the famine, mobility held out 
the possibility of using cash gained on the road to leverage their positions in social hierarchies. 
Technologies of mobility entered into these debates. They were desired both because of the 
ideological gloss they bore as signs of civilization achieved, and because social youth hoped to 
translate them into wiathi. But in this, they did not go unchallenged, as would-be elders, whose 
claim to power was itself borne of mobility, and the landed elite sought to wrest from them that 
which they sought: wiathi and civic virtue. Kenyatta was at the fore of leading this charge as he 
and his social kin castigated the next generation as unproductive, as those that worked for 
githukumo, and thus as failures “of their tribe.”  
It is at the “interface” that we have begun to unravel the dual vision of roads as 
concurrently sites of aspiration and sites of decline and death. Materiality and meaning here 
came together to produce the road, and the technologies and the people that called it home, as 
contested cultural objects. The cultural politics of the road would crop up again, and with greater 








“The Vehicle is Death, the Land is Life”: Vehicles, Value, and Domesticating Wealth in 
Postwar Kenya 
 
The Second World War unalterably shifted the scales against which people imagined their social 
and political worlds, and their prospective futures. Existing issues were not displaced, but their 
coordinates were reconfigured as people read them against broader social, political, and spatial 
topographies. This widened field of experience had been the government’s promise for those that 
fought in the war, a message spread over the region’s uneven road networks by the Mobile 
Propaganda Van—a multimedia unit upon which the colony’s single Mobile Information Unit 
was modeled (see Chapter 5). These tours aimed to convince people of the benefits of military 
service.1 In this, the administration walked a fine line, aware as it was that people would simply 
not attend shows if they viewed the tours as being geared towards conscription.2  
When asked about their earliest memories of radio, many of the older people I spoke to 
recalled hearing of the battles in Burma and the feats of their compatriot men being projected 
over the loudspeakers. If rural communities came into contact with the war through new 
mediated technologies, for those that did enlist, entry into the military often meant travel to 
places far afield as Kenyan askaris joined and fought alongside people from across the colonial 
world. The number of men on the move in these years was not insignificant. By the war’s end 
over 100,000 Kenyans had served, with Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru men comprising the largest 
proportion.3 The experiences of these men during the war and in its aftermath were in turn 
profoundly leveling and critically distilled the racial, economic, and technological hierarchies 
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that shaped everyday life. It was first time, I was told on more than one occasion, that people 
understood that whites could be killed.4  
In a more quotidian—though no less important—way, the military offered new avenues 
for individual transformation. People received technical training and gained new skills, many 
being trained as mechanics and drivers, making salaries for the first time as compensation for 
their services.5 Salaries, along with technical training, were two of the great promises offered 
would-be askaris.6 For these men, futures premised on their capacity to mobilize both their 
training and their hard-earned capital when they returned to civilian life were a central concern.  
As this chapter argues, in the postwar period, technologies of mobility, and the markets 
with which they were popularly associated, became central nodes of political disputation 
between returning askaris and the state, and among an aspiring class of Kikuyu traders, the 
landed elite, and the land poor. As askaris set their sights on attaining vehicles, rights to access 
became a key frame through which these servicemen evaluated whether the colonial state was 
recognizing their wartime contributions. Importantly, these demands were not premised on an 
abstract notion of service to the empire, nor the sacrifices of life and limb. Instead, this was a 
vocational politics that placed skill at their center. This was particularly true of Kikuyu askaris, 
many whom did not see combat but served in the service corps.7 Upon their return, these ex-
servicemen found their aspirations frustrated, as the administration sought a return to the 
racialized economic and technological hierarchy that structured the Kenya colony before the 
war. Many returning askaris thus experienced the postwar years as a period of reversal, where 
promises made before and during the war had been broken, and their hopes to parlay newfound 
skills as drivers were dashed. Colonial administrators, however, could not contain the politics of 
these critiques, nor their coordinates. By the 1950s, drivers rescaled these everyday discontents, 
linking access to vehicle and trade licenses to the very politics of immobility—emblematized in 
the kipande system—upon which the highly racialized colonial economy was premised. 
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These would-be traders, however, were not simply trying to use their newfound skills and 
wealth to leverage their position within the highly racialized colonial economic order of things. 
They concurrently hoped that access to new markets in trade would enable them to leverage 
capital accumulated on the road into “a publicly recognized mark of virtue” and adult status.8 
Indeed, not all ex-servicemen experienced these years as a period of reversal; a lucky few had 
benefitted from the boom of the war years. These men, in spite of having made strides in 
economic terms, were facing a threat significantly more existential than exclusion from new 
markets in trade. At the scale of community and household, these men of new wealth found 
themselves excluded from hierarchies framed in terms of wiathi, or self-mastery, as the landed 
elites, following in the footsteps of rural patriarchs of the 1920s and 1930s, castigated the 
wayward itineraries of these men, the nature of their work, and the morality of their money made 
on the road. 
These aspiring traders located unlikely allies in squatters who also found themselves 
excluded from achieving wiathi. These men and women, by contrast to the emergent trading 
elite, were excluded from social adulthood by virtue of their poverty rather than in spite of their 
wealth. Together, this group questioned the morality of rural elites within a frame of disputation 
offered by a Gikuyu epistemology of “civic virtue.”9 What came to be called Mau Mau was the 
result. These conflicts, again, were contestations over valuation, that turned on the means and 
metrics by which social adulthood could be claimed in changed material circumstances. But this 
alliance was not without conflict. As new forms of accumulation led to new possibilities of 
investment for the lucky few, the morality of these investments was something over which 
people could argue. It would be among Kikuyu communities that the density and the stakes of 
these contests would become visible. In what follows, then, I examine the multiple coordinates 
that shaped the politics of vehicle ownership and mobility in the postwar period. 
 
 
                                                
8 Derek Peterson, Creative Writing: Translation, Bookkeeping, and the Work of Imagination in Colonial Kenya 
(Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann, 2004), 17.  
9 John Lonsdale, “The Moral Economy of Mau Mau: Wealth, Poverty, and Civic Virtue in Kikuyu Political 





 “Our Sole Object of Employment is to be Able to Retire as…Lorry Owners”: Askaris, 
Aspiration, and the Politics of Mobility as the Politics of Vocation  
 
The deeper entrenchment of the cash economy had been one of the first goals of the 
administration. But with the war the Colonial Office became concerned as to the dislocating 
effects of cash in large quantities circulating in the region. “The natives are being exhorted to 
invest their savings,” wrote a member of the Overseas Planning Committee, “but are not 
sufficiently convinced of the wisdom of doing so.” The specific concern? The “savings of the 
askaris” were being spent “by…families at home,” leading authorities to forecast the 
“resentment” this would “arouse when the troops return[ed] to their villages.”10 In this, 
administrators registered an apprehension that it would be at the scale of community and 
household that newfound wealth would lead to conflict. It was, perhaps, in an effort to manage 
this threat that askaris’ wages were funneled back to the colony through the Post Office Savings 
Bank (POSB).11 This provision concurrently ensured that money’s movement was steady but 
incremental so as to slow the rate of rural inflation.12 And it had the added advantage of drawing 
shillings out from the roofs of homes and the bottoms of mattresses.13  
Ensuring money was in circulation had, as we have seen, been one of the guiding 
principles since the earliest days of the administration. This was, indeed, one of the motivations 
for implicating people in the wage-labor economy and for the exacting regime of direct taxation 
to which they were subject. But it was difficult to control popular perceptions of security, and 
harder still to control what people set their desires on attaining. As early as 1924, Arthur 
Champion, of whom we shall learn more (see Chapters 3 & 5), had reported an increase in trade 
in South Nyeri. The scale of this trade was impossible to surmise, he reported with frustration, 
as:  
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the Kikuyu buys so little from the local shops. It appears to me that they still prefer 
to put their superfluous cash into goats and sheep [rather] than into their banks or 
other home comforts. The fact is to be deplored but I see no immediate remedy.14  
The colonial state was perennially hopeful that wages would be funneled back into markets as 
people engaged in new patterns of consumption. But, as Champion’s comments indicate, people 
had other plans for how and where to invest their cash. Indeed, though it was set up in 1910-11, 
the Post Office Savings Bank had secured fewer than 1000 people designated “native” or 
“African” by 1927.15  
And while cash circulated in greater quantities during the war years, people remained 
skeptical as the wisdom of entrusting their hard-earned money to the system of savings on offer 
through the POSB. As the DC of Nyeri reported in 1944:  
It takes time to get the average Africans to understand the advantage of putting 
his savings in the Post Office Savings Bank. There is no doubt that much of this 
may be traced to the many minor irritations he experienced in the earlier days 
especially when he wished to draw his money out.16  
The solution, and one which “philanthropic” market-makers pursued again in the aughts: bring 
the bank to the people (see Chapter 6).  
The DC noted that a van had been posted to Nyeri District, and every effort had been 
made “through the Native Authorities, to urge the African to deposit at least part of his savings. 
Taking everything into consideration the response has not been bad but there…[was] room for 
very great improvement, which will only come about through propaganda and a proper” 
approach. The mobilization of “local” knowledge was necessary. Of particular import was the 
“Clerk in Charge of the Van.” This position was key, and the “personal touch” could not be “too 
strongly emphasized.” As the report continued: “The attachment of a African Propagandist to the 
Van is of a great assistance.” And the “present propagandist, a native of the District,” had 
“carried out his duties conscientiously.”17 As we shall see with greater clarity in the chapters to 
come (see Chapters 4–7), designers, technologists, and administrators have routinely mobilized 
African knowledge workers and experts to generate attachments between Kenya’s varied publics 
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and new infrastructures; this a means of ensuring that infrastructures—foreign expertise, capital 
and all—become firmly embedded in the Kenyan milieu, concurrently tethering people to 
emergent markets.  
But people remained suspicious of the new system of savings. And their reasons were 
well founded. Their experiences of the Post Office Savings Bank, like their experiences of road 
networks, was fundamentally structured by the racial hierarchies that animated everyday life in 
the Kenya colony. One complainant aired their grievances in Habari, noting the difficulties 
people faced in finding a “witness” to vouch for customers’ identities, a requisite in making 
withdrawals.18 Another argued that it was unfair that Africans should have to “give finger prints 
when withdrawing money from the Post Office Savings Bank,” claiming that this rule 
discouraged “many people from putting their money in the P.O.S.B.”19 The connections to the 
kipande would not have been lost on these would-be customers. And, indeed, administrators 
were forced to concede that: “The War Savings campaigns that were known to be in progress can 
have very little appeal to up-country Africans.”20 This had material effects. Indeed, by 1947, over 
34,000 of the 64,000 accounts opened for Kenyan askaris had been closed.21 
People had other systems of valuation with which they worked to decide how and where 
to invest their capital. Many askaris, Timothy Parsons argues, “saw remittances as investments 
instead of family support payments and ordered their representatives to buy cattle or bury money 
in the ground.”22 Indeed, by and large, a premium was put on sinking monies into assets less 
divisible than commodities of consumption, and less divisible than cash, moving money out of 
circulation and investing it in more durable stores of value such as livestock and, as we shall see, 
in an interesting twist, lorries—land itself being by and large out of reach for most in the postwar 
period.23  
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Investing in non-divisible forms had the advantage of enabling value generation in the 
long term.24 Livestock could not only be put to the task of domestic production, but animals’ 
reproductive capacities ensured that within a matter of years such an investment would be value 
generating, two animals becoming three. Capitalist expectations notwithstanding it was 
livestock, not capital, that was self-reproducing.  
Rural communities and landed patriarchs would have seen these investments as a way of 
socializing cash by investing it in durable and future-oriented forms of value, and at home. Cash 
was the currency of mobility. But if invested in livestock, cash could be used to secure emergent 
relations among families as it was transformed into bridewealth. This was of no mean import. 
Those that invested in livestock, and the few that were able to invest in land, were investing in 
both their own maturation as well as in that of their communities. Investments of this sort, then, 
were a means of tethering men to their natal homes while retaining hierarchies of value more or 
less undisturbed.  
But with askaris coming home flush with wages accumulated during the war, cash was 
ascendant. This led to generational discord, as young men, cash in hand, challenged the authority 
of rural elders.25 These generational rifts had decidedly gendered overtones. Cash, so it seemed 
to rural elders, was a symbol of the indiscipline of the young, a means of untethering both men 
and women from rural patriarchs. This was particularly the case in the instance of ritual debts, 
such as the payments owed in the instance of unsanctioned pregnancies. As members of the 
Kiambu Local Native Council (LNC) lamented: 
 
No penalty seemed to be imposed on members of other tribes who made Kikuyu 
girls pregnant and the elders of Native Tribunals seemed to have no power to insist 
on a penalty. No customary payment was ever made in stock and when found out 
young men paid in cash. [Members of the LNC] felt that it was necessary to insist 
on the customary payment by rams and goats. Chief Kibathi was in full agreement 
and stated that although judgement might be entered for a payment in stock 
                                                
24 For discussions of investments in livestock, see James Ferguson, The Anti-Politics Machine: ‘Development,’ 
Depoliticization, and Bureaucratic Power in Lesotho, (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, 1994); Shipton, 
Credit Between Cultures; And for a synthetic view, see Peebles, “Rehabilitating the Hoard.”  




the…[fine] was usually paid in cash. By insisting on the full customary penalty 
he felt that some amelioration of the situation could be obtained.26  
The threat of “foreign ways” was certainly on the table here. But in a more fundamental way, 
here the LNC registered its concern regarding who held the reigns of valuation. The ownership 
of livestock was a key symbol of adult masculinity. Young men, cash in hand, threatened to 
undermine not simply “custom,” then, but the authority underwriting livestock as socialized 
wealth.  
Landed patriarchs and administrators were not only concerned with askaris, then, but 
with the increased circulation of cash in general that was enabled by the expansions of the 
wartime economy. Transporters and lorry owners joined commodity producers as the main 
beneficiaries of the war years.27 Administrators’ concerns, for their part, turned on how the 
circulation of cash might adversely affect people’s willingness to engage in labor, this premised 
on the assumption that a decrease in commodities for consumption would simply lead to a 
decrease in laborers. Their concerns were premised on limited visions of both value and work, 
and the connection between the two. One report argued that since: “the African has no 
conception of wealth in terms of bonds or saving certificates, the supply of African labour to 
farms, plantations and mines and the production of native cash crops...will inevitably be 
adversely affected.”28 This, though, should not be taken to mean that people were not, in fact, 
saving; that people were not, in fact, investing in their futures.  
For would-be traders these futures were, of necessity, mobile. But people’s desire to enter 
the trading business was not simply animated by the possibilities of capital accumulation. By 
contrast to labor on farms, or work for the government, this work was not githukumo, but the 
self-possessed labor of working for oneself. The business of trade, then, would have enabled men 
to exercise their independence and “moral agency.”29 And it was this prospect, so it seems, that 
caused anxiety for rural elders and administrators alike.  
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What administrators did get right was that the end of the war marked a turning point. As 
it pertained to askaris, the administration appreciated that veterans would experience a mismatch 
between their newfound forms of expertise and the more constrained futures on offer in their 
villages. “Africans are experiencing conditions utterly different from those to which they were 
accustomed before the war,” remarked the Committee. 
Those Africans who have been trained as tradesmen, e.g., mechanics and joiners, 
are unlikely to be content to resume their pre-war occupations or to find scope for 
the employment of their newly acquired craftsmanship in their up-country villages 
on their return from service; further, their presence will in some districts introduce 
competition between Africans and Indians as skilled workmen.30  
The speculation that returning askaris would find their ambitions frustrated by racial hierarchies, 
bisected as they were by vocation and skill, would prove to be prescient. But administrators were 
not alone in their concerns as to what the postwar world would look like. Young men, for their 
part, were similarly concerned about their futures. In particular, returning askaris were intent that 
they be able to parlay their newfound capital and technological skill into new and more desirable 
future realities.31 This would prove to be no easy task. And askaris were not alone in harboring 
anxieties about the future.32  
For many young men, their foreseeable futures appeared constrained, shaped as they were 
by the changes wrought during the war years. In Nyeri, landlords had continued to consolidate 
their properties, building on trends that had been at play since the 1930s.33 In 1943 the Local 
Native Council ruled that land should be retained intact, and that only the eldest son should 
inherit. Wealthy householders and commodity farmers, for their part, had driven up the cost of 
bridewealth. This was their response to the threat posed by young men returning from the war 
flush with cash. But not all stores of value, as these young men knew, were held to be equivalent, 
and new measures of wealth often did not directly translate into adult status.  
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While many were frustrated, in truth it was younger sons and tenants that were the most 
vulnerable.34 As one young man lamented in a 1946 letter written to Habari, “the present system 
of high bride prices is not suitable to a civilized community…[as] paying it makes a young man 
poor.”35 He was not wrong. For those earning 180 Ksh per year as farm workers, payments of 90 
goats and 4 rams, investments totaling 1,190 Ksh in cash, were simply out of reach.36 And the 
stakes were high. As we have seen, for Kikuyu men poverty was as much an existential as it was 
a material problem. People did not apprehend poverty in structural terms, but as evidence of a 
moral failing: poverty was delinquent. Kikuyu veterans sought to respond to this threat when 
they created the “Anti-Dowry Association.”37  
For Kikuyu men and women, though, poverty, was more than a personal problem, it was 
like a contagion. Poverty was delinquent, yes, but it was also held to produce mobile, youthful, 
and specifically urban forms of delinquency. Poverty, then, was at once cause, effect, and 
evidence of social dislocations. Writing to Baraza, one letter writer argued that while “it would 
be wrong to stop bride price completely...it should be reduced. The high bride price prevents 
people from marrying young which leads the young men to a life of crime in the towns, and the 
girls to prostitution.”38 A life of wayward, unproductive mobility was the outcome of young men 
and women’s incapacity to root down in the land, and thus forward into the future. But 
hierarchies were becoming more rigid and the routes for attaining adult status attenuated by 
“greedy” elders who were eating too much; in some instances, this greed undermining their 
claims to have legitimately attained wiathi.39   
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And so, generational conflict was, perhaps, inevitable as social youth—some by virtue of 
status and wealth, others by virtue of status in spite of wealth—began experimenting with new 
means of attaining wiathi and social adulthood. As the DC of Nyeri reported: 
As always the older men have a vested interest in Conservatism and the young are 
continually striving to get what they think they want without having to wait and 
work for it. It is among them that the most violent forms of anti-European and 
anti-Government feeling are found, and while it is far from the truth to imagine 
that the middle-aged are contented, they have certainly been more reasonable and 
have shown some sense of proportion. The high bride-price merely serves to 
widen the gap between young and old, and the result is shown in the great 
popularity of European dances and the complete inability of parents and Chiefs to 
stop them, despite the fact that all European dancing has been prohibited by the 
Local Native Council for some years.40 
 
New forms of investment, as we will see, joined European dances as categories where social 
juniors—namely returning askaris and would-be traders—began exploring new paths of 
maturation.  
*** 
A close reading of a meeting staged between returning askaris and the “Director of Man Power” 
is instructive here. This meeting drew a large crowd who put their concerns to the “Director.” At 
the center of their desires sat technologies of mobility and access to markets; at the center of 
their critiques sat skill.41 As one askari from Fort Hall stated emphatically: “What we want are 
shops, licences, lorries and taxis.” The response of the government representative was not 
appreciated by the crowd:  
The District Commissioner informed them that the Government has controlled 
licences throughout Kenya. Soldiers are still in the Army. In order to give 
everyone an equal chance, APPLICATIONS NOW RECEIVED ARE FILED, 
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AND WILL BE CONSIDERED LATER, with the help of a sub-committee of the 
Local Native Council. 
There was oversaturation, the DC continued: “there are 300 licensed shops [in Fort Hall], and 
another 150 shops which have been built, but not yet licensed. What should he [the DC] do?” To 
this question, the crowd had a clear response: “License the 150 shops first, but give the ex-
servicemen an allocation above that. As for lorries, give us a free hand.”42  
People had been made promises, and continued delays were the cause of no small measure 
of frustration. As one ex-servicemen from Fort Hall remarked, many of the men in attendance 
had “willingly joined the Army” and were owed their due. This had, indeed, been guaranteed. 
“In Burma General Fowkes, our Divisional Commander, told us that we had fought well, and 
that on our return our District Commissioners would meet all our requirements.” And their 
“requirements” were specific. “In the Army we were told that we would be able to purchase old 
Army lorries freely.” As the speaker continued, he demanded that accounting be done: “Where 
are all the surplus Army vehicles going to,” he asked. For some, it seemed that civilians, in 
general, were being given preferential treatment.  
For others, this preferential treatment mapped onto the racialization of labor, occupation, 
and skill that had structured the colonial economy since its earliest days. One askari noted that 
people saw ex-military lorries “being sold to Indians in great quantities.” This particular 
accusation was sloughed off: “Vehicles sold...were not allowed to be licensed ‘as runners,’ but 
only to be broke up as spare parts. No Indian in his district has been recommended for an 
additional [Transport Licensing Board] T.L.B licence.”43 People wanted explanations. As one 
letter writer expressed in Mwalimu, the “present methods of issuing permits to Africans to 
purchase ex-military motor vehicles” was flawed, claiming that “many D.C.s refuse applications, 
without giving any reasons.”44 
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Askaris were not alone in claiming that “Indians” were given preferential access to vehicles 
and parts.45 As one African letter-writer wrote to the editors of the East African Standard in 
February of 1946, “Indians are here to exploit the native, and must be moved from the interior of 
the native lands.”46 In the same year another aspiring trader was more specific in his demands, 
arguing that Indians should “gradually quit trading in the Reserves, and confine themselves to 
trading in the towns.” He was not calling for the expulsion of Indians from the colony, he 
assured readers, he was simply arguing that their occupation of space should mirror the ideal-
typical economic organization of the colony, one wherein race and occupation had specific 
spatial coordinates.  
Access to trade, and the technologies and infrastructures with which it was associated, were 
central to these critiques. And these discontents registered a nuanced understanding of how the 
racialization of space and bodies, occupation and skill, structured the colonial hierarchy. The 
men of the IBEA had encouraged South Asian merchants to set up dukas along the lines of new 
roads and the railway.47 South Asians had subsequently established themselves as the dominant 
traders in the region. This structural position was protected by the colonial government, a means 
of structuring the colonial economy and mitigating against racial antagonisms framed by black 
and white.48  
At the center of these disputes, then, was not simply a sense that promises made had been 
broken, but perhaps the more troubling revelation that newly practiced forms of technical 
expertise had been cultivated for naught. As one questioner from Kangundu argued: “Many 
people did not wish to join the Army, and many had to. Of these, many were made to learn 
driving. Why are those of them now discharge[d], with good characters as First Class Drivers, 
made to pass a civilian driving test.” This, too, seemed racialized, as these men were forced to 
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“hire a lorry from an Indian to undergo such a test at a cost of Sh. 20/- a time.” The Director of 
Man Power responded, arguing that: “Peace time driving was different from war time driving.” 
Moreover, the men in the crowd were reminded that they were “now civilians, and had to comply 
with civilian Regulations.” Being a civilian, of course, was a highly striated social category in 
the Kenya colony.  
At the core of these men’s frustrations, then, was the sense that their newfound status, their 
emergent vocations, would not be given full breadth as they transitioned into civilian life.49 Skill 
was skill was skill; capital was capital was capital, they seemed to be saying. In this, they argued 
that their technical training was generic, easily transposed to the Kenya colony. These men were 
trying to forge infrastructural attachments, trying to bind themselves and their futures to the road 
and its markets, trying to naturalize their newfound skill in the Kenyan order of things. This was 
a scalar move. But of course, and from the outset, the idea that either technical competence or 
capital were generalized equivalents in terms of status had been off the table in what had become 
the Kenya colony. The dual mandate of commerce and civilization—and the tiered vision of ‘the 
public’ with which it arrived—ensured that this would be the case.  
The administration’s response was banal and unsatisfying. It claimed that there were 
simply too many people with the right training, and simply too few vehicles to accommodate 
them all. As regarded the Machakos district one administrator noted that there were “3,000 
Wakamba Drivers. If all had licences, who would drive the 50 or so lorries in the district? Each 
lorry could not have 6 or 7 drivers…Unlimited lorries were asked for, and the Director of 
Training explained the economics, as in the case of unlimited traders’ licences.” This problem 
extended to Kiambu. Accommodating askaris expertise would be a problem, for men returning to 
the area included “an enormous number of drivers, and it would be quite impossible to find that 
work for everyone [sic] of them when they returned to civilian life.”50 These responses actively 
worked to depoliticize the critiques of returning askaris and others, the banality of numbers side-
stepping the sticky issue of differential access to technologies of mobility, as well as the 
vocations and forms of accumulation that they made accessible. But the work of depoliticization 
was difficult. People’s futures were on the line.  
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Indeed, here administrators missed the point. These men hoped to translate their newfound 
skills and capital into future wealth. It was the:  
ambition of very large numbers of askari [sic] with accumulated funds, which were 
beyond their wildest dreams of wealth five years ago to either purchase a lorry or 
to set up trade as a means of increasing their resources. For the meantime both these 
ambitions must be restrained and lists of would-be vehicle owners are being 
compiled against the day when a partial fulfillment of their ambitions may be 
possible.51 
In working to stake out this position for themselves, returning askaris were likely wooed by the 
vast wealth that transporters in the Reserves seem to have accrued during the war, since people 
retaining the few non-requisitioned lorries consolidated unprecedented wealth through the 
transport of commodities.52 What administrators saw as a shortsighted desire, then, askaris saw 
as an investment, a means of securing futurity. As one Fort Hall questioner put it:  
When the training courses are finished, and we have, through employment as 
artisans or by any other means, accumulated our savings, how are we going to 
make use of them unless we can do so by trading or by driving lorries? Our sole 
object of employment is to be able to retire as shopkeepers or lorry owners. 
The Director was scandalized by this admission. If each “man is thinking only of himself,” he 
wrote, if:  
your heart is not in your work, how can you give of your best? It is alarming to 
learn that a man takes up work as a hospital dresser with the sole object of saving, 
so as to enable him to abandon his career and buy a shop. If this is the spirit 
generally to be found in the ex-Serviceman of today, than there is little hope for 
your country or your drive.53  
What local administrators saw in these desires was a connection between the emergence of 
troubling forms of individualism and vehicle ownership. Indeed, as early as 1941, the Provincial 
Commissioner of Central Province reported that the Kikuyu were developing a sense of 
individuality that, he argued, constituted a frightening threat to colonial authority. In bolstering 
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this claim, the PC noted that Kikuyu communities were engaging in unsanctioned trade, writing: 
“a good deal of the export of commodities is done in Kikuyu-owner lorries.”54 
For would-be lorry owners, by contrast, access to new markets promised wealth, and with 
it social recognition. And these men were, evidently, savvy fundraisers. In 1945, the Nyeri DC 
reported that:  
The problem of African Trade and Transport has become increasingly prominent 
and difficult to handle. A number of ambitious “Companies’ have been formed a 
few of which have been registered either under the old co-operative society 
Ordinance or as private companies. They are all strictly non-cooperative capitalist 
ventures and receive large scale financial support. Their aims are to dominate the 
wholesale African market as exporters and importers. Without skilled guidance 
their destiny seems certain.55 
The difficulty of securing vehicles in the postwar period evidently did not stop these would-be 
traders from working to get vehicles on the road. As one administrator noted: “There has been 
brisk demand for lorries for every conceivable trade; in view of the difficulties over tyres, spares 
and petrol applications have not been given except in essential cases.”56 Absent government 
officials conceding to their requests, people got creative. “All sorts of old scrap iron that was 
once a box body car or a lorry have been retried in attempts to get them on the road.”57  
*** 
Suffice it to say that in the immediate war period, access to technologies of mobility became a 
key metric by which people measured their relationship to the colonial state. As returning askaris 
demanded the right to licenses as a means of entering new markets, they did not frame their 
claims in terms of a generic notion of service to empire; theirs was a decidedly more constrained 
and focused politics. In making their claims on the state, these aspiring lorry-men argued that 
they constituted a subsection of the public, a new class of technical experts. This was a form of 
claims-making premised on vocation, which turned on assertions that expertise and skill were 
portable and generic. To these men, the state’s response spoke volumes: their skill and training 
notwithstanding, they remained at the bottom of the racialized economic and technological 
hierarchy. But colonial administrators could not contain the politics of these critiques, nor their 
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coordinates. Indeed, if the dearth of licenses led askaris, among others, to speculate as to the 
racial politics and economics underwriting the politics of mobility, the seeming proliferation of 
vehicles was also generative of rumor.  
James Beauttah was born in Nyeri in 1888. He left home early due to conflict with his 
father’s second wife, traveling to first to Fort Hall Town, and later to Nairobi, where he got a job 
working at the Post Office as a Telegraphist. He was also a member of this emergent class of 
African traders.58 Recalling this period, he spoke of the aspirations of returning askaris who 
“returned with more money than they had ever had before.” Men hoped to use this money, he 
argued, to build up a strong base in business, which they could parlay into political action. The 
government, threatened by these prospects, came up with a cruel plan. In his own words:  
Everyone expected the economy of Kenya to boom after the war, and everyone 
knew that because of the six years without new motor vehicles millions of pounds 
were bound to be made in the transport business. Accordingly, with the 
encouragement of the Government, many of the ex-soldiers used all their money 
in the purchase of lorries, buses and motorcars.59  
This, he argued, was a government scheme designed to draw out askaris’ shillings by convincing 
them to invest in lorries. These were poor investments, Beauttah argued, stores of wealth that 
would only depreciate in value. Beauttah claimed that he had:  
read a Government circular directing the Administrators to remove the money the 
soldiers brought back with them. I knew that many who bought these vehicles had 
used up all their own money and then they borrowed more at a very high interest 
rate to pay for them. It seemed so obvious to me. The British were encouraging 
Africans to buy cars which they could not afford in order to reduce them to 
poverty and force them to continue to depend on the Government [as laborers].”60 
Beauttah could not sit back and watch this active economic sabotage unfold. He tried, and failed, 
to campaign against this “wave of car buying,” but people, he recalled, “like wealth more than 
they like advice.”61 And people lost their savings, buying vehicles that they were “soon unable to 
maintain,” vehicles that broke down long before their owners had paid for them. Whether or not 
the administration was actively sabotaging would-be traders, evidence does suggest that many 
lorry owners quickly faced economic collapse. Administrators reported that “vehicles (especially 
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ex-Army ones)” were “liable to break down and require[d] expensive maintenance and repairs.” 
Some owners had done quite well for themselves, but the “prospects of many” lay “wrecked with 
the hulks of their machines,” these “[d]ecaying vehicles” lying dormant in Nairobi’s garages.  
It was perhaps in response to this rumored duplicity that Beauttah, then head of the 
Kikuyu Central Association (KCA), formed the Kenya African Automobile Association as well 
as the Kenya African Traders Association immediately following the war.62 Officially, 
Beauttah’s ambition was to enlist all African lorry owners as members, thereby creating a 
uniform platform from which their interests could be advanced. In his semi-autobiographical 
recounting, though, Beauttah claimed that the capital generated through membership fees was 
used to finance “underground KCA activities.”63 Beauttah, while more radical than Kenyatta, 
was as concerned as elders regarding the mobility of “youth” and their attenuated relationship to 
“traditional” authority.64  
Beauttah was not alone in linking automobility to politics. Francis Khamisi was born on 
the Coast, rising to notoriety as the editor of Mwalimu, a Kiswahili-language publication. In the 
immediate postwar years, he headed up a group “styling themselves the Thika Motor Drivers 
Association.”65 Lorries and taxis, while often lumped together as nodes of subversion by the 
administration, appear to have been split along the lines of class. While Beauttah’s organization 
represented the interests of lorry owners, those in the taxi business, in many instances, did not 
get to own their vehicles but worked for githukumo.  
In 1945, the DC of Thika wrote of labor unrest in the region, which was blamed on 
Khamisi’s group. The drivers complained that they were often brought up on charges related to 
the roadworthiness of vehicles that they did not own, arguing that it was not their responsibility 
to maintain the vehicles they drove, but the responsibility of the “mainly Indian” owners. It was 
on the basis of these grievances that Khamisi had approached the DC and asked for the 
association to be registered as a trade union.66  
In the coming months, the Association demanded that the government produce a list of 
offenses drivers could be held accountable for, “so that drivers know what is and what is not an 
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offence, as they complain of unjustified interference and persecution by the Police.”67 The role of 
police in impeding movement, of course, had historical precedents. So, too, were people familiar 
with officers committing semi-official extortion along the colony’s arteries. Read against this 
longer history these statements become legible as a deep and enduring critique of a colonial 
system that operated unequally, and in racial terms, controlling people’s movements through 
space.  
In the coming years, these taxi-men would explicitly map their access to vehicles and 
markets onto existing economic hierarchies, refracted as they were through hierarchies of race 
and expertise. Rumors circulating in Mwalimu in 1946 held that Africans were forbidden from 
plying for customers along the Machakos–Nairobi road. Indians, so went the claim, had a 
monopoly over this route, having paid a “large sum of money to bring this about.”68 In 
November of that year another letter-writer claimed that a “European or Asian” was “granted 
permission” by the Transport Licencing Board (TLB) “straight away to purchase a motor 
vehicle, while an African has to pass through many channels.” This, the writer concluded, was 
“all wrong and unjust.” These were unfair “monopolies…[held by] Asians and Europeans.”69 
This sentiment was not limited to Mwalimu. A correspondent writing for Baraza similarly argued 
that the “several Africans” who had “purchased taxis” could not use them “on this road because 
the Indians have a monopoly.”70 These men called on the administration to “rectify the mistake 
they are making in refusing to allow Africans to compete with others in this business.”71  
Predating strategies that would again come up during the years of Mau Mau, African 
taxi-men called on Africans “to travel in taxis owned by Africans and not [those owned] by 
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Indians.”72 As another editorialist wrote, the “three races in Kenya should work together…[but] 
Indian vehicles should [only] take Indians and African vehicles should [only] take Africans.”73  
For Khamisi and members of the Thika Drivers Association, these everyday issues related to 
ferrying passengers and access to routes were not unrelated to the broader politics of mobility in 
the Kenya colony. As his newspaper argued in a scathing critique:  
We are glad to note in Mwalimu...H.E. The Governor's words that he should have 
impression of his finger prints taken in order to possess the card which is given to 
the Africans in Kenya. If it is true that he is going to get the Kipande then he must 
fulfill its regulations. First of all he must change his colour, he must become a 
Blackman and never again be a white man, because Kipande is for the Africans 
in Kenya only. He will be obliged to walk along the River Road for that is the 
proper road for Kipande people. He must halt, when is ordered by Police, in order 
to produce his Kipande to them when they require it. If possible when H.E. Gets 
his Kipande, he must let us see it, so that we can compare his with ours. The 
Governor must prove the following, Clan, Circumcision age, Nature of Work, 
Sub-locations, Location, Name of Employer, Rate of Wages, If posho given, 
Chief, etc.”74 
Those in possession of the kipande understood the system’s role in dictating which spaces they 
could occupy, and which roads they could move along. River Road, and we shall hear this refrain 
again, was the “proper road for Kipande people.” For Khamisi, in other words, the quotidian 
complaints of drivers could not easily be divorced from the politics of mobility writ large.  
These connections were made more explicit at a well-attended meeting of the Nairobi Taxi 
Drivers' Union, where Jomo Kenyatta was also in attendance. Several speakers argued that the 
Municipal Rules governing taxi-drivers were tantamount to slavery. As one Said from Mombasa 
put it: “unless the bye-laws [sic] were rejected they would be in slavery and that freedom could 
not be got as a gift from a friend but by blood.” A Somali man attacked the by-laws forcing taxi-
drivers to wear badges. The badges, he argued, were like “dog collars,” arguing that African taxi-
drivers “might just as well be called dogs.”  
In making these claims these men were drawing on a broadly circulating critique as they 
tapped into new media technologies and put them to the purposes of local politics. Indeed, the 
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invective metaphors used by Nairobi’s striking taxi-men to describe the indignity of British 
colonialism in the 1950s likely began their life in one of Radio Cairo’s broadcasts, beamed from 
Cairo to the Swahili Coast. On the day of the meeting, Nairobi’s taxi-men joined Radio Cairo’s 
Swahili-language program, the “Voice of Free Africa,” and Zanzibaris’ laments on the streets of 
Stone Town in arguing that British colonialism reduced Africans to the status of dogs. The 
politics of mobility evidently sprung from many vectors in this period. But if these men drew on 
invective tropes emanating from as far afield as Cairo in registering these critiques, this was, too, 
a politics that operated with arguably greater intensity at more intimate scales. It is to these 
scales to which this chapter now turns.  
 
 
Domesticating Wealth in Postwar Kenya: Mobility, Labor, and the Politics of Masculinity 
 
Politics in this period, like at all times and in all spaces, operated at multiple scales and had 
multiple coordinates. And whether or not those in the transport business were social juniors, 
elders and colonial administrators discursively framed them—taxi-men in particular—as 
unproductive members of society bent on leading others to socially unproductive life in the city.  
Senior Chief Koinange and Chief Phillip briefly reported on a meeting which had 
been held with delegates from the Nairobi Advisory Council...It had become 
obvious that much parental control had been lost and even that of husbands over 
wives and that it was clear that the case of every woman going to Nairobi should 
be investigated...It was felt that if it is necessary to take produce into Nairobi this 
should be done by men and not by women and further that there should be much 
stricter control of taxi drivers plying between Kabete and the Municipality.75 
Building on discourses in circulation since the 1920s (Chapter 1), taxi men and lorry drivers 
were perennially vilified for leading young women to a life of debasement and immorality in the 
city.  
These mobile entrepreneurs were vectors of contagion in both symbolic and material 
terms. Efforts to stamp out venereal disease, wrote a Medical Officer, would be for naught if 
“taxis continued to carry women to Nairobi.”76 There were but a few dissenting voices, but a few 
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people that argued that women might have reasons for taking to the road. As one letter sent to 
Mwalimu argued, “prostitution” was everyone’s problem, and it was “useless to blame any 
particular people, i.e. taxi drivers.”77  
While these men were an object of concern shared by rural patriarchs and colonial 
administrators, the coordinates of concern merely overlapped; a venn diagram a better metaphor 
than mirrored reflections. Administrators, for their part, saw these taxi and lorry men as a 
nuisance, theirs a politics that evidenced the threat of “detribalization.” Elders likely saw things 
differently. For landed elites, these men were “time bandits” who, it seemed, were trying to 
leverage their fast wealth, their money made on the road with vehicles, into social respectability. 
And socializing private property, as we have seen, was always difficult. But people tried. Indeed, 
while the evidence is thin, it appears that would-be vehicle owners hoped that access to these 
new technologies would not only bring access to markets, but could operate as new sources of 
prestige; potential pathways to working for yourself, to self-possessed labor. In other words, 
vehicle ownership offered two components of wiathi: self-employment and the possibility of 
wealth. The question remained as to whether either could be domesticated. The answer: 
yes…and no.  
Early vehicle owners, interviewees repeatedly told me, were “feared.”78 These were men 
of both notoriety and fame. Indeed, all the men that I interviewed had vivid recollections of the 
first vehicles in their districts. To a one, these vehicles were described as lorries, but those 
marked for the transport of people were distinct, having a closed rather than open back.79 But it 
was the people, not the technologies, that were most well remembered.  
Charles Mwangi recalled the first owner in his district in Nyeri. His name was Thumbi, 
and he had run a passenger transport service popularly referred to as Gikondi.80 Moses Gacheru 
Kahindi was born in 1947 in Kiambu.81 The first family to own a lorry that he recalled came on 
the scene in the 1950s. They were the Mumo’s, and so it was called “Mumo Bus.” Benson 
Ndegwa was born in Mukurweini, in Nyeri county, in 1941. The first driver he remembered was 
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Kibuku. The bus was called Murmuki. James Muigai was born in 1950 in Kabete, Kiambu.82 He 
had a somewhat more intimate relationship with automotive technologies, his father having 
owned a lorry before he was born. This was the source of a good deal of pride for Muigai, who 
recalled the make and license plate of this vehicle: Austen, H4622. In the community, though, it 
was called “Jimmy’s Lorry” or Muigai’s Lorry or Kirori kia Njimathi, the “Lorry of James.” And 
there were others: Haraka Bus and the Nakuru Express.83 Another was called: Tonya Umbuke or 
“Enter to Fly,” speed and mobility explicitly on offer here, the letters marching boldly along the 
side of the yellow vehicle.84 Wanyika Gatibi, born in Nyeri in 1937, recalled that the first “bus” 
in his area was owned by a man called Waigera.85 The vehicle, he recalled, was called 
Mwomboko, the name of a dance done by circumcised men. This form of naming, as we shall 
see, might have been an effort to socialize questionable wealth. It might have been a way of 
domesticating efforts to “fly,” making them amenable to the incremental process of social 
maturation laid out in the concept of wiathi.  
The notoriety of these early vehicle owners was a function of novelty. People recalled 
very few vehicles in African areas in the postwar period. Ownership marked these men as 
unique. Correspondingly, travel in these days was by and large limited to “footing,” today a 
Kenyan shorthand for walking that is firmly tethered to poverty. Owners were men of wealth and 
power. Those with cars were “coming up well.” They were “developed” people of the city.86 
This changed status was marked sartorially. Drivers and owners were traveled, as evidenced by 
their clothes: military boots, khaki pants, white shirts, watches, caps.87 These guys were dressed 
“superb,” wearing striped shirts, nice shoes, and baseball caps.88 People contrasted this urban 
aesthetic people against forms of dress typical in the countryside. Those in the village wore 
shorts, Mbigi told me, while these men wore long pants.89 When most people were dressing in 
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“sheets,” Ndegwa explained, these men were wearing “modern clothes.”90 These forms of dress 
recall the earlier forms of cultural distinction of those associated with the missions.91  
If status within one’s natal village was one of the things on offer to these lorry-men, what 
did their passengers pursue on the road? In 1945, it was noted that: “The freight sought after [by 
lorry-men] is ostensibly fuel, vegetables or charcoal but it is in practice the much higher-paying 
human being.”92 This administrator had trouble understanding the desires for mobility of these 
would-be passengers.  
The Kikuyu do not seem to understand the saying 'is your journey really 
necessary? And think nothing of paying a Shs/4 – lorry fare to sell Shs 3/- worth 
of vegetables or eggs and see the sights of Nairobi.93 
But markets were not the only thing that people sought access to in making their moves.  
The city, as we have seen, was a vexed place in the Gikuyu cultural imagination. How could it be 
otherwise, since Nairobi was structured by the same racialized spatial logic that governed 
infrastructural distribution in general. As Dr. E. Boedeker recalled with no small measure of 
nostalgia in an article published by The Sunday Post: “With regard to the earliest commercial 
development, which began in 1900, the Railway had allocated a part of their land towards the 
swamp side for business shops and surveyed several plots in Victoria Street for Europeans 
only.”94 Like the roads along which these vehicles traveled, Nairobi as a space was a condensed 
node of the racialized economic and social logics that governed the colony more generally.  
Nairobi was a space of desire because it was a space denied. But as we have seen, within a 
Gikuyu epistemology of space and labor, the city was also a place of cultural loss, of youthful 
disobedience, of unproductive labor, of truncated adulthood. For these reasons, Nairobi occupied 
an awkward space, one of both desire and disdain, a space of both possibility and the threat of 
disillusion in the cultural imagination of men and women. But Nairobi was, and continues to be, 
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a place of possibility for the young. Many of the city’s harshest critics would have known this, 
the city being a key site of social transformation in their own itineraries.  
This doubled status was at the forefront of my interlocutors’ descriptions of Nairobi as 
well. James Mbigi recalled that for people in the village, Nairobi was a world away. For Mbigi, 
Nairobi was the site of the “modern.” He recalled hearing of the “wonders” of the city, stories 
that, mirroring proscriptions on Africans in town, mainly featured Asians and whites.95 Despite 
this conceptual and spatial distance, many emphasized that they thought Nairobi must be a good 
place, a place of great wealth, because those that went returned with nice clothing.96 Seeing new 
things mapped onto new modes of comportment—and a facility with new ways of being in the 
world—and new modes of consumption. Francis Njuguna Gathimba told me that people thought 
that Nairobi must be the place of very clean people, people wearing shoes, because those 
returning from Nairobi were marked as distinct by the shoes on their feet.97 Sometimes this was 
desirable. As Mbigi recalled, when people heard you had traveled to Nairobi, they respected you 
because you had seen the world. Among the well-traveled were lorry owners who, as we have 
seen, were marked as unique by their modes of comportment. By all accounts, then, Nairobi was 
a space of consumption and wealth; a site of novelty and a point of access to wider worlds. For 
young people in particular, then, Nairobi was an aspirational space. For some, it represented an 
escape from home, which at least one interlocutor recalled was a space of “slavery.”98  
But it was not an untroubled space. Many of my interlocutors noted that people rarely 
ventured to Nairobi because of the restrictive spatial logic embedded in the kipande system. 
Authorization to come to the city, documented in this “passport,” was a necessity.99 Without 
permission, those caught were arrested. And most did not come in lorries, but on foot. And they 
did not come on the main arteries of the colony but had to walk in the “bushes.” For Charles 
Mwangi, this racialization of movement was alive in the very substances with which roads were 
made. Joseph Mungai Muchuga confirmed this, recalling that there were two roads leading from 
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Nakuru to Nairobi. The first, forged of murram, was for blacks only. The second, smoothly 
tarmacked, was for whites only. The two routes, in his recollection, ran parallel to one another. 
Being caught on the whites-only road would lead to a charge of trespassing. In the memories of 
these men, road infrastructures emerged as core symbols of the highly stratified social and racial 
order that structured everyday life in the Kenya colony.   
And so, people journeyed along different routes. Some of these paths were called Njira 
ya Mikira, a shortcut taken to cross valleys and rivers. This was contrasted against Njira ya 
Mbathi, the “road for buses.” Others recalled these para-networks as: Njira ya agendi, or the 
“path of visitors.”100 Others still came to town along the footpaths that moved through Karua 
forest, routes they referred to as Njira cia Mikara.101 And there were others, especially during 
Mau Mau. These routes were Ngungo “secret or unknown,” or Njira cia Mukira, “side paths or 
diversions.”102 As these names suggest, the racialization of the spatial life of the colony was 
deeply felt, shaping not only practice but also creating durable imprints in the memories of 
young people. These alternative circulatory systems were both symbols of and responses to the 
truncated movement that structured people’s experiences of colonial road infrastructures. And 
many of these paths had longer genealogies, these being the names given to the precolonial 
circulatory systems along which people moved (see Chapter 1).  
If the path to town was full of potential blockages, those who made it to the city 
continued to feel the racialized topography press in on them. Many recalled spending time in 
Pangani, this being one of the few sanctioned African locations.103 Many others recalled their 
time in Nairobi through a single street: River Road. As one interlocutor succinctly put it, this was 
because “River Road” was the “place for Africans.”104 But the racialized topography of Kenya’s 
road networks and of Nairobi itself were not the only proscriptive spatial logics with which 
people had to contend.  
For elders in the countryside, the city was a space where people were “changed,” where 
people “got lost.” While many were drawn to town by the promises of employment and capital 
gains, young people could be wooed by what an earlier generation of critics had referred to as 
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“foreign ways.” The town was a place of trickery, recalled Moses Gacheru, who lost his money, 
10 cents, gambling on River Road the first day he arrived.105 These men were drawn by the 
possibilities of fantastic wealth. This could be a distraction because “now you have tasted 
money.” The responsible ones would find work and return home with gifts of shukas and sugar 
for their families, and money to invest in livestock and land.106 But there were those that did not 
return. These were “naughty boys.”107 Those that did not come home, those that did not invest in 
the land, had sacrificed their social standing. “If you are a man without a shamba, you are 
nothing,” Joseph Mwaura stated unequivocally.108  
Even those vehicle owners who made it home were subject to critique. While it was good 
for the community to have access to a vehicle—evidence of an individual’s wealth extending 
through the area, or their individual development developing place—many of the people I spoke 
to described the owners themselves as being slightly odd. There were those that seemed to stay 
alone, appearing to eschew relations with their age mates. For onlookers, this raised questions, 
which pivoted around the relative invisibility of their value-generating work.  
Indeed, how early vehicle owners had raised the capital to invest in automotive 
technologies was rarely clear-cut. But connections to external sources of power were central in 
the narratives of the people with whom I spoke. In some instances, askaris used their savings 
from the War. In others, interviewees confirmed that people pooled their wealth. Neither the Post 
Office Savings Bank, nor Local Native Councils (LNC) offered loans, so others turned 
elsewhere, combining their monies with loans granted by Indian money lenders.109 Many of them 
had traveled to the city in pursuit of work. Suffice it to say, people found ways of raising capital. 
As Chief Luka of Kiambu noted, “Kikuyu very seldom failed to raise large sums of money if 
necessary,” pointing to the routine purchase of “lorries for Shs. 15,000/-” as evidence. 
Some strategies of capital generation were more morally suspect than others. 
Interviewees recalled how some early owners mobilized proximity to the state, and to whiteness 
in general, to seemingly miraculously generate wealth that they invested in vehicles. These 
dynamics of odd intimacy could produce estrangement with natal communities. Still others were 
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assumed to be thieves, those thugs of the city. What united these narratives, then, was 
uncertainty regarding the sources of these men’s capital, and this turned on the invisibility of 
their labor. Unlike working the land, labor undertaken in Nairobi or with settlers or the 
government was invisible to family members and neighbors. When the accumulation appeared to 
be spectacular, there were questions. As in the past, rescaling this wealth would require 
transforming it into a socially recognized object of virtue. In this, these men often failed.  
Elias Mutahi recalled that the earliest vehicle owners in his area were close with the 
white community living nearby. It was through these dynamics that money seemed, as though 
without the exertion of labor, without the exertion of sweat, to materialize. These men, it was 
widely assumed, were having same-sex relations with settlers.  
If culture was the product of domesticating the wild, of cutting the land into civilization, 
this the means of securing a homestead as the prerequisite to becoming a fully productive man, 
the idea of non-reproductive sex as the source of value would index these paths to maturation as 
aberrant. For observers, these trajectories bespoke lorry owners’ efforts to leverage unsanctioned 
relations of production into social reproduction—we might think here of the synergy between 
these accusations and those leveraged against “prostitutes” in the 1920s. These men had attained 
wealth but not wiathi. And while these men had the status of big men, this was a truncated and 
imperfectly articulated masculinity. This was wealth without adulthood.  
Peter Ndirangu loved his father’s brother, his second father or uncle, who went by the 
name of Becker, but it had to be admitted he was unusual, his behavior and modes of 
comportment marking him as unique. He had done well for himself. Working in the city, he had 
developed close relationships with whites. These relations of intimacy seemed to have given him 
access to wealth. Most notably, Becker wore a suit. This, in and of itself, might not have opened 
him up to suspicion. He was, without a doubt, “coming up” well. And he could have socialized 
this wealth, using his own development to develop his home area. But, as Peter told me, he rarely 
returned to the village, leading his grandmother to implore Peter to reason with him: “Why can’t 
you tell him to come home?” she would ask.110 His visits were, indeed, episodic, but they were 
always eventful. On one occasion, his return home was announced with much fanfare, arriving as 
he did with a caravan of two cars. His work in the city had, evidently, served him well in 
                                                




material terms. But he had done something that seemed to be unthinkable. He had purchased 
these vehicles without having undergone initiation, without having been circumcised.  
Circumcision was part and parcel of pursuing the paths to socialization critical to 
achieving adulthood. This would, conventionally, have been followed by the purchase of land, 
the building of a home, and the establishment of oneself as a homesteader. If at all, a car fit into 
this hierarchy of investments, of future-making, as an afterthought. Becker did not do this. He 
had not only mixed up the order of maturation, claiming for himself a position of authority 
without being an elder, but he had bypassed circumcision, a ritual that fundamentally grounded 
one’s pursuit of adult masculinity, embedding men in horizontal relationships with their riika, or 
age set. And it was essential that it occur at home.111 In the case of Becker, his itinerary set him 
apart. As Peter told me: “If there’s someone hard to understand, it’s Becker.”112  
To be a vehicle owner, suffice it to say, was a vexed social position. While vehicle 
ownership was often associated with people who had access to “the modern,” linked to people 
who were “well developed,” who were “coming up well,” it just as often raised questions as to 
how wealth had been attained, and talk that turned on evaluations of how people were leveraging 
capital in order to assert themselves as adults as they tried—or even worse, did not try—to 
domesticate new sources of value. The appearance of fast capital, of money made not through 
the exertion of labor, opened you up to rumors. Capital made through suspect means and sunk 
into vehicles was, evidently, difficult to socialize. And those who failed were culturally lost, and 
this loss had both spatial and conceptual coordinates.  
  
          
Reading Wealth, Class, and the Politics of Mobility During Mau Mau Across Two Archives  
 
By the early 1950s tensions over what seemed, to many, to be an untenable future had reached 
their breaking point. Land scarcity, in tandem with the increased consolidation of the power of a 
landed elite, left many social juniors few options. The material conditions of possibility for social 
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maturation appeared to have been excised from their horizons of expectation, with no hope of 
their returning. As in the 1890s, this was a moral as much as a material crisis. As Lonsdale 
writes:  
by 1950 more and more Kikuyu were excluded from the means of production and 
self-mastery by inequality rather than idleness. Their poverty was not delinquent 
but structural. Land was now scarcer than labour. Rich men failed to adopt the 
poor but ate more meat. [With Mau Mau, or “the greedy eaters,” a reference to 
these hungry elders] Kikuyu were engaged in a struggle about class. 
These social juniors were split geographically—some in Nairobi, others squatting in the Rift 
Valley, and others still in Central Province—but they shared a sense of the impending threat of 
social exclusion and, in the case of the poor, social oblivion. This was particularly the case 
following the 1950 eviction of squatters from Olenguruone, which, Lonsdale argues, “settled the 
pact between town and country,” between the anake a forti, or the Forty Group, and the 
landless.113  
With an increasing measure of alarm, administrators reported clandestine meetings taking 
place both in Nairobi and in the reserves.114 Like in the 1890s, while tactics were argued over, 
both town and country agreed that what was needed was social renewal.115 On one reading, Mau 
Mau was an effort to restore the always imperfectly articulated vision of class structure—
hierarchical but premised on the possibility for individual advancement—that shaped Kikuyu 
social life. With Mau Mau, social juniors sought to remind elders of their obligation to guarantee 
the material prerequisites young men required in order to change their station. Indeed, it would 
not be far-fetched to argue that the Mau Mau forest fighters strove to enact ituika, a period of 
social renewal, the last staging of which, we will recall, followed the devastating famine of the 
1890s (Chapter 1). Like at the end of the nineteenth century, Mau Mau fighters were engaged in 
a battle to restore “social discipline.”116 Like in the 1890s, moreover, it was a debate over new 
measures of wealth, as land consolidation and the formalization of tenure forced the socially 
excluded to do more with less. For squatters, pursuing this critique on their own would have 
proven difficult. As Lonsdale argues, while the Gikuyu labor theory of value gave rights of 
                                                
113 Lonsdale, “The Moral Economy of Mau Mau,” 427.  
114 Ibid., 402-03.  
115 Peterson, Creative Writing, 15-19. 




access to squatters via their labor, “it did not deliver the power to assert them.”117 For this, new 
alliances were necessary. 
And in this, the urban and rural poor seemed to find allies in an emergent petite 
bourgeoisie. These men, it seems, had found their wealth not in landed status, but in trade. These 
were the lorry men. These were the taxi drivers. Some of these men might have been members of 
the driving associations formed at the war’s end, but theirs was a politics of mobility that moved 
along more than one axis.  
Eliud Mutonyi was one such middle figure. Mutonyi was a self-made man, having 
leveraged his business in transport into a position of wealth.118 He had come to public notice as a 
member of the Kikuyu General Union in the 1940s.119 His ideology of respectability was 
normative. He joined landed rural elders, squatters, and city dwellers in decrying urban life. This 
they shared. And yet, his own position did not neatly map onto rural landed eldership status. 
Indeed, his capacity to become a man of means was, itself, premised on his movement through 
the urban spaces that he so decried.120 Men like Mutonyi, unlike men of Kenyatta’s generation, 
though, found themselves unable to socialize their peripatetic itineraries and the sources of 
wealth that were their result. This was, perhaps, part of his point. Structural transformations had 
made city life a requisite for many. For these reasons, we might speculate, Mutonyi was more 
militant than the landed elites of the Kenya African Union (KAU), joining the poor in decrying 
the greed of rural patriarchs.121 Men of Mutonyi’s stature joined other urban men of means in 
challenging the authority of these men, men like Kenyatta. As Bildad Kaggia recalled, the men 
of the city were frustrated with Kenyatta’s willingness to decry the movement. Kaggia, along 
with Fred Kubai and Mutonyi, demanded that Kenyatta stop these public denunciations. His 
denigrations of city life and youth were too convincing. Kenyatta, Kaggia recalled, was taken 
aback. “It was rare for Kenyatta to face an organized opposition…but [he] accepted the 
demand.”122  
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For Mutonyi, as for Gakaara wa Wanjau, to whom we shall return, wealth itself did not 
confer virtue or patriotism. But whereas for Wanjau it was an accusation (wealth does not confer 
virtue), for Mutonyi it was posed in the interrogative: why did some forms of wealth, and some 
forms of work, not confer virtue? They seemed to agree that wealthy householders were not to be 
trusted.   
Men of Mutonyi’s ilk, it seems, hoped that the future of civic virtue lay in trade translated 
into self-mastery. As Lonsdale writes: “Fear of the Forty [as an affront of rural landed status] 
may have also stemmed from the fact that they were rejecting old authority in order to find a new 
basis of self-mastery in town. Repudiating ancestry, they would make their own way.”123 Landed 
elders disparaged these men, calling them spivs, mikora, hooligans, and collapsing them with the 
urban poor with whom they had formed an alliance. Wanjau, as we shall see, seems to have 
parted ways with men of Mutonyi’s social standing, joining landed elders in disparaging their 
work as unmeritorious.  
The driving set, however, did not seek to overturn the existing social order, but instead to 
supplant it, locating for themselves the status of moral eldership. In this they, in fact, sought to 
enact the same acrobatic feat as Kenyatta had with Mwigwithania, recuperating their itineraries 
as they rescaled them, incorporating exogenous skills and wealth as the new metrics of deserving 
leadership. One might be tempted to say here that their interests were at odds with those of the 
structurally junior: the squatters, the urban poor. This, though, would be to ignore the 
underwriting epistemology of civic virtue that guided the critique being advanced by the 
landless. This was, in part, a struggle wherein the indigent sought to rehabilitate themselves as 
the land poor but labor rich—a struggle for ithaka na wiathi—in the face of material constraints, 
and the intransigence and greed of landed wealthy elders. But it was not a critique of wealth 
itself. These youth—defined by both wealth and status—were seeking the restoration of a social 
contract, not its overturning. The men of means that offered leadership—men defined as youth 
by status but not by wealth—were likewise not interested in overturning the social order—they 
were interested in reconfiguring the metrics by which it was established. And this, of course, had 
a long history.  
                                                




An alliance was necessary. And despite their shared proscriptions on mobility, and their 
judgments surrounding it, mobile itineraries and vehicles themselves were the foundation of 
networks that linked an otherwise disjointed movement. People like Mutonyi, a capital rich, but 
respectability poor urbanite, were at the center of these networks. He was a man of the city, 
spending most of his time in this period in Nairobi. In this regard, too, Mutonyi was not unlike 
Kenyatta a generation earlier. It was from this position that he had joined the anake a forti, a 
heterogeneous group that included unmarried petty traders and artisans, as well as those of the 
lumpenproletariat. The first were excluded from wiathi by virtue of status, the second by status 
and wealth.124 This was the group that Lonsdale refers to as “time bandits.” These men, he 
writes, fundamentally overturned a Kikuyu epistemology of the unfolding of time, of the 
unfolding of social life:  
Kikuyu expected solidarity in annual initiation sets and, in the past, in the 
‘regiments’ in which age-sets were serially grouped. They also saw alternate 
generations as ritually equivalent; one was reborn in a grandchild. The Forty 
Group challenged all three perceptions. They were not an age-set. One of their 
leaders was circumcised mission-style, as early as 1937; any man initiated during 
the 1940s was eligible for membership. Their name, the anake of 1940, suggests 
that they thought of themselves as a junior regiment; no elder could have seen 
them as such without the required rituals. Finally, the Forty Group asserted that 
their parents (not their grandparents) were born, initiated in 1940, the same year 
that they themselves underwent all these life crises. It is hard to think of a more 
appalling affront to authority. It jumbled up the young men’s own moral growth; 
it destroyed the generational basis of civic virtue, seniority and inheritance.125  
This sense of temporal compression was also central in Beauttah’s retrospective recounting of 
the movement. The 40 Group, he recalled: “used to say that they had been circumcised in 1940, 
gone to war in 1940, married in 1940, and had their first child in 1940—everything that was 
important had happened to them, they said, in 1940. It was sort of joke, but because of it people 
began calling them the '40 Group.’”126  These men’s efforts to speed up time were matched by 
their mobile itineraries and, in the case of some, the vehicles they drove. And these mobile 
networks were a perennial concern of colonial administrators, an extension of the earlier trope of 
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the discontented urban youth of the 1920s and 1930s. Of the lorry men, administrators noted, 
“very few” were “really loyal.”127    
As Chairman of the Muhimu, Mau Mau’s central association, Mutonyi was rumored to 
transport men and women to “tea parties” where they undertook the oathing ceremony that 
bound together the loose congeries of people ostensibly unified in the project of what would be 
called Mau Mau.128 In 1952, it was reported that there had been a number of meetings held in 
Kiambu:  
Jomo Kenyatta, Ochieng and ex-Chief Koinange made provocative speeches, the 
main theme being the ‘return of our stolen lands.’ This appealed especially to the 
wives of those who were squatters in the Kinangop area. One may consider that 
the meeting held by the KAU...was the most effective one held to convert the bulk 
of the Akikuyu to Mau Mau tenets. At that meeting the sponsors brought forty 
lorries containing thugs and prostitutes, and in the vehicles all the necessary Mau 
Mau oath impedimenta were carried, flags and other emblems being openly 
displayed.129  
 
Lorries and taxis were central features in the memories of ex-forest fighters as well. Bildad 
Kaggia recalled that the first center of oath administration was in Kiambu, where they “used to 
transport hundreds of people…on buses by night.”130 Taxi drivers, many of whom were members 
of the Transport and Allied Workers Union, allowed people to “keep in touch with every corner 
of the town.” They routinely transported “oath administrators,” a service for which they were 
“owed a special tribute.”131  
And while the motivations for Mutonyi and the driving set remain unclear, it does appear 
that one thing that they lent the movement was the radicalization of what they perceived to be the 
unfair limits thrown up against Kikuyu traders and transporters by the government’s collusion 
with private capital, a marriage that impeded the aspirations of an emergent petite bourgeoisie.132 
In 1952, Mau Mau organizers encouraged sympathizers to boycott shops and buses not owned by 
“their adherents.”133 The leadership built on this energy.  
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In 1953, the “Voice of Truth” broadcast that the Central Command of Mau Mau in 
Nairobi had ordered their “adherents” to boycott the Kenya Bus Service (KBS).134 Between 
September 23 and September 24 of 1953, the manager of KBS Ltd. reported that the number of 
passengers dropped by 30 percent. The alleged boycott, the manager claimed, was the result of 
one of the company’s “Kikuyu Bus Conductors” telling “a prospective passenger that he was not 
allowed to travel in the bus.” Since the incident: “Some Africans on bicycles” had “been 
observed standing at the bus stops and glaring at the odd African passenger in the bus.” All buses 
servicing “native locations” were subsequently withdrawn. The manager of KBS concluded: 
“The boycott is Kikuyu inspired because all actions taken by Government are thought to be 
aimed at depricing [sic] the Kikuyu of his living and increasing the revenue of the European. 
They think the Bus Company belongs to the Municipality.”135 What the manager located as a 
misrecognition—the KBS was a private rather than public amenity—was, on another reading, a 
critique of the ways in which private monopolies impeded African entrepreneurs’ entrance into 
the transport market.  
The conflict between the KBS and the driving set escalated in the years following. In 
1954, following Operation Anvil, which saw the removal of Kikuyu, Embu, and Meru from 
Nairobi, the KBS reported that several of its conductors had been attacked, robbed by “gangs of 
Maragoli,” “armed thugs” who targeted immobile buses idling at transport terminuses across the 
city.136 These attacks appear to have been anything but random.  
  Indeed, a more interesting and complicated topography of power, as it mapped onto the 
politics of mobility, underwrote this story. As we have seen, by the 1920s entrepreneurs living in 
the Central Province had carved out a niche for themselves in the transportation sector.137 By the 
1950s, these informal transportation networks seem to have been standardized, with African-
owned lorries plying charted routes. And over these routes, they were willing to fight.  
In the early days of the boycott, the manager of KBS wrote to the Town Clerk, stating: 
We would like to bring to your notice that many buses other than our own are now 
asking up and setting down the same passengers within the municipal area. We 
do this officially since such acts are in breach of the Exclusive Agreement 
                                                
134 Broadcast #18, 18 November, 1953. KNA AHC/18/4 
135 Manager of KBS Ltd., 25 September 1953, KNA RN/ 1/79, 1952-55.  
136 A.S. Kennard to the Commissioner of Police, Nairobi, 14 December 1954, KNA RN/1/79. 
137 For a history of this home-grown industry, see Kenda Mutongi, Matatu: A History of Popular Transportation in 




between us, and we ask that immediate steps be taken to prevent such 
infringements.138 
The boycott, evidently, was a response to more than simply a conflict between a company driver 
and a passenger. This much was subsequently admitted by the company. Consulting with its 
staff, the KBS reported that the real causes for the boycott were myriad: African-owned buses 
had been taken off the road along Nairobi, Thika, Fort Hall, and Nyeri routes. African taxis were 
prohibited from entering the locations after 7 p.m., and those taxis had to be marked with a 
yellow band.139 The acting director of KBS, writing to the Mayor of Nairobi, concluded with an 
astute observation: “Due to the stoppage of native buses, the Kikuyu thinks the European is 
trying to starve him out of Nairobi while the European continues to get fat.”140 Landed elite 
were, evidently, not the only ones that were hungry, not the only Mau Mau or “greedy eaters.” 
These men were being squeezed from multiple directions. Not only did rural elders denigrate 
their capital and their work, repudiating their claims for self-mastery, rejecting their wealth and 
the self-possessed nature of their work as legitimate baselines from which adult status could be 
pursued, but in these years, their ability to pursue these vocations at all seemed to be under threat 
at the hands of a state-protected monopoly. These men were savvy in their efforts to 
circumnavigate state-led efforts to squeeze them out of the market and limit their access to the 
city.  
Indeed, protecting KBS’ monopoly was difficult. African drivers reportedly changed the 
routes on which they were allowed travel on the officially issued passes that they were forced to 
carry. And try as they may, administrators were at a loss for how to quash this para-network in 
transport, African-owned vehicles ably evading the state’s security apparatuses, which picked up 
only “two contraventions of the Council’s By-laws” over the course of fourteen days. Part of the 
problem was one of visibility. While police officers trained their attention on unsanctioned 
Public Service Vehicles (PSVs) plying KBS routes, the bulk of the vehicles in circulation were 
not passenger vehicles but repurposed lorries.141  
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These ghost vehicles were likely komerera buses, a Kikuyu word that translates to “lie 
low,” but which also pairs idleness with concealment.142 Denied their already limited paths to 
market, these secret buses continued to transport people, traders, and goods to and from Nairobi 
during the Emergency. Like the para-networks people used to get to Nairobi in these years, this 
network had many names, one report claiming that those behind the service called it the “Kikuyu 
Bus Service.” The parallel in the acronyms of the two services should not be ignored here. As in 
the case of literacy, the appropriation of technologies of mobility, once the markers of British 
prestige, was a means of capturing and subverting “the social value of the colonizers.”143 These 
technologies were not, evidently, neutral objects, but objects “appropriated and harnessed to 
quite a different political project,” in the words of Brian Larkin.144 
 While Mau Mau is typically framed as a struggle for land, these disputes suggest that 
access to markets and the city were also frames against which people interpreted the indignities 
of the present, their exclusion from markets foreclosing people’s possibilities for the future. The 
boycott was effective. By February 1954, the KBS reported that “the boycott appeared 100% as 
far as Africans were concerned.”145 The number of passengers using its services had dropped to a 
mere 200–300 per day, the company’s revenues cut in half.146 So fierce were these battles that by 
1959 the Provincial Commissioner of the Coast Province was referring to it as a “transport war,” 
a war fought as much over material as symbolic resources. In the face of this “transport war,” 
KBS and municipal authorities devised a solution. Technologies of mobility serving the public 
would be segregated, the KBS giving the “best service possible to Europeans and Asians” within 
the city limits, with “a complete ban on all other buses (excepting Kenya bus Services and long 
distances buses) entering Nairobi.” Municipal administrators were well aware of the delicate 
politics involved in this decision, and emphasized that the ban must not “be confined to Kikuyu-
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owned buses, but to all buses by whomsoever owned.”147 Race would determine how and in 
which vehicles people were permitted to travel. Technologies of mobility, like physical 
movement itself, would reflect the structure of the colonial hierarchy. 
*** 
Mau Mau was many things to many people. To men like Mutonyi it was, in part, a position from 
which to leverage a critique of the limits to trade and transport thrown up by the racialized 
spatial and infrastructural policies of the state. In relation to landed elders, though, men like 
Mutonyi appear to have been trying to do work of another kind. Theirs was a politics framed by 
efforts to authenticate their own paths to wealth, their own mobile and urban itineraries of 
maturation by other means. In this, they were not so different from men like Kenyatta a 
generation earlier. They too wanted their wealth and newfound forms of expertise to confer 
virtue. This was something worth arguing over. These men were time bandits, yes, but they were 
not radicals. Theirs was a normative politics that sought to domesticate new sources of value and 
new forms of value-generating work. Their opponents, like Kenyatta, argued that they mistook 
wealth for civic virtue. That they used their vehicles to speed up time and launch themselves into 
the status of eldership. This was not the timescale at which social change was held to move. It 
was to be both incremental and cyclical, as well as rooted down. It was the inverse of the fast-
paced mobility of the road. While perhaps cynically mobilized by the landed elite, such as 
Kenyatta given his own past, this critique would have been as legible to the landless as it was to 
the landed.      
If we can locate a kind of progressive conservatism in Mutonyi’s efforts to socialize his 
wealth, it was not without its critics. And these were not limited to corporate monopolies, or the 
colonial state. Nor were they limited to men like Kenyatta. To locate these other voices, we need 
to turn elsewhere, and to a new interpretive genre of disputation. The writings of one cultural 
reformer, Gakaara wa Wanjau, affords us just such an opportunity.  
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Wanjau had experienced many of the indignities of life both as a colonial subject and as a 
social junior with little hope of changing his station in either domain. Born in Nyeri, he was 
expelled from Alliance High school for going on a hunger strike in the early years of the war.148 
In World War II he joined the army. On his return, he found himself demoralized by the urban 
squalor that characterized his life working for the local government in Nakuru.149 The city was a 
place that debased men, material conditions sapping their capacity for self-mastery.   
 His education and service ought to have paid off. But material deprivation functionally 
prevented him from becoming a homesteader. While he was able to marry, his wife was forced to 
live with his family in Nyeri.150 Wanjau, like many of the young men that entered the forest, 
faced social censure in the years leading up to Mau Mau. Rural class formation, in conjunction 
with changing practices of land tenure, made social juniors and younger sons, such as Wanjau, 
vulnerable.151 Their possibilities for social maturation appeared truncated; social oblivion on the 
horizon. Holding true to a durable formation in Kikuyu cultural politics, he joined other young 
men in his position, rural elders, and wealthy traders, such as Mutonyi, in locating the cause for 
these unwelcomed conditions in the corruption of Kikuyu cultural life, castigating the wayward 
and corrupted youth of the city.152 And, like Mutonyi, he was very much of the place that he so 
critiqued.   
Wanjau’s writings at once offered a declension narrative of the present and a prescription 
for the future. His vocation was that of both a cultural critic and cultural architect. And he 
followed a long line of Kikuyu cultural reformers for whom mobility was both a source of 
anxiety and the condition of possibility for critique. Unlike men of Mutonyi’s stature, however, 
Wanjau did not need to domesticate the wealth derived from experiences further afield, as he had 
derived none. Perhaps this was part of his argument. His life, perhaps it seemed to him, looked 
more like that of squatters living in Rift Valley—for whom he wrote a pamphlet following their 
ejection in 1948, titled The Spirit of Manly Courage and Effort for the African— than it ought.153  
Around him, Wanjau would have seen an emergent class of wealthy Kikuyu—men like 
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Mutonyi—growing up. He would have seen these men benefiting from what were, to him, the 
disarming forms of moral disorder located in the city.     
Wanjau reportedly took the oath in 1952, and was swept up in Operation Jock Scott the 
following year. He would remain in detention for 8 years, and by 1956 Wanjau had confessed his 
involvement in the movement. For this he was rewarded, being granted a position as a staff 
member at Athi River Rehabilitation Center. From this position, Wanjau pursued his long-
standing vocation as a writer and cultural expert. While Wanjau was a prolific cultural producer, 
he clearly did not have a free hand in composing the texts he wrote while in detention, which 
were subject to the watchful oversight of the camp commandant.154 And yet, we can be fairly 
sure that some key elements of this creative work, elements that would have seemed insignificant 
to government readers, were central to the cultural politics of Kikuyu communities in the late 
1940s and early 1950s.          
Wanjau joined both contemporary cultural reformers and those of the past in mobilizing 
vehicles as a central trope of gendered and generational disorder. In the undated, “Nyarwimbo is 
With Me,” Wanjau narrates the story of Nyarwimbo and a girlfriend who, together with 
Nyarwimbo’s boyfriend, James, conspire against their parents, disrespecting the authority of 
their fathers and thereby undermining the basic hierarchies that ought to structure social life. 
Together the three plan to escape the oversight of their parents and travel to the city. They enroll 
a bus named Kaukuo, literally “there it goes,” in pursuit of their deviance.155 The titular 
Nyarwimbo is described as a “pretty, plump girl, not very tall. She was decked out in the current 
fashion and, from her words, she seemed a bit aloof.”156 We will recall here the anxieties that 
filled the pages of Mwigwithania in the 1920s and 1930s (Chapter 1). Dressed in current fashion 
immediately marked Nyarwimbo as deviant.  
The three are caught when Nyarwimbo’s brother, Waigwa, stops the bus in his Saab and 
demands that they return home. It is quietly revealed that the three had conspired to leave 
Karatina so that Nyarwimbo and James could marry, taking to the road so that James could avoid 
paying bridewealth and the indemnity owed to Nyarwimbo’s father for her pregnancy. A fight 
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erupts between Waigwa and James. The driver and the conductor of the bus become frustrated 
with the delay caused by the conversation, to which Waigwa responds: “Oooh! So you are the 
ones who help other people’s girls to run away so that they can go where they want!” All seems 
about to descend in chaos but for the presence of an “elder” sitting at the back of the bus who 
intervenes. Having listened to the case, he proclaims that the young man must pay for the 
pregnancy and formalize his intention to marry Nyarwimbo. James concedes and sends money 
for the purchase of “dew beer,” promising that he will initiate bridewealth once he has spoken to 
his father. As though speaking directly to the reader, a listening police officer turns to the elder 
and says, “And you, elder, we’re grateful to you, we need elders like you in this country of ours.” 
All breathe a sigh of relief, marking the end of the “case regarding the marriage payment on the 
bus of ‘Kaukuuo’”  
Here Wanjau was making an argument about the threats he saw facing Gikuyu society. 
For Wanjau, as for cultural reformers in the 1920s, youthful disobedience threatened to unglue 
the tethers of social obligation and respect for elders that were critical to the maintenance not 
only of social order but of social reproduction as well. For men like Wanjau, the road and 
automotive technologies became the sites upon which society’s nightmares materialized and, in 
the case of his writings, became “emotionally real.”157  
While working in a different genre, the central themes, objects, and sites of anxiety in the 
writings of Wanjau bear a striking resemblance to those expressed by the contributors of 
Mwigwithania. And like the writers of Mwigwithania, Wanjau was making an argument in these 
pages. But times had changed, and in structural terms his position was different from that 
occupied by men like Kenyatta in the 1930s. Indeed, he was no stranger to the existential crisis 
thrown up for young men unable to afford bridewealth. And yet, he was emphatic that the 
custom be maintained. What was needed were responsible “elders,” like the man at the back of 
the bus, capable of restoring moral order and ensuring that young people did not flee the 
countryside for life in the city. We will recall here the problem of poverty, which was at once 
evidence, cause, and effect of delinquency. Material conditions had to be modified such that the 
moral order could be restored. For Wanjau, writes Lonsdale, “wealth was not by itself 
                                                




patriotic.”158 And so, and in contrast to Mutonyi, Wanjau was suspicious of people trying to 
parlay new wealth into eldership status. It seems that, for him, the trader joined the “greedy” 
elder as the central archetype of this morally illegitimate wealth.   
Consider “Let His Wickedness Judge Him,” a play Wanjau wrote in 1956 while he was 
interned at Athi River Camp.159 It is a story that gives full expression to the concerns of men 
detained during Mau Mau. At its center are detainees’ anxieties regarding the conjugal lives of 
their wives and the status of their property.160 The story is framed around the life of Mariko, who 
we learn is an old, unrepentant, and wealthy Mau Mau “adherent.” 
There is something odd about this setup to begin with. Men such as Mariko were of a 
sociologically different type than many Mau Mau forest fighters. Wanjau was educated, but he 
joined the urban and rural poor, united by the impossibility of achieving self-mastery; theirs was 
a struggle for ithaka na wiathi—land and self-mastery—things that, on the face of it, Mariko, like 
Mutonyi, had achieved.161 But it is this oddity that seems to be at the center of Wanjau’s critique, 
Mariko acting as a stand-in for an emergent and increasingly robust class of men that had 
achieved wealth but not virtue. While the reader learns little of Mariko’s life pre-detention, pre-
Mau Mau, Wanjau offers us some important clues. Mariko’s concerns throughout the play pivot 
around the status of his investments, not in land or cattle, but in motor-vehicles, in lorries. In 
describing his properties to the rehabilitation officer, he brags: “I had three buses and four 
lorries,” to which the officer responds: “Don’t say that as a joke. You can run mad when you 
remember wealth like that.” Over these investments hangs an unnamed moral ambiguity. We 
learn, for example, that Mariko leaves the work of managing his affairs in trade to others. What 
Mariko describes as “his work” falls outside of the definition of both wiathi and wira—two 
concepts that sits at the core of an always contested but remarkably robust Gikuyu labor theory 
of value: “My sole work [before I was detained] was to drink and enjoy life, enjoy the world 
because I was rather late. That’s why you see me asking for much money from home, for 
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enjoyment, while people grieve over confessing our secrets.” Here we learn some critical 
information. Mariko, the reader was to understand, had been among those that found himself 
blocked from accessing land— “because I was rather late”—and yet he had managed to attain 
wealth nonetheless. And the absence of any discussion of land, in contrast to the repeated 
discussions of Mariko’s business, suggests that this wealth was secured through trade alone.162  
While not de facto excluding him from the status of wiathi, his relationship to this work as the 
abrogation of labor may have. He had, in other words, attained wealth but not self-mastery. For 
Wanjau, unlike for Mutonyi, this was not a position from which legitimate critiques could be 
made. And, while it is not spelled out by Wanjau, other information provided suggests that his 
wealth came from suspect sources and that it had not been properly socialized. Mariko states that 
his “affairs are different from those of the common people.” 
Here, Mariko marks himself as an outsider, one who had excluded his wealth from 
benefitting the collective. Wiathi, we will recall, was linked to civic virtue and wira. But forging 
the connections between labor, wealth, and respectability required further embedding, not 
distancing, oneself from the community. This required generating solidarities with one’s riika, or 
age set, but also with one’s mbari, or clan, the latter demanding the maintenance of a beneficent 
relationship with dependents. We will recall here the recriminations of early drivers, those that 
refused to return home, those that did not parlay their individual wealth into civic virtue, such as 
Becker. Mariko’s only dependents beyond his immediate family seem to have been urban 
discontents and waywards, those who “frequented the River Road,” with his “vehicles carrying 
people to oath ceremonies.” Mariko, in other words, had leveraged his improperly socialized 
wealth, for which his vehicles were the core symbol, to lead mikora, the unworthy poor, into the 
forest. Mariko was not a man of civic virtue nor self-mastery: he was a child. As the CDO 
rebuked him, “[What are you worth?] An old man like you, who has property and grown 
children? [And yet you] are no better than your son.” 
A close reading of Wanjau’s writings, through a focused attention on his sites of anxiety 
and the moral ambiguity hanging over them, sheds some light on the complicated politics of 
class amongst the Kikuyu who called the forest, a space of the wild, home in the years of the 
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Emergency. In this period, the always precarious relationships among wealth and status, hard 
work and class, aspiring eldership status and civic virtue had reached their breaking point. If men 
like Mutonyi argued that men like Kenyatta had an unfair advantage, having ably transformed 
their deviant pasts into leadership, men like Wanjau argued that men like Mutonyi’s labor was 
unmeritorious. Not having properly socialized their wealth, this class of men, Wanjau seemed to 




“Roads and Railways”—to this we might add lorries and cars—“are not just technical objects,” 
writes anthropologist Brian Larkin:  
but also operate on the level of fantasy and desire. They encode the dreams of 
individuals and societies and are the vehicles whereby those fantasies [and 
nightmares] are transmitted and made emotionally real…They form of us as 
subjects not just on a technopolitical level but also through this mobilization of 
affect and the sense of desire, pride, and frustration, [and fear] feelings which can 
be deeply political.163  
It is by tacking back and forth between materiality and meaning, between form and the content to 
which people ascribe form, that we can begin to locate both the “politics and poetics” of 
infrastructures. 
Chapters 1 and 2 worked at this interstice to explore the politics and poetics of roads, and 
the technologies that ride on their rails. Chapter 1 worked to tease out the vexed place of roads as 
common goods by exploring the contradictory place of infrastructures that began their lives in 
the hands of a corporation. The dual vision of roads as bearers of “commerce and civilization,” I 
argued, articulated with existing epistemologies as those living in the region interpreted these 
new infrastructures as against prevailing visions of space and work. In this chapter I turned to the 
postwar period and to vehicles. If in the early colonial period, the road and access to road 
infrastructures critically mediated relationships between the state and its putative subjects and 
                                                




mediated relations at the scale of community and household, in the postwar period technologies 
of mobility joined roads in becoming dense nodes of conflict.  
Askaris returned from the war with high hopes. Their participation in the British war 
effort had armed them with cash and expertise that they worked to translate into more desirable 
futures. While the state hoped that askaris would sink these monies into savings accounts, askaris 
brought to bear their own systems of valuation as they considered their futures. These men had 
been trained in the service corps, and at the center of their aspirations were lorries and the new 
markets of goods and people to which they promised access. Theirs was a politics that turned not 
on generic notions of sacrifice to the crown. It was more specific; a vocational politics that 
located newfound skills and expertise at their core. In this, they found their aspirations frustrated 
in at least two registers. In applying for licenses for vehicles and trade, aspiring traders were 
blocked by the racial and technological hierarchies that organized economic life in the Kenya 
colony. In particular, as they worked to enter new markets, they found themselves in conflict 
with South Asian traders, who had carved out for themselves what were popularly perceived to 
be monopolies in the fields of transport and trade. This offered yet further evidence that the 
public for whom infrastructures were constructed was tiered. These frustrations articulated with 
popular experiences of truncated mobility, which, I argue, was central to people’s experiences of 
these colonial infrastructures. By the 1950s, Kenya’s taxi-men and lorry drivers worked to scale 
up these (micro)politics of mobility as they tethered them to critiques of the racialized spatial and 
economic logics that shaped popular experiences of violence and exclusion in the Kenya colony.  
But in Kenya, the politics of infrastructures have rarely simply been a site where state-
subject relations are mediated. And it was not simply the state that seemed to foreclose young 
people’s aspirations. As landholding status was increasingly out of reach for many, askaris 
among them, conventional routes to maturation were foreclosed. The consolidation of power of 
the land rich ensured this. These householders denigrated the labors of their social juniors, 
promising that the work of trade, that wealth in vehicles, would never measure up to the stores of 
wealth located in livestock and land. Their capital was excoriated and their paths to attaining it 
opened them up to moral censure as they tried to rescale their wealth, leapfrogging over the slow, 
incremental path to social maturation. In these labors of domestication would-be traders by and 




had a generation named in their honor, this a means of integrating economic transformation and 
acknowledging the legitimacy of new forms of expertise and value generation.164  
By the 1940s, in other words, disputes over technologies of mobility and mobile work 
became the site where enduring generational dynamics played out. But this was not the first time. 
Indeed, each generation of men addressed in the past two chapters chastised the forms of 
mobility of which they themselves partook a generation earlier. Indeed, popular criticisms of 
youthful peripatetic itineraries seem to have become a de facto element of claiming elder status, 
all the while effacing the forms of movement and capital accumulation that had allowed 
successive generations to secure for themselves positions of power and authority. And this 
dynamic persists into the present (see Chapter 7).  
But by the 1950s, this capacity for repetition appeared foreclosed, as constraints on the 
material conditions of possibility for maturation solidified. This reached a head during Mau Mau. 
It was here that social juniors—by virtue of status if not wealth—joined other social juniors—
defined by status as well as wealth—as they took to the forest to fight for, on the face of it, 
ithaka na wiathi. As men like Mutonyi set to work claiming for themselves the right to parlay 
their wealth into elder status, they found their access to markets in transport and trade foreclosed, 
not simply by virtue of the censure of rural patriarchs, but by virtue of the early monopoly in 
transport secured by the KBS. While for Mau Mau forest fighters the struggle was, indeed, over 
ithaka na wiathi, for aspiring traders access to Nairobi and its markets was central to the politics 
of these men, men who perhaps uneasily called Nairobi home. And this alliance between city and 
country, between the property poor and the respectability poor, was always tenuous. Class 
formation amongst Kikuyu communities ensured this. For those doubly excluded, like Wanjau, 
the claims of the petite bourgeoisie seemed superfluous and self-indulgent. Wealth itself, he 
seemed to remind Mariko (and Mutonyi), did not make you virtuous.  
If, in part, this chapter was about people’s efforts to enroll infrastructures and 
technologies of mobility in a bid to rescale their futures in the context of widespread material 
transformation, the chapters to follow explore different labors of scale-making through 
interrogating a different infrastructure: that of radio broadcasting. As in the case of roads, 
discussions of radio generated conflict. As in the case of roads, these conflicts turned on 
                                                




contestations over how radio broadcasting could enact new scales of social and political 
inclusion (and exclusion). And as in the case of roads, finally, these conflicts themselves 
resonated across multiple scales as various constituencies mobilized their own visions of the 
ideal organization of people and belonging as they worked to secure for themselves more 








Enacting Radio: Expertise and the Politics of Scale in Colonial Kenya 
 
I met Henry Makokha at his office at Kenya Broadcasting Corporation (KBC) early one May 
morning.1 Henry is the radio program’s manager at KBC, which is housed next to the University 
of Nairobi, and across the street from the storied Fairmont Hotel in Nairobi, Kenya’s capital 
city.2 The building has lost much of its luster in the years since its opening in the late 1950s. At 
that time, it was described as a state of the art facility. Today, the carpets are faded, and the 
computers’ cathode ray tube monitors have seen better days. Henry had agreed to meet with me 
to discuss the history of radio broadcasting in Kenya, and greeted me warmly from across his 
large desk when I arrived.  
Henry was born in 1963, the year of Kenya’s independence, in Bungoma, a town located 
in Kenya’s Western Province. A child of independence, Henry came to Nairobi following high 
school to begin a degree in literature at the University of Nairobi. Upon finishing his degree in 
the late 1980s, he was “invited to go for [two] interviews.” One as a “District Officer,” and the 
second as an “Information Officer.” Henry was inclined towards the second position.  Before 
college, he had fulfilled his mandatory term with the Kenya Youth Service (KYS) and had 
“participated a lot in drills, like a soldier...and I think I was...tired of that...so I had opted for 
information officer, which was a good job for me.” Having impressed his interviewer, he was 
assigned his first position: “Producer Two.”   
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Henry had taken the job hoping that it would grant him some distance from the 
regimented discipline to which he had been subjected in the state-run NYS. He was mistaken. As 
in the colonial period, radio in postcolonial Kenya was deeply implicated in Kenyan statecraft. In 
the 1980s, like in the 1940s, the state deployed broadcasting as an instrument of governance. In 
the 1980s, like in the 1940s, the Kenyan government used radio as a means of fashioning 
subjects, all the while pursuing “development.” In the 1980s, like in the 1940s, knowledge 
workers were subject to a good deal of censure at the hands of the state.  
And yet, broadcasting in Kenya has gone through significant transformations since Henry 
began working for what was then called the Voice of Kenya (VoK) in the 1980s. Back then, the 
VoK was the only game in town, he told me. Things began to change in 1989, when the state-
owned Voice of Kenya was transformed into a parastatal operating under the auspices of the 
Ministry of Information and Broadcasting, and was rebranded the Kenya Broadcasting 
Corporation (KBC). These transformations were accompanied by the wholesale “liberalization 
and commercialization of the media industry in Kenya.” As Henry told me, “liberalization” 
transformed the industry from being one concerned with offering a “public service” into a 
“commercial venture.”  
Kenya’s media industries were not alone in this. Transformations in this sector were part 
and parcel of a spate of reforms that characterized Kenya in the early 1990s. In Kenya, as 
elsewhere, pressure from the International Monetary Fund (IMF) and World Bank had led to an 
opening of the political, social, and economic spheres. Donors told then-President Daniel arap 
Moi that donor dollars would be withheld if he refused to initiate multi-partyism and otherwise 
move towards “liberalizing” the country’s political and economic spheres, not least through the 
privatization of state-held assets. 
By 1991, Moi had been in office for 13 years, having come to power following the death 
of Kenya’s first post-independence president, Jomo Kenyatta. People viewed the VoK as a 
mouthpiece of the government during this period. Famously satirized by Kenyan author Ngugi 
wa Thiong’o as “The Voice of Truth” working at the behest of “His Excellency Ole Excellence,” 
the VoK hourly updated Kenyan listeners with the minutiae of the commandante’s daily life.3 
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For Kenyans, then, the liberalization of the media indexed a broader opening in the political 
sphere in Kenya, an opening which eventuated in the end of the dictatorship, with contested 
elections in 1992 and 1997 and, finally, Moi leaving office in 2002.  
And yet, for Henry, the liberalization of the media did not lead to the emergence of more 
‘open’ and truthful reportage. For him, interestingly, the period of liberalization has undermined 
the integrity of the industry as a purveyor of a “public service.” Exploiting what Henry referred 
to as “the negative aspects of liberalization,” the permissive regulatory structure that 
accompanied liberalization enabled commercial radio stations to pursue profit over the public 
good. For Henry, the drive for profits is an anathema to radio broadcasting’s function as a 
“public service,” which requires broadcasting offer “society” a vantage from which to “look at 
things from different levels:” the “local level, the regional level…[and the] global level.” For 
Henry, this multi-perspectivalism is crucial, enabling “the universal understanding of issues.” Far 
from leading to an opening in people’s media worlds, then, Henry argued that liberalization had 
foreclosed the interpretive terrain against which people recall the past, experience the present, 
and imagine the future. 
That Henry feels ambivalent about these transformations is not altogether surprising. The 
2007-2008 presidential election was marked by violence. Popular wisdom held that the newly 
liberalized media was largely to blame, with privately-owned, vernacular language radio stations 
stoking the sense of precarity of various communities defined, as they were, by ethno-linguistic 
attachments. Commercial broadcasters had abrogated what Henry views as being the central 
responsibility of broadcasters. Speaking to communities in vernacular languages, this had 
enabled the emergence and distillation of parochial modes of scale-making that, in the case of the 
election, were generative of what John Lonsdale has referred to as “political tribalism.”4  
*** 
For Henry, these concerns are particular to his postcolonial, post-liberalization present. And yet, 
they distill concerns regarding the place of broadcasting in prospectively securing (or unraveling) 
the contested boundaries of social and political belonging that had animated debates surrounding 
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the medium from its earliest days in the region. In the colonial period, these discussions took 
place over a broad geographic expanse, and drew together a variety of interests: “men on the 
spot,” BBC “experts,” private firms, metropolitan administrators, “local” populations, 
missionaries, and radio hobbyists, each of whom forwarded their own vision of the place of radio 
in Kenya, in Eastern Africa, and across the British empire. As this suggests, discussions of radio 
were, from the outset, framed by multiple scalar logics and interests.  
The first of three chapters on radio, this chapter explores the contested place of 
broadcasting in enacting East Africa as a region during the Second World War. Drawing on the 
concept of technopolitics, which highlights both how infrastructures are deployed to enact 
political goals, and the unintended “power effects” of technological assemblages, I argue that the 
debates over radio-broadcasting emerged at the nexus of multiple projects of scale-making.5 
While metropolitan experts hoped that the development of a regional broadcasting network 
would be generate a regional way of being with Nairobi at its center, “men on the spot,” building 
on the critiques of East Africa’s varied communities, countered that the homogenizing impulse 
of a regional network was not sensitive enough to accommodate itself to the particularities of 
conditions on the ground.  
Two sets of concerns were at play in these debates. “Men on the spot” felt that their 
“expertise,” founded on their intimate of their knowledge of “their charges,” would be 
undermined by an emergent metropolitan emphasis on the standardization of administrative 
practice, of which regional broadcasting appeared to be a harbinger. These local experts argued 
that “place-based knowledge” constituted a form of expertise superior to the “portable” 
knowledge advocated by BBC experts and metropolitan administrators located in London.6 
African communities, for their part, saw in metropolitan efforts to enact regional infrastructures a 
means of surreptitiously generating the material substrate that would usher in East African 
federation, a potential future that, they feared, would see their interests and lives subordinated to 
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the ideology of settler colonialism dominant in Kenya. “Men on the spot” and would-be African 
listeners found in each other an alliance. In leveraging their critiques, they called the Colonial 
Office’s bluff: technics could not be disentangled from the aspirational political futures from 
which metropolitan plans emerged. These cross-cutting projects of scale-making won the 
technopolitical battle of the day, and by 1949 the plans for a regional network were tabled.  
 
 
Broadcasting Empire  
 
Emergent communications networks were wrapped up in the project of empire. Sir John Pender, 
a Manchester Merchant, was one of the first enthusiasts to speculate on the possibilities of 
telegraphic communications, founding the Eastern Associated Telegraphy Companies in 1865.7 
Upon his death this work was taken over by his son, Sir John Denison-Pender, or ‘Le Roi des 
Cables,’ of whom none other than Cecil Rhodes is rumored to have said: “Pender was 
imperializing the map while I was just feeling my way.”8  
Rhodes’ was not merely speaking metaphorically here. As noted by Roland Belfort, a keen 
observer of telecommunications technologies, in 1898:  
The need of...direct cable communication is real and pressing. The Imperial 
Government can now strengthen the British position...quicken Colonial 
commercial expansion, and establish between her principal colonies and the 
mother country a material bond of union which cannot but produce the happiest 
results.9  
Communications networks, in other words, were imagined as being the material means by which 
disparate territories could be sutured together, linking seemingly distant ‘peripheries’ to Europe’s 
scattered metropoles. From the outset, telegraphy (both wired and wireless) was conceived of as 
a project of imperial scale-making.    
By the late 1920s, radio enthusiasts took as self-evident that these emergent 
communications networks were a means of stitching together Empire. As Belfort wrote: “If the 
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vision of the Empire as an organized economic family is to be realized, its communications 
services must be organized as a unified system. Only so can Imperial and International 
Communications Limited play its part in knitting the Imperial family together.”10 In this register, 
the commercial possibilities of telegraphy were tempered by the prerogatives of securing “the 
public interest.”11  
For their part, when administrators in London considered the role of radio in colonial 
administration, they conceived of radio as capable of broadcasting “progress.” Historically an 
agricultural term, to broadcast meant to widely scatter seeds for harvest. For administrators at the 
time, broadcasting held out just such a promise; the medium itself capable of spreading 
“progress” in both its ideational and material forms. As noted in 1936 by a Committee appointed 
to report on broadcasting in the colonies:  
We envisage the development of Colonial Broadcasting— and its justification— 
not as an instrument of entertainment … but…as an instrument of advanced 
administration … for the enlightenment and education of the more backward 
sections of the population, and for their instruction in public health, agriculture 
etc.12 
The vision of broadcasting as an “instrument of advanced administration” would become an 
aphorism in the world of colonial information. And so, and from the beginning, radio was 
freighted with the baggage of pedagogy.  
The temporality telegraphy seemed to offer was critical to the imperial ambitions 
wrapped up in radio. Metropolitan observers saw in the new communications network the 
possibility for centrally administering the colonies, the medium eliminating distance and 
enabling simultaneity. As Belfort noted: “there is no important country which is not in almost 
instant communication with Great Britain.”13 Radio’s capacity to transcend space and compress 
time seemed, to many, to neatly align with the Colonial Office’s (CO) aspiration that governance 
in the future should be standardized and streamlined, “rationally” administered from the putative 
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“centers” of imperial power. Within the metropole, in other words, administrators and 
technologists alike were confident that the space-scaling affordances of radio technology would 
enable the Colonial Office to enact “progress” “at a distance.”14  
In Kenya, limited broadcasting was introduced in 1927 when a group of settlers and self-
identified radio hobbyists pressured the government to initiate services for what was referred to 
as “the public.” This public, of course, was limited in both space and by race, radio broadcasting 
servicing as it did white settlers living in Nairobi and its immediate environs.15 Radio licenses 
cost 50/- per annum, and early efforts were financed by “prominent local business men.”16 These 
radio enthusiasts conceived of radio not as serving the public writ large, but as a special-interest 
venture. 
For these men, broadcasting was of secondary importance, a piggyback venture tacked 
onto their primary ambition: establishing direct communication between settler populations and 
their metropolitan “compatriots” via telegraphy. Tellingly, Lord Delamere, a supporter of 
settlers’ rights and an advocate of regional federation, played a central role in early radio. It 
seems likely that Delamere, in advocating for the advent of telecommunications in Kenya, hoped 
to use the medium to connect nodes of support into a network of voices advocating the expansion 
of settlers’ social, political, and commercial interests in a new, federated, East Africa.17 Radio 
offered these men a medium through which their racialized vision of the future could 
prospectively be scaled up thereby gaining global purchase. In this sense, early radio in Kenya 
was a complex project of scale-making, used to both shore up the settler community’s 
parochialism, while linking it to global elsewheres.  
But radio enthusiasts’ hopes of drawing metropolitan interests toward the Kenya colony 
were tempered by the terms of the agreement they had secured with the colonial government. As 
early radio enthusiasts Norman E. Walter and Allan S. Ker recalled when they penned “Some 
Reflections of the Early Days of Broadcasting in Kenya:” “The New company was granted an 
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operating licence by the Kenya Government [in 1927] only on the understanding that it would at 
the same time inaugurate a local broadcasting service to cover the whole of the Colony” using 
the call sign VQ7LO.18  
The company, called the British East African Broadcasting Co., was a short-lived 
venture. The Kenya colony was a large territory with a highly variable topography, and few 
people on the ground. The provisioning of a Colony-wide service was thus no easy task in 
material terms. As Walter and Ker recalled: “The medium wave transmitter was not powerful 
enough to cover adequately the required area, and…short wave was still in its infancy.” Medium 
wave, while desirable over short distances, is a sensitive medium, susceptible to atmospheric and 
electrical interference and so subject to distortion. The frequencies at which medium waves 
travel are also variable in a 24 hour cycle, messages moving better during the night, but 
struggling to travel during daylight hours.19 Financial constraints further challenged the team. As 
the two noted: “To begin with, all the equipment used for the telegraph and broadcasting 
services, was designed and constructed locally to cut costs.” Early radio networks were thus 
borne of policies of fiscal austerity as the state outsourced the cost of constructing and 
administering the network to a rag-tag operation: the British East African Broadcasting Co.20 By 
the 1950s, these relations infrastructural dependency would prove to be a liability for the colonial 
state (see Chapter 4).  
During a 1928 Imperial Conference, authorities mandated that the British East African 
Broadcasting Co. be absorbed by what was to become Cable and Wireless Ltd.21 While a team of 
local hobbyists and amateurs may have been partially replaced by Cable and Wireless’s experts, 
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and locally produced equipment replaced by state of the art manufactures, there was nothing 
seamless about the services offered by Cable and Wireless Ltd. As noted by the Sunday Post on 
the eve of C&W’s tenure in Kenya: “The Wonderful thing about Cable and Wireless was that it 
existed quietly in a corner of our lives...It was often deliciously amateurish and for that reason, 
often equally lovable, like so much of early Kenya.”22 This journalist’s reflections on the early 
days of colonialism via its broadcasting, while nostalgic, were not altogether wrong. The early 
years of broadcasting were characterized by folly.23 
In the late 1930’s the station began broadcasting on shortwave. Despite this technological 
transformation, the space-scaling (and yet decidedly parochial) achievements of this team were 
concurrently both more expansive and more limited than the group might have hoped. As Walter 
and Ker recalled:  
During 1931 so many letters were being received from listeners in England stating 
how well they were receiving our short wave transmissions. While this was very 
gratifying it was also very disappointing as our objective was to give a Colony-
wide coverage of about 400 miles and not 6,000. Local listeners [unable to pick 
up broadcasts from Nairobi 7LO] on the other hand were sending many 
complaints.24  
The uneven reach of broadcasts emanating from Nairobi was a perennial problem with which 
administrators had to reckon, and these limits would routinely undermine colonial aspirations to 
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Broadcasting Expertise  
 
In 1938, C&W constructed a new studio. The timing of this expansion was felicitous, coming as 
it did in the months leading to the outbreak of the Second World War. Cable and Wireless 
worked with the newly established Kenya Information Office (KIO) to facilitate a “large increase 
in broadcasting” to Africans.25 In preparation for this expansion, the Kenyan government 
initiated an “experiment,” designed to gauge “Africans’” reception of broadcasting in Kiambu, a 
district in Kenya’s Central Province, in August 1938.26 The purpose of the experiment was “to 
discover how broadcasting can best be used for the educational development of Africans.”27 
And, as “a social service,” it was financed by Government.”28  
Running on a “shoestring,” the Kenya Information Office relied on a series of non-state 
actors to subsidize its labors. Then District Commissioner, G.H. Williams, assembled a team in 
possession of various registers of expertise in devising programming for the experiment, which 
included not only representatives from the “Medical, Education, and Agricultural Departments” 
but also Dr. Leakey, of whom we shall here more, and “an educated Kikuyu, Mr. Harry 
Thuku.”29  
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The spatially constrained nature of the experiment mirrored the arterial reach of the 
colonial state.30 Instead of even territorial coverage, listening was clustered around nodes. A 
public reception facility was installed in Kiambu’s marketplace by Cable & Wireless in 
conjunction with the Posts and Telegraphs Department, and another was installed in Memorial 
Hall, a welfare hall located in Nairobi’s “African location,” Pumwani. Other spaces of listening 
were made available by employers who “allowed their employees to listen in at their own 
wireless sets.” Missionaries’ labors were also mobilized, and Dr. Clive Irvine of the Church of 
Scotland Mission (CSM), erected a “special aerial and power supply” outside of his house.31  
Policies of fiscal austerity required the state mobilize these extra-state entities—
missionaries and settlers, African knowledge workers and experts. The administration simply 
could not have pulled off the experiment on its own. But the mobilization of local expertise also 
reflected the prevailing ethos surrounding development initiatives in this period. Advocates of 
“place-based” knowledge argued that if the globally circulating technology of broadcasting was 
to take root in Kenya, it would have to be transformed and ‘localized’ as it was rescaled. These 
advocates for the local did not think in terms of the empire, nor the region, nor, even, the colony, 
but demanded a more precise telescoping. These “men on the spot” challenged the centralizing 
impulse underwriting metropolitan aspirations to extend broadcasting to African communities, 
emphasizing the importance of enrolling allies knowledgeable about the particularities of this 
Kiambu milieu. 
But simply enrolling these allies as prosthetic helpers and generating these spaces of 
listening were not, in and of themselves, guaranteed to produce the desired results. The medium 
was too novel. The messages too new. And the relationship between medium and message too 
tenuous. As it pertained to medium, as numerous observers would argue, any interruption in the 
medium of conveyance—crackles, fading, atmospheric noise—would undermine the 
developmentalist messages on offer. As Edward Twining argued, an inefficient service was 
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guaranteed to derail the “development of broadcasting in East Africa for many years.”32 As it 
pertained to message, many argued that assessing listeners’ responses would be all but 
impossible. Both the Provincial Commissioner and the District Commissioner argued that what 
was needed was research, a network of knowledge workers tasked with generating a clear 
understanding of how people were listening and, even more crucially, to understand what they 
were hearing. The goal of these tests was to gain: “valuable information...regarding the reactions 
of natives to various types of broadcasts.”33 And so, a wide variety of programming was included 
“with a view to finding out what appealed to the African Mentality.”34 These early broadcasts 
were in Kikuyu with English “interpolations,” but designers imagined a future wherein Kikuyu 
broadcasts would be accompanied by Kiswahili translations which, some hoped, would 
eventually propagate across the region under the mantle of the “East African Native 
Broadcasting Service.”35  
Calibrating Africans’ responses to radio required constant vigilance and local knowledge, 
“men on the spot” argued. And yet, administrators were confident in the results of the test. 
“There can be no doubt of the success of these experiments, or of the value of broadcasting,” 
wrote District Commissioner, Williams. Missionaries reported that the Kikuyu broadcasts were 
“most eagerly listened to,” with large groups assembling around receivers during listening 
parties.36 While some reported that listeners were particularly interested in “international 
events,” others noted that people showed: “particular pleasure at Kikuyu songs.”37 Employers, 
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for their part, enthusiastically reported on the capacity of radio to correct “rumors” and other 
“erroneous matter,” which typified the para-networks of communication which took the form of 
word of mouth communication.38 From the outset, then, radio’s purported function was to shore 
up government propaganda, and to “wear the wobblers away from the agitators.”39 This was truly 
a miraculous tool of “advanced administration,” they believed, which “proved quite definitely 
that the African is ‘Wireless’ minded.”40  
But what did it mean to say that “the African” was “wireless minded”? This statement, 
while rhetorically powerful in this period, turned on the conceit that both “the African” and the 
technology of broadcasting were generalizable, internally homogenous entities. Of course, 
though in less explicit terms, this was similarly the conceit of metropolitan administrators who 
imagined broadcasting ushering in a future of centralized “progress,” the infrastructure a “tool” 
of rationalized, centrally directed “advanced administration.” This conceit, in both its valences, 
would be challenged by a perhaps unexpected cast of characters.   
If in the experimental mode broadcasts were designed to capture a community separated 
in space but sharing a linguistic affinity, the affordances of shortwave radio held out the 
possibility of scale-making of a much more expansive kind. The 1938 experimental broadcasts 
transcended not simply the boundaries of the reserve and the African location of Pumwani, but 
the boundaries of the Kenya colony itself with reports indicating that the broadcasts were being 
picked up by listeners in neighboring territories.41 In the coming years, as we shall see in chapter 
4, this capacity would appear to be both a boon and a liability for administrators who assiduously 
worked to police the scales of social and political affinity enabled by shortwave radio.  
The exigencies of the war heightened the Colonial Office’s perception that imperial 
communications infrastructures needed to be expanded. So, for the time being, the experimental 
model was abandoned. And in 1939, and much to the dismay of local administrators, the 
government halted the carefully planned Kiambu experiment, precisely at the moment it 
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expanded broadcasting especially intended for “natives.” During the war, 7LO initiated 
broadcasts in Kikuyu, Dholuo, Kikamba, Luhya, Luganda, Kinandi, Kisii, and Kiswahili.42  
With this expansion in the reach of address came the expansion of the bureaucracy of 
communication. Across the Empire, the Colonial Office appointed Information Officers (IO) 
who were tasked with conveying “information about the war from the Governments to the 
peoples…to ensure the latter’s co-operation in the war effort,” and for generating material for 
metropolitan consumption.43  Within Kenya, an Information Office was established to service the 
regions of “East Africa,” here comprised of Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, Nyasaland, 
and Northern Rhodesia.44 The mandate of this office required the generation of content both 
particular and general.  
These goals tugged in two directions. On the one hand, the Colonial Office was 
concerned with ensuring that “local populations” received official versions of the “war effort.” 
“Uniformity” was the keyword here, indexing the effort to standardize propaganda directed to all 
communities within the command area.45 In spatial terms, this required “centralizing all 
propaganda and broadcasts in Nairobi.”46 On the other hand, broadcasts demanded localizing 
content such that it would appeal to East Africa’s myriad rural populations who were ostensibly 
located in parochial spaces and vernacular universes. These twin mandates reflected a tension 
between “portability” and “place-based knowledge,” and mapped onto a tension that cleaved 
along lines that divided metropolitan administrators and experts from “men on the spot.” 
Arguments in the years to come, as we shall see, were, at base, contests that turned on the scale 
of expertise required to enact radio in the Kenya colony.  
The tension between these imperatives was in clear evidence in the peculiar structure of 
the Ministry of Information (MoI) itself. From the outset, there was confusion regarding the 
hierarchy of the world of Information in East and Central Africa, a confusion which would 
persist following the end of hostilities. Geoffrey Northcote was assigned as Principal Information 
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Officer (PIO) in 1942.47 His office, titled the Regional Information Office in East Africa, had its 
headquarters in Nairobi and was a branch of the British Colonial Office. Northcote, in his 
capacity as Principal Information Officer (PIO), was responsible for conducting information 
work that addressed itself to all interested parties within the East Africa Command. And yet, 
Northcote was administratively beholden to the Colonial Office’s Director of Information 
Services located in London, not to the governments of the territories which he served.  
Territorial governments, for their part, were tasked with assigning Information Officers within 
their respective territories. Many of these men were not formally trained in the “comparatively 
new science of broadcasting,” most being officials seconded from Department of Education, and 
they were responsible, first and foremost, to “local government.”48 This set of relations de facto 
bypassed the authority of the PIO located in Nairobi.49 From the outset, then, the centralizing 
impulse of the Colonial Office existed in tension with what would come to be called the 
“parochial” interests of the individual territories.   
People within these imperfectly nested administrative structures differed over how to best 
wield radio as a “valuable weapon,” a “precision tool” of “advanced administration.”50 While 
administrators at the Colonial Office hoped that radio could streamline colonial governance 
through standardization, “local” officials argued that broadcasting was not a sensitive or 
malleable enough medium to be able to accommodate itself to the particular needs and 
proclivities of the communities to whom broadcasts were targeted. These conflicts, as Northcote 
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noted, tended to “limit the scope of the Principal Information Officer,”51 rendering centralized 
coordination all but impossible.52 But try they did.  
Centralization was a labor of knowledge-work and paper. The Colonial Office tasked 
“men on the spot” and Information Officers with assiduously documenting the responses of 
listening audiences. These reports were subsequently sent up to the Colonial Office. In 
interpreting these reports, the CO appealed to metropolitan “experts” of the medium, notably the 
British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC). Once reviewed in London, the best among these 
reports were circulated back to each of Britain’s colonial holdings as examples of model 
knowledge-work, methods of information gathering to be emulated.53  
Many viewed the mobilization of expert knowledge at the ostensible “center” of Imperial 
power as being critical to the expansion of communications infrastructures during the war. As 
noted by one observer, if “expert knowledge and work” is to be achieved, it was imperative that 
“the very closest and most constant contacts between the Colonial Office and the BBC...and 
between this Office [in London] and the Information Officers and Broadcast departments in the 
Colonies [be maintained].”54 
Maintaining the “very closest and most constant contacts” was no easy task. Indeed, BBC 
experts routinely lamented the absence of uniform standards in the work of Information Officers 
on the ground. As noted by a BBC observer in a report on Radio Listening in the Colonies in 
1942: “the information sent in by information officers is disappointing…Some of the 
comments...might well be the Information Officer’s personal opinion. This is not wanted in 
objective listening research.”55 For BBC experts, cultivating listeners was a “science” that 
required the use of uniform measures of evaluation and critical distance from that which was 
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being evaluated. For these men, expert knowledge was defined by its standardization. Only 
uniformity would generate usable data that would be universally applicable and portable. In 
pursuit of these ends, the Colonial Office recommended that the BBC send “qualified 
intelligence officers to the Colonies.”56 For “men on the spot,” by contrast, the demand for 
“objective” knowledge completely missed the point.57  
Indeed, advocates of “local” knowledge routinely lamented working under “experts” who 
had “no experience of the African Areas.”58 This, they argued, was a liability. As Noel Sabine of 
the Colonial Office noted with some frustration, East African governments were opposed to the 
prospect that programs for the region be developed in, and broadcast from, London:  
Apart from practical language difficulties East African Governments regard as 
dangerous proposal[s] to broadcast to Africans from London. Experience in 
Kenya [they argue] has shown that unless those responsible for programmes are 
in constant touch with African listeners and can ascertain their reactions 
broadcasts may produce results the reverse of those intended.59 
Centralization, for these observers, was not simply undesirable—it was dangerous.60 Local 
knowledge was essential to interpreting listener responses, and was critical in program 
development. As noted by M.F. Hill: “if the African’s interest in broadcasting is to be stimulated 
and maintained...the programmes must concern themselves with the warp and woof of his life.”61  
Place-based knowledge, these men argued, should govern the world of imperial information 
work. As Chief Secretary of the Governors’ Conference, Henry Gurney, wrote:  
Any material…[issued] from London of either standardized or more specialized 
form...can be more usefully, safely and economically be sent in the form of 
concise notes or list of facts which can be adapted for local use…the African 
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population should be provided with material prepared in the light of up to date 
local knowledge with an understanding of African sentiment [and] with an eye to 
translation.62 
Colonial information work, in other words, demanded particularization.  
The most forceful advocates of place-based knowledge were “men on the spot,” 
including those information workers that moved with the medium. Despite the ambitions of the 
CO, the reach of broadcasting from 7LO was uneven throughout the war years. And so, 
administrators brought the medium to communities along the region’s troublesome road 
networks. Arthur M. Champion, of whom we will hear more (Chapter 5), ran Kenya’s first 
Mobile Unit. Formerly a Provincial Commissioner in Kenya (Chapter 2), Champion was selected 
for his “wide knowledge of natives” and his long interest in “native welfare.”63 The Government 
hoped that “through the medium of a wireless receiving set attached to the van” the problems 
thrown up by the lumpy reach of the state in both material and ideological terms could be 
mitigated, as the van brought government messages and entertainment “to audiences which 
would not otherwise be reached [by] the vernacular broadcasts from the Nairobi Station.”64  
Moving with these Mobile Units offered ample opportunity for traveling administrators 
to engage in a comparative, if essentializing, ethnographic mode as they evaluated audience 
responses and commented on “local” conditions.65 For these men, metropolitan technopolitical 
aspirations for centrally produced broadcasts were completely misguided, unable to account for 
the variation in would-be listeners. Reflecting on the experience of conducting a Safari in 
Uganda in 1943, Gurney noted the variations in audience responses, writing: “It is quite 
impossible to generalize about our audiences” each of which responded differently to the 
messages brought to them by van.66  
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They varied from wild Acholi, stuff of the KAR, dancing around us with speakers 
and shields, and shooting technical questions regarding machine gun calibres and 
ranges: timid, primitive, skill-clad Bachiga...starting back as a spear was thrown 
on the cinema screen: rubbishy town audiences – ‘takaka ya soko’- of pimps and 
urchins, already used to the films: highly critical audiences of the KAR, Pioneers 
and Police (at Kampala, Tororo, Jinja and Kisumu), viewing our drill and weapon 
display with professionally jaundiced eyes: the cynical and suspicious, but 
indisputably intelligent Baganda, main source of supply of Signallers, clerks, 
Drivers, Dressers, Education Corps teachers, and other ‘fundis’ of the EA Forces: 
the Teso, turning out in thousands to see our show but forbidding their women to 
attend.  
Local Information Officers, such as Gurney, rejected metropolitan claims for the portability of 
radio work. As Gurney argued: “With audiences so widely different, the impossibility of 
generalising and the difficulty of lying down any hard-and-fast lines of propaganda will be 
appreciated.”67 Local information workers were largely in agreement with this position. As noted 
by W. Kelly who manned the mobile cinema unit in Kenya following Champion’s retirement, 
audiences were composed of “individuals” all of whom had “different views.”68 For these 
knowledge workers, the notion of a singular “African mentality” was, evidently, rubbish. And 
the stakes of this misapprehension were high. As officials on the ground were quick to argue 
absent “up-to-date information as to…[audience] reactions, serious danger exists that the 
broadcasts may lead to results the reverse of those intended.”69  
Conflicts over content and audience reception, then, were conflicts over the status of 
expertise as it related to questions regarding the affordances of radio as a tool of administration. 
And they were not limited to those concerned with Information, but were arguments that distilled 
broader anxieties provoked as strategies of colonial governance were being reformed in the years 
bookending WWII. This period was marked by an astronomical increase in the technical and 
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professional branches of the colonial service, which generated tensions, as the Colonial Office 
sought to replace the “man on the spot” by waves of technical experts.70   
The Postmaster General, himself responsible for Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar, and Kenya, a 
position that perhaps lent itself to regional thinking, put his finger on a key node of conflict when 
he wrote:  
One reads in the general press and in the deliberations of certain societies 
lamentation, whether justified or not, that the Administrative Service has been 
progressively losing that intimate contact with the indigenous peoples which, in 
earlier days, was one of its most important functions. Those who regret this 
change attribute what they view as a deterioration to the growth of paper-work in 
District Commissioners’ offices.71 
An increase in the bureaucratization of colonial hierarchies had critically separated “men on the 
spot” from intimate knowledge of their “charges.” Developing programing suitable for what 
some administrators referred to paternalistically as “my listeners,” turned on mobilizing these 
intimacies.72 These men did not deny the valuable role radio could play in spreading the 
emergent developmentalist ethos. They did, however, argue that development could not be 
transposed without modification to new spaces. This was an argument against scalability.  
For the Postmaster General, by contrast, far from separating administrators from the 
African communities with whom they worked, the technocratic impulse underwriting the 
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expansion of broadcasting, in tandem with the prospective reach of the infrastructure, would 
enable a return to older models of intimacy:  
 
Re-examination of the case by the Administration with the possibilities of 
broadcasting in mind may show that whereas no District Officer can be expert in 
all phases of matters affecting administrative work, a judiciously selected team of 
officers coupled with a liberal corps of trained interpreter-broadcasters for the 
various vernaculars may be capable of carrying the administration once again 
intimately into the lives of the people and thus make the influence of the 
Government more effective.73 
 
Infrastructural regionalists, such as the Postmaster General, argued that the labor and knowledge 
of idiosyncratic “men on the spot” ought to be standardized as it was distributed across a cadre of 
technical experts. Rather than a kind of arterial knowledge network, what was imagined here was 
a capillary and distributed knowledge apparatus which, as we shall see, advocates of regional 
standardization hoped to mirror in the infrastructure of broadcasting itself. If these debates 
distilled broader anxieties regarding the shape of colonial hierarchies and the status of expertise 
during the war, they concurrently articulated with debates about the appropriate scale of 
administration in Eastern Africa.  
 
 
Broadcasting the Region  
 
At a 1941 Conference of Information Officers held in Nairobi then Governor of Kenya, Henry 
Moore, addressed attendees. He opened by remarking that theirs was a moment of profound 
transformation in the region, transformations in which radio could play a central role. In Moore’s 
framing, radio broadcasting enabled a kind of space-scaling that marked the medium as distinct 
from other communications technologies. “That I should be able to address a Conference such as 
this” he began:  
is a forcible illustration of the manner in which the vast distances that in Africa 
separate us from one another in a physical sense are being bridged by the 
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aeroplane. But in the realm of ideas the development of wireless broadcasting is 
in a fair way to eliminate these vast distances altogether...because the transmission 
of information and the dissemination of ideas knows nowadays no territorial 
boundaries.74 
Just as the Postmaster General imagined broadcasting as a means to restore administrative 
intimacy, the Governor, too, imagined broadcasting as capable of transcending space, and 
generating new scalar imaginaries. These two positions shared a belief that there was something 
enabling about the intangibility of the air through which broadcasts moved. Radio signals’ 
capacity to propagate through the air could, he argued, be mobilized to generate profound 
material transformations. At the forefront of Moore’s mind was the possibility that radio could 
enact a new geographic and political unit: the region. Not all agreed with this position.  
Prior to the war, it was more or less undisputed that radio broadcasting could serve as a 
new tool for effecting “social welfare” and “development.”75 As Kenya Information Officer 
(KIO) Mervyn Hill noted in 1941:  
Before the outbreak of this present war there had been a growing realisation in 
certain East African colonies that Broadcasting provided a valuable means of 
propaganda designed to reinforce the efforts of Medical, Educational, 
Agricultural, Veterinary and other Departments of Government concerned with 
leading the African towards a better life.76 
For Hill, radio could bolster the efforts of other branches of government as they sought to lead 
“Africa towards a better life.” And all in attendance agreed with this general principle, but many 
of those present emphasized the volatility of the medium, an instability which convinced them 
that “the question of an East African broadcasting station ought not be left till after the war.”77 
Precisely how broadcasting could best articulate with government directives and plans for 
the future remained both uncertain and disputed. For administrators, like Hill, the war had 
unduly interrupted the knowledge work he viewed as being critical to understanding the nature of 
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the medium and its relation to messages received. Derailing the experiments in Kiambu had led 
to an “inadequate appreciation of the many and perplexing difficulties involved in devising 
broadcast programmes...suited to the intelligence of the audience to which they were directed.”78 
This was no matter of small importance, he concluded, because:  
whereas the wireless is a powerful weapon of propaganda, it is also a 
disappointing weapon, and it can be a dangerous weapon, to the wielder unless it 
is used with great care and skill. The ephemeral character of any message carried 
by sound waves, frequently unsupported by subsequent recording in print, renders 
wireless propaganda peculiarly susceptible to distortion, benignant as well as 
malignant, in the minds and by the tongues of listeners.79  
For Hill the problems of broadcasting inhered in the qualities of the medium itself. Unlike print, 
a medium to which readers (and administrators) could refer back, soundwaves seemingly melted 
into thin air, distorted versions extending beyond the moment of broadcast as they were carried 
by the “tongues of listeners,” the new mediums of “garbled” versions of official messages.80  
If the medium of broadcasting lacked the verifiability of print media, it also precluded 
clarification through face-to-face communication enabled by the presence of “men on the spot.” 
As noted by Edward Twining in his much-cited recommendations on the future of broadcasting 
in east Africa: it was necessary that programing designers “anticipate the sort of questions that 
would be likely to be asked,” concluding that “the best way of doing this would be to present the 
talk in the form of a dialogue.”81  
Administrative aspirations to mobilize broadcasting as a medium that transcended 
“territorial boundaries” were quickly beset by problems, which hinged on the material qualities 
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of the air itself. Wavelengths is “tropical Africa,” experts lamented, were burdened by higher 
noise levels. And, while shortwave was less subject to noise interference it held out other 
problems. Not only was the technology of shortwave more expensive but the frequencies 
themselves were overcrowded and were subject to competition. If administrators were committed 
to expanding broadcasting in the region they would need to contend with the “acute, world-wide 
shortage of short wavelengths available for broadcasting.”82  
Problems of transmission led to problems in reception. Administrators argued that 
receivers picking up signals obstructed by “noise” were of serious consequence, capable of 
destroying the purported benefits of broadcasting altogether. As Twining wrote: “Poor reception” 
was “likely to jeopardise the successful establishment of Broadcasting in this Protectorate for a 
generation.”83  
But perhaps most vexingly, shortwaves travel at a higher frequency, enabling them to 
traverse vast expanses of space. In practice, this meant that people listening in to shortwave 
broadcasts from Nairobi needed only turn the dial to access broadcasts emanating from further 
afield. Indeed, colonial anxieties regarding parallel infrastructures of information critically 
animated discussions surrounding the need for an expanded broadcasting service during the war, 
as administrators reported that people were listening in to shortwave broadcasts from Italy and 
Germany. While the spread of this information “by the tongues of listeners” was derided as 
“rumor” in the “colonial lexicon,” officials had to concede that many of these “agitators” were 
tapped into global networks of information that were precisely facilitated by the introduction of 
shortwave broadcasting.84 The affordance of shortwave technologies was a source of a good deal 
of anxiety for the administration and, as I explore the chapter to follow, critically shaped 
                                                
82 Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Officer Administering the Government of Kenya, 25 March 1949, 
“Broadcasting: With Special Reference to East Africa,” KNA HAKI/13/173.  
83 E.F. Twining, M.B.E., District Officer, Uganda, W.K. Brasher, Engineer-in-Chief, Department of Posts and 
Telegraphs, Palestine, and C.A.L. Richards, Assistant District Officer, Uganda, “Broadcasting Investigations,” 
(Entebbe: Government Printer, Uganda, 1939). 
84 Rumors did not only travel from outside in. There were also rumors moving in the other direction, from Kenya to 
places as far away as California, USA where, in 1940, there was a rumor reported that colonial subjects in East 
Africans were punished by death for owning radios. H. Gurney, Information Officer, to the Honorable Chief 
Secretary, 23 September 1940. KNA AE/34/64 - Posts and Telegraphs, 1940-41. The term “colonial lexicon” comes 
from Nancy Rose Hunt, A Colonial Lexicon of Birth Ritual, Medicalization, and Mobility in the Congo. 




discussions over the ideal type of network and “tropicalised” receiver to be used in colonial 
Kenya. 
Administrators feared that people were drawing on the space-scaling capacity of 
shortwave broadcasting to generate new networks of affinity with global elsewheres that could 
lead to a scale of political connection that was out of synch with colonial logics. Government 
broadcasts were designed precisely to supersede “bush telegraph[s]”—those inscrutable lines of 
communication which were held to be responsible for spreading the news of foreign broadcasts 
throughout the countryside—by offering listeners a register of belonging in line with colonial 
policies.85 But here was the rub. In the years bookending the war, debates over broadcasting 
turned precisely on the capacity of broadcasting to eliminate space and create new scalar 
imaginaries underwritten by the extension of material networks.  
In 1939, Twining penned a report which made recommendations regarding the future of 
broadcasting in East Africa, and which circulated broadly in the world of colonial information.86 
Twining was not a technical expert, but was a District Officer (DO) turned member of the British 
Intelligence Service for East Africa.87 He was somewhat unusual in his capacity as DO. While he 
and his wife, a doctor, thoroughly enjoyed the early years of their post in Uganda, he had no 
affinity for language-learning, struggling even to develop a rudimentary understanding of 
Kiswahili after having spent ten years in the region.88 As noted by his biographer, Darrol Bates, 
the Colonial Office did not know quite what to do with Twining: “He had neither the unobtrusive 
temperament nor the talent for detachment needed in a secretariat official and his value as a 
district officer was limited by the fact that he couldn’t pass the statutory examinations in 
Swahili.”89 He was, in other words, betwixt and between two epistemologies of administration. 
The first, standardized and detached. The second, embedded and intimate.  
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But large scale projects of the kind demanded by the Uganda broadcasting experiment 
were right up his alley.90  And knowledge work of this kind, so he argued, demanded regional 
thinking. As he warned: “a parochial view regarding the development of Broadcasting in East 
Africa,” must be avoided at all costs.91 Instead he spoke of the “great advantages to be gained if 
the development of Broadcasting in Kenya, Tanganyika and Uganda was considered on an East 
African, rather than a territorial basis.”92 Twining was not alone in this mode of infrastructural 
thinking. Indeed, Twining’s emphatic plea for this particular vision of centralization was 
embedded in a more enduring set of contentious conversations regarding scale-making in Eastern 
Africa, conversations which turned on an administrative and infrastructural future bound not by 
the colony, but extended to enact the region.  
*** 
As early as 1922, then Secretary of State for the Colonies, Winston Churchill, told 
representatives of Uganda and Kenya that he looked forward to the day when the four 
territories— Kenya, Uganda, Tanganyika, Zanzibar— would become: “a great East African 
Federation, almost an Empire.”93 Like the move away from the “man on the spot” that would 
characterized Colonial Office policies in the years following the Second World War, regional 
thinking was guided by the aspiration of ushering in a mode of colonial rule that was centrally 
administered and standardized.  
Immediately, African communities voiced their opposition to East African federation. 
Nowhere was the opposition stronger than in Uganda. In the late 1920s, coming on the heels of 
the Hilton Young Commission, which was tasked with exploring the possibility of the “Closer 
Union” of East Africa, representatives of the Buganda Kingdom wrote a series of memoranda 
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opposing the unification of the region. In particular, they cited their fears that the Kingdom’s 
relative autonomy would be undermined and subordinated to the interests of other communities. 
As Daudi Chwa II, then Kabaka of the Buganda Kingdom, wrote:  
From the newspaper reports and other correspondence on this subject emanating 
from the European Community in Kenya, it is only too clear that my fears and 
anxieties are well-founded and that it is the express intention on the part of the 
European Community to subordinate the interests of the Natives of East African 
Territories to the interests of the immigrant European races.94  
At the center of these fears was the possibility that unification would open Uganda up to white 
settlement on the model of neighboring Kenya. For these reasons the parliament of Buganda, the 
Lukiko, expressed its: “unanimous disapproval of the contemplated amalgamation of the 
Kingdom of Buganda with any other African tribes of the British Territories in East Africa 
outside the Buganda Kingdom.”95 The Baganda feared that federation would usher in a scale of 
politics—that of the region—to which another scale of politics—that of the Kingdom— would 
be subordinated.  
The homogenizing impulse underwriting proposals for political integration demanded a 
politics of differentiation.96 As a subsequent memorandum argued: “it is…well known…that the 
fundamental traditions and customs of the Baganda…are totally different from those of any other 
native tribe in East Africa.”97 This argument cut against the centralizing aspirations for 
standardized administration at the heart of both arguments for Federation, and the centralization 
of broadcasting services.   
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The prospect of political Federation was formally tabled following the 1931 Report of the 
Joint Committee which noted a rejection of: “the whole idea of closer union.”98 This it attributed 
to inadequate communications networks which resulted in “the absence of a sufficient East 
African consciousness (particularly among indigenous populations).”99  In the face of 
obstructions to political unification, the Joint Committee sought to enact unification by other 
means, namely by extending “common services,” a measure which fell just “short of 
superimposing…[a] political framework.”100 Regional infrastructures, the Report noted, would 
“create [the] machinery” that could both precede and enable the ultimate goal of “advancing 
towards unification.”101 Political federation would be borne of the extension of these new 
infrastructural and administrative networks.  
This mode of infrastructural thinking, then, was at base a technopolitical project of 
incremental regional scale-making.102 The future-driven technopolitical aspirations embedded in 
regional broadcasting operated along two contiguous registers, the first pertaining to medium, the 
second pertaining to message. First, regionalists hoped that the infrastructure underwriting an 
East African broadcasting network could generate the region, requiring as it would a new center 
of administrative power to coordinate the network. Second, regionalists speculated that the 
messages carried over this East African network could surreptitiously instill in listeners a 
regional way of being. As the Chief Secretary of the Colonies wrote: “Though opinions may 
differ on the methods by which closer integration should be effected between the 
territories...Information and Public Relations are powerful agent[s] in this matter.”103 
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Baganda observers had been well aware that metropolitan efforts to cordon off “politics” 
from the “machinery” of unification were duplicitous. For them, infrastructural coordination at 
the scale of the region was inherently political, portending a political future that would lead to 
their subordination within a newly enlarged field of competition. As they wrote: “Although it 
was set aside in the Report that the things to be amalgamated...were to be: Customs, Railways, 
Defence, Posts, Telegraphs and Researches...it is apparent that the policy of administration and 
welfare of the Natives will be gradually affected in time to come.”104 Efforts to impose 
federation, wrote a man who identified as a “Ugandan African,” conjured up a vision of the 
future that was “very degrading as far as Uganda is concerned.”105  
Ugandans had not been alone in taking this position. As noted by Chief Kidaha of 
Tanganyika in a letter to the editor of the East African Standard, it was well known that “the 
Native people” were very much “opposed to political...union.” He continued, rejecting efforts to 
cordon off politics from the project of infrastructural and administrative coordination, writing: 
“economic fusion of the three territories…[will] ultimately mean political fusion later, because 
economics cannot be kept widely away from politics.”106 Dissenters like Chief Kidaha were 
savvy as to the uneven tempo of administrative transformation, and savvy, too, in their 
observations that constructing one infrastructure on a regional basis could become the foundation 
upon which subsequent infrastructures and administrative practices could assemble.  
If colonial administrators debated amongst themselves and with metropolitan experts 
about the role of the language of broadcast in enacting affinities, African communities, too, 
framed language as political when confronted with the standardizing impulse of radio 
broadcasting in the region. And this had characterized people’s responses since the earliest days. 
In 1939 during the Kiambu experiments, various overhearers queried why Kikuyu was the only 
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language of broadcast.107 By 1940, an official reported that: “without exception audiences all 
over these territories are now asking for more radio programmes [in their vernaculars].”108  
Infrastructural regionalists derided Africans’ demands for linguistic differentiation as 
evidence of “parochial pride.”109 However, listeners’ tastes for international news and music 
suggests something more complicated was afoot. It was precisely against the enlarged frame of 
reference enabled by broadcasting that people’s demands for inclusion via the recognition of 
difference were made.110 As Yowana Mukasi, a Bugandan man wrote succinctly in letter that, 
significantly, he penned in Kiswahili: “We people of Uganda…wish to hear…the news broadcast 
in our own language. Every day we hear the news in Kikamba, Nandi, Luo and Swahili. Now 
why is Luganda alone forbidden?”111 It was at least in part in response to these demands that, 
during the war, broadcasts were given in: Kiswahili, Dholuo, Luyia, Kikamba, Kisii, Kinandi, 
Kikuyu, and Luganda.112 
For proponents of Federation, by contrast, the peculiarities of the medium of radio 
broadcasting were critical to its capacity to generate regional unification unbifurcated by 
difference. As the authors of the “Report of the Commission of the Dependencies in Eastern and 
Central Africa” wrote: broadcasting was of “much importance for the future.” “The air,” the 
authors continued, “knows no frontiers, and this service, of such special moment to the territories 
in which other means of communication are few, ought not to be allowed to be delayed.”113 For 
these writers, by contrast to some of their local counterparts, the possibilities that broadcasting 
seemed to hold out were defined by contrast. Unlike the difficulty of creating a robust 
communications network in the form of roads, for example, the capacity of broadcasts to 
propagate through the air, theoretically unencumbered by regional variations in geography, and 
touch down in local communities, lent the medium to the project of regional scale-making.  
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These aspirations for a re-scaled future critically shaped Twining’s recommendations. As 
he stated, emergent plans for broadcasting must look away from the parochial past towards a 
federated “future:” “At the present time,” he wrote, “an important factor to be taken into account 
is the policy of regional areas in Colonial Administration, which is being projected...This would 
seem to preclude entirely independent stations which are not linked to some central control.”114 
He continued, acknowledging that there existed:  
some apparent difficulties resulting from the different conditions existing in the 
three Territories and from multiplicity of languages spoken by the African tribes, 
but these are not insuperable, and any disadvantages that may be entailed are 
outweighed by the economic and administrative advantages which would result 
from unified control.115  
Mervyn Hill was even more deterministic in his views. Reflecting on Twining’s 
recommendations, he noted: “In regard to the language question it seems reasonable to assume 
that the need to broadcast in several vernacular languages is an expedient which will disappear 
before the march of progress.”116  
Just as Hill imagined a lingua franca superseding vernacular languages, those in favor of 
Federation, Hill seemingly among them, imagined broadcasting as being capable of transcending 
individual territories and enacting the region. Simple coordination was not sufficient, however. 
Instead infrastructural regionalists argued that all broadcasts coming out of 7LO Nairobi must be 
made “truly East African” in order to impart a “Pan-African conception of the [war] 
campaign.”117 For Hill, broadcasting was the infrastructure of monolingualism. In regional terms, 
it was the infrastructure of East Africa. 
Until this time, Nairobi 7LO had been broadcasting on 350 and 49.5 meters, the 350 
wavelength giving service over a 50 mile radius, with the 49.5 meter providing service to the rest 
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of Kenya and beyond though, it was acknowledged, the 49.5 meter failed “to ensure satisfactory 
reception over considerable areas of Uganda and Tanganyika.”118 During the war years, 
experimental broadcasts had been put out on a third wavelength, 27.96 meters, and the “available 
evidence” suggested that this wavelength provided “a greatly improved service over the greater 
part of East Africa.”119 The Information Office was hopeful that seamless broadcasting would be 
generative of a regional way of being. These messages, traveling through a substance that 
“knows no frontiers,” it was hoped, would break down barriers, variously described as 
“linguistic,” “political” and “geographic,” as new relations of regional affinity were broadcast 
over the airwaves. 
The experiment was an unequivocal failure. As one administrator noted: “I regret to say 
that there is no evidence that the experiment...has succeeded in enlarging…the number of 
habitual listeners to 7 L.O. Nairobi.”120 Gurney, Chief Secretary to the East African Governors’ 
Conference, was more explicit, writing: “Efforts to make the news and announcements broadcast 
from Nairobi more East African and less parochial in character have apparently failed.”121 
Parochialism, here, was conceived of as being both infrastructural and ideational. The first 
concerned with form, the second with content. Infrastructural parochialism inhered in the 
material limits of broadcasts emanating from 7LO.122 The other register of parochialism was 
related to content. Information workers had failed to generate programing with broad appeal, 
content capable of transcending the ostensible parochialism of target populations themselves.  
Both were conceived of as being problems of scale. Enacting the region would require 
transcending both. And maybe, regionalists thought, the medium of regional broadcasting, could 
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become the message of unification. For reasons that will be explored, both Uganda and 
Tanganyika rejected this logic. In their hands, parochialism was not something to be overcome, 
but something to be protected against another essentializing impulse, one which spoke easily of 
“the East African.”  
*** 
In 1943, the Conference of Governors agreed that a BBC engineer should be invited to visit the 
territories to “investigate and report upon the future of broadcasting in East Africa from the 
technical side.”123 In a bid to offset criticism the Chairman emphatically argued that 
investigations into the feasibility of region-wide broadcasting were being undertaken on 
“technical grounds” alone.124 Proponents of centralized broadcasting hoped that an: “expert from 
outside might…suggest a policy which could be satisfactory to all EA territories.”125  The hope 
here was that a team of technical experts, and the recommendations they made, would appear to 
be operating outside of political interest, making recommendations on the basis of objective 
knowledge alone. The hope, in other words, was that technics could simultaneously precede, and 
yet be productive of, new political futures.  
The following year, W.E.C. Varley, an engineer from the BBC, undertook the survey. 
The findings of this research established that the six territories be broken up into two groups: a 
“Central African Group” and an “East African Group.” Perhaps unduly insensitive to the politics 
of the project, he argued that the particularizing work of vernacular language programing was 
undesirable for “reasons of economy.” To this end, he recommended that vernacular programs be 
limited to a maximum of Kiswahili, Luganda, Gang and Kikuyu. These vernaculars would be 
broadcast over a “single, centrally sited short-wave transmitter of adequate power employing the 
special aerial systems necessary to provide a...short wave service and using wavelengths which 
[are] optimum for distance, time of day, season of year and position in sunspot cycle.”126 
These recommendations were met with no small measure of critique. Perhaps 
predictably, Varley’s few supporters were other infrastructural-regionalists, such as the 
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Postmaster General, and the Kenyan Government. Tanganyika and Uganda, by contrast, 
evidenced “an apparent lack of interest in this matter.”127 At issue was not so much coordination 
across the territories, but the fact that this would turn on establishing a center. Indeed, Uganda 
and Tanganyika harbored a healthy suspicion as to Nairobi’s interests in regional broadcasting, 
which located it as the central node. As the Ugandan representative noted: “In these discussions 
in Nairobi on broadcasting one could not help feeling that the suggestions about a central 
broadcasting station were not as altruistic as the Kenya representative would have us believe. 
The representatives from Tanganyika and Zanzibar were of the same opinion.”128 These 
administrators feared that the new scheme would enable an unwanted redistribution of agency 
which would usher in a new scale of administrative order: that of the region with Nairobi as its 
center. And there was nothing new in their opposition to such a plan. As a Colonial Times article 
noted: “Uganda and Tanganyika have always been opposed to this idea [of federation].”129 
Uganda and Tanganyika, though, were discursively limited in how they could frame their 
rejection due to the terms of the conversation. It was widely accepted that the governments of 
Tanganyika and Uganda could not afford “to ignore the potentialities [of a regional broadcasting 
network] in view of the Colonial Office’s manifest” interest. And so, it was necessary to 
convince the Colonial Office that “the matter” had been “carefully considered.” The plan, in 
other words, could not be rejected on political terms alone—the different communities 
interested—but had to be framed in a language of material constraints. 130  If infrastructural 
regionalists had worked to separate the technics from the politics, their opponents, too, framed 
their rejections in technical terms foregrounding arguments about place-based expertise, 
infrastructural limitations, and a dearth of funds. This did not depoliticize the debate but, instead, 
reflected an acute awareness on all sides as to where the politics of regional integration were 
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playing out in these years. In other words, and Gurney’s hopes notwithstanding, prospective 
technological transformations could not be easily untethered from the politics of federation.  
Indeed, if the problem that Uganda and Tanganyika were confronting was how 
centralized broadcasting would usher in a scale of politics—that of the region—through 
assembling a new infrastructure, they framed their rejection of regional coordination in 
infrastructural terms. As the Chief Secretary of Uganda argued: “the same broadcasting wave 
length could not deal with both Kenya and Uganda…on account of technical reception 
difficulties. As an addendum, he added, there was the “insuperable problem of [developing 
programmes]…to suit the widely different communities interested.”131 Foregrounding technical 
constraints enabled the Chief Secretary to reintegrate the politics of regional broadcasting into 
the conversation.  
Arguing that expert knowledge was place-based offered administrators another 
opportunity to simultaneously make political arguments while effacing the political reasons they 
were rejecting the network. Here, the status of expert knowledge as it related to the politics of 
language again came to the fore as a key node of conflict. As the Ugandan Information Officer 
stated: “I can see no...advantage accruing to Uganda. I am quite convinced that no broadcast in a 
local language would be translated as satisfactorily in Nairobi as in Kampala.” He concluded 
unequivocally: “[And] Nairobi news is not wanted here.”132 If, at the scale of empire, the conflict 
had been framed as one of the metropolitan expert against the local expert, this logic was re-
rehearsed between a different center, now Kenya, and its would-be peripheries of Uganda and 
Tanganyika. Here the politics of expertise intersected with debates surrounding the desirability 





In the 1930s, metropolitan administrators hoped to use radio broadcasting as a tool of centrally 
directed “advanced administration.” The capacity of broadcasts to propagate through the air lent 
                                                
131 Chief Secretary, Entebbe, Uganda, to the Honourable Chief Secretary, Nairobi, 17 September, 1948, KNA 
HAKI/13/276.  




radio to this vision, radio capable of redrawing the boundaries among people as new relations of 
affinity were forged over the airwaves. The Colonial Office was not unique hoping that the scalar 
capacity of broadcasting could generate social and political futures of a new scale.  
Since the earliest days of the medium in the region, radio enthusiasts had seen in radio a 
means of enacting scalar leaps by drawing dispersed communities into a single orbit. When the 
small settler community living in the Kenya colony first proposed broadcasting in 1927, it 
aspired to use the new network as a means of connecting them to their metropolitan kin, 
generating a set of infrastructural attachments which, they hoped, would have political effects, 
cultivating empire-wide support for regional federation dominated by the interests of white 
settlers.  
This parochial view of broadcasting was taken up by administrators in London, who 
imagined a regional network as capable of having a homogenizing effect in the region, in the 
process generating a new political unit, the East African federation, with a new type of political 
subject, the East African, at its center. Officially federation had been tabled years before, there 
was simply too much opposition to proceed with the project of integration in explicitly political 
terms. Instead, the Colonial Office and regional enthusiasts had worked to untether conversations 
of infrastructural coordination from the project of regional integration, in the process distributing 
the contentious politics of the project to the seemingly apolitical domain of technics.  
Uganda and Tanganyika administrators, fearful of the political implications of plans for 
infrastructural integration, rejected regionalists’ efforts to outsource politics to infrastructures, 
using the banal language of technological and material constraints to make a political argument 
about the importance of “place-based knowledge,” and the heterogeneity of listening audiences. 
In conjoining material constraints with the importance of “place-based knowledge,” 
representatives of Uganda and Tanganyika ably reintegrated their political concerns into the 
debate.  
In this, colonial administrators were following in the footsteps of African dissenters of 
the late 1920s who had expended a good deal of labor in demonstrating the impossibility of 
disaggregating the technical from the political. In so doing, these two groups called the bluff of 
administrators, demonstrating their savvy in reading plans for regional broadcasting as 
subtending technopolitical aspirations for a federated future. And so, by 1949, plans to use 




were abandoned. The politics were too complicated and could not be cordoned off from the 
technics, as conflicts with Tanganyika and Uganda, in particular, had demonstrated.133 There was 
nothing to be done. “In view...of the attitude adopted by the Governments of Uganda and 
Tanganyika towards the introduction of a regional scheme, the reasons for which are fully 
appreciated, there appears to be no alternative...but to consider further developments on a 
territorial basis.” 
The Kenya colony was the big loser here. A regional broadcasting network would have 
seen investments in high-powered transmitters that would have enabled Kenya to provision for 
African communities both within its borders and beyond, locating Nairobi at the center of a new 
administrative, political, and infrastructural unit. But by 1949 these aspirations had come to 
naught, leaving Kenya with only the paltry broadcasting network run by Cable and Wireless, and 
with no plans for the future. In the years to come, incomplete networking within the Kenya 
colony would create space for people to engage in other forms of scale-making as they mobilized 
radio technologies to tap into prospective futures that neither mapped onto the boundaries of the 
colony nor the prospective regional unit of East Africa. The following chapter addresses itself to 
these stories.  
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“Tropicalising” Technologies: The Airwaves and the Formation of Communities of an 
“Intermediate” Scale 
 
      
In the 1940s, infrastructural regionalists had hoped to construct a regional broadcasting network 
to cultivate new sensibilities in colonial communities. These administrators spoke easily of “the 
East African listener,” betraying their confidence that radio was capable of generating colonial 
subjects of a new sort.1 As this suggests, while during the war broadcasting was used, in the 
main, to “steady native opinion,” it was also a future-driven infrastructure freighted with 
pedagogy—an “instrument of advanced administration” and a tool “of mass education.”2 
Programs were to convince communities of the beneficence of colonial governance, and usher in 
a period of expertly guided “development.” As E. R. Davies proclaimed over the airwaves in a 
1941 broadcast, postwar radio must: “ventilate and explain to the African this plan of 
development in all its aspects and the methods by which it is proposed to carry it out.”3 Radio, 
many believed, could usher both persons and landscapes into a new and developed future. 
Following the war, this vision of development along social welfarist lines expanded to embrace 
all branches of government. With this shift in ideology came cadres of “experts” who were 
responsible for guiding transformations in agriculture, health, and education.4 These new 
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initiatives were to extend the reach of the state through the centralized coordination across fields 
of governance, with “all levels of activity” firmly “interlocked.”5 
For those working in the field of information, however, postwar developmentalist 
aspirations would have appeared familiar.6 As early as the mid-1930s administrators had forecast 
radio’s role in enacting “social welfare,” and ushering in a new phase of expertly guided 
development across the colonial world.7 It was not until the 1940s, though, that metropolitan 
monies were available to offset the cost of these prospective social and material transformations.  
In chapter 3, I focused on the 1940s and documented how the Colonial Office’s (CO) 
hopes of enacting a regional network as the technological framework subtending a new political 
order failed in ideological terms. This chapter turns to the 1950s and works at the interstices of 
material constraints, the consolidation of a social welfarist vision of development, and popular 
forms of claims-making to understand the broadcasting network that the Kenya Information 
Office (KIO) finally succeeded in assembling by the end of the decade.  
If in the 1940s administrators spoke of the “East African listener,” by the 1950s the 
appropriate scale of social and political attachments had different coordinates. In this twilight 
moment, as I argue, the colonial government hoped to use broadcasting to guide, constrain, and 
mold the social and political worlds available to Kenyans by generating a scale of attachment 
that was beyond the “tribe” but before “all-embracing citizenship.” With this came a change in 
language policy, with Kiswahili being reframed as the language not of the region, but of the 
Kenya colony. The government’s aspiration to use radio to generate subjects of an 
“intermediate” scale would prove to be an uphill battle. In the years following the war, and 
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absent a plan for regional broadcasting, the Kenyan Information Office had let its infrastructure 
and programing languish.  
1949, the year regional broadcasting was formally off the table, was a bad one for the 
state to be without a robust broadcasting network. The strikes of the late 1940s, in tandem with 
the Mau Mau "rebellion," and the Egyptian Revolution a few years later appeared to threaten the 
integrity of the political unit that was the Kenya colony. These events convinced the 
administration that expanding its broadcasting network was a matter of urgency.  
The state’s aspiration to engender a new and more robust parochialism through 
Kiswahili-language broadcasting and bounded by the borders of the colony was complicated in 
practice. From the perspective of designers there were three considerations with which 
technologists would have to contend. First, Kenya was a distinct atmospheric zone. Second, 
Kenya was a distinct topographical zone. Compounding these two issues was a third: historical 
policies of austerity had resulted in a broadcasting network that was incomplete. In the early days 
of broadcasting, absent metropolitan investments, the state had mobilized Cable and Wireless as 
an infrastructural prosthetic, rendering the state dependent on private infrastructures. By the 
1950s, administrators were forced to acknowledge that this entanglement mitigated the state’s 
capacity to develop a network of broadcasting as a “public service.” With the entrenchment of a 
social welfarist vision of development, these relations of infrastructural dependence produced a 
contradiction between material capacity and ideology, contradictions that African communities 
leveraged in demanding their inclusion within the infrastructural state.  
The stakes of these material constraints would only heighten throughout the 1950s. As 
people started tuning in to broadcasts from various global elsewheres on their shortwave 
receivers, the state played catch-up as it worked to deploy radio broadcasting to shape the scales 
of social and political belonging thinkable to colonized communities. These external concerns 
articulated with internal transformations, as administrative reforms placed downward pressure on 
communities to increasingly view a landed and ethno-linguistically bounded mode of 
identification as being the surest means of securing their futures. Taken together, these cross-
cutting projects of scale-making convinced the administration of the need to regain control over 
the informational worlds of communities who thought of the Kenya colony in rather ambivalent 




Listeners seized on this opportunity, conjuring up the anxieties of the colonial state as 
they called the government to task, demanding that the state recognize their linguistic difference 
and provision them with vernacular-language broadcasts. In so doing, they drew on colonial 
discourse, framing the infrastructure of radio broadcasting as a public good to which all should 
have access. Inclusion in the infrastructure of broadcasting, they argued, was a key metric of 
recognition within the shifting terrains of the Kenya colony. Taken together, these conditions 
required radio technologies and the infrastructures of broadcasting be “tropicalised.” 
Tropicalisation, however, required more than simply retooling existing technologies, as we shall 
see in this chapter and the one to follow; it also required mobilizing the labor of African 
knowledge workers and experts and acceding to the popular demands of would-be listeners.  
 
 
Broadcasting “Development”: Radio and Fashioning of Subjects of an “Intermediate” 
Scale  
 
Administrative hopes to use broadcasting as a tool of social welfare were guided by emergent 
conversations surrounding the danger of “the masses.” Indeed, across the colonial world, 
colonial governments hoped to use policies of “social welfare” to offset popular forms of 
discontent.8 When it came to radio, pursuing “development” through “mass education” over the 
airwaves was precisely designed to function as a prophylaxis against the specter of disorder. 
These newly mediated messages, heavy with developmentalist promises for the future, might be 
capable of shoring up the center of an anxious colonial state.  
This would prove to be no easy task. Years of infrastructural neglect in Kenya, as 
elsewhere, had resulted in a state that was lumpy in its reach. Colonial administrators had before 
them a difficult task, then, as they set to work convincing colonial communities of the benefits 
that would come from administrative interventions into their daily lives in the absence of 
smoothly tarmacked roads, access to clean water, and an electrical grid. Radio broadcasting 
seemed, to some, to offer a solution. The new developmentalist aspirations of the colonial state 
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would be brought into the intimate spheres of Kenyans’ everyday lives over the airwaves. Radio, 
in other words, could temporarily act as a suture, closing the gaps generated by long-term 
infrastructural neglect, bypassing largely absent harder infrastructures and services all the while 
enabling the education and "development" of the masses living in Kenya’s cities and throughout 
the countryside. In this capacity, administrators hoped, radio could act as an infrastructural 
prosthetic, propping up this ideologically dense but infrastructurally thin developmentalist state. 
At one level, then, efforts to enact radio in this period both indexed the change in direction of 
colonial policies and exemplified colonialism on the cheap. This was colonial austerity in the age 
of social welfare.  
Administrators were particularly anxious about the social and political implications of 
what they referred to as ongoing “social changes.” These changes, they argued, had generated 
discontent that could be scaled up, leading to “social upheaval,” a potential for rupture that they 
attributed to the emergence of “mass consciousness.”9 
It is no surprise, then, that the pedagogic function of radio was matched by its purported 
disciplinary capacity. As the Chief Native Commissioner (CNC) wrote: “African broadcasting” 
offered “tremendous opportunities…[for] controlling and regulating…[Africans’] social, 
economic, and political advancement.”10 As this framing suggests, the colonial state appreciated 
that people’s social and political worlds were set against an expanded scale in the years 
following the war. And this was threatening, particularly as it led to a misdirection in blame with 
people, ascribing “responsibility…[to] groups or individuals, especially those in authority.”11  
The goal was not to repress these reactions but to guide and mold them, not least by shaping the 
scales of social and political belonging thinkable to colonized communities.  
                                                
9 “Mass Education in African Society,” Colonial Office: Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, 
Colonial No. 186, (Distributed by British Information Services An Agency of the British Information Services, An 
Agency of the British Government. New York: 30 Rockefeller Plaza), 7. These transformations had been 
thoroughgoing, the report argued. “Another phenomenon perhaps not wholly unrelated to the changes of which we 
have just spoken is the changing attitude in the face of evil conditions. In the past that attitude might be described as 
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end, administrators complained, people were blaming the government for “misfortune,” which, of course, was 
completely appropriate.  
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11 “Mass Education in African Society,” Colonial Office: Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, 
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Radio listening was to “broaden the outlook” of audiences, turning “the African into a 
self-governing and responsible citizen.”12 Citizenship proper was not, of course, on the table in 
this period, instead the Committee imagined an intermediary status. As the Report noted:  
The realization of citizenship begins in a small unit where common loyalty and 
common interests are expressed in daily activities and mutual service. Within 
these small units people hold tenaciously to what may appear as a narrow 
sectionalism, operating behind barriers which divide them from their fellows. 
Contact with the modern world is breaking down these barriers and expanding the 
social and political horizons of the people. But the conception of common 
citizenship is vastly wider. It may be that intermediate behind the small sectional 
units and all-embracing citizenship we shall have to envisage some form of 
‘national units.’ It is going to be a delicate task to enlarge the narrower loyalties 
until they have reality and meaning in a wider circle.13 
And so, educative radio programing was to offer listeners a scale of belonging that was 
“intermediate”—after “the small sectional units...[but before]...all-embracing citizenship.”14 The 
Committee was not altogether wrong in its assessment here. The politics of intermediacy were, 
indeed, “delicate.” What it seems to have missed, however, as we shall see, was that the meaning 
of “narrower loyalties” would gain their definitional and affective strength precisely up against a 
“wider circle.”  
The Committee was not totally naïve, though. Its members expected that efforts to use 
“mass education” to enact subjects of this intermediate scale could engender other, potentially 
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13 “Mass Education in African Society,” Colonial Office: Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, 
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learning to make a real and not an artificial basis for local democracy. In many rural areas the traditional forms of 
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Education in African Society,” Colonial Office: Advisory Committee on Education in the Colonies, Colonial No. 
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cross-cutting, projects of scale-making. Language occupied a central space in these discussions. 
Broadcasting, the committee argued, would undoubtedly “have a profound influence on the 
development of…language,”15 but it conceded that efforts at linguistic standardization would be 
routinely thwarted by what they referred to as “political factors and parochial attitudes.”16 
Despite these problems, for administrators it was self-evident that first Kiswahili, and later 
English would become the lingua franca of the Kenya colony, dominating both education and 
radio broadcasting. But in the meantime, as we shall see, people’s tastes had to be 
accommodated, as nothing could “make people listen in to programmes which do not appeal to 
them.”17 
Listeners, as this suggests, could not be presumed to exist a priori. They were not a pre-
existing pool, but rather a potential that had to be cultivated in order to be tapped. And yet 
information workers remained undaunted. Responding to critics’ claims that the expansion of 
broadcasting was premature, seeing as Africans had not demonstrated an interest in the medium, 
G. S. S. Hutchinson, Manager of Information Services, Kenya, was indignant: “This is not,” he 
retorted, “a valid argument...The existence of broadcasting facilities creates the demand for 
them,” not the other way around.18 Hutchinson, as we shall see, was not altogether wrong in his 
assessment, but questions remained: How was a desire for listening to be cultivated? And what 
forms of listening were most desirable? What kind of broadcasting network would give complete 
coverage? And what kind of receiver was best placed to accomplish these goals? Neither these 
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Materializing an Infrastructure and the Problems of “the Market”  
 
In 1954, the Kenya Broadcasting Commission published a report on the future of broadcasting in 
the Kenya colony. When these technologists discussed the future of radio broadcasting, they 
speculated about the utility of two wavelengths: medium and short. Medium waves were the 
cheaper option. But traveling closer to the earth’s surface, and contacting the ionosphere closer 
to their point of origin, they could service a more constrained geography than shortwaves. 
Moreover, the capacity of these waves to propagate through the air was contingent on 
atmospheric conditions. And wavelengths in “tropical Africa,” experts remarked, were burdened 
by higher noise levels, which presented an acute problem by reducing “the effective range of 
medium wavelengths to a small fraction of their range in temperate regions” and making “long 
wavelengths altogether unusable.”19 The propagation of wavelengths in the “tropics” was also 
subject to seasonal variation, with radio noise intensity reaching the maximum in March and 
April and October and November—“the periods of the ‘Long’ and ‘Short’ rains respectively.”20 
Medium waves were not only subject to meteorological and atmospheric interventions, however. 
So, too, were they subject to topographic variation.  
The Great Rift Valley, running some 7,000 miles from northern Syria to central 
Mozambique, was one such topographical intervention. The terrain of the Great Rift varies, 
ranging from salt flats some 152 meters below sea level to a series of towering mountains, some 
of which reach 17,000 feet.21 Just north of Nairobi, the site of Kenya’s main transmitter in these 
years, the rift reaches its deepest point. The presence of this ancient rift presented problems for 
medium waves, which travel along the “surface of the earth,” making issues of topography of 
paramount importance, since the frequencies, while able to surmount “minor hills up to 1000 ft 
or so…[were] stopped by mountains.” But it was not simply vertical interventions that had to be 
considered but also the “electrical conductivity of the ground over which the wave must travel,” 
                                                
19 Atmospheric noise refers to natural variations caused by shifting weather patterns, specifically lightning 
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Colonial Office [hereafter CO] 875/31/1 “Receivers for Colonial Peoples: Policies” (1948)   
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for moving over dry, “sandy soil reception becomes poorer…while over marsh or water (which 
has high electrical conductivity) reception remains good to much greater distances.”22  
Shortwave seemed to circumvent some of these problems. Traveling at a higher 
frequency than medium waves, and bouncing off the ionosphere at a greater distance from their 
sites of transmission, shortwaves have a unique spatial reach. But shortwaves remained 
vulnerable to atmospheric changes more common in the tropics. As the 1954 Commission noted: 
“The useful energy from a shortwave transmitting aerial travels skywards until it meets reflecting 
layers, some 200 miles up, which return it to the earth for reception.” But, reflecting layers 
varied: “daily, seasonably, and over an 11-year cycle” occasionally disappearing “altogether 
during periods of electrical disturbance in the atmosphere.”23 In addition, shortwave frequencies 
were overcrowded and subject to competition. And while different geographies could, 
theoretically, share a single short wavelength for use at different times, Africa was in the 
“unfortunate position of being in competition with Europe.”24 But modes of transmission could 
not be considered without considering modes of reception. Not only were shortwave receivers 
costlier than medium wave, but they were “more elaborate” and “less easy for the unskilled user 
to tune.”25 Shortwave technology may have been more expansive, in sum, but it was also more 
complicated and more expensive.  
During the war, the administration had settled on a compromise. Nairobi and its 
immediate hinterlands would be serviced by mediumwave, with the rest of the colony (and 
beyond) relying on shortwave.26 And so, during the war, Nairobi began running broadcasts for 
African communities in Kikuyu, Dholuo, Kikamba, Luhya, Luganda, Kinandi, Kisii and 
Kiswahili.27 These efforts notwithstanding, it was widely acknowledged that broadcasts failed 
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23 Kenya Broadcasting Commission, “Report of Kenya Broadcasting Commission, June 1954.” File: Cable and 
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“to ensure satisfactory reception over considerable areas.”28 But the issue of technics were never 
divorced from the issue of politics.  
The self-same affordances of shortwave that made it the most optimal mode of 
broadcasting in East Africa concurrently made shortwave technologies objects of concern.29 
Indeed, the capacity of shortwaves to bounce off of the ionosphere and thus travel great distances 
brought to the fore questions of the forms of social and political affinity enabled by “listening in” 
on a shortwave receiver.30 As the Report noted: “Short wave transmissions...might be subject to 
severe interference by the numerous and frequently no doubt more powerful short wave stations 
of other countries.”31 Despite the fact that there was “some degree of international control in the 
allocation of transmission frequencies,” this was “by no means…completely effective.” This was 
not mere prognostication. As the Commission reported, as we shall see, foreign transmissions 
were being received in “increasing numbers in all countries, and especially in Africa.”32 
Airwaves, evidently, could not be constrained by the same logic of territorialized control that 
animated colonial imaginaries. Indeed, it was widely acknowledged that foreign broadcasts 
bleeding into Kenyan airwaves were “outside the direct control of the Kenya Broadcasting 
Service.”33 And so, discussions over topography and airwaves, ideal transmitters and receivers 
were not merely technical questions, but issues that, as one astute observer noted, verged on 
“higher politics.”34 
But there was a third register of materiality with which administrators and technologists 
had to contend: long-standing policies of colonial austerity. From the outset, proponents of 
broadcasting in Kenya had been limited by the pecuniary structure of the Colonial Office. Until 
the postwar period, individual territories were expected to cover their own costs. These 
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constraints had convinced early administrators of the wisdom of allowing C&W to gain a 
monopoly over commercial broadcasting in the 1930s (see Chapter 3).  But by 1949 things had 
changed. Coming on the heels of the Colonial Development and Welfare Acts of 1940 and 1945, 
for the first time financial aid from “Imperial sources” were made available to “promote the 
growth of broadcasting in the Colonies.”35 Colonial Secretary Creech Jones was emphatic on the 
importance of this development, writing in a circular of March 29, 1949 that there was an 
“urgent need” for the “wide development of Colonial broadcasting.”36 The availability of these 
monies was contingent on their being used to forward a vision of radios as “instruments of social 
and educational advancement.” The infrastructure, administrators argued, was uniquely poised to 
act as a technology of “development.”37 All seemed to agree on this point. To this end, 
£1,000,000 was made available for colonial broadcasting schemes.38  
But the Colonial Office was not willing to take on the full financial burden of developing 
a robust radio network in its colonial holdings. As one administrator wrote: in choosing between 
the “broadcasting and receiving sides,” the Colonial Office had decided to concentrate “upon the 
former,” leaving the issue of receiving technologies to “the market.”39 And this created 
problems. Indeed, the incongruous forms of scale-making that shortwave technologies seemed to 
hold out took on particular urgency due to the treasury’s refusal to make monies available for the 
design and construction of receiving sets. 
It was left to administrators to communicate these technopolitical concerns to 
manufacturers as they discussed the parameters of the appropriate receivers for East African 
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listeners.40 While some argued that “pre-set tuning” might offer one solution, ensuring that 
“whomsoever possesses such a receiver cannot be ‘got at’ by propaganda from other parts of the 
world,” others argued for centrally controlled broadcasting in the form of communal listening 
sites or wired broadcasting.41 The latter had the advantage of being a closed system. This would 
be a boon for “broadcast programmes…brought from the studio to the listener by wire, instead of 
by ordinary wireless transmission, [eliminated the problems of] interference, fading, and 
distortion.” Neither “weather conditions…geographical situation, nor ‘man-made static’ 
…[would] affect the broadcast programme carried by wire.”42 But most importantly, with wired 
broadcasting there was “no risk of interference from unwanted programmes broadcast on a 
nearby wave band.”43 The advantage, in other words, was that “Central Control” was in 
“complete charge of every programme at every stage.”44 These proposals turned on the 
proposition that a simple technological fix could constrain the social and political futures 
colonized communities could access over the airwaves, a form of infrastructural attachment 
building that could delimit people’s access to a competitive radio world. These options had the 
added advantage of circumventing the “problem” of users whose “inquisitive nature” led them 
“to pull [apart] the pieces of most kinds of European equipment that comes within…reach.”45  
But Kenya’s human geography, itself the product of colonial labor policies, mitigated 
against the use of wired broadcasting as well as medium wave. Kenya’s African population, 
administrators noted, tended to live in less concentrated settlements in the countryside, making 
“the proportion of the total populations, which…[could be] economically…served” by either 
medium wave or radio rediffusion “much smaller than in Europe or many other countries.”46 
Finally, there was the problem of infrastructural neglect, which left few rural areas electrified by 
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the 1950s. These areas, it was noted, were likely to remain dark for “some considerable time.”47 
This would have to guide the design of receiving sets, as any radio put in circulation could not 
depend on a direct energy supply and would thus have to be battery operated.48  
And so, the Colonial Office labored to pressure commercial manufacturers into designing 
sets specifically suited to “the tropics.” By and large, these efforts failed, confirming “a widely 
held impression that…[radio manufacturers] are not, as a whole, progressive, imaginative, or 
inclined to take risks.”49 Market-making operated differently in the colonies than in the 
metropole, where the design and manufacture of receivers could be “left to the ordinary process 
of demand and supply.”50 In the colonies, by contrast, both supply and demand were mere 
prospects.  
The issues were threefold. First, receivers produced for African listeners had to be 
affordable, and within the reach of an African “clerk class” whom, administrators argued, could 
not afford sets exceeding £5.51 Second, all technical components would have to be “tropicalized 
to resist the inroads of insects, dust, and damp” if they would be able to operate in the region.52 
But most importantly, manufacturers had to be “encouraged to undertake the expense of 
experiment in design or of building [a] new prototype for a market which seems to him potential 
rather than actual.”53 The trick would be to get manufacturers “to realize that such a poor 
population could and would buy radio sets.” This required cultivating a pool of listeners as a 
market, as developmentalist subjects, as consumers.  
These arguments for market-making were not framed as anathema to radio’s purported 
function as a “public service.” Manufacturers needed only “see the vast potential market for the 
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poor man’s radio and the part which radio could play in the development of the colonies.”54 If 
this market of consumers could be cultivated, it would open a “world-wide market for British 
industry in this field.”55 In other words, policies of colonial austerity ensured that colonial 
broadcasting as a tool of social welfare was always wrapped up in projects of market-making in 
colonial East Africa.  
But striking a balance between public and private interest, between market-making and 
the social good was in no way seamless. And these entanglements were particularly acute in 
Kenya. Indeed, even with the availability of monies for transmission, the administration was 
bound by early agreements made with Cable and Wireless Services, the company that had 
secured a monopoly over commercial broadcasting, which would eventually expire in 1959.56 
Following the enforced merger of companies, both cable and wireless, the British East African 
Broadcasting Co. had been absorbed by C&W. The terms of the British East African 
Broadcasting Co.’s contract with the government of Kenya had stipulated that the firm offer 
colony-wide broadcasting. This clause had extended to Cable and Wireless upon its absorption of 
the shoestring operation. As a result, C&W was responsible for offering services to settlers and 
South Asians throughout its tenure in Kenya. Over the years, C&W’s reach had grown. In 1931, 
the number of license holders in Kenya was just over 300. By 1959, this number had risen to 
30,000.57  
With the outbreak of the War, and with a regional broadcasting network on the horizon, 
the Kenyan administration had opted to rent C&W transmitters rather than construct its own 
infrastructure to provision services for African communities. This right had been guaranteed in 
the initial contract, which granted the government the use of C&W equipment and studios for 
“public purposes” at a rate of SHs 20 per half hour.58 Insofar as it was dependent on C&W’s 
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networks, though, a company whose own bottom line was capital gains, administrative ambitions 
regarding broadcasting were always subordinated to the market-driven interests of the company. 
And this relationship of infrastructural dependence translated into incomplete coverage across 
the Kenya colony, with some areas enjoying “fairly good reception, whereas many others had 
extremely poor reception or none at all.”59 It was not simply in material terms that this 
relationship of infrastructural dependence was a liability, but in ideological terms as well.60   
Indeed, administrators and metropolitan “experts” routinely complained that C&W’s 
bottom line of capital gains threatened to undermine radio’s purported status as a “public 
good.”61 The British Broadcasting Corporation (BBC), for its part, lamented that C&W refused 
to rebroadcast BBC programs that it did not consider to be of “general interest.”62 According to 
the BBC, this was based on a “narrow conception of the responsibilities” of the company, a 
“conception which…[had] no regard for certain responsibilities placed by Parliament on the 
BBC.”63 Among these was the responsibility to broadcast items deemed important to the 
“Commonwealth,” even if they did not “comprise the most popular programmes.”64  
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This obstruction was not limited to white and South Asian listeners. Administrators held 
that C&W’s monopoly over commercial broadcasting had impeded the state’s ability to extend 
broadcasting to Africans communities as a “public service.”65 Part of the problem was that a 
notion of a single “public,” made little sense in Kenya colony. Instead, the government thought 
of the public as a divisible unit, one that broke down along the lines of race and ethnicity. C&W 
had little patience for such arguments. Indeed, when the government appealed to C&W, 
requesting that it jettison licensing fees on receiving sets for Africans, C&W refused to 
compromise, arguing that the fees, though well beyond the reach of many would-be African 
listeners, were its main source of profit.66 Licensing fees were not the only issue. C&W’s 
infrastructures were also beholden to its commercial ventures. As one report noted: "Even in the 
case of the service for Africans Government is dependent on Cable and Wireless for the time 
allocated and there is danger of expansion being limited by the possible non-availability, at the 
optimum listening hours, of transmitters which may have other commercial commitments."67 
Constraints in time would, indeed, prove to be a problem in the years to come.  
When C&W first secured its monopoly, and absent metropolitan investments, C&W’s 
presence in the region seemed like a boon to the austere infrastructural state, allowing it to offset 
the costs and risks of the venture, all the while guaranteeing the state access to its network. By 
the 1950s, however, these relations of infrastructural dependency appeared, to many, to be a 
dangerous liability. Having examined the terms of the agreement between Cable and Wireless 
and the government, J. B. Miller remarked disparagingly that it was “clearly a makeshift 
arrangement.” In this, the state was in a bind. C&W’s position was protected under contract.68  
But administrators were always cautious about the degree of marketization that was 
desirable in its colonial holdings. Indeed, while creating a class of African consumers for 
manufactured receivers was amenable to colonial administrators, after consideration they 
outright rejected the possibility of initiating broadcasting to colonial subjects on a commercial 
                                                
65 Minute of JB Miller, 20, November 1951. BNA CO 875/64/3 "Broadcasting, Kenya.”  
66 Carla Heath Wilson, “Broadcasting in Kenya Policy and Politics, 1928-1984,” 73. 
67 G.G.S. Hutchinson, “Broadcasting in the Colonies,” 31 August 1948, KNA HAKI/13/267. 




basis.69 Commercial broadcasting, some had argued, would offer a means of circumventing 
financial constraints, but the government found that, “after carefully considering the matter from 
every possible aspect, we have come to the conclusion that full scale sponsored commercial 
broadcasting would not be in the best interests of Kenya.” Administrators were particularly 
concerned, because, they claimed, listeners looked to radio broadcasting as “a Government 
service” presenting a “very real danger that any products advertised would be considered as 
having official blessing, and Government would tend to be blamed for any shortcomings found 
in them.”70  The administration was not altogether wrong in its assessment that people viewed 
radio as a “Government service” in these years.  
Others were more concerned by the possibility that “irresponsible and shady outfits” 
would try to enter the market by posing as respectable private firms.71 After much discussion, the 
Commission agreed that broadcasting in Kenya “should be controlled by a single, independent 
public corporation,” but that “‘spot’ advertising on a limited basis…continue.” The Commission 
was emphatic, though, that “other forms of commercial broadcasting should not be 
introduced.”72 The prerogatives of commercial broadcasting were simply out of step with the 
prerogatives of “public service” broadcasting. As the Commission wrote:  
There is a clear conflict of interests between commercial broadcasting and what 
has come to be known as ‘public service’ broadcasting. Of its nature, the main 
object of commercial broadcasting must be to provide entertainment…the objects 
of ‘public service’ broadcasting are to provide a balanced programme of 
entertainment and information, while at the same time recognizing responsibility 
for education in the particular as well as the general sense, and the interest of the 
various groups, social, intellectual or political, which make up the community of 
the nation.73  
Commercial broadcasting conceived of only one type of listener: the consumer. Public service 
broadcasting, by contrast, was concerned with various interest groups, themselves internally 
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differentiated. The government’s insistence that radio broadcasting was a “public service,” as we 
shall see, would become the foundation upon which people would demand that the government 
provision communities with broadcasts in vernacular languages, and in so doing grant them 
access to the infrastructure not as homogenous listeners, but as linguistically particular 
constituents.  
In a moment of evident frustration one commercial firm queried the administration, 
writing, “[is] there something rather odd and exceptional in the idea of conducting a service to 
the public on a profitable basis?”74 Here he hit the nail on the head. While today private capital is 
widely held to be the animus for infrastructural expansion as a means of securing development 
(see chapter 6), in this period, and in the context of an emergent social welfarist model of 
development, administrators felt that there was indeed something “odd” about the prospect of 
leaving the “public good” to the whims of the market.  
These difficulties notwithstanding, listenership was on the rise in these years. By the mid-
1950s, the Saucepan Special had entered the market. This shortwave receiver, designed by Harry 
Franklin, an Information Officer posted in Northern Rhodesia, was specifically designed to 
withstand the conditions in the “tropics:” “clumsy handling by…set owner[s], the hazards of 
long transportation…extremes of temperature and humidity, the ravages of white ants, borers, 
etc.”75 Tropicalizing this technology, however, required more than merely modifying its 
technical components. It had to be “tropicalized” in “cultural” terms as well. This was the reason 
for the set’s color: blue. Franklin, based on his experience in Northern Rhodesia, had concluded 
that “one tribe or another [was] superstitious about every other colour.”76  
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Figure  1  The  "Saucepan  Special"  
In 1951 the government claimed that broadcasts were reaching 1.5 million listeners per 
year, this out of an estimated population of over 6 million.77 Evidently, the “pump had been 
primed” and people were “listening in.”78 The set was sold for £5, and by 1955 it was reported 
that Africans were buying up the “quantity of cheap wireless sets on the market” in “large 
numbers,” with 1953 estimates putting this number at 5,000.79 In those years, the government 
was only broadcasting in Kikuyu and Kiswahili, and even the reach of these programs from 
C&W’s transmitters in Nairobi and Mombasa were unsatisfactory. But listenership was, 
evidently, on the rise.  
As promised, shortwave broadcasting had fulfilled its role as an infrastructure of 
connectivity, as a means of linking geographically dispersed populations. Indeed, the airwaves 
were heavy with new messages in the 1950s, messages that invited people to generate 
attachments of “intermediate” scales, albeit ones with different geographical and conceptual 
coordinates than either the Kenya colony or the region of East Africa. Concurrently, 
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administrative transformations placed downward pressure on “minority” groups to consolidate 
modes of identification bounded in ethno-linguistic terms. This, it seemed to many community 
leaders, was the surest way to secure their future place in the coming nation-state. Broadcasting 
became part of these debates as communities, increasingly drawn together by language, 
demanded that the state infrastructurally recognize their particularity in the form of dedicated 
vernacular-language broadcasts. The administration had rushed to establish the Kenya 
Broadcasting Commission to address these demands. And, the Commission conceded, the issues 
were complex.  
 
 
“Broadcasting” Affinity: Radio and the Development of Networks of Other “Intermediate” 
Scales  
 
Upon concluding its research in 1954, the Kenya Broadcasting Commission reflected on the 
future directions of radio broadcasting in the Kenya colony, writing:  
 
A complex society like that of Kenya, with its three major groups [white, Asian, 
and African] and its many languages, creates special problems for broadcasting; 
and these problems can only be solved by a complex, and therefore expensive, 
system of broadcasting. It was clear from the evidence put before us that, as far 
as Africans are concerned, while Swahili is understood in most areas, there are 
important tribal groups which would prefer, and, would only derive full benefit 
from, broadcasting if it were given in their own vernaculars.80 
Crucial here was the admission that popular demands for vernacular-language programing would 
have to shape the broadcasting network of the future. Indeed, as we shall see, the invocation of 
preference of desire as demand had, by the mid-1950s, decidedly political overtones.  
The Kenya colony had been wracked by a series of labor actions in the 1940s, culminating in a 
general strike in 1947, which transcended the parochial imaginary of the Kenyan state as laborers 
spread the strike from Mombasa to Nyanza. This movement was not only capacious in spatial 
terms, but demonstrated the capacity of labor organizers to draw on globally circulating 
discourses as they made bids for inclusion in regimes of labor that proffered protections to 
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metropolitan workers.81 In so doing, colonial communities drew on and consolidated affinities 
that transcended the geographic boundaries of the colony, in the process demonstrating the limits 
of colonial conceptions of the appropriate scale of social and political organization in its colonial 
holdings. The 1947 strike had, indeed, been the initial prompt, reinvigorating conversations 
about the need to expand the state’s broadcasting network on a territorial basis. But dockworkers 
were not alone as they worked to rescale their social and political worlds. At the forefront of 
administrative concerns, in this regard, were two other events that held out the promise of 
rescaled futures: Mau Mau and the Egyptian Revolution.  
In 1952, the government declared a state of emergency in response to what government 
officials first referred to as Mau Mau. Variously described as an anti-colonial struggle, a civil 
war, a class struggle that pit young, marginalized Kikuyu men and women fighting to achieve 
“self-mastery” against an older generation of wealthy men who had forgotten their obligations to 
social juniors, Mau Mau was a movement of moral and material reform (see Chapters 2 and 5).82  
Men and women fighting government forces and “loyalists” from their strongholds in the forests 
of Central Kenya and the Rift Valley firmly rooted their critiques within a Gikuyu epistemology 
of “civic virtue.” While the language of Mau Mau was Kikuyu, though, the government feared 
that the movement could be rescaled, transcending ethnic boundaries as it spread to other ethno-
linguistic communities.83  
In the same year, the Egyptian Free Officers, staged a coup, ushering Egypt into a period 
of wholesale transformation. Soon thereafter, Egypt began beaming vernacular-language radio 
programs to the region. Taken together, these events seemed to press in against the boundaries of 
the Kenya colony, concurrently threatening to make Kenya’s borders irrelevant. The integrity of 
the political unit itself appeared, to many, to be at stake. These events seemed to demand the 
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mobilization of a radio network not as an infrastructure of expansion, but as an infrastructure of 
containment; a new network offering the means of constraining the imaginaries of Kenyan 
communities. These twin contexts gave communities a point of leverage when they demanded 
that government initiate vernacular-language programing in their mother tongues. Indeed, if in 
the early 1950s the state had hoped to use an expanded broadcasting network as a technopolitical 
infrastructure capable of enacting the colony with Kiswahili as the language of “intermediacy,” 
communities’ demands reformatted the technopolitics of broadcasting as they argued that their 
linguistic particularities should guide the siting of new transmitting towers and shape decisions 
surrounding programing. What would emerge was a technopolitical network geared towards 
forwarding parochial interests, to be sure, but it was being driven from below.  
In Mombasa, anxieties about the emergence and fortification of extraterritorial networks 
were rife in these years. In the early 1950s, the Mombasa District Annual Report noted that the 
“direction” of the “Arab community…is becoming established on an East African rather than on 
a territorial basis.”84 Institutional and political connections were being drawn between Zanzibar 
and Mombasa, with the “East African Arab Congress” organizing meetings in Zanzibar in 
1953.85 While “Arabs” on the Coast were not, themselves, internally homogenous, there being a 
“serious rift in the Arab community,” many sought closer relations with Zanzibar and argued 
with increasing urgency for the sovereignty of the Sultan over the Coastal region.86  
But years of infrastructural neglect ensured that regaining control over people’s 
informational worlds would prove to be no easy task. With the collapse of plans for a regional 
broadcasting network following the war, the administration had not simply halted its upkeep of 
its broadcasts, but had actively scaled back broadcasting, with broadcasts to Kenyan Africans, 
using C&W transmitters, trebling around 9 hours per week. By 1951 broadcasts directed to 
Africans were limited to Kiswahili and Kikuyu broadcasts alone, with the latter receiving a mere 
30 minutes per week—this, in part, based on expectations that first Swahili, and then English 
would come to supersede vernaculars as the language of communications in the Kenya colony.87  
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A decline in programming was matched by government directives to actively dismantle 
the network that had been in operation during the war. To the consternation of many in the 
western part of the colony, administrators and inhabitants alike, in 1950 Nairobi opted to remove 
government sets from the Welfare Centers dotting Nyanza’s landscape.88 By the end of the year, 
the 30 receivers that had been dedicated to Africans had been withdrawn, supposedly leaving all 
remaining sets in the hands of South Asians and white settlers.89 For many, the rationale behind 
this decision was inscrutable. 1948 returns showed that Africans in increasing numbers were 
listening in at “Welfare Centres, Information Rooms, and Schools,” leading one administrator to 
remark on the successful work that had been done to “popularize vernacular broadcast 
programmes.”90 And yet, by the end of the year vernacular language broadcasting had been 
jettisoned.91 Listeners and local administrators were incensed. Broadcasting to the Coast received 
somewhat more airtime. Particularly following the General Strike of 1947, which saw the launch 
of Sauti ya Mombasa, to be renamed, Sauti ya Mvita, or “Voice of the Coast,” a Swahili-
language program operating in a coastal variant, Ki-Mvita.92  
In 1948, the government expanded programing on the Coast from a mere 15 minutes to 
40 minutes, and “audiences had increased very considerably.”579 By many accounts, Sauti ya 
Mvita was popular. But the state’s fears were only momentarily assuaged by this rise in 
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listenership. Extending control over inland communities in places like Nyanza would come to 
appear, in the main, to be beset by the problem of too few shortwaves. On the Coast, the problem 
was the inverse. These communities were subject to altogether too many signals. And here, the 
Egyptian Revolution was at the fore of administrators’ minds.  
*** 
On July 23, 1952, the Egyptian Free Officers staged a coup that led to the ouster of King Farouk, 
who was viewed by many as being a puppet of the British, and an ineffectual ruler besides. From 
the outset, Gamal Abdel Nasser, coup leader who would become president in 1956, offered a 
vision of the future that was decidedly unbounded. As he wrote in the Philosophy of the 
Revolution:  
We should first of all agree upon one thing before we proceed further and that is 
to define the boundaries of place as far as we are concerned…If I were told that 
our place is limited by the political boundaries of our country I…do not 
agree…the era of isolation is now gone. Gone also are the days when barbed wires 
marked the frontiers separating and isolating countries, and every country must 
look beyond its frontiers to find out [from] where the currents that affected it 
spring.93  
For Nasser, Egypt was uniquely placed to foment these border-transcending attachments, 
situated as it was at the crossroads linking Africa to the Middle East. What was required was an 
infrastructure of connection, one that enabled the materialization of this “united struggle.”94 
Nasser imagined radio broadcasting as being just such an infrastructure. As Radio Cairo 
proclaimed, broadcasts directed to the Swahili Coast aimed to use the airwaves to link “the 
fighting people of Africa with the Arab peoples who are also fighting for freedom, peace and 
prosperity.”95  
To this end, in 1953, Nasser launched “Voice of the Arabs” or “Saut el Arab.” This 
Arabic-language broadcast was beamed on shortwave, its messages traveling over the airwaves 
and finding a home at nodal sites across continents. As the New York Times anxiously reported: 
it could be “heard and understood by the restive peoples from Algeria to Uganda and from Iraq 
                                                
93 Gamal Abdel Nasser, Philosophy of the Revolution, (Smith, Keynes & Marshall, 1959), 60.  
94 Ibid., 70.  




to the remote sheikhdoms at the southern tip of Arabia.”96 These programs broadcast a message 
that imagined a scale of political affinity that transcended the boundaries of the territory. These 
messages readily reached the Swahili Coast, and immediately people were listening in.97 Nasser 
hoped to use radio broadcasting as a means of scaling up and extending his political project; 
generating attachments between people and Radio Cairo’s network seemed to offer the 
revolutionary government an infrastructure of anti-imperial revolution.  
The content of these broadcasts was diverse, ranging from critiques of American neo-
imperialism, to support for Mau Mau, to condemnations of the apartheid state in South Africa.98 
Transcripts of the speeches of African nationalists, such as Kwame Nkrumah, were put up over 
the airwaves.99 A new lexicon of critique was disseminated as listeners were referred to, often by 
Nasser himself, as “my brothers.” Broadcasts spoke of a united future as seemingly discrete 
struggles were linked. Out of this would emerge a “new African personality” primed to enact an 
emergent concept: “African unity.”100 This was a scalar move designed to secure a new, non-
territorialized vision of connection, one that did not turn on flattening the particularities of 
listeners, but worked to suture people’s heterogeneous experiences together and put them to the 
project of anti-imperial struggle. In geographic terms, this vision oriented people towards the 
north. In ideological terms, this vision oriented people towards an independent future, though not 
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one necessarily framed by the borders of the colonial states, which people thought of with 
ambivalence when they considered the parameters of home.   
As new audiences tuned in, anxieties among administrators heightened. Reporting on a 
1954 trip to the Coast, then Governor of Kenya Evelyn Baring gave a lengthy description of the 
state of broadcasting in the region. “The broadcasts which have been made [in Kenya] are widely 
listened to and by all accounts are a great success in Mombasa. But at present in all the North 
Coast and in most of the South Coast it is impossible to pick them up.”101 It was estimated that 
on average 20,000 people were listening in, no paltry amount, but it was estimated that there 
were a prospective 100,000 listeners. The 80,000 being missed could potentially be brought into 
the listening fold if only the signal were stronger.102 And these material constraints had dire 
political ramifications. This technical lumpiness had created space for other deeply troubling 




Figure  2    African  Affairs  Department,  Annual  Report,  1952.  
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Here, the Governor overstated the popularity of Nairobi-based programing on the Coast. 
And the limited impact of Nairobi’s broadcasts was not unique to the 1950s. The quality of 
reception on the Coast—both in terms of medium and message—had always been problematic. 
In the 1940s, despite the installation of loudspeakers for communal listening in Mombasa’s 
markets, it was reported that Sauti ya Serikali was “hard to hear.”104 Indeed, as elsewhere, when 
administrators debated prospective solutions to what they banally referred to as the “problem” on 
the Coast, they were forced to confront the limited reach of Nairobi’s incomplete network. In 
1948, it was noted that the “broadcasts from Nairobi are transmitted on two low power 
transmitters, one on the medium wave length, giving a regional service within 10 miles of 
Nairobi, and the other on the short waves, giving fairly adequate coverage in most parts of the 
Colony.” But, the report continued, “reception from Nairobi is poor in Nyanza Province and the 
Coastal districts.”105  
The limited reach of these transmissions was not the only problem. From the outset, 
information experts had struggled to develop messages for broadcast that would appeal to 
Muslim communities living on the Coast. And often, they failed. People on the Coast argued that 
BBC’s programming was “too classical and high brow.” The music was also not liked, alienating 
would-be listeners who would have preferred to hear broadcasts of readings of the Koran.106 
Criticisms of both the BBC’s Arabic and Nairobi’s Swahili-language programing persisted 
through the 1950s.107 In 1954, “Arab” women living on the Coast complained about the 
broadcasts directed at them, arguing that “such broadcast talks conflict[ed] with their 
customs.”108   
From the earliest days of broadcasting, observers had warned that the administration 
would need to be attentive to the proclivities of listening communities. This was a key 
component, “men on the spot” had argued in the 1940s, of “tropicalising” the technology of 
radio broadcasting. Indeed, on the heels of the first experimental broadcasts in Kikuyu, one S. le 
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Mesurier Lavers wrote to the Director of Civil Intelligence. He argued for the “the psychological 
value of” vernacular broadcasts, which allowed communities to feel they had their “‘own 
broadcast.’” This value was derived from the importance people attributed to having their 
linguistic and cultural uniqueness realized, of seeing “something being done for them 
specifically by the Government of the colony.”109 The government had paid no heed. Other 
broadcasting networks, as we shall see, were more attentive.  
If the Governor overestimated the popularity of government broadcasts, it seems he 
underestimated the popularity of those coming from Cairo. Other observers offered a corrective. 
Not only were the broadcasts emanating from transmitters sited in various elsewheres “easily 
heard,” but people on the Coast were “avidly” seeking them out as they used their shortwave 
receivers to tune in to Saut el Arab, with a smaller number listening in to Arabic broadcasts from 
Omdurman and All India Radio.110  
The infrastructural weakness of the Kenya Information Office, in tandem with a lack of 
capital, required a makeshift solution. On the Coast, this took the form of Sauti ya Mvita. The 
problems of broadcasting on the Coast, both in terms of the limited reach of transmissions from 
the Nairobi station and the historical inability of British Information Officers to generate 
programing that appealed to Coastal communities, ensured that this station was largely 
autonomous, run by “volunteers” who were given a free hand in developing programing, this on 
the agreement that broadcasters would not introduce “politics” over the airwaves.111 These 
conditions ensured that the directions this station took were largely guided by prerogatives of the 
African information workers that peopled its one shabby office, which was overseen by the 
Municipal African Affairs Officer.  
These knowledge workers were largely pursuing their own vocations when they decided 
to devote their time and energies to Sauti ya Mvita. As Sheikh Hyder Kindy, a Swahili man born 
on the Coast, and a career civil servant and Information Officer recalled: “Volunteers were called 
for and a few enthusiastic Muslims came forward to offer their services.”112 Their aspirations in 
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this were decidedly “intermediate.” As Kindy recalled: Those that volunteered felt “that this 
would give them an opportunity to propagate their religion through this powerful 
medium.”574 Administrators had hoped to use Kiswahili as the language of intermediacy, but a 
secular Kiswahili, not one bisected by religious affiliations. Suffice it to say that the incomplete 
networking of the state not only created space for other forms of listening, but also required that 
it mobilize the work of African knowledge workers and experts, “volunteers” who used their 
position within this lumpy network to pursue their own projects of scale-making.  
The labor of these men was eclectic. Kindy recalled the team extracting news bulletins 
“from the Mombasa Times” from whence they were translated into Kiswahili, and taping music 
from the BBC and, later, Cairo.113 While it was to be the voice of the Coast, Sauti ya Mvita 
clearly serviced a rather more constrained audience. The initial half hour program was divided 
into an “opening with the Zanzibar National Anthem, a Koran reading of about five minutes and 
then a news bulletin, after which there would be some music—mostly Arabic and Swahili 
songs.”114 To capture both Swahili and Arabic-speaking Muslim populations, Sauti ya Mvita 
began broadcasting in both languages and administrators were pleased with the results, arguing it 
was “proving increasingly effective in diverting attention from Arabic broadcasts from Cairo and 
other foreign stations.”115  
But the politics of the Coast were complicated in these years. As Kindy recalled, while 
his aspiration had been to use Sauti ya Mvita to “propagate” Islam in Eastern Africa, he was in 
an awkward position, rejected by Africans for being ‘too Muslim,’ and by Arabs for being ‘too 
African.’116 The stakes of these politics would heighten by the late 1950s, when Muslims on the 
Coast began calling for Mwambao, or Coastal autonomy, as against the threat of “up country 
Africans.”117 Indeed, if Kiswahili was imagined to be the language of an intermediate scale 
framed by the borders of the colony, at the scale of the Coast, as we shall see, Kiswahili mapped 
onto a kind of identity politics framed against a different set of geographic and religious 
coordinates, politicizing Kiswahili broadcasting in critical ways.  
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And while Sauti ya Mvita had gained popularity in these years, largely due to the African 
knowledge workers attached to the station, a dearth in funding ensured that the technics 
remained a problem. As Kindy recalled:  
There was no doubt that Sauti ya Mvita programmes were extremely popular 
wherever they were heard throughout the province. It was therefore unfortunate 
that the transmitters then placed at our disposal by Cable & Wireless Ltd. had 
insufficient power to permit our broadcasts being heard over a wider area of the 
Coast.118   
The stakes of these limitations were high. In 1955, and despite efforts to improve the strength of 
the transmitting station, Mombasa’s signal was routinely swamped by other, and often hostile, 
stations. The competitive nature of this radio sphere was only to increase in the coming years. 
These conditions, however, created an unexpected opening for people to make claims for their 
infrastructural inclusion on the state.  
Indeed, the technopolitical anxieties of the state were not lost on leaders on the Coast. 
Powerful Sheiks and Liwalis actively leveraged administrative fears when they argued that if 
Nairobi wanted to regain control over people’s imagined futures, they would need to cater to 
Arabic-speaking populations. To do so, the state would need to install a more powerful 
transmitter in Mombasa.119 This demand for infrastructural inclusion would ultimately be 
realized in 1957, when a transmitter was finally installed at the Coast. But here the state again 
found itself playing catch-up.  
By 1954, Radio Cairo had expanded its programming, launching Sauti ya Cairo, a 
Kiswahili-language broadcast designed to reach Kiswahili speakers in Kenya, Tanganyika, 
Uganda, and the Belgian Congo.120 These programs responded to the demands of Muslim 
listeners, and opened with recitations from the Koran. Initially thirty minutes long, daily news, 
political commentary, and cultural programs followed readings from the Koran. By 1955, the 
program was forty-five minutes in length, which was increased to an hour in 1958 and, finally, 
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an hour and a half by 1961.121 By 1957, the Voice of Free Africa, by many accounts the most 
virulent in its critiques, joined the queue.122  
Administrators and foreign observers were alarmed at the vitriol of the messages crossing 
into British airspace. As The New York Times wrote: “Cairo Radio, burdening all wave-lengths 
from dawn until after midnight in almost every language of the area, wheedles and cajoles, 
browbeats and foments the restive and unhappy peoples in every corner of the area.”123 Even 
those not actively listening to the broadcasts were subject to their influence, as the “effect of the 
radio’s claims and reports…were spread rapidly and elaborated through coffee-house gossip.”124 
Radio Cairo’s strategy did not turn on flattening the particularities of colonized persons’ 
struggles. Instead, its broadcasts invited listeners to situate their grievances against a larger frame 
of reference by holding the particularities of their experiences in the same analytic frame of those 
of colonized communities located further afield. The goal, in other words, was to tether together 
nodes of discontent, and to invite listeners to see these nodes as not distinct, but as a function of 
the self-same system. Of this, administrators were well aware. “Considerations in determining 
action [regarding the future of broadcasting and in light of Radio Cairo’s programs] are the 
political asmosphere [sic] in the Sudan, Somalia, Zanzibar and Egypt…[there is a] need to 
counteract this influence as soon as possible,” wrote the Chief Secretary in 1955.125  
Cordoning off nodes of discontent within the British empire was a core concern of the 
British in these years.126 It was a strategy that, they hoped, could scale, operating with the same 
logic within the space of the Kenya colony as it would across the Empire. Radio Cairo threatened 
this strategy as listeners were united not necessarily by the simultaneity of their listening, nor by 
the homogeneity of the programing, nor by their geographic contiguity, but by programing that 
both addressed the particularities of their struggles and particularity of the struggles of those 
located across the colonial world. The message of unity in difference was what appeared most 
threatening to colonial powers.  
                                                
121 Brennan, “Radio Cairo,” 177. 
122 James Brennan notes that colonial officials were beset by fears that, as the broadcast claimed, this program was 
being broadcast from Kenya’s White Highlands. Brennan, “Radio Cairo,” 178.  
123 Osgood Caruthers, Special to the NYT “Cairo Radio Stirs Restive Peoples: Air Barrage Covers a Broad Area,” 
The New York Times, July 6, 1958. E5. 
124 Seaghan Maynes, “British Jam Cairo Radio to Halt Rumors” Daily Boston Globe, November 17, 1956. P. 2.  
125 Notes of Chief Secretary, signed Ag. A.S. N.D. AHC/10/66; CO 1036/22 





The Suez Crisis raised the stakes within this competitive radio sphere. And the British, 
pursuant of informational isolation, deployed brute force, bombing Radio Cairo’s transmitters 
within days of their invasion of Egypt.127 Initially, this appeared to have “worked.” But within a 
few days “repairs” had evidently been made, and the signal was “heard again at the Coast.” 
People resumed listening in.128 Efforts to “lure” listeners away from Radio Cairo “and its various 
attractions” had ‘failed.’129  
Evidently, it was true, the airwaves knew “no frontiers,” and radio was indeed capable of 
inviting people to participate in scalar imaginaries that were both larger and smaller than the 
boundaries of the colony.130 And this was precisely the fear. Indeed, administrators in this period 
were anxious that a form of unity based on a shared commitment to Islam could scale up, leading 
to the formation of broad-based Coastal sentiment as listeners fortified attachments among their 
struggles, making it “politically very important that…[Kenyan programs] reach Moslems 
throughout the Coast area.”131 While broadcasts from Nairobi were audible in Mombasa, they 
could not be heard beyond a few miles of the Island. This was not, evidently, a problem for 
shortwave broadcasts emanating from Delhi and Cairo.  
The constellation of issues brought together by Radio Cairo’s broadcasts mirrored its 
technics, which were as expansive as they were nodal. The strength of its signals, broadcast from 
at least 11 shortwave transmitters in the Nile delta area by 1958,132 in tandem with the “truly 
remarkable increase” in shortwave receivers amongst African communities, lent Radio Cairo an 
aura of invincibility.133 And Nasser was not wrong in attesting to the unique geographic position 
Egypt held in fomenting new attachments in the region. As noted by the New York Times, Radio 
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Cairo had “become the most far-reaching voice to be heard between Longitude 20 and Longitude 
60 East and from Latitude 40 North to below the Equator.”134 
 
Figure  3  Osgood  Caruthers,  Radio  Cairo  Stirs  Restive  Peoples:  Air  Barrage  Covers  Broad  Area,  The  New  York  
Times,  July  6,  1958.  E5.  
By 1958 Radio Cairo was broadcasting in over 20 languages, including Somali and Amharic.135 
But Radio Cairo’s efforts to firmly tether its programing to the lives of prospective audiences 
were not limited to considerations of language. Radio Cairo expended a good deal of effort 
generating programing that would come across as firmly embedded in the lives and concerns of 
the communities listening in on their shortwave receivers. While hyperbolic, a sense of the labor 
of this knowledge work was offered by Ray Vicker of the Wall Street Journal:  
Each program is preceded by long studies. Included are studies of the customs of 
each people to whom a broadcast will be beamed. Attention is paid to the time 
they sleep and awake, the time they start and end work and the average time-
distance between work and home. This helps decide the time the program will be 
beamed. Other studies delve into the political position of the country, its economy, 
the type of government and major problems occupying the attention of the 
people…Each program is presented by a native of the country to which the 
message is beamed, assuring that all idiom and methods of presentation will be 
authentic to listeners.136  
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Having mobilized African knowledge workers from across the communities it addressed, Radio 
Cairo worked to embed its programing in the “warp and woof” of everyday life.137 In a strange 
twist of irony, one perhaps not recognized by information workers in the 1950s, this was 
precisely the kind of ethnographic knowledge, the kind of embeddedness, that “men on the spot” 
had argued for in the 1940s, when they debated how best to generate attachments between 
African communities and government-run, vernacular-language broadcasting (see Chapter 3). 
While this was a politics of connection that recognized popular desire for linguistic and 
cultural differentiation, the central message was clear. As Osgood Caruthers of the New York 
Times wrote in 1958, while Radio Cairo had:  
many voices…depending on local situations and their relation to Nasser’s 
policies, one theme never varies…That is that the foreigners – ‘white dogs,’ 
imperialists, bloodsuckers and colonialist oppressors…who have dominated most 
of the area for more than a century, must either leave voluntarily or be driven 
out.138  
The technological reach of these stations, for many administrators, seemed both to proceed and 
to be generative of newly thinkable political futures; the reach of the medium portending the 
message.  
This is not to say that audiences were made up of single-minded listeners. Indeed, people 
were savvy in their listening habits, preferring to piece together information provided by myriad 
different media houses, rather than accept without question the messages of a given one. As 
noted by one administrator in 1956 following a trip to the Coast, where he visited “various coffee 
houses,” people were listening to a “tremendous number of programmes from the Arab 
world…including the BBC.”139  This was not, in other words, passive listening. And these were 
not passive listeners. Theirs was an open, though discriminating, informational world.  
While administrators framed the problem of Radio Cairo as being at once political and 
technological, the only acceptable potential solutions were framed in explicitly technopolitical 
terms. What was needed was the mobilization of new technological networks, networks capable 
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of materially foreclosing the political languages and potential futures thinkable to listeners. “You 
are well aware,” wrote the Provincial Commissioner, “of the reasons for improving the local 
broadcasting along the Coast...Increasing numbers are listening to Radio Cairo and Radio 
India… a substantial improvement to this service [is]…urgently necessary for political 
reasons.”140 Initially, the Government proposed a technopolitics of time, arguing that they need 
only increase the hours being broadcast over C&W’s transmitters “from a total of 47 hours a 
week to more than 80 hours.”141 But this ambition was beset by problems. Not only were 
airwaves crowded, but so too was the clock.  
Historically, Kenya’s Swahili broadcasts to the Coast ended at 7:30 p.m.142 Egypt, wise 
to the African Broadcasting Services’ schedule, ran programs that began at 7 p.m., continuing 
until 9 p.m.143 Extending the broadcasts to 9 p.m., one administrator noted, was essential, and 
had been “made doubly urgent by the opening up of Swahili broadcasts from Saut el Arab, the 
Cairo station…[which contained extremely] undesirable material.”144 But even this seemingly 
simple fix was not feasible. And again, the Government’s relationship with Cable and Wireless 
remained an impediment. The company, responding to Government requests to extend 
broadcasting times, indicated that it was unable to lease the government its equipment in the 
evening hours. These transmitters, the company explained, were occupied at night when they 
were used to transmit to Australia. This was a commercial agreement, and it was protected under 
contract.145  
The government would have to strike out on its own in technological terms if it was to 
succeed in political terms. And, as the administration was soon to learn, simply extending the 
hours of broadcast would not suffice. It was contending with other, more sophisticated, technical 
networks, which transmitted “on a wave length so close to that used by ourselves at the Coast 
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that…[our] transmissions are frequently swamped.”146  Not only did the signals from Egypt 
appear to be more “local” due to the clarity of their reception, of course, but the messages 
themselves seemed to be more firmly embedded in the local milieu to which they were directed.  
By all accounts an expanded material network was the only solution to the expansion in the 
imaginative scale of social and political futures Radio Cairo offered to audiences on the Coast. 
What was needed was a new transmitter of containment, one that would broadcast on a medium 
wavelength, receiving signals parallel to, but distinct from, the shortwaves coming from Cairo. 
In moving from discussions of expanding broadcasting time to discussions of expanding the 
infrastructural reach of the state’s broadcasting network, the colonial administration’s strategy 
shifted from a technopolitics of time to a technopolitics of space.  
By 1955, Kenyan administrators contended that “the need for a Regional Transmitter at 
Mombasa…[was] almost an Emergency matter.”147 But the labor and expertise required to get 
the new station up and running was lengthy, beset as it was by the problem of finding an 
appropriate site for the new transmitter, which required determining not only the quality of the 
soil, but reckoning with concerns over atmospheric “noise.” The staccato rhythm of 
infrastructural expansion was out of step with the temporality within which new relations of 
affinity were being forged. As one frustrated administrator wrote: “This is an extremely urgent 
matter, unfortunately it is also a highly technical one. We shall have to be very careful to avoid 
being bogged down in a morass of megacycles and kilowatts.”148 
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If Radio Cairo offered listeners the possibility of generating new social and political attachments 
over the airwaves, domestic policies, too, encouraged people to engage in the work of 
consolidating and fortifying new attachments. In 1954, the colonial administration began 
implementing the recommendations of the Swynnerton Plan. Designed to increase agricultural 
outputs, the Swynnerton Plan advised that land be consolidated and tenure formalized. As old 
borders were redrawn, there was downward pressure on people to firmly root themselves within 
a logic of a territorialized ethnicized narrative of belonging.149 This was matched by other 
transformations, most notably the 1954 Lyttleton Constitution, which created room for African 
and Asian participation within the government. National political parties were banned but 
political aspirants were invited to create parties bounded by locality. While mitigating against 
large-scale political mobilizations that were not bounded by ethnicity was one the of goals of the 
colonial government, the disproportionately low levels of African representation was bound to 
cause conflict.150 Taken together these politics seemed to demand, as a form of protection, that 
people firmly tether themselves to ostensible homelands defined in ethnic and linguistic terms. 
The colonial state would seek to capitalize upon and direct this emergent and competitive realm 
of differentiation through broadcasting.  
If in the late 1940s and early 1950s the administration hoped to use Kiswahili broadcasts 
to generate subjects of an “intermediate” scale, listeners had their own ideas about what scales of 
inclusion they hoped to access through the radio. In the mid-1950s one administrator reported 
that: “The most interesting feature of the period has been the clear indication that African 
listeners are no longer content with radio material which merely fills air-time. They have become 
increasingly critical in their selection of programmes and throughout have shown that they wish 
to help, by constructive suggestions, what they regard as their own radio station.”151 African 
listeners were, indeed, making their concerns and desires known. 
In response to this renewed interest, the African Broadcasting Service (ABS) launched 
the “African Broadcasting Club” in 1954, and a listenership magazine called “Habari za Radio.” 
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The Club was hierarchically structured, with “Group Leaders” being multilingual so that they 
could “monitor both Swahili and English programmes.”152 Full-fledged group leaders were to be 
marked as distinct. “Wherever possible, a small metal badge might well set off the Group 
Leader…and a photograph of the successful man, with his badge, will be published in HABARI 
ZA RADIO.”153 Regular members, for their part, were to get “plastic badges.” Groups were to 
organize at the scale of the “neighborhood,” the object being to establish an “intimate feeling of 
belonging to and being identified with the programmes broadcast” by ABS.  
In keeping with the intermediate scale that the Government hoped to cultivate, “Habari za 
Radio” was a predominantly Kiswahili-language monthly. Aside from information workers on 
the ground, the KIO used “Habari za Radio” to get a handle on listeners’ responses to 
government broadcasting. But it was also a space where listeners were invited to express their 
tastes and desires. And while there is good reason to be skeptical of this publication and what 
editorial oversight allowed to grace the pages of the magazine, there are equally good reasons to 
take this seriously as source. As Harri Englund writes, while government publications “may not 
furnish uplifting examples” of resistance narratives, “we must examine them as cultural and 
political artifacts in their own right.”154 In the context of this publication, it was taken for granted 
that capital-P politics would not be permissible, just as politics were not permissible over the 
airwaves. And yet, what the administration seemed to view as the apolitical domain of language, 
from the perspective of listeners, was a deeply political domain of future-building.  
In the letters pages, writers directed questions to the ABS staff and responded to their co-
listeners. These letter-writers offered both critiques and praise of the government-directed 
broadcasts orchestrated in their name. Letter-writers were encouraged to see themselves as 
individuals involved in a collective project:  
If you read the name of this page on top there, you will see "YALIYOSEMWA" 
Translation in English "the things they say." So, what are these things they say? 
And who are they? So, "they" are our readers, and the things they say are the many 
letters they write to us...If [you are not yet a listener and a letter-writer]...we urge 
you to be one of them.155 
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People would be rewarded for generating this knowledge. “Every month, in the middle section of 
this page, we will publish the letter that we think is THE BEST AMONGST ALL RECEIVED 
from our listeners. The writer of that best letter will receive a gift of ten shillings.”156 
This was a collective project designed to fortify and entrench a vision of radio broadcasting as a 
public good:  
now we request you to write and tell what you think about us, if you think we are 
good we will be happy to hear you say that, and if you think we are bad people 
also you need to tell us why you think so, also we will be happy if you share your 
opinions on the best way to give you the news. Remember this work of RADIO, 
is yours, we only try to entertain you, relax you and advise you, and most 
importantly give you the true information, we want you to speak up, if you hear 
anything broadcasted by A.B.S is true, then, write short letters.157 
More verbose commentaries would be ignored, writers were warned. There were limits on 
space.158 
By the late 1950s, the magazine claimed to have a membership trebling around 750, a 
small group, but that it had a reading public of 5,000.159 People actively responded to “Habari za 
Radio’s” solicitations for feedback, ABS claiming that it received thousands of letters per week 
from listeners. It had to be acknowledged, though, that the reach of the magazine, like the reach 
of the paltry broadcasting networks themselves, was incomplete.  
Some areas of the Colony are conspicuous by a blank on the A.B.S. Club map 
here; we’d be glad of advice on the reasons for this. Is it that radio listening in 
those areas is low density? Or is HABARI ZA RADIO not reaching listeners 
there? Or is the trouble merely apathy?160  
Those that did write in, though, seemed to take seriously the claim that radio was theirs, and that 
it was a public service provided by the government. Over the years, the government had actively 
shored up this vision.  
Indeed, while the Colonial Office had never been willing to subsidize “the receiving 
side,” leaving it to commercial manufacturers to design appropriately “tropicalised” 
technologies, broadcasts were brought to people in the Mobile Information Van (see Chapter 5). 
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In the 1950s, African knowledge workers distributed "Saucepan Specials” to restaurants and 
community centers. In 1954, on the occasion of the Queen’s Coronation, “loyalists” were given 
Saucepan receivers as gifts, which “African bodies” were to maintain; this, though, a means of 
making “Africans realize that broadcasting facilities are not always provided free by 
Government.”161 
By 1954, it was clear that an interest in radio had been achieved. “The market,” 
administrators argued, could be left to do the rest.  
In the past the Department has encouraged listening to its programmes by the 
provision of free listening facilitates in the form of rediffusion services, public 
address points and the issue of sets to institutions and individuals. This policy was 
adopted as a measure to ‘prime the pump’ and build up a listening habit. With the 
present popularity of the programmes and the quantity of cheap wireless sets on 
the market which Africans are buying in large numbers, this object can be said to 
have been achieved. The Department will provide no further free listening.162 
People had been irritated by the contraction in the infrastructure of broadcasting in these years, 
which to many appeared to constitute a form of infrastructural exclusion. Technopolitics was, in 
these years, then, shaped less by technological intervention than by infrastructural and 
technological absence. Within the pages of “Habari za Radio” listeners reiterated the spirit of this 
critique, arguing that the government should subsidize their access to receivers.   
Indeed, letter writers routinely called the government to task, asking that it provision 
receivers for listeners and make good on their claim that radio broadcasting was a public service. 
As J. M. Mwalimu wrote: “Me and my family don’t have a radio, [I] am asking if ABS can lend 
us a radio? Or give [one to] me then I pay slowly.”163 Others tried to leverage their role as club 
members in working to secure receivers. Suleiman Abdullah, for example, wrote: “I am an A.B.S 
club member, but I don’t know what to do because I don’t have my own radio and my parents 
are poor [so] they can’t get one…[I’m] asking if the A.B.S club officials would agree to buy me 
a radio then I shall be paying little by little every month.”164 The African Broadcasting Services’ 
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response to these demands was tepid. It was simply no longer its responsibility to provision sets 
for its listeners. 
The government had changed the terms upon which radio could be experienced as a 
public good. But it was based on this vision of the infrastructure, and the services that it 
proffered as “their radio,” that people made claims on the state. Nowhere was this clearer than in 
discussions surrounding the language of broadcast. It is clear from these letters that access to the 
infrastructure of broadcasting was, for these letter-writers, critical to their apprehension of 
whether the Colonial state was including them and their communities in “this work of radio.” 
And here listeners would be able to leverage their demands. 
People living in Kenya’s Central Province complained that only Kikuyu speakers and 
Kiswahili speakers were accounted for in the programing. As Angelo Daudi of Meru wrote, “the 
problem arising is, our listeners don’t understand well Kiswahili and Kikuyu. So, I would like to 
ask if it is possible to get like 15 minutes of programming in [the] Meru language.”165 The 
response was predictable. “In Kenya, there are 82 tribes.” Should the administration try to cater 
for each? “Or shall we ask everyone to learn Kiswahili and English so that we can be able to 
communicate together happily?” Kiswahili was to be the language of intermediacy. But here, 
many administrators seemed not to have understood the politics of language in light of political 
and administrative reforms.   
Indeed, these demands were about more than simply having one’s language represented. 
Instead, letter writers’ concerns suggest that language had become a flashpoint in emergent 
discussions about the future nation-state and the place of minority communities in this 
prospective polity. As one Meru letter writer wrote following the introduction of a Kimeru-
language program.  
Mr. Murungi mixes Kimeru with Kikuyu during his broadcasts and as a result of 
this, everything gets mixed to such an extent that most of the listeners have lost 
interest in the programme. We are tired of his poor Kimeru broadcasts and 
especially his insistence in criticizing the handwriting of his listeners by saying 
that most of the letters are illegible.166 
This bastardized hybrid was not wanted by listeners, who demanded “clean Kimeru.” For many 
of these letter writers the stakes of such debates were not insignificant. By the mid-1950s, and 
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with independence a vague outline on the horizon, minority communities feared being swamped 
by majorities. For some, and in Central Province, these groups feared the domination of Kikuyu 
speakers. For others, and along the Coast, the question was whether the region would become an 
“Arab-Muslim” zone, or a Christian “African” one.   
And people leveraged the fears of the colonial state in working to get it to accede to their 
demands. As Ole Aomo wrote:  
I am a Maasai man, who lives in Narok, and I would like to say that because the 
Mau Mau have already entered my area, Maasai programs should be introduced 
for those who only know Maasai language and those who have already joined the 
Mau Mau so that they may be told the truth…[I] am sure this will help them.167 
If on the Coast, the threat of Radio Cairo offered listeners one such opportunity, in the interior 
Mau Mau offered another, people mobilizing the threat of the movement and its capacity to 
spread along the inscrutable lines of the “bush telegraph” in their bid for government recognition 
of their linguistic particularities.  
In the 1940s demands for vernacular programing appeared to be evidence of “parochial 
pride,” demands to be variously addressed and ignored, but this did not appear to be the case by 
the mid-1950s. By this time, “parochial pride” was not something to be unraveled. Instead, it had 
been reformatted as a, if not the, most desirable scale of social and political identification.  
Vernacular programing, administrators hoped—and cultural patriots would join them in this (see 
below)—would shore up notions of community defined by place and language. It would be these 
modes of identification, not the space-scaling modes historically available to people that would 
take precedence. In the mid-1950s, one administrator reported that: “Nyanza Province were very 
keen on programmes in their vernacular languages,” and that the circumstances demanded that 
the “claims of Nyanza Province should receive…consideration alongside those from the 
Coast.”168 And so, in 1953 Dholuo broadcasts were restarted for 15 minutes per day. Programs in 
Luhya, Kisii, Kinandi, Kikamba broadcast over communal sets followed.169 
By contrast to Radio Cairo’s strategy of forging connections across difference, then, the 
colonial state’s strategy was to deploy difference as a means of undermining emergent 
attachments. By 1953, these efforts were fortified as lorries arrived heavy with receiving units 
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for communal listening. Discussions of creating a market for receivers were reignited, and 
information officers recommended that wireless sets be given to loyal chiefs to ensure that the 
technology became “known” and desired “in the African areas.” This, it was hoped, would lead 
to “increased sales to individuals.”170  
*** 
If “Habari za Radio” offered one platform for listeners to engage in comparative work as they 
measured their infrastructural inclusion as against various ‘Others,’ these issues also came in to 
the fore in more expressly political arenas. Despite the strategic widening of Kenya’s political 
sphere pushed through under the Lyttleton Constitution, African representatives were not invited 
to broadcast their opinions over the airwaves, and this caused no small measure of upset.171 As 
noted by Carla Wilson:  
The AIS was responsible for explaining…[constitutional] reform and procedures 
for…[the] election to the public. However, African candidates were not permitted 
to make political speeches on the radio nor were the subsequently elected 
members permitted to make their opinions regarding government policies heard 
on the air even though Europeans had that privilege.172 
African representatives, Nyanza-born Tom Mboya, Member from Nairobi among them, were 
incensed.173 Tellingly, Mboya argued that broadcasting was a public service, the public paying 
the costs of licensing fees, and so Elected Members, as members of the public, were “as much 
entitled as the Government to put forward…views on various aspects of Government policy and 
programmes.”174 While Cable and Wireless had obstructed the state’s capacity to provision radio 
to African communities as a free “public service,” Africans being required to pay licensing fees, 
for Mboya this offered a point of leverage. African radio-owners had invested in the 
broadcasting infrastructure of the territory, whether it was privately owned or not, and so, they 
seemed to argue, it was partially theirs.  
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Mboya was joined by others, such as Ronald Ngala. Born in 1922, in Gotani in Kenya’s 
Coastal region, Ngala schooled first at Alliance High School and later at Makerere, where he 
received his teaching certification, thereafter becoming a teacher and later headmaster on the 
Coast.175 In 1957, Ngala was elected to the Legislative Council as the Coast’s representative. 
Following the promulgation of the Lyttleton Constitution, which formalized Ngala’s status as a 
politician, the politics of the Coast amped up, making it a highly contested space and competitive 
forms of differentiation were the result. Swahili-Muslims and Arabs on the Coast feared being 
swamped by “up Country” Africans. Coastal Africans, for their part, feared domination both by 
Coastal Muslims and by larger African ethno-linguistic communities “upcountry,” leading to 
what one administrator referred to as the increased “political awareness of local Africans.”176  
Ngala, in spite of, or perhaps by virtue of, his own widely traveled itinerary, was an ethnic 
patriot (see Chapters 1 and 2). And like other ethnic patriots he set to work constructing a 
timeless history of the Giriama, Nchi na Desturi za Wagiryama “The Land and Tradition of the 
Giriama,” which, importantly, he composed in Kiswahili.  
Upon entry into the Legislative Council, Ngala began advocating for the particularities of 
Coastal African communities. In 1957, the District Annual Report noted:  
March saw the first African elections to be held in this country when Mr. RG 
Ngala was elected as member for the Coast Constituency. Since the elections there 
has been a marked increase in political activity, particularly among Africans, who 
are treated to a weekly diet of nationalist politics at meetings held in Tononoka. 
Political interest reached its climax at the end of the year following the visit of the 
Secretary of state for the Colonies to Mombasa at the end of October. The 
constitutional settlement proposed by the Secretary of State aroused considerable 
opposition from the politically-conscious African and, as a result, other races in 
Mombasa have been woken out of their customary political apathy.177  
Ngala joined Francis Khamisi (Chapter 2) in giving speeches that were “full of nationalist and 
racial slogans.”178 
Ngala was quick to link the need for the autonomy of African communities on the Coast 
to radio broadcasting. He argued that ethno-linguistic groups on the Coast needed to be 
represented by government-provisioned radio broadcasting. Why, he asked, did Sauti ya Mvita 
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fail to live up to its name and create broadcasts that would appeal to all on the Coast?179 His 
demands did not stop there. During a debate on information estimates undertaken during a 
LegCo session, Ngala argued that Sauti ya Mvita should dedicate more airtime to African 
listeners, in particular by broadcasting in Giriama and other Coast vernaculars.180  
Ngala was not alone in linking the future of broadcasting policy to the future political 
direction of the Kenya colony on the eve of independence. Giriama-speaking listeners writing to 
Habari za Radio were equally concerned that their linguistic particularities were not being 
recognized by the state. As one letter writer wrote: “The day before yesterday when we were 
listening to the news… [one listener]…asked us why ABS does not announce in Giriama. We are 
not able to give to him from you an answer to this question.”181 The response was predictable. 
“There are many indigenous languages in the whole of Kenya and without a doubt we cannot 
broadcast in every language…We have certainty that every Giriama is able to understand 
Swahili.” Ngala initially received a similar response, with the Chief Secretary indicating that the 
“provisioning of programmes for Africans was in hand, but that broadcasting in vernaculars 
would not be possible because of the limited funds available.”182 Here the administration missed 
the point. Comprehension was not at issue. Swahili-language broadcasting on the Coast appeared 
to these listeners to portend a future wherein the region would be dominated by the interests of 
Muslims, both “Arab” and “Swahili.” Swahili, for these men (and women), was not a language 
of an intermediate scale, but a language of partisanship. For these advocates, vernacular 
broadcasting might enable them to leverage their parochialism into political representation on the 
national stage.  
In 1960, Ngala would join representatives of other minority constituencies to found the 
Kenya African Democratic Union (KADU), with himself as the leader. KADU, in keeping with 
Ngala’s radio politics, argued that independent Kenya should be a federated union, this the only 
way to prevent Kenya’s minorities from being swamped by the dominant ethno-linguistic 
groups. By the late 1950s, the balanced provisioning of services had become one register by 
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which communities interpreted their position in relation to the colonial state. The stakes of these 
relations were high with a future independent state an increasingly robust outline on the horizon. 
But Ngala’s seemingly parochial politics in these years did not stop him from traveling to 
London with Nyanza-born Tom Mboya to protest colonial efforts to use the new constitution to 
bifurcate a nation-in-becoming. For many people at this time, politics was a game of hedging. 
Absent a secure future it was left to these leaders to play the game of both the particular 
(language/"tribe") and the general (nation/"African").  
And demands begot other demands. In the mid-1950s, Somali-speaking listeners 
demanded Somali broadcasts provisioned for their communities living in the Northern Frontier 
Province. While in the past the claims of this historically marginal and marginalized population 
could have been ignored, by the end of 1957 it was clear that Radio Cairo’s Somali language 
broadcasts were heavy with “vicious propaganda,” which was being “listened to by the Somalis.” 
And so, the price for ignoring claims for inclusion via the recognition of difference appeared to 
be impossible, making it of the “greatest importance” that a “good Kenya service be 
provided.”183  
The specter of Mau Mau certainly haunted the colonial imaginary when administrators 
discussed the future of the colony and the role of broadcasting in shoring up what was perceived 
to be a beleaguered center. Broadcasting in Nyeri, it was noted, was “rehabilitation,” whereas 
broadcasting on the Coast and Nyanza was “preventative.” The airwaves heavy with colonial 
visions of the future touching down in communities to the east and to the west could be subtler. 
In these regions “many a pill,” one administrator argued, could be “slipped in without their 
realizing it.”184 The state was savvy, too, in seeing that people in this twilight moment were 
responding to conflicting demands and the uncertainty of the moment. And so, it settled on 
conceding to these demands, hoping that the politics of infrastructural inclusion premised on 
popular demands for the recognition of linguistic difference in the domain of broadcasting could 
be beneficially divisive, allowing it to retain its fragile hold on a territorial unit: the Kenya 
colony. 
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By 1957, and following much anxiety and hand-wringing over the siting of new stations in both 
Nyanza and on the Coast, new transmitters had been installed in both regions to address what 
was banally referred to as the “problem” of each. On the Coast, the “problem” was “the impact 
upon it of outside propaganda,” namely “programmes from Cairo (Saut el Arab), All India 
Radio, and [those] from Omdurman.”185 The problem with these broadcasts inhered not only in 
their message, but in the form of the medium itself, as the “stations use powerful transmitters 
working on a wave length close to that used by our Information Services with the result that the 
local broadcasts are frequently swamped and listeners tune in to the more powerful 
transmitters.”186 The aim in installing the new transmitter had been to “establish broadcasting 
arrangements at the Coast so as to ensure that good reception of the local programmes…[was] 
provided without any interference from outside stations.”187  
While in the 1940s, administrators discussing the role of radio broadcasting in the colony 
and beyond labored to cordon off the technics from the politics, this was no longer the case by 
the mid-1950s, by which point the technics were self-consciously being deployed to affect 
political ends, in this case shoring up the borders of the Kenya colony in a moment of flux. As 
noted by then Director of Information, Watkins Pritchford:  
the whole object of installing a medium wave transmitter is to try and ensure that 
listeners do not need to turn to the short-wave band at all. If we can keep them 
listening consistently on the medium wave band we can ensure that our 
programmes are not interfered with by outside stations and by avoiding the 
necessity for the listener to use short wave band at all we may be able to wean 
him away from the powerful shortwave broadcasts from Cairo, Omdurman and 
All India Radio.188  
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While the media sphere remained saturated with threats, Cairo was the “principal antagonist” in 
this “radio war.”189  
But in settling on this plan, the administration had been forced to confront a series of 
potential material interventions, and develop an appropriately “tropicalised” network. Kenya’s 
unique topography, and meteorological conditions obtaining “in the tropics” ensured this. To this 
was the added problem of accessing receivers suitably designed for the region. The market was 
called upon to do this work. The arrival of the Saucepan Special, a small compact device, a 
“tropicalised” technology, seemed to be just what the administration had been hoping for.  
But it was a shortwave technology. And it was over these small blue sets that people 
tuned in to programs that offered communities a set of potential attachments that were not 
bounded in territorial nor ethno-linguistic terms. Over the airwaves, Radio Cairo invited various 
communities on the Coast to see their struggles as linked to those living at a distance from 
themselves. Speaking in the language of listeners and attentive to their programing desires, 
Radio Cairo offered a vision of the future wherein difference could be the basis for unity, or at 
the very least temporary alliance. 
But the vision of the future on offer through Radio Cairo was always refracted through 
more local political considerations and contests. The Coast, in these years, was a contested space. 
As discussions regarding independence amped up, Arabs on the Coast feared being swamped by 
“up Country” Africans as new constituencies were inscribed in law. Coastal Africans, for their 
part, feared domination both by Coastal Arabs and by the larger African ethno-linguistic 
communities of the interior, leading to an “increase in the political awareness of local 
Africans.”190 This politics, though divisive, was more desirable to the colonial state than the 
politics being offered by Radio Cairo. The terms of the Lyttleton Constitution made as much 
clear. And so, the state sought to reinforce the parochial and ethno-linguistically bound focus of 
African political activity by mobilizing a new infrastructural network. 
As A. M. Dean of the Department of Information wrote: “Present and possible future 
political trends in the Colony argue strongly in favour of Government owned Broadcast Service 
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in all languages.”191 This was not simply inclusion, but an inclusion that turned on the capacity to 
capitalize on difference, to make it antagonistic. As one Coastal administrator wrote: “What we 
need to do…is to make both African and Arab feel that they were being well catered for, and 
even for each to feel that they are getting ‘a better deal’ than the other community.”192  
The animus for infrastructural expansion, however, was a response to homegrown 
demands for infrastructural inclusion premised on government claims that radio broadcasting 
was a “public good.” As infrastructural networks were variously expanded and rolled back, 
people engaged in comparative work as they calculated their relative access vis-à-vis an 
increasingly hard set of borders that separated themselves from various ‘Others.’ It so followed 
that people did not make claims on the state as homogenous listeners, but as linguistically 
particular constituents. Tropicalizing technologies was a colonial trope premised on a vision of 
incommensurable ‘Otherness.’ Listeners reformatted this vision when they argued that the Other 
public of which they were a part was not, in fact, the “masses,” but rather more discrete 
categories that demanded accommodation. This was a parochial technopolitics, to be sure, but it 
was guided from below.  
We need to situate demands for vernacular-language programs in this light. This was a 
politics that linked recognition of difference to equal airtime, that linked political inclusion to 
access to infrastructures. The state had laid the groundwork for this. And these demands were, 
ultimately, heard loud and clear. The recognition of linguistic difference as a metric of inclusion 
was on the table so far as broadcasting was concerned. These demands mitigated against the 
linguistic telos that would have had first Kiswahili and then English as the lingua francas of the 
Kenya colony.  
The postcolonial state largely built on colonial-era thinking regarding the utility of radio 
broadcasting. It, too, hoped to use broadcasting to enact developmentalist subjects of an 
intermediary scale, listeners now hemmed in by the boundaries of the nation-state. And the 
threats of alternative modes of scale-making did not end with independence, as the rise of KADU 
suggests. But the terms of the debate had changed. As feared by Muslims on the Swahili Coast, 
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Nairobi sought to centralize and standardize the state’s administrative power. In this, too, it built 
on late-colonial practice. In 1959, the colonial government had unceremoniously shuttered Sauti 
ya Mvita.193 The station was subsumed within the newly established Kenya Broadcasting Service 
(KBS), which was rebranded the Voice of Kenya (VoK) in 1964. While the VoK continued 
vernacular language broadcasting, it built on colonial aspirations and worked to leverage 
Kiswahili as the language not of the colony, but of the nation-state.  
In trying to assemble a fractured and precarious unity, then, the postcolonial state 
martialed radio as an infrastructure to constrain people’s imaginative futures, attaching them to 
the center of administrative power. This left little room for autonomous forms of action in the 
field of broadcasting. The creative work of men like Kindy and Ambrose Wakaria, of whom we 
will learn more (Chapter 5), was sidelined as the content of vernacular-language programing was 
increasingly administered from Nairobi. The politics of broadcasting in the independence period, 
in other words, continued to be shaped by the territorialized framework within which they had 
been actualized by the anxious colonial state in the 1950s. In the postcolonial period, as in the 
twilight years of colonial rule, difference would be recognized and accommodated, the borders 
of the then colony, now nation-state in becoming, were not up for debate.    
This, then, was the framework against which interested firms deployed vernacular-
language broadcasting in the liberalization period as tools of “political tribalism.”194 It is only up 
against this longer history that the frustration of communities, their receptivity to vitriolic and 
ethnicized broadcasting, must be cast. The sense of precarity that commercial broadcasters 
tapped into built on a more durable set of political formations, which linked inclusion within the 
body politic to access to infrastructures not as a means of asserting generic political inclusion, 
but as a means of staking out a position for access and inclusion premised on difference.  
If this chapter focused, in part, on the forms of attachment building that emerged in the 
absence of a robust broadcasting network in the late 1940s and through the 1950s, the chapter to 
follow explores the prosthetic work that enabled the network, such as it did exist, to materialize 
in these same years.    
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“Tropicalised” Technologies: Making Broadcasting “Work” in Colonial Kenya 
 
One morning in January 1944, a mobile information unit arrived on the compound of a Church 
Missionary Society (CMS) school, located in Maseno, in western Kenya. The engines signaled 
the arrival of the group as they made their way towards the school compound. Classes were in 
session, but the students knew of the unit’s impending arrival, hearing the caravan before they 
saw it. Samwel Okwako Libuko put to the page some of the excitement he felt on that day: “It 
was on Thursday morning when a motor car of mobile cinema came here.” When the van 
stopped, “many boys rushed out of their classrooms. Other boys peeped through the windows 
and doors.” The reason for these school attendees’ interest was clear to Samwel. Such “a motor 
car had not been seen by us for [a] long [time],” he reflected in his “composition.”  
This van, though, a “very large and clumsy bedford green van,” was distinct from other lorries of 
its kind.1 As Vetus Oduor recalled, it was marked by performative “golden letters” which 
brought to these students’ “eyes the name ‘cinema.’”2 This vehicle, the only one of its kind, was 
storied, rumors of its existence circulating through the countryside long before its arrival. As 
another student recalled on that day: “I have been hearing of the cinema, which has been shown 
by Mr. Champion for many days without seeing it myself. I was very pleased today when I saw a 
huge motor car, on which was written in capital letters ‘Mobile Cinema.’”3 Upon reading those 
letters Vetus “at once...knew what the lorries brought to us.”4  
Others were less excited by the arrival of the unit. These young men, one student wrote 
rather skeptically, “pretended that they never cared for that motor car.” This student did not 
reflect on the reasons for this disinterest, but perhaps for some of these young people, novelty did 
not inspire excitement but distrust. Like Ambrose Wakaria (to be discussed below), these young 
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people may have been taught to view European novelties with some circumspection by parents 
and grandparents at home.  
These students were to be the audience of one of the many viewing parties staged by the 
information arm of the colonial state in the war years. This was not an event of equals, to be sure, 
but it was an encounter shaped at the “interface.”5 And these students were well aware that they 
were not the only ones consuming information, well aware of the fact that they were as much the 
viewers as the viewed. As Samwel wrote: “This peeping of the school boys might have surprised 
the gentleman who brought the cinema.” These tours, indeed, were as much concerned with 
gathering information as to the situation in African locations, and Africans’ responses to cinema 
and broadcasting, as they were with disseminating information to the myriad local communities 
that they visited.  
As W. F. P. Kelly, who took over the unit from its first operator Arthur M. Champion, 
noted in his memoir, this work was highly valued. Operators’ observations were sent directly to 
the Chief Secretary, who appreciated the unique status of these “reports as being first hand 
accounts of what was happening in the districts by an outsider who would be meeting thousands 
and thousands of Africans and wandering about their country.”6 On occasion, this led to distrust. 
As Kelly wrote, both he and Champion were “known as...spies by the District Administration.”7  
Initially, the administration imagined these units serving small audiences. Champion had 
changed all this. By obtaining “a non transparent screen which he erected some 12’ in height by 
means of a series of poles…by choosing natural amphitheatres and by marshalling the audience 
into a narrow segment so that they did not stray away from the reflection of the light he was able 
to show to audiences as large as 5,000.” People walked great distances, “almost fifty kilometers,” 
one elderly gentlemen recalled, “to see the...mobile.”89  
To use the language of the time, in rejigging the equipment such that it ‘worked’ in the 
Kenya colony, Champion had “tropicalised” the unit and its technologies. And this work of 
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“tropicalisation” took many forms. Sometimes set up on hillsides, or “little slopes,” at other 
times in the “big hall[s]” of schools, in the “godowns” of local businesses, or sometimes in 
“amphitheatres,” which made “first-class outdoor…hall[s].”10 The siting of the spectacles was 
important. What the crew sought was “favourable ground [which] enabled...a large number to 
see well.”11  Broadcasts were accompanied by silent films (over which a commentator spoke), 
pedantic developmentalist lectures, educative performances, and the distribution of 
broadsheets.12  
Not only did these spectacles have distinctive spatial coordinates, they also tended to 
follow a fixed temporal regime. As Champion wrote: 
The performances generally start at 6.30 p.m. preceded by a few items consisting 
of band music, songs in English, Kikuyu and Kikamba on the loudspeaker and the 
reading of the introductions in the appropriate language of two or three of the 
films takes place before showing...After that one or two local films follow with 
running commentary only...We conclude [at] about 8.p.m. as a rule.13  
The regimented nature of this routine was in line with the developmentalist-cum-disciplinary 
effect that administrators hoped these events would produce. Not only were attendees to be 
‘taught’ how to reform everyday life and so achieve “development,” but the administration 
hoped to cultivate attendees as spectators of a particular sort: quiet, attentive, interested.  
Not only was the unit regimented by the clock, following the rhythm of sun’s descent, but 
the timing of these trips was shaped by the seasons. As Kelly wrote: “normally we stayed in 
Nairobi during the month of April when the long rains were at their height and again in 
November for the short rains.” For African knowledge workers and experts, these were periods 
of reprieve, enabling them to tend to their shambas, to take holiday, to visit family.14 During 
these periods Kelly “would travel around on the tarmac roads in the vicinity of Nairobi showing 
to various institutions such as the two breweries at Ruaraka, [and] the schools at Pumwani” 
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among other locales.15 As this suggests, the itineraries pursued during the rains were not 
accidental. Kelly was only able to do his work during these months by virtue of the presence of 
tarmacked roads. The unit, in other words, was dependent on another infrastructure whose lumpy 
reach was similarly borne of policies of developmental austerity: roads (see Chapter 1).  
The awkward tempo of these visits, though, also accounted for their novelty, enabling 
this “clumsy” van to draw such impressive crowds. Indeed, one can imagine the spectacle of 
these visits. Staged in largely un-electrified regions of the country, the glow of the screen, the 
projection of voices, and the large crowds of viewers must have marked these occasions as 
exciting events. It is no wonder that they were storied; rumors of the van’s arrival generating 
expectant excitement across the countryside. Novelty, though, was not the final goal. 
The administration hoped to use the van to cultivate regular listeners to its broadcasts. 
The unit itself, it seems, was never to be a permanent feature of the broadcasting apparatus. 
Instead, it was conceived of as a stop-gap solution, temporarily addressing the problem of the 
limited reach of the state until such a time as the airwaves were heavy with broadcasts emanating 
from Nairobi. And lofty ambitions were pinned on broadcasting, which administrators in London 
imagined would play a key role in enacting an emergent developmentalist ethos. Indeed, as early 
as 1936, as we will recall, the Committee on Broadcasting in the Colonies wrote: 
We envisage the development of Colonial Broadcasting - and its justification - not 
as an instrument of entertainment for Europeans and quasi-Europeans … but as 
an instrument of advanced administration…for the enlightenment and education 
of the native populations and their instruction in public health, agriculture etc.16 
In the beginning, administrators imagined radio-listening would be a domestic affair because 
“private listening on personally owned sets in the house is...the best form of listening.”17 This 
was, then, a universalist vision of technologies. A vision that held technologies to be easily 
transposed to new spaces, having the same effect no matter where they were dropped down. But 
administrators accepted that it would be “a very long time before one can hope for…[the] ideal 
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[of domestic listening] to be reached in Africa”18 In this networked future, government 
development initiatives would travel over the airwaves, rather than the roadways, with centrally 
produced broadcasts from Nairobi reaching into the lives of communities living throughout the 
territory. To this end, during the war Nairobi began running broadcasts for African communities 
in Kikuyu, Dholuo, Kikamba, Luhya, Luganda, Kinandi, Kisii and Kiswahili.19 These efforts 
notwithstanding, it was widely acknowledged that broadcasts failed “to ensure satisfactory 
reception over considerable areas.”20 
And so, in the meantime, the Government hoped that, “through the medium of a wireless 
receiving set attached to the van,” the problems thrown up by the lumpy reach of the state could 
be mitigated, as the van brought government messages and entertainment “to audiences which 
would not otherwise be reached by the vernacular broadcasts from the Nairobi Station.”21 
Administrators, then, acknowledged that material constraints would make domestic listening 
over personally owned sets impossible. This was an acknowledgement that seamless radio 
broadcasting, like brick-and-mortar schools, electrification, and local clinics, were not 
possibilities in the immediate or near future.  
For all intents and purposes, then, the mobile information van was radio in this period. It 
was broadcasting. This van was a tropicalized technology designed to bridge the gap between an 
emergent developmentalist ideology and the particular material world of the Kenya colony, 
shaped as it was both by Kenya’s unique geography and by long-standing policies of colonial 
austerity (see Chapter 4). To use a technological anachronism, the Kenya Information Office 
(KIO) hoped to use the van to “leapfrog” over non-existent harder infrastructures, all the while 
ushering the colony and its people into a developed and developmentalist future. In this regard, 
and like radio broadcasting itself (see Chapter 4), the unit was imagined as an infrastructural 
prosthetic, a means of temporarily addressing the limited reach of the state until such a time as 
material networks conformed to the state’s aspiration for seamless infrastructural reach.  
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Perhaps because these events were staged at central nodes, and drew crowds from quite 
far afield, they were often heterogeneous and lively in character. In Nakuru, for example, one 
1940 visit drew a crowd of “between 2,000 and 3,000 natives...of mixed tribes.” This 
linguistically diverse group demanded that “Kiswahili, Jaluo and Kikuyu languages were all 
made use of.” This, Champion noted, “appeared to give general satisfaction.”22 At other times, 
all the films were accompanied by running commentary in Kiswahili alone.23  
Not only did heterogeneous populations often watch and listen side by side in this period, 
generating a kind of multilingual and polyphonic space, but the content was anything but 
exclusively ‘local’ in character. As Ambrose C. Coghill wrote: "the keenest interest and curiosity 
are aroused in new scenes of unfamiliar peoples, lands and customs, giving rise to a desire for 
reading and a wider knowledge of the world.”24 This interest in the broader world was intimately 
linked to the developmentalist mandate of these tours in the minds of administrators. As Coghill 
continued: “There can be little doubt that the use of selected films would rapidly make the minds 
of the Africans in the Reserves sympathetically disposed towards the acceptance of improved 
conditions of life."25  
The work that went into orchestrating these events was routinely elided in Information 
Officers’ reports. But these visits were carefully staged happenings that depended on the input 
and practiced labor of African knowledge workers and experts. These men were responsible for 
making the messages legible to viewers and listeners, such as the school-goers at Maseno. It was 
these men, for example, that gave “introductions in the appropriate language” and who offered 
“running commentary.” African technical experts, for their part, were responsible for 
maintaining and repairing imperfectly tropicalised technologies, negotiating worn out parts, and 
otherwise “jumping into the breach” in the context of routine failure.  
In what follows, I excavate the critical role these knowledge workers and experts played 
in making information—broadcasting included—‘work’ in colonial Kenya. As we saw in the 
preceding chapter, durable policies of colonial austerity worked as a critical counterpoint to the 
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ideal of seamless infrastructural reach in the field of radio broadcasting. Here I explore the 
lumpy network that did emerge, a network that was not only incomplete but that was marked by 
perennial breakdown, which took two forms: material and conceptual. Not only were the 
technical components upon which the unit depended routinely in a state of disintegration and 
disrepair, but the ideological and developmentalist ambitions wrapped up in new media forms 
were also perennially on the brink of “failing.” In the minds of administrators, importantly, these 
registers of breakdown were not held to be distinct.  
New media technologies not only brought new administrative possibilities to the fore, but 
raised critical questions regarding the relationship between medium and message. Indeed, 
administrators were certain that the breakdown of technics would lead to a breakdown of the 
messages on offer. The maintenance and repair of both imperfectly tropicalized technologies, 
and the messages that propagated through the airwaves, was essential. The Information Office 
called on African knowledge workers and technologists, these colonial “middle figures” and 
experts of both technics and culture, to the task of acting as critical maintainers of both ideology 
and technology.26 In this, they were called to the task of acting infrastructurally, called to the task 
of engaging in prosthetic work in a context where colonial networks were arterial at best.  
Central to this maintenance work was the labor of translation. I argue that the work of 
translation—and the anxiety it generated for administrators and missionaries—turned on the 
widely held perception that content need not only be translated in linguistic terms but in 
conceptual terms as well.  
As this suggests, this work was never simply prosthetic, it never simply filled the gap. 
Not only was the prosthetic work of African experts and knowledge workers essential to making 
this information network “hang together,” such as it did, but it was also value-generating. The 
importance of these contributions would be tacitly acknowledged during Mau Mau, when the 
Kenya Information Office tasked African knowledge workers with generating content that would 
resonate with communities in the countryside and, the administration hoped, with the young men 
and women fighting in the forest. During Mau Mau, this cultural expertise was appropriated by 
the state, scaled up, and put to the ongoing task of “tropicalising” Kenya’s media infrastructures. 
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And yet, the value of this expertise was rarely formally acknowledged by the state. Durable 
conditions of austerity had created the conditions wherein African infrastructural workers were 
routinely simply expected to act like infrastructures.  
But it was precisely this critical work of translation that rendered African knowledge-
workers powerful cultural brokers and authors of culture. As I will demonstrate, from this 
intermediate position, knowledge workers in particular leveraged their roles in the colonial 
hierarchy as they fulfilled their vocations, engaging in their own projects of culture-building. In 
so doing, they rescaled their prosthetic work within this lumpy system, turning new media forms 
into their own prosthetics with which to generate new attachments with “their listeners.” 
Ambrose Wakaria was one such knowledge worker. It is to his story to which we now turn.  
*** 
I met with Ambrose Wakaria in Ngong Town, a large peri-urban city on the outskirts of Nairobi. 
Wakaria was rumored to be the oldest serving broadcaster in Kenya, and I had gotten his contact 
information from Henry Makhoka, the current director of broadcasting at the Kenya 
Broadcasting Corporation (KBC), some weeks earlier. Like Ruaraka, Ngong Town might have 
been included on Kelly’s Nairobi itinerary during the short rains. Falling to the East and West of 
Nairobi, each of these locations was flanked on one side by Nairobi’s historically white suburbs. 
If Ruaraka boasted large populations of African laborers working at the breweries active there, 
Ngong would have been an ideal place to site events for laborers working on the region’s white 
farms.  
I was accompanied on my mission by another informant, Wanyika Gatibi, a taxi driver 
who had been driving around Nairobi and its environs for many years. Born in Nyeri, in Kenya’s 
Central Province, Gatibi was enthusiastic to take me on this journey. From my perspective, we 
were about to meet with the oldest living Kenyan broadcaster; for Gatibi we were meeting an 
expert in Gikuyu culture. Indeed, Wakaria has something of the status of celebrity among 
Kikuyu men over the age of 50. 
We met Wakaria at a two-story bar, something of an enigmatic staple in Kenya, off the 
main strip. Wakaria was sitting at a small square table set for four by large sliding glass doors 
which led to the verandah outside. Sitting down, I introduced myself and Wanyika who had 
decided to sit in on the meeting. Picking up the menu, I indicated that people should order what 




learn was resented—I offered in exchange for the opportunity to speak to Ambrose. It was late in 
the afternoon. Scanning the menu, I asked if he’d like a chai or, perhaps, a beer. He told me he’d 
start with tea. Business happened over tea, the consumption of alcohol marking business 
successfully concluded. This, he indicated, was in line with durable visions of work that he 
located in Gikuyu culture.27 Chai having arrived, we began our conversation.  
Wakaria was born “in Nairobi” in 1928, in a part of the city that is today called 
Ridgeway. These were all Kikuyu lands then, he told me, gesturing out the windows behind him. 
His parents were early Protestant converts, joining the Church Missionary Society (CMS) in the 
early 1920s. Before Ambrose’s birth they had a “Christian wedding,” paid for largely by his 
father who worked as a cook in what is today called Westlands.28 When Europeans stole his 
family’s land, he continued, he and his family moved to Kiambu. Like many in his position, his 
father’s decision to join the church had led to conflict within the family.29 Indeed, Wakaria spoke 
at good length about how his father’s conversion had caused a critical rift with his grandfather, 
who was skeptical of European intentions in the region and equally suspicious of the Church.  
Ambrose’s grandfather was particularly irked by his son’s decision to send Wakaria to the 
mission school. “My father was very much interested in schools…[and] my grandfather could 
not allow me to go to school,” Wakaria recalled. And so, the two were at an impasse. Wakaria 
grew up in the midst of this tension but walked the line with seeming equipoise. On holidays, he 
told me, his parents sent him to his grandfather to “cool him down.” “So, you were a peacemaker 
then?,” I asked. “I was a child, but my father wanted to make peace with the father.” And so, 
Wakaria did as he was told.  
His father’s conversion and relative affluence brought Wakaria first to a CMS mission 
school, and later, in 1942 when he reached Standard Four, to boarding school. Wakaria’s 
relationship with his education was fraught.30 While he enjoyed history and agricultural courses, 
the teachers were harsh, “terrible” he told me, “beating us all the time.” Following high school, 
Wakaria attended classes in pharmacology at the King George Hospital, but he was “chased” for 
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fighting with other students.31 Wakaria’s mobile itinerary, though, enabled him to pursue his 
life’s work. Indeed, it was due to his own unusual trajectory that he landed his position at the 
Kenya Information Office (KIO) in 1950. And it was through this work that he had gained his 
expertise (and celebrity status) as the authority on all things Gikuyu. Men like Wakaria were 
both the voices and the ears of the information arm of the colonial state. But they were also 
researchers and experts of “culture,” lay ethnographers whose knowledge the colonial state 
routinely mobilized as it fine-tuned its information apparatus. Men like Wakaria, then, critical 
translators and professional knowledge workers, occupied positions of relative power. The 
colonial state viewed these men, and the knowledge they bore, with apprehension.   
 
 
A Fragile Development  
 
Wakaria, like many African knowledge workers, got his start working for the Mobile Cinema 
Unit. Often getting their training under the watchful eye of Arthur M. Champion, the lives, 
experiences, and expertise of these men is fragmentary in the archival record. But this in and of 
itself tells us something of the hierarchical nature of Kenya’s knowledge economy. Importantly, 
their labor emerges less in the day to day operations of the unit than in moments of ‘indiscipline’ 
and ‘breakdown.’ The archival traces emerging in the context of indiscipline tell us something of 
the strictures under which these men performed their work, and their emergent status as a social 
category. Archival traces emerging in the context of breakdown reveal how critical their work 
was to the operations of the Kenya colony’s lumpy information apparatus.  
If Wakaria’s own itinerary was relatively unique, the same was true of the British 
information workers under whom men like Wakaria worked. Champion, like Wakaria, was 
something of an enigmatic figure. He had been educated at Clifton College, located in the port 
city of Bristol. Following graduation, he became a Royal Engineer, joining the Kenya 
Administrative Service around 1909. He first worked in Kitui District, a place for which he 
apparently developed a deep affection.32 From Kitui he acted as a District Commissioner in both 
                                                
31 Interviews with Ambrose Wakaria, 2014. 
32 W.F.P. Kelly, District Officer, 1936-63. “Chapter V: The Mobile Cinema,” 5 in Kenya Memoir, Kelly 




Meru and Nyeri. In 1931, he won a gold medal from the Royal Geographical Society for his 
exploration of Teleki’s Volcano, located at the Southern tip of Lake Rudolf.33 Champion, 
though, was an avid observer of people as well as place, coupling his administrative duties with a 
penchant for lay ethnography. In 1944, following his retirement, he wrote “Native Welfare in 
Kenya.”34 In it, he lay out his ambivalent feelings regarding the role of Christian education in the 
region. He argued that Christian conversion had led to undue rifts, with the mission educated 
constituting a separate community within a “sea of paganism.”35 Education had stripped these 
persons of ‘culture,’ producing a damaging segregation that separated the mission educated from 
the strictures of social life that were essential for maintaining what, to him, would have 
otherwise been unchanging cultural practices.36 Champion, we can imagine, would have had a 
good deal to say about the conflicts that structured Wakaria’s own upbringing.  
And yet, Champion appreciated the possibilities for “development” that many at the time 
located as being the special purview of the Kenyan Information Office. Perhaps, for Champion, 
there was something about the leveling aspirations of the unit. Unlike the Church, the unit served 
all that were willing to walk the many miles to the central nodes where the events were typically 
staged. Though nodal, in theory the unit’s reach was sociologically all embracing; a tool of 
“mass education.” This contrasted with the Church, which required a spatial commitment to the 
lands of mission stations and often an avowed disavowal of the unconverted. In 1940 Champion 
became the first mobile unit operator, crisscrossing the country in the single van serving the 
territory from which he broadcast ‘news’ (with African broadcasters providing translation), 
screened films (with African knowledge workers providing commentary), and, with his crew, 
organized live performances (wherein African assistants executed performances, Champion 
himself limited to the sidelines).  
For Champion, maintaining the integrity of the group as a unit was key to its success. As 
Kelly recalled, Champion moved “round [the countryside] with a large tent for his staff and a 
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smaller tent for himself.” Despite this separation in the quarters of repose, he was evidently 
attached to “his staff,” which consisted of “the Machakos driver a Kamba called Katele and his 
assistant and...two interpreters.” Moses, the Kikuyu interpreter, spoke Kikamba as well as 
Kiswahili fluently, while John, “the Luo,” spoke Kiswahili as well as his own “mother tongue 
Dholuo.”37 The linguistic specialization of these knowledge workers was a critical component of 
their expertise.  
The unit of which Champion was a part traveled widely. By all accounts, Champion’s 
visits were wildly popular, with every district “anxious to have a prolonged visit from the Mobile 
Cinema Unit.”38 This would have been the team that the students at Maseno recounted in their 
“compositions.” Incomplete infrastructural networking demanded that broadcasting be brought to 
communities living across Kenya’s varied topography. But for audiences, the unit’s arrival bore 
with it the possibility of temporarily traveling to various global elsewheres. As Bartholomew 
Orwa wrote:  
Yesterday, about twelve o-clock...I saw a big lorry on which the word CINEMA 
was printed. I asked some of our boys why it comes. Most of the boys told me 
that he comes to show us how the war [was proceeding] and many things which 
are done in England and other parts of the World on the Cinema.39 
For this viewer, the unit was a window through which the wider world became visible and 
audible. This was a place of pleasure and excitement. Orwa continued:  
I was very happy when I saw Mr. Champion…I did not take my dinner because 
of the strange things which [would]...be shown. The first thing which made me 
interested was Gramophone. This made me stand and dance, and I said in my heart 
that this was the only thing which I should hear till I shall leave the place.”40  
For Orwa, the music amplified over the speakers was the main attraction. As Orwa intimated, he 
hoped this would be both the beginning and the end of the content on offer that day. But music 
was merely the initial draw, which would have been followed by propaganda films, often 
designed to shore up popular support for Britain’s war effort, and on many occasions, a crew 
member would have tuned into broadcasts from the Nairobi station. 
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On this occasion, music was followed by a film on a “Bukura Farm,” which boasted a 
“garden” with “many crops,” and “good milking cows,” as J.E. Obala recounted, one of the best 
of which was milked “by a brown boy.” Obala continued his composition, writing:   
This boy was trained in the veterinary farm...He used all the methods he learnt at 
the Veterinary School like using a clean bucket[,] washing his hands before 
milking, washing the cows udder and rinsing the bucket with hot water. All of 
these made it sound to correlate the crops work and the animals work.”41  
This developmentalist vision reflected an emergent rationality that, following the war, would see 
the rise of new cadres of “experts” and new genre of “expertise” that sought to reshape the 
colonial world and effect “rationalized” development. But this vision got its first lease on life 
with new media technologies, tools of both “development” and “advanced administration.”42  
While teams of experts would make their way into the countryside following the war, in the war 
years this message was spread, evidently, in nodal form. Despite this lumpiness both in time and 
across space, these performances offered viewers a vision of a seamless, well-integrated 
development apparatus. As Obala’s observations attest, these performances were designed to 
“correlate the crops work and the animals work.” They were, in other words, tasked with linking 
up the branches of the state concerned with different aspects of an emergent developmentalist 
ethos. In this instance agriculture and veterinary work were presented as intimately linked—now 
rationalized, they unfolded together as an integrated and coordinated totality.  
Administrators offered these developmentalist shows as representations of reality, but the 
austere fiscal policies of the colonial state rendered these ambitions chimerical—they were 
spectral and experimental at best, the match between image and reality, between referent and 
referred, tenuous. This was not a “real” shamba, but the “Bukura Farm Institute,” a “12 acre 
model holding” to which “married couples were invited to live” so as to get a “good idea of how 
they should look after their own land back on the land unit.” This, then, was a representation of 
an ideal reality, rather than a reflection of existing conditions. As Kelly, writing of the Bukura 
film some years later, reflected: “This made an excellent propaganda film to show, but...did not 
                                                
41 J.E. Obala, “Composition,” KNA HAKI/13/328  
42 Excerpt of report from Committee appointed by the Secretary of State to report on Broadcasting in the colonies. 
M.F. Hill, Information Officer. “Draft Memorandum on the Broadcasting Service Arranged by the Kenya 
Information Office, with the Cooperation of Messrs, Cable & Wireless, Ltd., with Certain Proposals for the 





work out in practice.” The couples living on the farm complained that “it was all very well for 
governments to have these farms because there was no risk attached if the crops failed.” By 
contrast, if the couples used the proposed agricultural methods on their own plots and the crops 
were to fail, they “faced starvation.”43  
Viewers and listeners routinely read these experiments against their own experiences. As 
the developmentalist aspirations of the state continued making inroads into the lives of 
communities in the countryside, people grew increasingly wary of the new expert knowledge to 
which they were being subjected, drawing instead on more enduring ideas regarding the meaning 
of the social good and the means of securing it. As one administrator reflected, while it was 
important to note the “advance of civilization,” most people were “ultra conservative and 
distrustful of European ideals and ideas, with the exception of a growing worship of the 
‘almighty dollar.’”44 In supporting this argument, the officer cited a letter of complaint. The 
complainant asked why people had been “encouraged to plant maize and cotton to replace our 
old crops.” This advice was at odds with durable agricultural knowledge, “that our old crops 
such as wimpi, matama and mwele,” give “more food in bad years.” The letter writer was 
incensed: “Why are we told to do things that are wrong?”45 Africans brought to bear their own 
knowledge and expertise in the fields of agriculture as they evaluated these schemes. Just as 
word of the mobile unit preceded its arrival, so too did rumors of failed agricultural experiments 
and development initiatives gone awry.  
Popular responses to government broadcasts and films must be considered in light of 
experiences such as this. People were skeptical of these new mediated forms and the messages 
they bore. This raised the stakes for government-initiated information work. Government films 
and broadcasts were to offer viewers and listeners a vision of this integrated developmentalist 
thinking as an already existing reality, evidence to the contrary notwithstanding. The unit was, in 
other words, to mitigate not only against the uneven infrastructural reach of the state—to operate 
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as a material prosthetic—but its contents were to convince and cajole audiences in the face of 
conceptual breakdown. The unit’s operations had to offer proof of concept. In both material and 
conceptual terms, African experts would be asked to fill the breach, to act as critical maintainers, 
repairers, and translators of both technics and culture. In this regard, their labor is best conceived 
of as prosthetic work.   
 
 
Medium as Message: Mechanical Breakdown, Prosthetic Work, and the Cultivation of 
Technical Expertise  
 
In 1943, after three-and-a-half years as head of the Government Mobile Cinema Unit, Champion 
retired, being replaced by W. F. P. Kelly.46 Kelly was coming off three years working as a 
District Officer in Northern Province, a place of “hardship as well as danger.”47 Although Kelly 
felt ambivalent about “the idea of government propaganda in the bad sense,” he appreciated what 
he described as the “educative value of showing films to the Africans.”48  
For Kelly, his new role joined together his professional ambitions and his desires for 
administrative intimacy in a moment of flux (see Chapter 3). “The Officer-in-charge of the 
Mobile Cinema has one of the most interesting jobs in the Colony,” he wrote. “He sees more of 
the country and the people than anyone else, and has the most leisure to digest his experiences. 
Nothing could be better for an officer who having spent years in the Secretariat, feels he has lost 
contact with reality, than to spend a few months with a Mobile Cinema.”49  
For Kelly, the success of the mobile information unit turned on using technologies to 
produce a sense of “awe” in colonial audiences, an effect of what Brian Larkin has referred to as 
“the colonial sublime.”50 This was not an un-curated effect, but was an expressed goal of British 
information workers in this period—we might recall here the golden letters written boldly across 
the side of the van that were cause for such excitement, but also ambivalence, at Maseno in 1940. 
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When it came to technologies, though, this sense of awe was to be produced by backgrounding, 
rather than foregrounding, their mechanics. Kelly worked to strengthen this effect when he 
replaced Champion. While the “method of exhibition” had remained substantially the same, he 
was proud of the “improvements” he had made. Importantly these “improvements” did not 
pertain to content, but to form. He had raised the height of the screen, thereby enabling the 
projector to be located some distance from the screen itself. This reconfiguration was undertaken 
to minimize popular apprehensions of the mechanics of the operation, not least by minimizing 
the “noise of the generator.” This was critical. “From this eminence…[the show] can be heard 
for several miles, the crowd can be silenced at will, and, when silent, the commentator can 
introduce all kinds of modulations into his voice.”51 As was the case with the Bukura farm, in 
other words, the “success” of these shows, administrators believed, required minimizing the fact 
that they were, in fact, representations. New media technologies were supposed to awe, yes, but 
they were also to be received as transparent lenses onto reality.  
Kelly’s interventions were an improvement on the old system of harder, more 
interventionist discipline. The rejigging of new technologies arriving from the UK had rendered 
it possible to allow the spectators to “laugh, talk, and enjoy themselves within limits without that 
continual blowing of whistles by...Tribal Police...an irritating feature of the old shows.”52 This 
was an attempt to move from discipline to ideology. And these shows, he assured the 
administration, were a great success, with average audiences reaching 2,300.53 The system 
remained unwieldy, he admitted, but was sufficient for the time being. In the future, though, he 
imagined a unit that was “less elephantine and more mobile.”54 In reconfiguring the unit Kelly 
was following in the footsteps of his mentor, Arthur Champion. It had been Champion that 
impressed on him the importance of actively tropicalizing this imperfectly tropicalized unit by 
navigating its imperfections, actively responding to its breakdowns, and improving on its design. 
But again, as was the case with the Bukura farm, while an emergent developmentalist ethos 
guided Kelly’s hope for a seamless system, these hopes were aspirational, located in a distant 
and never realized future, rather than in material conditions of everyday life. And trying to police 
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this line between representation and reality, trying to ensure that representations were taken as 
reflections of reality, required the input of constant labor and vigilance.  
Commentators, and their “modulations” of voice, were critical to bridging the gulf 
between representation and reality. These men, administrators acknowledged, were essential to 
ensuring that programing was listened to and that these visits did not fall out of favor, being 
“completely forgotten.”55 The KIO mobilized African knowledge workers, in other words, to 
mitigate against the possibility of the conceptual breakdown that would be the result of a visible 
(or audible) disjuncture between the state’s aspirational developmentalist future and the material 
present. Critical, too, were African technical experts who were responsible for ensuring that 
imperfectly tropicalized technologies ‘worked’ in the novel material setting that was the Kenya 
colony. This work, importantly, was obscured in Kelly’s representational practices, as had been 
the case with Champion. 
Indeed, like Champion before him, Kelly expended few words on the African men 
staffing the unit, offering a picture of non-experts, of the any man, of an easily replaced laborer. 
Consider the following report from Kelly’s 1944 safari log: “The work of the African staff has 
been satisfactory considering they are not qualified electricians or mechanics.”56 Far from being 
middle figures, these men are not even presented as having been cogs in the unwieldy operation 
that was the mobile information unit. And this trend was not limited to Kelly. As William 
Sellers, an Information Officer based in Nigeria, and one of the central personalities in the 
distributed knowledge economy that was the world of colonial information, wrote: “The vans 
will be required to operate over long periods without skilled servicing.”57  
However, reading official reports for moments of interruption reveals that African crew 
members, far from being dispensable, were critical to the operation of the unit. The long 
distances traveled over poorly cut roads were hard on bodies, hard on equipment, and hard on 
morale.58 It is precisely in the context of breakdown that these experts and their expertise become 
visible. That this work becomes visible in the context of breakdown suggests just how much the 
unit’s capacity to function depended on these otherwise unremarked upon individuals. The work 
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of maintenance and repair in the context of breakdown was not only essential, it was creative. 
And breakdown was routine.  
As one monthly report recounted: “This week’s performances have been somewhat 
marred by a defect in the loud speakers which has begun to assert itself,” leading to a “complete 
breakdown of our arrangements for amplification of the human voice.” This defect, he continued, 
“would not assert itself or perhaps be a defect at all under conditions in England.”59 
Administrators routinely attributed breakdown to imperfectly “tropicalised” technologies. And 
this was not limited to mechanical technologies. Film reels, too, had a different shelf-life in the 
“tropics.” Degradation, noted one report, was the result “many factors.”60 Climatic conditions 
were partially to blame, but so too were the craggy road infrastructures over which mobile units 
were expected to travel. These “[b]ad and dusty roads” caused “heavy wear and tear on the 
films,”61 causing “a considerable amount of slacking” to take place “on reels of film…[leading] 
the adjoining surfaces...rub against each other at every jolt on the road.”62 These media were 
simply not designed for these conditions.  
In the face of these imperfectly tropicalised technologies a series of workarounds became 
essential. In this case, a report noted that there were: “various devices for securing films tightly 
on their reels to stop them from rubbing in transit. An efficient and cheap one is a thin cross 
section of an old motor-car inner tube. A loop of tape on this home-made elastic band will make 
removal easy.”63 Innovation was thus essential to the work of maintenance. And these 
innovations had to be both “efficient and cheap.” The need for such workarounds were both 
generated and constrained by policies of colonial austerity. But that did not render them 
unstudied. Indeed, technical workarounds of the kind described here were essential to making 
broadcasting ‘work,’ and the perceived stakes of ‘failure’ were high.  
Administrators were convinced that mechanical mishaps would unduly shape the 
messages received, that an interruption in medium of conveyance might interrupt the messages 
on offer. Sellers was insistent on this point: “A very simple error on the part of the operator may 
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cause some part of the equipment to fail at a time when its satisfactory operation is essential.”64 
And such interruptions would have durable effects, without a doubt retarding the “development 
of broadcasting in East Africa for many years.”65 As F. H. Knight reported, absent the dedicated 
maintenance of imperfectly tropicalized technologies, deterioration was inevitable, the results of 
which were “obvious to the audience.” Audiences’ evaluations of breakdown were a major 
source of concern, for seldom did “they blame the projector.” Instead, the audience left with “a 
poor opinion of either the film, the projectionist, or the mobile cinema generally.”66 Audiences 
had expectations, expectations for seamless presentation that the administration sought to live up 
to. And if “high standards” were not achieved, the “film show” and thus the efforts to use the 
mobile to usher in “development” would not be “a real success.”67 This made the daily work of 
African crew members critically important. Indeed, officials’ reports notwithstanding, these men 
were technologists who fine-tuned their practice on the road. And this practiced labor had 
rendered the crew expert maintainers. 
These technical experts routinely repaired the Megavox, changed worn out tires, tinkered 
with imperfectly tropicalized loudspeakers and amplifiers, tuned the wireless receiving set, 
managed the van-engine generator and the Bell and Howell 16 mm projector, and spliced 
together films when they broke. If policies of colonial austerity, in tandem with the unique 
material conditions obtaining in the Kenya colony, demanded the use of the van to run over the 
colony’s rough-shod roads as an infrastructural prosthetic, these were workarounds that required 
careful management. 
And the hierarchies that critically shaped this world of information demanded that the 
crew should shoulder this burden. The “responsibility of maintaining the equipment in good 
conditions,” wrote Sellers:   
falls upon the operator...[who] will, it is hoped, recognize his responsibility and 
set up a regular routine which will enable the equipment to be maintained in good 
condition. In this way, he will become familiar with the entire equipment and be 
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able to replace or readjust minor parts without causing delay in an itinerary or the 
expense and miles of travel by a skilled mechanic or electrician.68  
There was a disjuncture between the actual daily work of African crew members and colonial 
representational practices, which were rooted in a deep-seated ideology that held there to be 
something incommensurate between Africa and technologies, between Africans and 
technological expertise. This impeded administrators’ capacity to see technological expertise 
where and when it was happening.69 And yet, evidently, African operators were routinely 
saddled with the task of maintaining and repairing persnickety technologies.  
While the Bell and Howell was widely viewed as being an ideal projector for the region, 
as it worked “well under tropical conditions,” it was a complicated technical object.70 As Knight 
wrote in an article titled “Projector Maintenance:” “The portable film projector is a highly 
complex precision instrument, and consequently requires...careful handling and maintenance.”71 
Without this work of maintenance, which, he lamented, was all “too frequently” ignored, the 
equipment would be subject to the particularities of the “tropics.” This “very roughest treatment” 
allowed “dust and dirt” to accumulate.”72 These conditions demanded the mobilization of 
specialized knowledge, without which the “projector’s steady journey on the downward path” 
was assured. In other words, these African crew members were responsible for making 
imperfectly tropicalized technologies “work.” 
If African experts and technologists were responsible for maintaining and rejigging 
imperfectly “tropicalised” technologies, they were also responsible for negotiating worn-out 
parts—the material stuffs of policies of colonial austerity. After complaining about a series of 
mechanical upsets, one Officer noted that not a single show had been delayed, admitting that 
credit was due to his “native driver who …[had] jumped into the breach.”73 This act of jumping 
into the breach, I have shown, was routine. And it was prosthetic work. In the context of the 
habitual breakdown of non-tropicalized technologies, African technologists were routinely asked 
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to close the breach, to use their skills to make broadcasting ‘work.’ In this instance, the 
“driver/operator,” one of the few technical experts I can track in this partial archive, was Katele. 
And he had worked with the mobile unit’s first operator, Champion, since the earliest days of the 
operation—navigating the treacherous roads of the colony as the unit moved, operating, 
maintaining, and repairing the “generator and projector” along the way. Conditions obtaining in 
the field demanded this. And by the time of this report, Katele had been working with the unit for 
many years. 
The expert work of these men, in other words, far from being unexceptional, was 
practiced. It was expertise borne of experiences in negotiating Kenya’s topography, navigating 
its uneven road infrastructures, and repairing the unit’s worn out parts. It is against this material 
backdrop that we should interpret one Officer’s reflections, when he wrote that the unit’s staff 
routinely undertook “duties which one feels are much more responsible than their education and 
experiences warrants.”74  
Despite the central role played by African knowledge workers and technical experts, 
however, not only was their import perennially elided in official correspondence, but they were 
inadequately remunerated for their labors. In 1940, while African translators for broadcast were 
all recruited from other government departments in order to “ensure a satisfactory degree of 
reliability and responsibility,” they were not compensated for their work.75 This generated no 
small measure of conflict, with the Information Department complaining that the seriousness of 
its mandate was being undermined by the reliance on “voluntary workers.”76 Once remuneration 
was standardized, African knowledge workers were making just above what semi-skilled 
laborers were making in Nairobi, this despite the outsized role that their knowledge work played 
in the world of colonial information.77  
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Message as Medium: Conceptual Breakdown and the Prosthetic Labor of African 
Knowledge Workers  
 
African knowledge workers—those men responsible for translating government scripts into 
vernacular languages, conducting research with communities on the ground, reporting back on 
Africans’ responses to government information work, and elucidating the situations in African 
locations—were relatively autonomous in executing their responsibilities. They were largely “in 
charge of the unit and responsible for the conduct of the show.” And they were in positions of 
authority, making announcements and commentaries to explain policy and the rationale behind 
development campaigns. They were also to act as a sounding board of public opinion, rendering 
reports to the KIO.  
The central importance of these men was directly related to their work of translation. And 
this work of translation was required in both linguistic and conceptual terms. Just as the unit’s 
technical components were perennially subject to breakdown, so too were the messages the unit 
bore. Just as the unit’s technical components required rejigging, so too did the developmentalist 
vision on offer. In the field of translation, then, administrators leaned heavily on the cultural 
expertise of knowledge workers like Wakaria. But Wakaria’s role was not limited to that of 
conceptual suturer. Indeed, it was precisely due to the state’s reliance on Wakaria, and people 
like him, that knowledge workers were able to routinely repurpose colonial media technologies 
as they pursued their own vocations.  
In the case of Wakaria, his role as a researcher and broadcaster enabled him to engage in 
his own project of culture-building and renewal, rendering new media technologies his 
prosthetics, extensions he mobilized as he called to order new communities of listeners, listeners 
increasingly bound together by language. But before we return to Wakaria, it is critical that we 
locate the important role of translation in this work, and how issues of translation emerged as the 
central pivot of administrative and missionary concern.  
Savvy administrators betrayed their understanding of the centrally important role played 
by these knowledge workers as they undertook this critical work of translation. As noted by one 




propagandists. A good African propagandist is as rare as a good European one.”78 The 
comparison of African information workers to African evangelists is telling. As all were aware, 
the success and spread of Christianity in the region, and of Protestantism in particular, turned on 
the knowledge, the work, and the commitment of these critical intermediaries. It was for this 
reason that the Church had expended so much labor on the work of translating the Bible into 
vernacular languages, the requisite not only for teaching would-be catechists to read, but also for 
enabling these men to spread the “Word.” Perhaps it is no surprise, then, that when issues of 
translation came up in relation to media, those affiliated with the Church had a lot to say.  
Indeed, the history of radio broadcasting in Kenya is linked to the history of the Anglican 
Church in the region in critical ways. Reverend Leonard Beecher of the Church Missionary 
Society (CMS) was heavily involved in orchestrating the production of broadcasts to African 
communities in the Kenya colony.  
By 1941, the Information Office had recruited Beecher to undertake the work of 
translating scripts from English to Kikuyu.79 In the same year an ad-hoc Translation Bureau was 
established as a joint effort between the administration and CMS.80 Five African translators were 
engaged under the direction of Beecher to undertake translations from English into Kikuyu, 
Kikamba, Bantu-Kavirondo, Swahili, and Nandi languages.81 Miss Clarke of the Union of 
Seventh Day Adventists, for her part, supervised Dholuo translations.82 In the beginning, African 
programs consisted of two half-hour weekly programs in each of the vernaculars, with an 
additional fifteen-minute daily program in Swahili.83 Kisii and Taita were given one program per 
week each. Though Beecher was convinced of the “value of the Christian contribution to African 
Broadcasting,” it was work, he felt, that took him from what ought to be his primary duty: 
translating literature.84  
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Louis Leakey, for his part, had been a vocal celebrant of radio as a tool of governance, 
“development,” and social transformation from the outset. Leakey was born in 1903 at his 
father’s mission station in Kikuyuland.85 Growing up among Kikuyu peers, Leakey underwent a 
modified version of initiation at the age of 13. Fluent in Kikuyu, he spent his life mediating—
often to his own advantage—between Kikuyu communities and the colonial government.86 It is 
perhaps no surprise then that Leakey was at the forefront of voices arguing for the important role 
radio could play in correcting “wild rumors” during the 1939 broadcasting “experiment” 
undertaken amongst Kikuyu communities in Kiambu and Pumwani (see Chapter 3).87 In this, 
Leakey was being somewhat self-congratulatory, acting as he did as the “announcer for the 
Kikuyu broadcasts.”88  
In mobilizing the labor of missionaries and their kin, the government built on long-
standing politics of austerity that conjured up missionaries’ sense of purpose as they worked to 
use the Church as yet another infrastructural prosthetic, tethering missionaries to state-directed 
projects of development. Yet this was not merely colonialism on the cheap. Administrators 
understood Beecher and Leakey’s participation as being essential to generating new attachments 
between communities and new media, a capacity that turned on, in the case of Beecher, his deep 
“knowledge of the African.”89 But if the administration hoped to use the Church to fortify its 
developmental ambitions via the use of media, missionaries brought their own ideas—ideas 
borne of this supposed intimacy—with them as they circulated into the world of colonial 
information.  
In particular, missionaries brought with them ideas regarding language gained through 
their experiences as evangelizers. The way missionaries conceptualized language was never 
divorced from conversations regarding social change, two thorny domains of practice and policy 
that were intimately linked in the minds of these men and women. From the outset, 
administrators imagined that, in the future, broadcasting would be undertaken in Kiswahili, itself 
a stop-gap solution with English ultimately replacing Kiswahili as the single language of 
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broadcast (see Chapters 3 and 4). Missionaries, far from advocating for the wisdom of cultivating 
English as a would-be future lingua franca, emphasized the importance of reforming and 
standardizing vernacular languages. In the domain of literature, missionaries and African 
converts had devoted no small measure of energy to the work of translation, rendering the Bible 
accessible to the literate among their congregants. In part these divergent visions of language 
turned on competing ideas of development. By contrast to administrators, who held a teleological 
vision of development as being intimately tethered to English-language learning, missionaries 
held that paths to development could be linguistically heterogeneous.  
This belief was born of missionaries’ conception of language, which saw a direct 
correlation between culture and language, between the formation of complete persons and the 
maintenance of linguistic inheritances. As a member of the Advisory Committee on Education in 
the Colonies wrote:  
the mother tongue is of primary importance. The mother tongue is the true vehicle 
of mother wit. Another medium of speech may bring with it, as English brings 
with it, a current of new ideas. But the mother tongue is one with the air in which 
a man is born. It is through the vernacular (refined, though not weakened, by 
scholarship and taste) that the new conceptions of the mind should press their way 
to birth in speech.90 
People’s internal transformations, as this suggests, were imprinted in language. Language was 
thus not simply the vehicle for expressing reality. Instead it registered changes in, and in turn 
reshaped, reality. In this, missionary ideas surrounding language were not dissimilar from the 
future-driven, though spectral, weight administrators granted to messages carried over the 
loudspeakers attached to the van.    
Evangelists, though, were often at odds with the government when it came to language, 
particularly in the postwar period when administrative energies turned towards centralizing and 
streamlining administrative practice (see Chapter 3). The Anglican church, for example, was a 
central critic of the administration regarding the limited knowledge of people in the employ of 
the state in either the rudimentaries of Kiswahili, in the case of mainly African askaris, and 
vernaculars, in the case of administrative officers.91  
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What they shared with administrators, however, was the belief that language was critical 
to forging a sense of group, of community. Vernacular languages, for missionaries, were critical 
tethers that enabled people to unify around core concepts and values. Language was not a 
reflection of culture, then, it was culture:  
A man’s native speech is almost like his shadow, inseparable from his personality. 
In our way of speech we must each, as the old saying runs, drink water out of our 
own cistern. For each one of us is a member of a community. We share its energy 
and its instincts; its vernacular, through our folk-speech, whether actually uttered 
or harboured in our unspoken thoughts, that most of us attain the characteristic 
expression of our nature and of what our nature allows us to be or to discern….It 
is the mother tongue which gives to the adult mind the relief and illumination of 
utterance, as it clutches after the aid of words when new ideas or judgements 
spring from the wordless recesses of thought or feeling under the stimulus of 
physical experience or of emotion.92  
A Gikuyu Anglican representing African interests on the Advisory Committee on Education was 
in partial agreement with this position. He argued that children trying to learn any secondary 
language would be at a disadvantage if they did not first have a real understanding of their 
vernaculars.  
It is difficult to see how a child can acquire any real understanding and command 
of English if he has never been trained to express himself with ease and freedom 
in his mother tongue. A first essential step towards raising the quality of language 
teaching in general and indeed the teaching of all subjects, is a recognition of the 
primary importance of the vernacular.93  
For this representative, vernacular language acquisition was not incommensurate with the 
learning of other languages. But, he continued, noting that Kiswahili was not Africans’ second 
language of choice but English, comprehension of which, he argued, was an “African’s right,” it 
being the “only door...that is precious in the common inheritance of the peoples of the Empire.”94 
This was not, then, an argument for parochialism, but an argument that advocated for the 
development of linguistic facility along at least two contiguous registers. Indeed, it seems quite 
possible that, for men such as this representative, these inheritances did not evidence different or 
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even incommensurate scales of attachment. Theirs was a politics of linguistic and conceptual 
multiplicity, a world of potential wherein multiple scales of belonging—in linguistic, social, and 
political terms—were simultaneously at play (see Chapter 4).     
But not all African evangelists agreed with this position. Many viewed Kiswahili, not 
English, as being a key lingua franca, as being the language of the state to come. As an 
anonymous writer penned in a letter to the Committee, demands for the abolition of Kiswahili in 
education turned on an “alarming tendency among educationalists to think of education as being 
for examinations instead of for the purposes of developing a community. Swahili is a necessary 
part of a country such as this, containing so many tribes and tongues, with people at so many 
different stages of development.”95 For this letter writer, Kiswahili would be the language of a 
new cosmopolitanism, located not in global elsewheres but within the polyglot social worlds of 
the Kenya colony. As he continued: “If people will only realize that township life and 
consequent mixing of tribes and tongues is going to spread, they would realize too that in 
Swahili we have a priceless means of inter-communication and of imparting information and 
instruction.”96 
The position of this writer was borne of an emergent broadcasting infrastructure:  
In many schools now Swahili is becoming a popular study... This change is 
possibly due to the increasing use of Swahili in broadcasting, [and] in the 
newspaper Baraza, which is so widely read and quoted, and to the wider world 
brought to the notice of the tribes by the war and the fact that so many of their 
men have seen the value of Swahili in their contacts with fellow soldiers.97  
Whether the use of Kiswahili in broadcasting was fundamentally reshaping the linguistic 
landscape of the Kenya colony during the war years is hard to ascertain. It is clear, however, that 
peoples’ experiences fighting in the war had contributed to their visions of the role that language 
could play in binding together community. 
The key point here, though, is that neither position advocated for monolingualism. 
Critiques, such as they did exist in the case of Kiswahili, turned not on a defensive parochialism 
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(see Chapter 4 for a contrast), but precisely on the limited social and political worlds to which it 
gave people access. As members of the Local Native Council (LNC), Fort Hall, wrote: “Swahili 
[simply] does not exist outside East Africa.”98 It was the state and missionaries, though operating 
from different vantage points, that held out a parochial vision of languages as constraining 
structures that would dictate, albeit in different terms, the desirable scale—here in the singular—
of social and political inclusion. If for administrators, vernacular language broadcasting, for 
example, was a stop-gap solution in preparation for the days of monolingualism for some 
listeners, Wakaria likely among them, register switching was not a stop-gap position but a 
desired state.  
Irrespective of one’s position, issues of language were always a matter of concern, and 
rarely a matter of fact when it came to questions of broadcasting.99 The problem, in part, was 
fundamental, turning on the realization that direct one-to-one translation was impossible. Nor 
was translation simply a linguistic feat, a consideration that itself required “unremitting attention 
to every detail between the preparation of the original English script...and the eventual delivery 
to the microphone,” but an achievement that required the painstaking labor of translating 
concepts. As it pertained to Europeans working for the Information Office, this was widely 
acknowledged. As a member of the Translation Bureau noted: “Mr. Beecher’s work is by no 
means limited to the checking of translations. The preparation of African broadcasts does not 
only involve their molding into a form of English capable of proper translation into the 
vernaculars...It also requires that the broadcasts should be attractive and informative.”100 This 
was completely uncharted terrain, as “the task of broadcasting to Africans is a new one.” This 
demanded experimentation and research, because “only by constant trial and error can a 
successful form of broadcast be established.”101 
In pursuit of this work of conceptual translation, the KIO recruited African knowledge 
workers. While some reported that “translator-announcers” took “to broadcasting like a duck to 
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water,”102 others acknowledged that being an effective broadcaster was not a given but a skill.  
As Champion recounted, “the absence of competent personnel for the technical work...combined 
with a particularly incompetent announcer…who has neither the voice nor the mentality for the 
job” could positively destroy a tour.103 These criticisms of personnel brought into full relief how 
reliant the unit was on the crew’s work and expertise. As Champion himself admitted, these 
experiences had clarified for him “how dependent the success of our demonstrations is on…well 
read introductions and intelligent and well timed commentary.”104 The goal was to create 
something unique, “something that was real African propaganda and not just an adaptation of 
mechanical European propaganda.”105  
On the one hand, the need for African knowledge workers to undertake conceptual 
translation was in line with a colonial ideology which spoke easily of an “African Mentality.” As 
the Provincial Commissioner of Nyanza wrote:  
To succeed in getting information across to the African, we must employ Africans 
for the purpose. We believe that we have a knack of presenting subjects and 
wonder why they do not penetrate the African perception, it is because we ‘think’ 
differently. I recollect an advanced African telling me once that he was sorry his 
education had not continued, though he was earning a good living, ‘because he 
was just beginning to understand how Europeans think,’ and considered that in 
time he might have been of considerable help to his people in ‘translating’ our 
thoughts and teachings. This brings me to the point that to succeed in ‘reaching’ 
the Africans we must employ Africans for the purpose, and allow them to translate 
very freely any subject which is to be presented.106  
As this suggests, the skilled work of translation required shuttling meaning across what were 
perceived to be divergent epistemological fields. These traces suggest something of the delicate 
knowledge work undertaken by Africans working for the information department. They had to 
do more than be the voices of translation; they had to make legible the messages of their 
European interlocutors.  
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And this was difficult to achieve. In 1940, the Advisory Committee on Information 
noted:  
The Information Officer...was dissatisfied with the Vernacular Broadcasts. He 
said that on the previous day he had caused the Kikuyu script to be translated back 
into English and this had revealed serious discrepancies with the English script, 
which itself was not good. The Information Officer added that he had issued an 
instruction that in future no script in a vernacular was to be broadcast until the 
translation had been checked with the English script by a European.107  
Ensuring quality work required time and vigilance. As Hill noted on joining the KIO as an 
Information Officer on November 1, 1940: “I found that the preparation of the original English 
script was often unsatisfactory and frequently lacking in [an] appreciation [of]...the form and 
style essential to effective translation into the vernacular language[s].”108 Ensuring a match 
between English and vernacular versions of broadcasts was essential. But as missionaries would 
have known, creating such symmetrical translations was near impossible in linguistic or 
conceptual terms.  
The easiest and least threatening fix would have been to employ Europeans fluent in the 
vernaculars to both write and present the materials. But the administration was in a bind. Not 
only was media that was obvious government propaganda dismissed out of hand, with listeners 
responding to what they heard from Europeans with “only scepticism and suspicion,” and 
rejecting programing that did not appear “objective and free from Government propaganda,”109 
but native English speakers’ handle on the vernaculars was the subject of much derision.110 
Audiences were quick to point out any interruption in the flow of broadcasts or live shows, 
though interruptions were routine.111  
This work of conceptual translation required mobilizing local idioms and salient 
metaphors, and finding the right people to perform this work was no easy task: 
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Vernacular[s] besides having a considerable grammatical system taps all the 
wealth of allusion to traditional songs, stories and proverbs which are deliberately 
used by good vernacular speakers to make all points clear. These allusions have 
not only a profound literary and artistic significance, but also an important value 
in propaganda and morale because their use is an appeal to history and the 
inherited wisdom of the tribe.112  
What was required, in other words, were knowledge workers capable of making British 
developmentalist messages legible and meaningful to African communities. Carbon copies 
across scripts were impossible, to be sure, and loose conveyance was as necessary as it was 
threatening. 
In this, and in general, administrators were limited by their own conceptual imaginaries, 
assuming that listeners’ cares were parochial in scope. “We must collect and ‘feature’ local 
news” argued E. R. Davies, head of the African Section of the Kenya Information Office. 
Understanding “the local” required employing “locals.” As the report continued: “To make sure 
that the local news was of interest to Africans it had to be collected by Africans.”113  
Indeed, the recruitment of African knowledge workers was undertaken in a bid to firmly 
root broadcasting in the lifeworlds of listeners.114 And so, during the war years, “well-known 
chiefs” were invited to the microphone to counter the feeling that broadcasts to African troops 
had come to feel “too impersonal, coming as they do from an unknown announcer in Nairobi.”115 
Observers had noted that “the chief attraction of…[speakers was a] well known voice, and 
personality, [this was the case] irrespective of the matter on which he speaks.”116 The goal here 
was to “introduce a personal element into the vernacular broadcasts by means of short talks by 
men who are well known to the tribe to which they are talking...This gave a domestic touch to 
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the programmes.” Autobiographies were a move in the same direction. Indeed, Davies readily 
acknowledged that: “A good deal more credence is given to the broadcasts if the voices of well 
known natives are occasionally heard by the listeners.” And this had been the case from the 
outset. As early as 1940, people on the Coast reported that Africans showed a great interest in 
talks “given by Africans whom they know.”117  
If this work of conceptual translation required a kind of poetics, it also brought into full 
relief the politics of the infrastructural world of which broadcasting was a part. The “psychology 
and political views” of Africans would “have to be taken seriously” when programing was 
designed, one report noted.118 To do so, administrators were forced to concede, would require 
mobilizing the local. It was only in this way that a seemingly generic form, radio, would become 
habitual and everyday. This was a scalar move by which administrators sought to embed radio 
broadcasting in the particular milieu of communities it hoped to address over the airwaves.  
Claims to the contrary notwithstanding, African knowledge workers did not only act 
infrastructurally, then. They were critical intermediaries and maintainers of ideology as well as 
technics. This placed African knowledge workers in a place of threatening power. So 
thoroughgoing was this issue that these key intermediaries, these knowledge workers and 
broadcasters, these researchers and translators, were always viewed with suspicion. As Kelly 
noted, even with an expansion in funding for information work, which included 5 vans promised 
following the end of hostilities, the group would still have to concern themselves with the 
“loyalty of the commentator.”  
Perhaps because of their experience with translation missionaries, in particular, viewed 
the medium of radio as being unsteady and volatile, leading those among their ranks to be even 
more anxious than the administration about the prospect of drawing on the labor of African 
knowledge workers and announcers. In coming to their conclusions, it seems that missionaries 
drew on their experience working with African catechists, and their intimate knowledge of the 
importance of innuendo, proverbial forms, and idiomatic sayings in shaping communication.119 
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They, in other words, understood the complexity and the Janus-faced nature of language; the 
ability for language to communicate cultural facts to listeners, facts that might be missed by 
European listeners. Perhaps unsurprisingly, then, it would be these men, men who saw 
themselves as having unique insights into the local, who argued for ever-more stringent protocol 
when it came to recruiting knowledge workers. Leakey, for his part, argued that despite evidence 
that local voices would augment the success of broadcasts, that “any such talks by chiefs and 
other prominent natives” were not “advisable in war time.”120 Mobilizing local knowledge, all 
were beginning to realize, was a requisite, but it did not come without risks.  
*** 
But who were these knowledge workers? To crib from Ambrose’s own itinerary, these were men 
of high education, who were highly mobile as a result. These were men with an interest in travel, 
who spoke a minimum of two languages. Most importantly, perhaps, these were men with a 
sensitivity for the local. Indeed, in the 1940s, the IO tasked African knowledge workers with not 
only translating government knowledge but with generating new knowledge. This took many 
forms, ranging from research on local conditions to reporting back on local responses to the 
information being disseminated through the mobile information unit. And this work, their 
remuneration notwithstanding, was value-generating. Indeed, the information gathered and 
interpreted by these men was subsequently cycled up and integrated into the state’s expanding 
information apparatus, a critical component of ongoing efforts to “tropicalise” colonial media.  
This knowledge work was not to be depersonalized. These African knowledge workers were 
“expected to make as many personal contacts as possible.”121 Some were to act as “local 
correspondents, with their homes widely scattered.” By 1941, some 15 of these correspondents 
had been appointed. And it was these men that were responsible for sending news from the 
districts to Nairobi.122  
It quickly became apparent that this work of news gathering, too, was a skill. While some 
“caught on to the idea at once,” one administrator reported, others had “no nose for news.”123 
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The concern was not simply that there would be accidental slip ups, but that knowledge workers 
would use their position in the network of information to spread messages contrary to those 
desired by the state. And this was not limited to newsmen. “We could never guarantee,” wrote 
another administrator, “that a singer would not convey remarks about the weather to the 
enemy.”124 Thus it was of the utmost importance that they locate “men whom they could trust to 
broadcast faithfully the material supplied.”125 Screening was strict. “A number have been tried 
out,” one report recounted. Some were outright “rejected on political grounds eg because they 
are members of associations, the activities of which are likely to make them unreliable.”126 The 
political work of these knowledge workers was, evidently, of a different shape than that aspired 
to by the colonial state. But even with these provisions in place, overhearers could never tell, 
really, what knowledge workers were communicating nor how their messages were being 
received.  
Indeed, so great was the concern over how information generated by these men would be 
broadcast and interpreted that G. G. S. Hutchinson, Manager of Information Services, argued that 
what was needed was a network of informants to report back to the Information Office on 
popular perceptions of, and reactions to, broadcasting.127 And so, in the early 1940s, in a bid to 
generate “reliable reports of the effect which the various types of propaganda is having,” the 
Information Officer enlisted the “assistance of observers” of a wide variety; a heterogeneous 
group composed of “various races, both official and unofficial throughout the country.”128 But 
evaluating responses remained difficult. Some argued that it was impossible to judge the “degree 
of effect [of these shows] on the native mind.” In other areas, the interest was simply not there, 
reports indicating that so few people were showing up for broadcasts that information, such as it 
did exist regarding reception, could not be said to have been representative.129 Those that were 
listening in tended to be highly educated, moreover, and therefore their opinions were not 
                                                
124 Miss Wrong, Secretary of International Committee on Colonial Literature for Africa (1941) ACKA/COM/CMS/2 
125 To the Hon Chief Secretary, “Broadcasting Facilities for Africans,” 20th September, 1945.  
126 AE/34/64 - Posts and Telegraph, 1940-41.  
127 G.G.S. Hutchinson to the Provincial Commissioner, Nyanza Province, “African Broadcasts,” 1 December, 1941. 
AHC/10/68. 
128 C.M. Deverrell for Chief Secretary, “Asian and African Propaganda,” 30 January 1941, KNA HAKI/13/229.  





reflective of popular consensus.130 In other instances, still, administrators simply refused to offer 
up their reflections, perhaps resenting this impulse towards centralization (see Chapter 3).131  
It seems likely that Leakey played a significant role in stoking this anxiety. Indeed, he 
routinely railroaded information work, demanding that particular voices be banned from the mic. 
Sometimes, Leakey’s position won the day, leading to the dismissal of knowledge workers. In 
1940, for example, James Beauttah was cut from the African Information Services’ (AIS) roster. 
He had been scheduled to broadcast on the soil conservation efforts that would become part and 
parcel of the spate of expertly administered reforms that typified the “second colonial 
occupation” of the postwar period.132 Beauttah was, at this stage, already in the employ of the 
state, working as a propaganda officer of the Local Native Council (LNC). And he was 
experienced in the world of information, having worked as a commentator with Champion in the 
early 1940s. And yet Leakey emphatically rejected Beauttah’s appointment. As the meeting 
minutes noted, Leakey “felt very strongly on the matter” claiming that Beauttah had “taken an 
oath that he was the enemy of the British and would probably be under detention within a week.” 
For his part, the Chairman of the meeting stated that he had known “James Beauttah for many 
years and that the latter had been a member of the first Native Council to be elected in the native 
locations of Nairobi in 1926 when he himself had been District Commissioner” there. E. R. 
Davies, too, challenged Leakey, arguing that Beauttah had been “sent into broadcast by the 
District Commissioner at Fort Hall.” Even the Chief Native Commissioner (CNC), the Chairman 
noted, had “approved of his giving a talk on the wireless.”133  
In this instance, Leakey was himself playing double duty. His rejection of Beauttah, 
among other African broadcasters, he freely admitted, was based on knowledge he gained 
working for the Criminal Investigations Division (CID). It was ostensibly on the basis of 
information so gathered that Leakey made his recommendations. But here he was also exploiting 
his dual role, using it as a “cloak for fetina,” as he worked to settle old scores. In this instance, 
Leakey’s disdain for Beauttah was the result of Beauttah’s role in the Kikuyu Central 
Association (KCA), an organization that Leakey felt unduly challenged the authority of 
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conservative Gikuyu elders, such as Chief Waruhiu, with whom he was close.134 And Beauttah 
was not the only prominent personality rejected. So too was Eliud Mathu, on largely the same 
grounds. Leakey “considered that such announcers should be selected with great care and some 
time in advance so that something would be found out regarding them.”  
While in many instances the concern regarded individuals well known to administrators 
and missionaries alike, it raised more fundamental questions about African broadcasters as a 
social category, and the medium of broadcasting as a form of communication. During the same 
meeting, it was recorded that “Dr. Philip enquired...as to whether any native is a fit and proper 
person to broadcast or as to whether a chief or other native cuts any ice or no.”135 Programs were 
broadcast live, and “African entertainment” being “essentially impromptu in character” bore a 
number of threats, not least leaving no one with any “idea what they” were “going to say 
next.”136 As Davies proclaimed in a 1941 broadcast designed for European settlers and 
employers: “You may rehearse them as often as you like and find that on the actual occasion of 
the broadcast they may give quite a different version to what they have rehearsed.”137  
Evidence suggests that knowledge workers did leverage their status within the government to 
secure for themselves the most desirable outcomes in putatively “local” disputes.138 One 
administrator claimed that some correspondents “thought their function was to air their 
grievances or to start an argument. Great care…[thus had to be] taken in the sifting of these news 
letters. For an apparently innocuous account of an incident may easily cloak local ‘fetina.’”139 
This was the world of colonial information, a world wherein knowledge workers, Leakey among 
them, competed with other information workers in using their positions to secure a monopoly 
over public opinion.  
  As these scenarios demonstrate, the world of knowledge work was rarely clear-cut in the 
Kenya colony, and African knowledge workers, administrators sensed, were often playing 
double duty. Anxieties over hiring, then, indexed a fear that knowledge workers, those 
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infrastructural prosthetics, used their prosthetic labor as a means of engaging in their own 
political and cultural projects. In this, they transformed these new mediated forms into their own 
prosthetics, extensions by which they could call to order new audiences, spread new messages, 
and engage in their own political contests over the mediated worlds of those people they hoped 
to secure as their listeners. Deftly moving between subject positions—of loyal intermediary and 
dissenter, of soil expert and oath-taker—these men cycled through the colonial hierarchy, 
leveraging their positions to their own advantage, sometimes undermining the colonial authority 
that underwrote their own, while concurrently augmenting their power and authority in domains 
illegible to the state.  
As in the case of African representatives advising as to the future of language policies in 
the Kenya colony, this is best apprehended not as a movement between discrete categories of 
belonging and practice, but rather as evidencing a social, political, and cultural world that was 
rife with code-switching and multiplicity. For knowledge workers like Beauttah, in other words, 
their work as intermediaries was not incommensurate with their work as dissenters, their work as 
state-employed knowledge workers not at odds with their efforts to leverage new infrastructures 
to forward their own political projects. Perhaps this was why, by 1946, African knowledge 
workers were limited to “men of high educational standing.” And this hiring policy was matched 
by an expansion of responsibility, these men being tasked with “advising of the form in which 
the material should be put over to their own people.”140 The significance of this labor from the 
perspective of the colonial state was, as we shall see, most evident in the government’s 
protracted propaganda war against Mau Mau.  
 
Extending Prosthetic Work: Vernacularizing “Development” and Mau Mau  
 
By the 1950s, the Kenyan Information Services was actively courting dedicated African 
information workers. The KIO’s recruitment pamphlet reveals how it sought to pitch these 
positions to would-be knowledge workers. The KIO began by justifying its very existence:  
 
Any Government or any other big organization which serves the public must tell 
the people what it does and why, so as to gain the goodwill and understanding 
                                                




which are essential if its work is to be effective. In years gone by this could be 
done by word of mouth, by meetings and speeches, and by individual contacts 
between Government officers and the people of the country. Today...these 
methods...are no longer enough by themselves. Many modern methods of mass 
communication are now available such as newspapers, radio, films, film strips, 
posters, books and pamphlets and governments cannot ignore these ways of 
reaching people. In Kenya the Department of Information has the task of making 
use of these methods so as to ensure that the people of Kenya are fully informed 
of Government’s plans, policies and achievements and to build up public opinion 
in other countries well informed on Kenya affairs.141  
Would-be recruits had to be recipients of a “School Certificate.” And those traveling with 
Information Vans were guaranteed attentive audiences:  
 
 
Figure  4-­  Careers  in  Government  Service,  Recruitment  Pamphlet,  No.  2  
Would-be knowledge workers were also promised space to exercise their creativity and their 
expertise as they were invited to become parts of the administrative apparatus. “This pamphlet,” 
recruits were reminded:  
was written and designed by one of the staff of the Department of Information. 
Such production is typical of the interesting and creative work performed by its 
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officers, who are concerned with the writing of Press stories, the production of 
newspapers and magazines, broadcasting, the making of films and the running of 
cinema information vans.142  
These men, though, were not granted authorship status. Like technical experts, knowledge 
workers were not recognized as shapers or producers, as creative innovators or designers. The 
author of this report remained unnamed. 
What was on offer, then, was an interesting mix of autonomy and discipline, of creativity 
within confines. And this intermediary status both opened up opportunities for creative forms of 
action and subjected these men to stringent oversight and scrutiny, strictures that heightened 
during the years of Mau Mau. And yet, even then they retained a good deal of mobility. The 
peripatetic itineraries of these men, their movement through various local spaces, placed them 
beyond the reach of the state. Indeed, they possessed an unprecedented degree of autonomy in 
these years, with each van staffed by an Information Assistant, who was largely in charge of the 
unit and responsible for the conduct of the show.  
These information workers were to “make announcements and commentaries as 
necessary to explain policy, the background of campaigns.” This work of information 
dissemination was coupled, as we have seen, with the equally critical work of information 
gathering. These men were to “act as a sounding board of public opinion, rendering reports on 
his return to his headquarters station.” Those involved in the work of information were tasked 
not simply with generating information, but with the work of surveillance and policing. These 
knowledge workers were accompanied by experts of other kinds, a few of whom we have met, 
such as Katele, a “driver/operator” who was to “drive the vehicle” and assist “with the operation 
of the generator and projector.”143   
Wakaria was one such information worker. As promised, he fulfilled myriad roles. 
Wakaria not only acted as the voice of the broadcast, but also as a researcher. Later he was the 
editor of Mugambo wa Kiambu, a paper directed at Kiambu communities, after which he opened 
“the first information office” in Muranga. In 1956, he was tasked with opening the Mount Kenya 
Broadcasting Station, where he started another newspaper called Matemo. Reflecting these 
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varied responsibilities, and reflective of the nodal and lumpy infrastructural reach of the state, 
sometimes Wakaria was on the move, traveling with the mobile unit. At other times, he was 
more stationary, broadcasting from the Mount Kenya station. 
The flexibility of Wakaria’s work was critical in the context of colonial policies of 
austerity that mitigated against the cultivation of a robust broadcasting network. Not only were 
the hours of broadcast highly circumscribed, but Africans by and large, due to colonial labor 
policies, did not have the capital necessary to buy receiving sets (see Chapter 4). As Wakaria 
recalled: “You know, we didn’t have radios.” It was left to the government to provision sets if 
they wanted to cultivate a pool of listeners. “The information,” Wakaria noted, “they were the 
owners of the radios.” Wakaria was routinely tasked with disseminating these “for [the] public,” 
dropping them at marketplaces throughout Central Province. This was critical. Radio was, after 
all, conceived of as being a public service (see Chapter 4). Once deposited with shop owners at 
central sites, it was left to these sellers to tune the receivers and manage the upkeep of the sets.  
As with the mobile unit, listening was a public, rather than a private, affair. “During 
lunch hour all people would come there to listen” for the mere 15 minutes a day—12–12:15 
p.m.—that the Kikuyu program was allotted. This state of affairs, Wakaria recounted, continued 
until 1954, when “they brought this Saucepan Radio.” He laughed at the recollection: “I wonder 
if you’ve found this Saucepan Radio. It was a circular radio.” The small blue radio, operated by 
battery, was easier to transport than older models. This receiver was a tropicalized technology, 
specifically designed to accommodate itself to the particularities of Sub-Saharan Africa. And, 
once on the market, men like Wakaria were tasked with installing the Saucepan Special in 
marketplaces across Central Kenya.  
As Ambrose’s own itinerary suggests, strict recruitment policies notwithstanding, the 
limited infrastructural reach of the state continued to require the autonomy and mobility of these 
men in the 1950s. And this led to problems. As noted in a 1956 letter of termination addressed to 
Joseph Ngugi: “In view of the nature of the post you have been holding being one whereby the 
officer filling it is required to travel round the Province without constant supervision,” it was 




responsibility “to this Department.”144 Failure begot paperwork. And paperwork reveals the 
central role played by these men. But it also reveals that this autonomy demanded austere 
discipline.  
These men were employees of the state and were to comport themselves with the ascetic 
discipline such a position demanded. Failure to do so led to summary dismissal, as John Gitonga 
would have known. Gitonga, like Wakaria, was the son of a committed Christian. In Gitonga’s 
case, his father was a clergyman of the Church of England. Gitonga had been educated in 
mission schools, spending three years at a government school. He later attended Alliance High 
School, from whence he proceeded to Makerere College, thereafter attending King’s College in 
Uganda. His elder brother was a District Officer, with another brother having secured the 
position of Chief Inspector of Police in Kakamega, a third brother acting as a Medical Assistant, 
and a fourth as a “Farm manager.” As Gitonga pointed out in defending himself against 
accusations of insubordination: “most of us are all in Govt. Service.” These men, in terms of 
education and ascension within the colonial hierarchy, were exceptional.  
It was upon completing college that Gitonga joined the Department of Information in 
1951, where he was trained in the art of broadcasting. Soon thereafter he became a 
Translator/Announcer. In the beginning, these responsibilities were combined with record-
keeping. As he moved up the ranks, he was appointed an “Announcer in Swahili,” and then a 
“Broadcast Producer.” With the Emergency, he was given the responsibility of producing 
“counter propaganda.” This position saw him fly high over the Aberdare Mountains. From this 
eminence, he was responsible for affirming for listeners that, indeed, the bombing was happening 
a great distance from the reserves. Wakaria, too, was trained by the British in the art of 
propaganda. He was, he emphatically told me, a “propagandist.” But this term, in Wakaria’s 
hands, takes on a slightly different valence than one might assume.  
While the value of the knowledge generated by these men turned precisely on their ability 
to cultivate dynamics of intimacy with would-be listeners, the colonial state routinely tried to 
calibrate the emergent intimacies of these men as they moved through the countryside. Indeed, 
the ascetic discipline demanded of these men was, in part, designed to halt the formation of 
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emergent socialities that, given the context of Mau Mau, constituted threatening insubordination. 
These intimacies were everyday, ranging from consuming beer off duty, to arriving late, to 
cavorting with “local” women, all of which led—as in the case of Gitonga—to dismissal.145  
The administration desired the maintenance of a firm hierarchy and a strict division of 
labor. “Drivers are to drive. Operators and Officers in Charge of vehicles will on no account take 
the wheel. The fact that they are in possession of a valid driving licence will not be accepted as 
an excuse. Disobedience to this instruction will entail instant dismissal.” Access to a vehicle, and 
indeed the right to move, registered these knowledge workers as men of high status. One can 
only imagine the temptation of these men to go on joyrides with these government vehicles, 
wooing both women and men with the possibility of otherwise unavailable mobilities.  
Prohibitions on unsanctioned movements were put in place to limit these emergent 
socialities. “Vehicles will not carry passengers unless written authority is first obtained from a 
European member of this Department or the Administration.” The specifications were even more 
precise. The “use of vehicles for other than official running is strictly prohibited.” These 
regulations were not simply preventative, but were a response to unsanctioned though widely 
practiced forms of sociality. “It is known,” the report continued, “that it is the custom of many 
drivers, operators, etc., to use the Departments’ vehicles for the purpose of visiting friends who 
live near to places where entertainments etc., are given. This practice must cease forthwith.”146 
These joyrides were difficult to monitor. One could simply not keep track of gasoline usage. 
Even if you could monitor the fuel needed for a given leg of the journey, the generators 
themselves were voracious consumers of the valuable substance. Ambrose confirmed the 
prestige he gained driving around the countryside in the information department’s vehicle. The 
use of the van—itself operating as an infrastructural prosthetic—enabled knowledge workers and 
technologists—themselves performing prosthetic labor—to transform the unit itself, and media 
infrastructures as a whole, into their own prosthetics, in this case a technology critical to the 
formation of new socialities.  
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During the years of Mau Mau, these men, as employees of the Information Department of 
the Government, particularly as Kikuyu men, were vulnerable. Gitonga noted that he had 
“received several letters from Mau Mau [stating] that they wanted my head badly.” Wakaria also 
emphasized this awkward middle status, “Many of us were killed by Mau Mau,” he said, but 
many “of us were [also] chased away by British.” As Wakaria ruminated: “you had to be very 
careful.” Not all situations were similar in their risk. Most dangerous were periods when 
knowledge workers returned to their towns. Here, intimacy was not a source of protection, nor a 
source of value, but a source of vulnerability.  
*** 
In this section I turn to what colonial officials referred to as Mau Mau. Variously described as an 
anti-colonial struggle, a civil war, a class struggle that pit young, marginalized Kikuyu men and 
women fighting to achieve “self-mastery” against an older generation of wealthy men who had 
forgotten their obligations to social juniors, Mau Mau was a movement that sought to affirm new 
affinities as it worked to secure new possible futures in what appeared to many to be an 
untenable present.147 For some, this required constraining the behaviors of young women and 
men in the city.148 For others it involved shoring up a putative “Gikuyu” center perceived to be 
under threat from variously constituted “Others.”149 For others still it was a struggle to draw 
connections among class formation, land scarcity, and the politics of adulthood.150 By all 
accounts, though, Mau Mau was a project of social and moral reform. A project wherein various 
players sought to assert themselves as the legitimate protectors and guarantors of contested 
notions of “community” and contentious visions of the future. 
As noted by Myles Osborne, while much has been written on the conflict, decidedly less 
attention has been directed to exploring the central role played by propaganda during the 
Emergency. In this war of words, Osborne argues, the colonial state deployed “development” as 
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a key tactic designed to convince Mau Mau forest fighters of the wisdom of surrender.151 
Development’s failures were a product of Mau Mau’s actions, future development the promise 
for loyalty. The state mobilized development, in its social welfarist form, as the carrot to induce 
a swift conclusion to the conflict.  
This potential future would be marked by the government’s provisioning for the health 
and wellbeing of the population. But globally circulating visions of development were not the 
only ones the state sought to harness in its fight against Mau Mau. Simultaneously, the KIO 
mobilized another, and arguably deeper, set of ideas regarding social transformation or 
development. If the history of radio broadcasting in colonial Kenya had taught the KIO anything, 
it was the importance of tropicalizing both the technologies of media and the messages they bore. 
And so, during the Emergency the colonial state mobilized African knowledge workers and 
vernacular notions of development as they sought to convince forest fighters to leave the 
confines of the Aberdares and return to “civilization.”  
In this, the Information Office actively combined notions of development premised on a 
logic of social welfare with Gikuyu notions of complete personhood, emblematized in the 
concept of wiathi or self-mastery. These twin notions of development were to be broadcast over 
the airwaves, reaching into the cultural consciousness of Kikuyu forest fighters and their allies in 
the reserves.  
The sources I work with in this section are partial at best. They are based on the few 
remaining audio files from the period, which today are housed at the Kenya Broadcasting 
Corporation (KBC). Holding true to colonial representational practices, rarely are the voices of 
knowledge workers attached to personalities, nor are they named. Like other forms of African 
expertise, these unnamed men are, instead, represented as easily replaced non-experts, as easily 
replaced voices. However, as the preceding sections have demonstrated, these men were 
anything but replaceable: they were actively courted experts of both technics and culture.  
This anonymizing impulse notwithstanding, a close reading of these broadcasts demonstrates 
how the cultural expertise of African knowledge workers was actively brought to bear in efforts 
to convince Kenya’s diverse communities to side with the government in its fight against Mau 
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Mau. In this, the concept of wiathi was to play a central role. My concern here is less with 
elucidating whether these strategies “succeeded” or “failed.” Instead, my efforts are directed to 
understanding how various notions of development were actively co-mingled in this period, and 
to elucidating the place of vernacular knowledge workers, and the infrastructure of radio in 
broadcasting, in advancing this twinned vision. 
*** 
Gikuyu social thought holds that self-possessed labor is the most valorized form of work. 
Through their active labor on the land, boys became men, people became moral persons.  
According to historians John Lonsdale and Derek Peterson, this ethic of labor emerged from the 
particular ecological zone within which Kikuyu communities lived. Located in the forested 
region of what has come to be called Kenya’s Central Province, cultural life was literally cut out 
of the wild. It was through the painstaking work of removing trunks, stumps, and roots that the 
land was made tillable and social reproduction was secured.152 These homesteaders, writes 
Lonsdale, literally “sweated culture from nature.”153 This ethos of work, itself in part borne of 
material conditions, shaped Gikuyu political thought.  
Labor as the means of self-actualization was historically reflected in Gikuyu structures of 
authority. An acephalous society, the homestead was the foundational unit of social organization. 
Like concentric circles, this logic—while argued over—was reproduced in the mbari, or 
lineage.154 Once a given homestead grew too large, frontier groups reached outward, taking over 
neighboring ridges.  
The highest responsibility of a man was the successful management of his immediate 
family. This, itself, was marked by rituals of maturation, most notably circumcision. It was upon 
being circumcised that a man would seek to separate himself from his father’s shamba, or 
garden, cutting his own bit of soil and laboring to produce a tillable plot. This piece of cultured 
land was the first step towards establishing a household. It was at this stage that adult life was 
pursued (and pursuable)—a man marrying his first wife who, after the initial clearing of the land, 
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was largely responsible for tilling the soil. A man’s worth was defined as wiathi, or self-mastery; 
this, argues Lonsdale, was an expression and recognition of the social value of his labor.155  
Wiathi is a profoundly future-oriented theory of value. It was only by virtue of pursuing land, 
marriage, and children that a man would be remembered beyond his death; a man’s legacy being 
sustained through his children and their mothers, and the generations that succeeded them. 
Adulthood was the promise in the immediate future. The status of venerated ancestor, of 
protector of the line, was the promise in the long-term. Failure meant adulthood was not realized. 
And this was a profoundly classed vision of maturation. Adult status was premised on access. 
First to land, then to wives, and children after that. Poverty, then, merited social exclusion. Here, 
then, we have a Gikuyu epistemology of both individual and collective development. Mau Mau 
was, in part, an argument over this vision of maturation.  
Social conditions had changed. Land was scarce and thus the possibility of gaining the 
requisite materials for maturation became functionally obstructed. This was not the only time 
such disputation had happened, but it was the most extreme.  
Within this epistemology, the uncut forest was the place of the wild. Indeed, the forest 
stood in for the troubling forms of disorder against which Gikuyu civilization gained some of its 
definitional strength. The forest was a place of anti-culture. Its creatures the opposite of man and 
civilization. Gikuyu enclosures maintained strict boundaries between the uncultured world of the 
bush and the spaces of domestic life.156 This spatialization of culture was reflected in modes of 
consumption, Kikuyu almost uniformly maintaining prohibitions against the consumption of 
wild animals.157 These frameworks of both self and society were at the center of the arguments 
that formed the basis of what the colonial state called Mau Mau.  
*** 
Social welfarist visions of development, as I have argued, had always been wrapped up in efforts 
to curb discontent in Britain’s colonial holdings (see Chapter 4.). Indeed, we must situate the 
push for social welfare via radio broadcasting as a response to the labor unrest of the 1930s and 
1940s. As we have seen, this included among other things the promised extension of government 
services in the fields of medicine and agriculture, as well as better labor conditions and housing 
                                                
155 Ibid., 356 
156 Peterson, Ethnic Patriotism, esp, Chapter 8. 




in the cities, premised, in the case of the latter, on the hope that the consolidation of 
monogamous and urban working-class households would act as a bulwark against “disorder.” It 
is no surprise, then, that efforts to mobilize development as antidote against disorder was equally 
prevalent in the fight against Mau Mau.  
Over the airwaves, people that joined the government, so-called Loyalists, were promised 
that they could look forward to a developed future. This, administrators acknowledge, was a 
direct response to discontent. As one Kiswahili broadcast detailed: “The government and the 
leaders of the big areas have already known that black people are not satisfied by houses that 
they live in.” It was in response to this that one Gikuyu broadcaster promised, as he called to 
order his audiences in Kikuyu, a future wherein Africans would be “given food and houses to 
live in, and after that, we’ll find a way of letting their wives and kids go live with them [nitūre 
tabarira ūria atūmi na ciana ciao].158   
But a comfortable dwelling was not sufficient. People were promised “other things so 
that they can live happily and [be] satisfied.” These included “a football pitch, and places they 
can watch movies [nyūmba cia kuonanagĩria thinema] and also places where their kids can 
play.”159 New forms of leisure were promised as a means to staunch the flow of discontent. And 
all would be provided by the government, which had “spared funds for that to happen.” 
Together, these reforms would ensure that urbanites had houses within which to live, places 
where they could “go for meetings and where they…[could] be reading books.”160 But 
broadcasts situated these futures as a kind of return wherein people could “start having the fun 
that we used to have where people will dance and sing.” As this suggests, promises for new 
developmentalist initiatives were routinely grafted onto visions of the good life that tapped into 
longer histories.  
If the future was represented as the realization of this augmented vision of the past, Mau 
Mau was presented as an atavistic throwback, the inverse of both development and progress. In 
this, it was presented as anathema to civilization. But the notions of civilization conjured up by 
the colonial state were not generic, but explicitly drew on Gikuyu notions of complete 
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personhood. As one European, who secondary evidence suggests was none other than Louis 
Leakey, put out over the airwaves in a Kikuyu broadcast that likely took place in 1954:  
 
We’ve beaten Mau Mau together and most of them have already seen the truth 
and surrendered but we are still going on with killing or arresting those who are 
still there. And those who are like animals of the forest [nyamū cia gĩthaka] should 
think of their people and respect them, their kids and their wives [andū ao, ciana 
ciao, atumia ao]. They don’t have a big chance [ihinda ikuhe] and in the near 
future they will be killed if they refuse to surrender.161 
Here, listeners were offered a vision of Mau Mau forest fighters as having abandoned their 
families. In so doing, they had abrogated their central responsibility as effective fathers, as 
homesteaders. What was more, the broadcast continued, for those unrepentant, this decision was 
irreversible. As Leakey continued, the “already captured Mau Maus will never go back to their 
families [makĩria ya ūguo, ndĩna wĩtekio, andū a Mau Mau arĩa mahĩngeretwo matire hĩndi 
mangeĩtekerio gūcoka kwa andū ao].”162 The stakes of this threat would not have been lost on 
listeners, so central was the connection between the cultivation of a homestead and the 
realization of social maturity.  
But Leakey sought to cut even deeper than this. Mau Mau fighters, in rejecting this 
central tenet of Gikuyu masculinity, had rendered themselves non-human. Not simply boys—
arguably a framing that led them to the forest in the first place—but “animals of the forest.” The 
inverse of humanity, the opposite of civilization; the wild animal a symbol of anti-culture, the 
opposite of intellect.163 As one broadcaster provoked those in the forest: “If you know you’re not 
animals, then think.”164 What these men were being called to think about was the way in which 
their decisions to become like “wild animals” had placed them beyond the realm of culture.  
If Mau Mau were wild animals, it so followed that they had no claims over the gardens they had 
cut.  
Those who are in the forest must surrender and those who are helping them inside 
the reserves, and also in the big homes inside the shambas, should go to the 
District Commissioners, or to the District Officers, or to the Police Officers and 
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confess their mistakes before 10th of July so that they can save their lives and their 
properties.165 
This was not simply a matter of property, however. For Kikuyu listeners, the distinction between 
life and property was not so neatly drawn. Land was both a central symbol and materialization of 
culture, central as it was to Gikuyu notions of individual and thus collective actualization. Land, 
in other words, was not an addendum to life, it was life (see Chapters 1 and 2).  
The threat, then, was existential, not only calling into question the present and immediate 
future but the futures of generations to come. The very viability of Kikuyu as a people was on 
the line. Those who refused to confess would be lose their “Ithaka [lands] before the 10th of 
July,” and these would “never be given back either to their kids or their kids kids, forever and 
ever. Those people in the forest if they refuse to surrender...will never never go back and live in 
their migunda with their parents or their kids ever ever again.” Here, the forest fighters were 
framed as having sacrificed their land, the critical hinge between past, present, and future. This 
threat fundamentally undermined the animus underwriting Kikuyu social life, anchored as it was 
in material interventions on the land.  
The centrality of land to Gikuyu social thought, as Lonsdale has argued, was framed by a 
temporality of futurity. While cutting culture out of the forest might seem to be a temporally 
circumscribed vision of futurity, constrained as it appears by the immediate needs of social 
reproduction, it was undertaken in a bid to secure one’s own future beyond death by provisioning 
for the long-term sustainability of a line. It was for this reason that Kikuyu men were always to 
act “on behalf of their children’s children.”166 The threat here, then, was not simply death or the 
loss of property, but a kind of social death that would extend through the generations.  
Being landed was the first and critical move towards establishing oneself as a 
homesteader. Without land, there was no family. This meant no expansion in material terms, but 
also in temporal terms. These men would not be mourned, one broadcast warned, but would “die 
like animals of the forest.” This reduction of men to the status of animals in the forest was 
tethered by these broadcasters to a serious set of existential uncertainties. “Now, are you among 
those that will be killed like animals. Without a wife, who will cry for you?”167 Without family, 
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there was no future. Having no one to mourn you and pay deference to you after death rendered 
not only the death meaningless, but the life, and the lives of your children and your children’s 
children, as well. “Posterity, not burial, conferred remembrance and reincarnation,” writes 
Lonsdale. And this was profoundly classed. Though framed in generational terms, for those 
marrying “late and often dying young, the poor were at greater risk of oblivion.”168 This threat 
was precisely what had led these social juniors to the forest in the first place.  
This disgrace, though, would not be limited to the individual, or their families beyond 
them; it threatened the longevity of the entire group. With Mau Mau, one Kikuyu broadcast 
began, “the Kikuyu culture was destroyed and their name was hated.” The onus for this was 
placed on forest fighters: “How can you do these things to your own people?” the broadcast 
continued. Contrary to Mau Mau’s claims, this was not framed by broadcasters as a putative 
return to Gikuyu culture, but marked a critical a departure. “Go back to how…[you] lived 
earlier,” one broadcast advised. Otherwise Mau Mau’s actions would “destroy the whole country 
which has ustaarabu [Swa. civilization].”169  
In some broadcasts, these twin visions of development were actively combined. One 
broadcast promised both “development” and wiathi for those who surrendered. However, and in 
keeping with colonial policies of austerity, this future would, the broadcast acknowledged, be 
borne on the back of unremunerated labor, not government investments. The repentant would be 
responsible for bringing:  
back cleanliness in the black people’s areas [anduai airu] and that is by digging 
the trenches that will be leading water to their shambas [mugunda] or by trying to 
slash out the bushes [githaka]. All these jobs have been established to bring back 
better lives for the black people and to enhance their shambas. The government, 
together with the black people, especially the elderly men [athuri agima], have 
come to an agreement that that type of a job is the best one in trying to heal the 
people who were infected by the Mau Mau disease [mirimu].170  
The elders consulted were likely landed men with an interest in maintaining the social order, 
their status as much reflecting their wealth as their age. From the perspective of these 
conservatives, Mau Mau were waywards, mere boys. In their hands, these two visions of 
development could be mobilized to stabilize existing social hierarchies. From the perspective of 
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Mau Mau, youth by dint of class rather than age, by contrast, these elders were “hungry eaters,” 
voracious in their appetites; they, in collusion with the government, had neglected the social 
contract. Land reforms of the past many years, but most recently the Swynnerton Plan, which 
formalized land tenure, had attenuated these relationships in critical ways. Poverty was now a 
permanent position, rather than a temporary status. This class immobility, this emergent 
inflexibility, led many to the forest. It was in the domain of vernacular, not social welfarist 
visions of development, that they found their paths blocked. The threat: forever remaining a 
child. Without land or family, these men would simply fade into oblivion.  
These broadcasts must be interpreted against this existential threat. As one Kikuyu 
broadcaster stated: “Any person who submits easily [and] shows that he is ready to change...it’s 
possible that they will be given a new bush [githaka] where they will live.”171 Here, Mau Mau 
forest fighters were being promised that for which they fought. Here they were being offered a 
piece of land to cut into culture. Here they were offered the possibility for marriage and thus 
children. Here they were offered the possibility of becoming self-actualized adults, respectable 
males, the bearers of wiathi.  
 
 
Reformulating the Labor of Maintenance and Repair and New Prosthetic Extensions   
 
Understanding the premium put on mobilizing vernacular notions of development and the 
cultural knowledge of African knowledge workers requires understanding what the state 
perceived itself to be up against: other highly elaborated networks of communication. The 
information arm of the colonial state was, indeed, designed to combat what was routinely 
referred to as the “bush telegraph.” Administrators felt profound anxiety in the face of 
uncertainty regarding what African communities thought. During Mau Mau, these other 
communications networks would have called men and women to the task of joining Mau Mau’s 
fight along many of the same registers as those vernacular notions of development the state 
mobilized in an effort to combat Mau Mau.  
                                                




This was a fight that pit ‘young’ men—defined as much by class position as by age—
against elders—defined less by age than by class. These men were called to arms to regain ithaka 
na wiathi, or cultured land and self-mastery. It was a fight over how, in the context of ongoing 
material change, these putative youths could achieve wiathi—the route to social adulthood and 
complete personhood. This, in other words, was a battle over both the future and the capacity to 
establish futurity. And these messages would have made their way into the homes and locations 
of people along the inscrutable lines of the “bush telegraph.” Of this, the state was well aware. 
“Don’t accept to be lied to by the voice [twanya toa ohoro] of those who call themselves leaders 
of the opposition [atongoria a ūtĩti],” one broadcast in Kikuyu advised.172   
The communications network of the colonial state was not the only one in effect, in other 
words. And often the same people generating cultural knowledge for the state’s use were 
engaged in other cross-cutting communications networks. Walking this fine line required careful 
calibration, subtle movements to convince audiences on both sides, a complicated dialectics of 
intimacy and estrangement. It was this work, this work of pivoting between two epistemologies 
that, for Wakaria, made him an expert propagandist. Recalling the difficulty of reporting during 
Mau Mau, Wakaria stated: you had to “make sure both sides…[understood] you well.” This was 
not about ensuring that a single message was communicated clearly. Instead, it required the 
development of a seemingly singular message that could be interpreted by each side according to 
their reigning epistemologies. Doing so required a nuanced understanding of each.  
The British needed to hear your broadcasts and interpret them as loyal. As for Mau Mau, 
Wakaria continued, “We could say proverbs or idioms” that communicated messages illegible to 
the British. It was in this way that you could make sure that “Mau Mau was happy, [and that] the 
British were happy.” But you “had to be very careful...During the emergency you had to be very 
careful. Because you have to please the government, and also you have to please the Mau Mau. 
The government can kill you. Mau Mau can kill you.” This might have been a skill rooted in 
wordplay, but it was dangerous. I asked Wakaria if he remembered any of the proverbs he 
mobilized during this period. Of course, he said, “I remember. I use them even today in 
broadcasting.” In this, Wakaria signaled how his work as a “propagandist” was part and parcel of 
the “return to culture” that has enabled him to become an authority on all things Gikuyu. 
                                                




Wakaria no longer self-identifies as a propagandist. But in those years, “The tension was high” 
and information workers “had to play it very well.” “To be a spy is not easy,” Wakaria 
continued, “it’s not easy.”173 This, too, was a product of the uneasy movement between intimacy 
and estrangement.  
Ears were everywhere. But savvy British listeners, in particular, were a source of great 
anxiety for these knowledge workers, particularly those British listeners with a facility in 
vernacular languages. In this, Leakey loomed large. “Our big man was Louis,” Wakaria 
recounted. He “knew Kikuyu very well....[so you] had to be very careful” not to be found out. 
“We were followed, every word we said.” And people occupying this doubled position were, on 
occasion, found out. One story, in particular, many interlocutors recalled: the story of Mburu 
Matemo.174 
Matemo was Wakaria’s senior in the field of information work. And the two were close, 
Wakaria continuing to visit Matemo’s widow after Matemo’s death. Like other information 
workers, Matemo had to negotiate this fine line between intimacy and estrangement as he 
reported on Mau Mau. Matemo’s story, like all good stories, is subject to variation, but in broad 
strokes it goes as follows. African knowledge workers reporting on the war were prohibited from 
publicizing the deaths of Europeans. Instead, Mau Mau losses were to be foregrounded. One day, 
Matemo recounted a battle that had taken place at Brackenhurst. Deviating from policy, he 
reported on the deaths of Europeans. He “used a proverb,” Wakaria said, describing Europeans 
using the term thukumu.175 “That’s what he did,” explained Wakaria, it “was as simple as that.” 
Matemo, perhaps, thought that by tapping into this longer linguistic genealogy of otherness, he 
would escape Leakey’s attentive ear. In this he was wrong.  
Leakey himself was concerned with locating culture in language. Indeed, it was based on 
interviews with elite Gikuyu elders that he had set himself the task of writing The History of the 
Southern Kikuyu, which ostensibly documented precolonial Gikuyu culture and social life. In this 
text, Leakey put to page his knowledge of the term thukumu. In his rendering, it was a Kikuyu 
concept used at the turn of the century to describe foreign trading partners—first Swahili traders, 
and later Europeans. And so, Matemo was caught in his vernacular insubordination by Leakey, 
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who “chased him,” summarily firing Matemo. But they were all vulnerable in the face of Leakey. 
And this vulnerability stemmed from years of intimacy that had transformed Leakey into “a 
Kikuyu,” as Wakaria explained.   
The colonial state’s efforts to secure a monopoly over communications in the region had, 
evidently, failed. Robust para-networks had always existed. “So there were many 
communications networks?” I asked. “There were many communications. We didn’t have 
telephones but we used to communicate.” And Matemo was not unusual in using his position to 
demonstrate his support for the Mau Mau forest fighters, Wakaria insisted. Indeed, according to 
Wakaria, all Kikuyu, information workers included, were on the side of Mau Mau. For his part, 
not only did Wakaria mobilize proverbial forms to communicate with Kikuyu listeners—“To the 
Mau Mau I will only give a single sentence, but it says a lot”—but he used his connections as a 
one-time would-be pharmacist to get medicine to the Mau Mau forest fighters. “They knew very 
much that I was in pharmacy. And, therefore, I was given a mission to supply them with 
medicine.” In this, too, he mobilized para-networks, relying mainly on women to move the goods 
to the forest. 
*** 
Despite all these dangers, Wakaria was emphatic that he enjoyed his role as a knowledge worker 
before independence was granted in 1963: “I enjoyed very much. I enjoyed broadcasting.” This 
was understandable. From this position Wakaria discovered and pursued his vocation as the 
preeminent authority on “Gikuyu culture.” “When people first saw the unit,” he told me, people 
“didn’t like it. Not from the beginning.” As he explained “It was a new thing to us. We were not 
coming across those things. They were done by Europeans.” His opinion changed in 1950 when 
he joined the unit and “saw it was a good thing.”  
What he found the most satisfying was knowledge work. “I enjoyed looking for news.” 
For this, he had to do “a lot of research for my language, because it was a Kikuyu broadcast.” 
This allowed him to “interact with the people…[and go] to meetings.” And this brought him 
access. “After I joined the information,” he told me “especially when people liked me so much, 
[the elders] called me to sit with them.”  For Wakaria, this allowed a return from the path of 
deviance pursued by his father. His research, he explained, allowed him to go “into the culture.” 




airwaves, calling together a community bounded by language and culture to him through his 
“Kikuyu broadcast.”  
This about-face, in other words, came from his appreciation of the reach broadcasting 
allowed him, the capacity it offered to act has his own prosthetic, enabling him to call to order a 
new community of listeners. For this work, he made 142 shillings per month, a wage that placed 
him just above the semi-skilled workforce employed in Nairobi.176 This was an improvement on 
years past. In the beginning knowledge workers had been seconded from other departments, 
retaining no pay for their labor. His work, in this capacity, was to close the gap between the 
desired reach of this aspirationally rich but materially poor developmentalist state and the arterial 
nature of its presence in the lives of the bulk of the population living in Kenya’s rural areas. 
From this vantage, he claimed for himself the position as authority on all things Gikuyu. And this 
brought him fame. “I was a big man by the way. I was a boss. An information assistant. ABS. 
African Broadcasting Service. Driving in that car. Oooh! I loved it.”  
Knowledge workers like Wakaria, then, routinely turned their positions within the 
information arm of the colonial state into ones from which they could pursue their vocations as 
not simply advocates of an abstract and developmentalist ethos but as purveyors and authors of 
culture. In this, then, they reformulated their prosthetic work, appropriating the form of these 
new media for themselves as their own prosthetics. Radio broadcasting reformatted as a tool that 
they could put to work in calling to order new audiences, audiences bound together by language.  
*** 
When I interviewed Wakaria for the second time, his narrative slipped easily between past and 
present. In the present, like in the past, he uses his role as a broadcaster as a means of suturing 
listeners to their culture. In the present, like in the past, many fear Kikuyu are on the brink of 
cultural loss. In the present, like in the past, the status of adulthood is a key part of what, for 
Wakaria and his listeners, is at stake. On this second occasion I was accompanied by Gitau, who 
himself views the revival of Gikuyu culture as being imperative to combating the forms of 
cultural loss, of forgetting, that are linked to material transformations. When Wakaria is not 
producing broadcasts, he uses his status as a venerated radio personality to advocate for the 
project of cultural renewal being argued for most forcefully by the Kikuyu Council of Elders. 
                                                




These men of wealth and power, these social adults, have set for themselves the task of 
revivifying what, to them, appears to be a cultural inheritance under attack.  
Today, Wakaria told me, the youth have gone astray. These men of 30–35 years are 
social children, mere “boys” in Wakaria’s framing. Their social immaturity is indexed by the fact 
that they have pursued paths of listless waywardness. Both Wakaria and Gitau linked their 
deviance to the collapse of white-collar work. These men, by and large educated for futures in 
white-collar professions, have turned to drink and drugs waiting for futures that will never be 
theirs. In the context of this changed economy, Wakaria told me, “They have found that they are 
educated fools.”  
Critically, this foolishness is tightly bound to their perceived disrespect for their elders. 
One of the key symbols of their insubordination is evident in their consumption of alcohol, 
which they drink without paying due diligence to generational hierarchies. Wakaria and Gitau 
were both emphatic that they would never had dreamed of consuming muratina, Gikuyu beer, 
without the permission, without the invitation, of their fathers. For this reason, men like Gitau, 
the fathers of this wayward generation, are “trying to go to their culture.” While this declension 
narrative might appear to be closely linked to the material transformations that came on the heels 
of structural adjustment programs of the 1980s and 1990s, Wakaria’s narrative positions this 
moment as but the most recent in a long line of attacks on Gikuyu culture.  
The first attack he locates as coming on the coattails of Christianity. While Wakaria self-
identifies as a “true Christian,” he is adamant that the “Church did us something very bad.” Its 
main violence, for Wakaria, was the work that it undertook to “change the Kikuyu in their 
culture.” Kikuyu are unique in this cultural decline, according to Wakaria. By virtue of their 
early conversion, he explained, it is “only Kikuyu…[who] are lost.” This process of cultural 
dilution was echoed during Mau Mau when male detainees were separated from their wives and 
placed in detention camps. This led to polluting cultural mixture, as non-Kikuyu men were 
relocated to Kikuyu locations and these “Others” “produced with the Kikuyu women.” And so, 
men “returning from detention, would find their wives “with children” and they were left 
“wondering.” According to Wakaria, this was a tactic of the British, designed “To finish 
Kikuyu.” “The trouble started then also,” he told me. While the British were not successful in 




For Wakaria, this declension continues into the present, but it is actively being rolled 
back by people like him, a cultural expert who is at the center of what he actively refers to as a 
“campaign.” The culture, he told me, “it’s coming back now, it’s coming back.” Gitau agreed. It 
would require time, “another 50 years,” but the cultural inheritances of Kikuyu people would be 
restored to them. This required that men and women, boys and girls, be re-educated in Gikuyu 
culture. “I teach men, I teach women,” he told me, “I bring them together.” Much of this happens 
over the radio, where listeners call in to consult with Wakaria over “correct” Gikuyu practice. As 
though untouched by time, it is over the radio that Wakaria explains to them their cultural 
inheritance. Over the airwaves these inheritances will be restored and the Kikuyu will “find 
themselves correct,” find themselves “standing straight.” 
Ensuring that today’s youth take the path to attaining wiathi requires closely monitoring 
the moment of circumcision. It is here that cultured adults are born. For this reason, Wakaria 
routinely attends circumcision ceremonies. “Sometimes I stay with them for about two days. 
Teaching them: What is circumcision? What they should do after circumcision.” He is busy in 
this venture. “I’m booked every week,” he told me, “nearly every week.” While Wakaria spoke 
to me in English, it is essential that this cultural knowledge be transmitted in Kikuyu. For 
Wakaria, like for Leakey, language is where culture lies.  
Today, by contrast to the past, Wakaria is well compensated for his labors. “And they pay 
me! No joke!” He laughed. This is not quite the realm of “ethnicity inc.,” discussed by Jean and 
John Comaroff.177 This cultural knowledge is not on the global marketplace, but it does index the 
commodification of culture that has come on the heels of the liberalization of the economy and 
the transition to multi-party politics. It is a product of the same moment and set of processes that 
has enabled the emergence of myriad privately run vernacular language stations, those bastions 
of coded violence largely blamed for the dire dislocations and loss of life of the post-elections 
period. But Wakaria is finally being properly remunerated for this cultural knowledge. It was 
against this backdrop that his irritation at my paltry offer by way of thanks for our meeting gain 
their texture and historical depth. Payment for his cultural knowledge by the parents of wayward 
                                                




youth he read against both a deeper past and my own cheapness: “I’m telling you to pay me 5000 





The colonial state had grand ambitions for radio broadcasting in the Kenya colony. As early as 
1936, the colonial office advocated for radio broadcasting’s future as a “tool of advanced 
administration,” capable of ushering in a new ethos of social welfarist development. In this 
vision, a robust broadcasting network heavy with developmentalist messages was to precede, 
rather than accompany, more concrete material investments in the lives of communities in the 
fields of health, education, and farming. In this, radio broadcasting was, from the outset, 
imagined as an infrastructural prosthetic—a network capable of filling the breach, of suturing the 
gulf between the state’s aspirations for seamless infrastructural reach and its actual presence in 
the lives of Kenyan communities, which was lumpy and uneven at best. These ambitions for 
capillary reach were always stopped short, though, truncated as they were by troubling and 
seemingly intractable material interventions (see Chapter 4). But the reach of this broadcasting 
network, and the messages it bore, remained limited in both material and conceptual terms.  
In the seams of this infrastructural landscape the mobile information unit was imagined 
by administrators to have a central role to play. Absent a robust infrastructural network it would 
be over the roadways, rather than over the airwaves, that the developmentalist messages would 
move into the lives of colonized communities. Contrary to the ideal-typical vision of radio as an 
affair of the domestic, with nuclear families gathered around hard-won receivers, most Kenyans’ 
first experiences of radio came with the whole host of new media technologies. And in a van that 
was subject to breakdown. And irregularly, subject as the van’s movement was to seasonal 
variations and the roughshod roads over which it traveled. And people’s experiences of new 
media technologies were anything but seamless. Breakdown was not simply an aberration, a 
moment when technologies and their components became visible.178 Breakdown, instead, was 
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the perennial state of the new media technologies—and the van itself—as it went trundling 
through the countryside. And the stakes of these breakdowns were, at least from the perspective 
of administrators, very high. The discerning ears and eyes of audience members was a source of 
perennial concern, worrying as administrators did that a breakdown in mechanical components 
might unduly interrupt the messages on offer.  
But this should not be taken to mean that the mobile information van and broadcasting 
did not, in spite of these difficulties, 'work.' They did, but this status of working required the 
input of vigilant labor and constant re-jigging. This was the work, to use the language of the 
time, of “tropicalising” technologies. And this was not a one-time fix, but required constant 
monitoring and intervention.  
Focusing on these moments of breakdown has disclosed new histories of labor, namely 
the labor of African knowledge workers and experts, who were routinely tasked with undertaking 
the work of maintenance and repair critical to making these imperfectly tropicalized technologies 
themselves “work.” And this labor, like the van itself, was prosthetic, mobilized to close the gap 
between the state’s aspirations for smoothly operating technologies as the harbinger for a 
development to come and everyday forms of breakdown. This prosthetic work was not mundane, 
though, but was a form of expertise. And much of this expertise was cultivated on the road, as 
crew members familiarized themselves with technical components and developed workarounds 
to make these machines work in this new zone. This required technological translation, as 
mechanical components were reformulated such that they could operate in the novel material 
environment that characterized the Kenya colony.  
The work of translation was not limited, though, to technical components. So too did the 
messages carried by these new media require translation. And this work of translation was not 
only linguistic. Instead, messages needed to be made both legible and meaningful to the 
communities to whom they were being broadcast. This work was delicate and nuanced, and of 
translation, missionaries and their kin had a lot to say. It is perhaps no surprise that it was this 
cadre of men and women who were most forceful in voicing their concerns that this work of 
translation might open up avenues for knowledge workers to engage in creative and troubling 
forms of social, cultural, and political action. And in this labor of translation, African knowledge 





workers were, like African technologists, called to the task making imperfectly tropicalized 
technologies, and the messages the bore, “hang together.”179  
But this labor was never simply prosthetic. By that I mean it never simply filled the gap, 
generically taking the place of the missing part. It was essential and value-generating work that, 
on occasion, fundamentally transformed the system of which these experts were a part. In some 
instances, this authorial capacity was tacitly recognized by the Kenya Information Office, such 
as when it deployed African knowledge workers to the field where they were to act as 
information gatherers tasked with generating content that would appeal to “local” communities. 
The central place of this form of work was further amplified during Mau Mau, when the state 
sought to capture and redeploy this cultural labor in its propaganda war against forest fighters. It 
was here that African knowledge workers’ cultural knowledge was appropriated as new sources 
of informational value, scaled up as it was and integrated in the ongoing process of tropicalizing 
the Kenya colony’s media apparatus. And yet for this critical work these experts were rarely 
acknowledged and were poorly remunerated, when they were remunerated at all. These men 
were simply expected to engage in prosthetic labor, simply expected to act like infrastructures, to 
act infrastructurally in the context of durable policies of colonial austerity.   
As I have demonstrated, though, African knowledge workers routinely translated their 
prosthetic labor by deploying new media technologies as their own prosthetics, extensions 
through which to call to order new audiences and extend novel messages to newly reached and 
reachable communities. Such was the case of Ambrose Wakaria. It was by virtue of his work 
with the information department that he ably reconfigured his position, transforming these new 
media into a platform from which he could call together new audiences. While today, the value 
of Wakaria’s expertise is recognized in monetary terms, this was not always the case. Indeed, 
during the colonial period this labor was not acknowledged as the value-generating work that it 
was, in part because it was never recognized as expertise. This, I have argued, turned on a 
pernicious and durable vision of Africa as a place without technologies and thus as a place 
without technological experts, knowledge workers included.  
                                                





As we shall see in the next chapters, this trend continues to structure how technological 
expertise and knowledge work is framed today. In the chapter to follow, I turn to the present and 
to new digital financial infrastructures and their politics. Colonial practices that sought to 
maximize the value-generating potential of knowledge workers and experts, all the while 
devaluing their work as simply labor, did not end with independence. And here, too, the concept 
of prosthetic labor helps us understand how, in the present, emerging capital markets draw on 
older tropes of Africa’s relationship with technologies, thereby enabling the elision of the types 
of expertise that remain critical to making new infrastructures and the technologies that ride on 
their rails “work” in Kenya. This, then, is what is at stake in recognizing the labors of 
maintenance and repair as critical forms of expertise. Not simply does this focus disclose new 
histories of work, but it also offers a critical foundation from which we can locate a robust and 
historically rooted critique of the present, and the logics and forms of capture that continue to be 









Intimacy and Estrangement: Safaricom, Divisibility, and the Making of the Corporate 
Nation-State 
 
One morning in September 2014, I hopped on a matatu minibus heading north-east away from 
Nairobi’s Central Business District (CBD). Alighting by a lime green pedestrian bridge, I 
confronted a large billboard marking my destination. Familiar lime green letters marched neatly 
across the face of this sign, and the many others peppering the landscape of the sports grounds: 
Safaricom Stadium Kasarani. This name is new. A rebranding that came on the heels of a large 
investment into the facilities made by Safaricom, the region’s largest corporation and dominant 
telecom, but a few years ago.1  
The proprietary claim implicit in the presence of the new name frames how visitors 
interpret the grounds of the sports complex. The stadium, historically a key symbol of the nation, 
now hails Kenyans with an altogether different brand of belonging, that of corporate citizenship. 
In a few discrete places, the old name remains in smaller, red font: Moi International Sports 
Centre. In this space of cultural and sporting spectacle, Safaricom has displaced another giant, 
Kenya's dictatorial second president, Daniel arap Moi.2 Reflecting on the meaning of this 
displacement, I joined my fellow travelers, many dressed in their Sunday best, as we approached 
the hulking stadium. The event: Safaricom's Annual Shareholders’ Meeting.   
A friend had facilitated my access to the meeting. His sister was a shareholder but, he 
told me, she was so disappointed with the performance of her shares, and the resulting dividends, 
following the massive oversubscription during the Initial Public Offering (IPO) 6 years earlier 
that she had no interest in attending the Annual General Meeting (AGM). This enabled the 
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curious researcher to participate in her stead, a deal secured by the scrawl of a signature and the 
inscription of a national ID number on a form downloadable from Safaricom's website.  
But a few years ago, access to the internet was limited to “cybers” and the homes of 
Kenya’s elite. Today, “smartphones” proliferate across the Kenyan landscape. These material 
transformations have been accompanied by the emergence of a new set of imaginaries, both of 
which are largely attributable to Safaricom and the “miraculous” rise of mobile telephony. 
Indeed, today techno-enthusiasts worldwide describe Kenya as a “hub of technological 
innovation,” the continent’s “Silicon Savannah.” Within Kenya, people at all tiers of society 
traffic in this rhetoric, which has moved beyond the circumscribed field of technological 
innovation and is today used to index a whole range of projects: from an individual’s aspirations 
for the future, to a national shorthand for how “development” is thought today. The promises of 
“the digital” also shaped the aspirations of would-be shareholders, who viewed buying into the 
digital communications company as a means by which they could secure their fiscal futures, 
personal enrichment a means of becoming digital. 
As I made my way across the complex, I became increasingly perplexed by the confusing 
semiotics of the space. Every few feet, one was confronted by signage. Safaricom's telltale 
italicized green font, nested amongst the dark green, red, and black of the Kenyan flag. Most 
striking within this palette was how the green of the national flag, the green symbolizing the 
struggle to regain control over lands lost to white settlers —itself a contested symbol of the 
ethno-politicized struggle that precipitated independence—was juxtaposed against a green of a 
lighter hue, what Kenyans refer to as “Safaricom green.” Here, the signs of the corporation and 
signs of the nation at once seemed to jockey for preeminence, while concurrently existing in an 
uneasy cohabitation—an awkward conviviality splashed across walls, banners, and flags.   
Approaching the stadium, I was handed a small box containing a sandwich, a can of soda, 
and a Safaricom branded t-shirt. This welcome, I later learned, was a vast improvement from the 
year before. In 2013, the company had provided no material offering in exchange for attendance. 
As shareholders were quick to point out, Safaricom had not even provided transport to the 
stadium.  People had been incensed by this deviation from the script that guides interactions 
between patrons and clients. In registering this critique, Kenyans called the corporation to 




register wherein politicians routinely pay (and are expected to pay) people to turn out for rallies 
and political meetings. Shows of political loyalty are rarely freely given in Kenya.  
But shareholders are not clients as conventionally understood. Their investment in the 
relationship uniting themselves to Safaricom has been secured by shillings, their shares “freely” 
bought on the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE). Shillings, rather than promised votes, are 
what ostensibly tethers these Kenyans to their corporate patron. Meeting attendees were acutely 
aware of this transformation in conventional relations of dependence.3 They appealed to the 
company both in their capacity as client-citizens and in their capacity as corporate shareholders, 
a mix that reveals how the company is today reconfiguring not only the meaning of citizenship, 
but the nature and location of the attachments binding Kenya’s citizen publics to both the state 
and the corporation.4 
My sense of the complicated place of the company in Kenyan social and political life 
increased as the day progressed. As I walked up the steps of the stadium, a brass band started 
playing. "Wimbo wa taifa" the woman next to me whispered to her companion as they stopped, 
bowing their heads as the national anthem played. As the last notes faded, we proceeded into the 
belly of the building. Safaricom's management was seated on a raised dais in the center of the 
stadium. Shareholders sat in the bleachers gazing down at this international cadre of men and 
women who were flanked by flags and bunting the colors of the Kenyan national flag, the 
secondary green of Safaricom conspicuously included. The meeting followed the model of a 
baraza, or political meeting, where normative codes of behavior dictate the enactment of the 
bonds binding the citizenry to the state.5 
But the semiotic doubling of Safaricom’s green jockeying for space with the green of the 
Kenyan flag at the 2014 AGM is not seamless, and gestures toward a deeper ambivalence 
regarding the place of the corporation in everyday life. This is not altogether surprising. 
Everyday Kenyans of various stripes engage the corporation, whether to access money, provision 
for a family member or friend, make a call, send an SMS, gather provisions following calamity, 
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or watch a football match. The multiplicity of its domains of operation renders Safaricom, both 
as a material network and as a discursive and visual presence, pervasive; its ubiquity and reach 
through the sinews of everyday life impressive, rivaling the reach of the state in ways both 
visible and invisible. As Safaricom’s reach into the intimate lives of its customers expands it 
generates new attachments, attachments that industry insiders refer to as “stickiness.” And while 
Safaricom’s embeddedness in this Kenyan milieu is not accidental, it can be a liability for both 
itself and the Kenyan state. Indeed, both Safaricom and the state work assiduously to walk this 
line between proximity and distance. Understanding this dialectic of intimacy and 
estrangement—both in material and symbolic terms—forms the substance of this chapter which 
seeks to understand how today Safaricom, the region’s largest company and a multi-national 
corporation, produces state-like effects in Kenya. 
This chapter begins by considering the conditions of possibility for the emergence of 
Safaricom in the early 2000s. It situates this emergence as having been generated at the interface 
of the changing proclivities of international governing bodies, transformations in national 
policies, and global shifts in telecommunications technologies. The watchword in this period was 
“transparency.” It was only by disembedding the new corporation from the state that 
“innovation” and the “efficient” provision of services could be ensured and the “public good” 
protected. This new ethos entailed both the reordering of the relationship between public and 
private within the state, and a reconfiguration of the relationship between infrastructures and the 
constitution of belonging. The relocation of the “public good,” I argue, concurrently brought to 
the fore uncertainty regarding who or what was responsible for “development.” As this history of 
the present will demonstrate, incrementally the onus for “development” moved from being 
framed as the responsibility of the state to being placed on the shoulders of Kenyan citizens who 
have been reconstituted as a market of investors and innovators in the process.  
 
 
The Birth of a Corporation: Privatizing the Commons and the Production of Divisibility 
 
Safaricom's complicated relationship with the Kenyan state extends back to its founding 
moment. And, like many origin stories, this one begins with a series of perceived betrayals.  




was not until the mid-2000s that the state began breaking up the last of its nationally held assets. 
This process was one of fits and starts. In 1998, a new Information and Communication 
Technology (ICT) policy was enacted, which split the former Kenya Posts and 
Telecommunication Corporation (KPTC) into three discrete entities: The Postal Corporation of 
Kenya, the Communications Commission of Kenya (CCK), and what was to become Kenya’s 
monopoly telephone service provider, Telkom Kenya.6  
Proponents of the disaggregation of state assets argued that the move would increase both 
“transparency” and “efficiency.” As David Mwiraria, then Minister for Finance, argued in 
parliament in 2004:  
in the past, incidents of mismanagement in public enterprises have imposed heavy 
financial costs on both the economy and the Kenyan taxpayers. As a result, the 
public has paid for services which were either not rendered or when rendered, 
were of a low quality. In general, this sub-sector has been largely under-
performing and unable to service its debt obligations, transferring most of the 
burden to the Exchequer.  
Spotty service provisioning was not the only thing at issue. “In some instances,” he continued, 
“these enterprises hired excess labour while engaging in inappropriate procurement procedures. 
The result has been overpriced purchases of assets, real estates or outright theft through 
purchases of [the] wrong equipment.”7 Public enterprises, in other words, were being used 
illicitly to secure private gain. Rather than provisioning services and enabling the development of 
robust infrastructures that would bind people to place, those managing state enterprises stood 
accused of unraveling the material networks that enabled connectivity, separating the materiality 
of infrastructures from their purported function: the provision of services necessary to secure the 
“public good.” These actions placed an undue burden on the Kenyan population, as government 
appointed managers sucked capital out of state coffers.  
This was particularly vexing in the context of telecoms for, as Moses Akaranga put it, 
communications infrastructures were critical to “the development of any place.”8 The division of 
KPTC, and the subsequent creation of Telkom Kenya was, in effect, designed to both protect the 
                                                
6 “KENYA TELECOM REFORM: A GOOD STORY GONE BAD?” April 10, 2005. Wikileaks, Available online 
at https://wikileaks.org/plusd/cables/05NAIROBI1488_a.html. Hansard Parliamentary Debates, September 27, 
2007.  
7 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard), 10 June 2004.  




Kenyan public and the state from the perceived predations of government officials. It was only 
through these reforms that national “development” would be possible.  
Observers at the American Embassy tended to agree. However, they were quick to argue 
that, as a remedial step designed to ensure transparency, the bifurcation of KPTC had been a 
failure. So, too, did these observers question Telkom’s integrity as a semi-autonomous parastatal.  
To no one’s surprise, the CCK’s latest annual report notes TKL’s utter failure to 
translate its monopoly status into improved services [in landline provisioning] and 
infrastructure…Nearly all Kenyans can recount anecdotes which together paint a 
picture of an inefficient, badly managed company widely seen as more a platform 
for political patronage and corruption than a genuine service provider.9  
These observers claimed that government foot dragging had beleaguered the path to 
liberalization, as contracts to private corporations were routinely thwarted in what observers 
perceived to be efforts to protect “cabals.”10 Challenging a long-held ideology of distribution that 
links political patronage to (albeit unequal) service provisioning, these critics positioned 
patronage as an anathema to the “public good.” The politics of patronage, the message was clear, 
was an obstruction to infrastructural maintenance and expansion, both of which had implications 
for service delivery.  
There was some truth to this. The extension of Kenya’s landline network had proceeded 
slowly and unevenly. By 2002, Kenya had 327,000 landline connections servicing a population 
of over 31 million, ranking Kenya 23rd on the continent.11 Services, parliamentarians claimed, 
were mainly nested in Nairobi and its immediate hinterlands: “leaving most of the country 
unwired in the information age.”12  
Kenya’s entry into the “information age” would be heralded by privatization, a process 
which was widely held to be the only way to bring together what was needed:  the holy trinity of 
foreign expertise, technology, and capital. For proponents of privatization, the selling off of state 
assets would not reproduce asymmetric relations of power between putative centers and 
peripheries. The goal, wrote then Minister of Finance, Chris Okemo in 2001, was to cultivate 
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new, “strategic partnerships.” This was especially important: “when...dealing with enterprises 
that involve technology and management expertise.”13  
The value of these relationships was not to be framed in terms of dollar (or shilling) 
amount alone, but crucially turned on a qualitative assessment of the emergent relationships 
borne out of the selling of state assets. “What was needed,” he argued, was “somebody who 
would bring value to the corporation not just by acquiring assets but… [by bringing] technology 
and management skills that will enhance the value of that enterprise; that will lead to efficiency 
of services.” His framing here was cautious, however. Care must be taken, he stated, to protect: 
“Kenya’s interests first…all other interests are secondary.”14 Amidst much discussion, the 
Privatization Act of 1999 was finally passed by Parliament. Oddly, then, privatization was 
devised as a means, the only means, of both protecting “the public” and securing the “public 
good.”  
*** 
It was in this period that Safaricom first made its appearance. One narrative holds that Safaricom 
was created in 2000, having gained access to Telkom Kenya’s subscriber base and network— in 
other words, its wealth in people, and its wealth in things (Guyer 1995). Soon thereafter, 
Vodafone Kenya Limited acquired a 40 percent interest in Safaricom by contributing $20 million 
USD in cash. Telkom Kenya and British owned Vodafone contributed $33 million USD and $22 
million USD, respectively, as their contributions for the portion of the license fee required to 
operate cellular services. An alternative narrative holds that Safaricom was registered as a wholly 
owned subsidiary of KPTC on April 3, 1997. In January 1999, the newly formed parastatal, 
Telkom Kenya, gave 30 percent of Safaricom to Vodafone Kenya Limited (VKL), followed by 
another 10 percent in October of that year.15  This 10 percent later ceded, while seemingly 
unknown in this period, would become important in years to come. In both narratives, under the 
terms of the new ownership structure, Telkom Kenya held 60 percent of Safaricom, which was 
subsequently taken over by the government along with a range of debts, in December 2007. 
                                                
13 Kenya National Assembly Official Record (Hansard), October 23, 2001 
14 Ibid. 





While these timelines would be hotly contested in the months leading up to the 2007 IPO, 
what united these founding narratives were the numbers. Indeed, in the series of debates and 
intrigues that would assemble around the company, the numbers themselves—60/40— would 
occupy a central position as the objects over which people argued. Though in this period, the 
terms of the split remained unquestioned, uncertainty remained regarding the proprietary claims 
embedded in these numbers, which turned on the status of the monies granted by Telkom and 
Vodafone and how they were to be evaluated. The Public Investments Committee on the 
Accounts of State Corporations tasked with examining Safaricom’s origins some years later 
outlined the confusion. Why, it asked, were the monies exchanged framed as a loan rather than 
equity?  
The problem of the character of the exchange was beset by other irregularities. As the 
committee wrote in its report, the deals under question had not generated a paper trail. "[I]n 
absence of a written agreement between the parties…the Committee was unable to confirm the 
term[s] of the said loan."16 For members of the committee, the lack of documentation, and the 
discursive authority it bore, smelled of the bad old days of the politics of patronage. Not only had 
privatization failed to deliver on transparency, but uncertainty regarding how these proprietary 
numbers were to be evaluated made it difficult to discern who (or what) was really driving the 
company. If it was a loan, at issue were the rates of interest, the nature of debtors’ oversight, and 
rates of repayment. If it was equity, at issue was how the division of managerial labor, and the 
identity of relevant shareholders, would impact the future direction of the company. All of these 
questions led critics to query how the new arrangements would upset the status of Kenyanness. 
At this stage, foreign proponents of liberalization were unconcerned with the specifics of 
this origin story. For their part, the growth of Safaricom confirmed an emergent orthodoxy: 
development was best effected when driven by global capital and expertise operating under the 
conditions of a newly liberalized economy. As noted by a U.S. Foreign Service Officer (FSO):  
TKL's failure as a fixed line service provider stands in stark contrast to the roaring 
growth of Kenya's mobile phone industry - one of the country's rare economic 
success stories. Mobile services were commercially launched in 1993, but the 
market didn't start to take off until 1997, when SafariCom, [sic] a wholly-owned 
subsidiary of TKL, was established. In May 2000, TKL sold 40% of Safaricom to 
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Vodafone UK, which assumed management of the company…the market took 
off. Mobile network connections surpassed the number of fixed lines in 2001 and 
by 2004, total subscribers exceeded 2.8 million. Networks have been rolled out 
quickly, and close to 60% of the population now has cellular signal coverage. This 
rapid growth in mobile is both a cause and a consequence of TKL's failure in the 
fixed line market.17  
These numbers depoliticized liberalization. They offered ‘proof’ that privatization had 
‘succeeded,’ enabling both transparency and service delivery. In a sentiment that was coming to 
the fore amongst policy-makers, foreign lenders, and industry leaders alike, inefficient 
government agencies needed to be replaced by responsible and efficient corporate management 
structures and models.18 If a new corporate managerialism via privatization was the solution to 
state “failure,” new technologies were to be its arsenal; allowing Kenya to “leapfrog” landline 
infrastructures and launching the country into a mobile future.  
Kenya’s entry into the mobile market in this period was not, however, unique. Indeed, the 
launch of mobile phone networks in Kenya was part and parcel of a broader, indeed global, shift 
towards mobile telephony. In 1995, there were approximately 91 million mobile phone users 
across the globe.19 By 2006, this number had risen to 3.3 billion subscribers.20 Kenya was a part 
of this trend. By 2006, 26.9 percent of the adult population were mobile subscribers.21 While 
Kenya’s rates of adoption were reasonable under the leadership of Vodafone, it was not until 
these new mobile networks were reformed, made “peculiarly Kenyan,” that Kenya embarked on 
the path towards becoming Africa’s “Silicon Savannah.”  
For U.S. observers, market growth took precedence over the material and symbolic 
implications of the company being reformed by the injection of private foreign capital and 
expertise. Indeed, it was these investments to which they attributed the generation of new 
markets in mobile telephony, itself unquestioningly positioned as an index of national 
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development. But this was to be a wireless, rather than wired, development. A development 
secured through the privatization of national assets and infrastructures rather than through the 
extension and maintenance of state owned infrastructures. This would serve an integrative 
function, binding diverse parts of the country into a single network.22 This was not, however, a 
conventional story of state building. These infrastructures were not a means of generating 
attachments between people and the state.  Instead, Kenyans were becoming tethered to an 
interesting hybrid, Safaricom, by a series of 0s and 1s.   
*** 
These transformations were not lost on the Kenyan public for whom the fact that Kenya’s 
telecommunications sector, under the auspices of a parastatal, Telkom, had been ceded to foreign 
interests caused much consternation. The numbers themselves— 40 percent being held by British 
owned multinational, Vodafone, and 60 percent being held by Telkom— were a part of these 
debates. Under the terms of the Privatisation Act (1999), no more than 40 percent of a state asset 
could be foreign held.23 This regulation indexed an attempt to fix in place and render in 
numerical form the nature of the new relationships being established as state assets were 
privatized. For some, the numbers were all wrong. Allowing foreigners a stake in state assets, 
they argued, would parlay into a kind of neo-imperial relationship. For these critics, the enforced 
privatization of state enterprises was in the interest of foreign investors alone. A cynical means 
of creating new markets for metropolitan capital, their own markets having long-since dried up. 
For others, the question of Kenya’s sovereignty was front and center. As C. Kilonzo stated in the 
national assembly: “Privatisation is a new form of colonization. It cannot be anything else. Very 
soon, if we sell all the parastatals then all the managing directors will be European.”24 Though all 
seemed to agree that services would be improved, not everyone was convinced that the benefits 
of these improvements were worth the costs.  
For these opponents of privatization, the question turned on the status of the asset. For 
many, state assets were “public resources” to be protected and retained as whole, indivisible 
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parts of the national patrimony.25 As Boaz Kipchumba argued in April 2004 while a new 
privatization bill was being debated in Parliament, Kenyans had a naturally endowed right to 
these networks as these “parastatals are... owned by members of the public.”26 For some, this was 
a matter of history. As Kerow Billows argued: “There is no way we can sell Telkom Kenya; a 
company owned by Kenyans, in which they have invested their time, efforts and resources for 40 
years.”27  
Others moved away from history, tapping into a logic of rights and ownership rooted in a 
deeper genealogy of belonging, thereby firmly rooting Telkom Kenya and its infrastructures 
within the logic of the patria. It is “our heritage” one parliamentarian emphatically stated.28 
These critics argued that Kenyans’ proprietary rights over telecommunications infrastructures 
were rooted in a logic of primordialism. Kilonzo, for example, argued that while he, too, 
supported the new privatization bill, it was essential that the majority “of the shares should be 
sold to Kenyans, and to indigenous Kenyans for that matter. If we are going to pass and support 
this Bill, it has to be on condition that it is only going to benefit Kenyans, and it must be 
indigenous Kenyans.”29 In invoking indigeneity rather than citizenship as the metric of rightful 
ownership, Kilonzo firmly framed Kenya’s telecommunication sector as one of the “resources of 
this country.” The legitimate purview of the legitimate holders of the land, defined not as citizens 
but as first-comers.30 Like conflicts over the continent’s subsoils, this debate turned on a logic of 
autochthony. In this framing the resource ought to remain indivisible, a commons over which 
indigenes held a naturally endowed right.  
While writing a few years later, the spirit of this argument was captured in the Kenyan 
blogosphere.  
 
If you are awake, you should have noticed something very strange has been 
happening since [the] 1980’s. From this period, we have witnessed [the] massive 
sale of basic industries, or natural monopolies by states. For instance...Kenya Post 
and Telecommunications Corporation (KPTC)...As usual, the priests will yell, 
efficiency. They said the same as they enclosed common lands in England and 
Scotland which was then extended to other continents in form of colonialism. We 
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are in the midst of the greatest enclosure of commons ever witnessed by 
mankind.31  
For this blogger, state assets were a kind of a commons, which the government ought to retain 
outside of market relations. Kenyans had naturally endowed rights to these services and 
networks, rights that were fundamentally undermined as these entities were commodified and 
rendered divisible.32  
But policy-makers were in a fix that pit ideology and materiality against each other. Like 
the boundaries that demarcate the borders of belonging, infrastructures require constant 
investment and vigilant maintenance work. As Assistant Minister of Co-operative Development 
stated, while parastatals had been:  
founded using the taxpayers’ money…parastatals were expected to offer services 
and they were supposed to be of help to Kenyans at large. I am saying this because 
I realize that when we speak about privatization, we are mainly talking about the 
improvement of the infrastructure.33  
Critics of privatization were in a double-bind. To privatize would be to remove publicly held 
assets from the hands of Kenyans who were their naturally endowed owners. Dividing these 
assets, they seemed to argue, fundamentally altered their status vis Kenyanness. But allowing the 
company to remain in the hands of the state as a “custodian of…enterprises” would prevent “the 
improvement of the infrastructure” and thus fail “to be of help to Kenyans at large.”34  
Here anxieties over the status of Kenyanness precluded a simple economistic reading of value. 
As Peter Kenneth argued during the same discussion:  
 
On the issue of valuation...we need to be careful. We need to have the correct 
machinery and procurement procedures in place. This is normally a very difficult 
subject in privatization. I am aware that not all of us can agree on certain values 
which are pegged on various assets of a company… If you look at the previous 
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privatisation exercises which have taken place, you will find that there has always 
been a dispute as to what the real value could have been.35  
On the face of things, Kenneth was concerned with how value should be ascertained economic 
terms. This was no easy task. It required establishing the monetary value of existing assets but 
also forecasting how they might generate future profits in a context where the future was 
uncertain at best. And yet, lurking in the background was an uncertainty regarding how 
authorizing the divisibility of state assets might reconfigure the terms of Kenyanness. Not all 
parastatals ought to be subject to divisibility. Some, as Kenneth argued, ought to be retained by 
the government “on behalf of its people.”36  
For opponents, then, this concern turned on the relationship between materiality and 
meaning. Was the improvement of services worth what some viewed as a ceding of state 
sovereignty? Did this new relationship not simply re-rehearse colonial dynamics?  And, perhaps 
most importantly, what were the implications for belonging? The “value” of foreign investments, 
evidently, did not simply inhere in the amount of foreign capital and expertise brought in to run 
what were formerly state-held assets. Quantities in these discussions were meaningless without a 
close reading of the mechanisms and relationships that modified their qualities.37  
Privatization in the form of the Initial Public Offering (IPO) seemed, to some, to remedy this 
impasse. State assets would be rendered divisible in the form of shares, but the selling of those 
shares would be undertaken in a bid to protect the patria, to ensure that Kenya’s natural 
“resource” returned to its natural owners: Kenyans. In subsequent years, however, this debate 
would reframe the terms of earlier discussions over privatization. Public assets would, indeed, 
return to Kenyans, but this time not as autochthons or first comers, nor as undifferentiated 
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“The question which vexed the Committee’s mind was: ‘Who is Mobitelea Ventures?’ ”38 
 
Kevin and I were out for nyama choma with a friend, Simiyu, and some of his colleagues, all of 
whom work at Finance Against Poverty (FAP).39 FAP’s mandate is to make “markets work for 
the poor.” FAP’s research is concerned with understanding the patterns and networks of the poor 
so as to better include them in emerging financial markets. This mandate, which goes by the 
shorthand M4P (Markets For the Poor), rests on an increasingly prevalent postulate: the private 
sector, rather than governments, or NGOs, is best placed to ensure “development.” According to 
this emergent developmentalist wisdom, the poor ought not be viewed as people in need. Instead, 
this rationale holds that the poor be viewed as both entrepreneurs and a potential market to be 
tapped through the financialization of everyday life.  
M4P is not limited to FAP. This ethos was formalized following the publication of C.K. 
Prahalad’s, 2006, The Fortune at the Bottom of the Pyramid: Eradicating Poverty through 
Profits. In this oft-cited text, Prahalad argued that: “we stop thinking of the poor as victims or as 
a burden and start recognizing them as resilient and creative entrepreneurs and value-conscious 
consumers.” The Bottom of the Pyramid (BOP), he continued, was not simply a base of 
consumers, but was a “source of innovations,” innovations that could be marketized.40 This near-
orthodoxy is propounded by Safaricom, Simiyu’s former employer, as well.  Indeed, Safaricom 
routinely attributes its success to the company’s investment in the twin projects of “knowing 
their customers,” and investing in projects operating under the banner of “Corporate Social 
Responsibility.” However, and as we shall see, while this ideology now has global purchase, its 
emergence in Kenya was contingent and firmly rooted in the particularities of the Kenyan milieu.  
We first reached out to Simiyu to gain a better understanding of the knowledge work 
Safaricom undertakes to establish and nurture new markets. How, we wanted to know, could we 
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account for the unprecedented success of this company? Why were customers seemingly so 
closely bound to Safaricom? From whence did their attachments derive?  
As the night wore on, talk turned to Mobitelea, a shadowy company that emerged as a 
shareholder of Safaricom in the period leading up to the IPO. Despite much talk of the company, 
which was registered in Guernsey, an island in the English Channel, very little was known 
regarding how Mobitelea gained shares in East Africa’s largest corporation, nor did anyone seem 
to know—or was willing to name—who was behind it. The moniker, Mobitelea, had puzzled 
Kevin and I. Did any among them know where it had come from, we asked the group. Jim, an 
innovations leader at FAP laughed. Standing up, and walking away from the group as his 
cellphone rang, he turned to the table and shouted: “Everyone knows! Mobitelea: Moi, Biwott, 
Telecoms!” It was so simple, so elegant, so obvious. Safaricom may have displaced Moi’s legacy 
at the newly renamed Safaricom Stadium, but Moi—and the politics of patronage and statecraft 
for which he stands— had, evidently, remained embedded in Safaricom.  
This section works to tease out the debates that surrounded the second phase of 
privatization, which took the form of an IPO initiated in 2007 and completed in 2008. The IPO 
was framed as a means of democratizing the ownership structure of the corporation by placing it 
firmly in the hands of an undifferentiated and distributed Kenyan public. This was accompanied, 
I argue, by a reconfiguration in how “development” was being imagined in the period. No longer 
linked to the state and the partisan ethno-politics that characterized its operations, development 
was increasingly viewed as being the proper purview of Kenya’s multiple citizen-publics, who 
were reconfigured as both investors and markets to be tapped, with Safaricom operating as a new 
corporate patron and seeker of value. In tracking this distribution in developmentalist agency, I 
turn to questions of market-making. Here I query how it came to pass that the poor came to be 
viewed as a source of both value and innovation.  
*** 
Now firmly under the directorship of Michael Joseph, a South African national, Safaricom had 
undergone massive transformations by 2007. From a company with only 200,000 registered 




corporation in the region.41 Much of this success can be attributed to the company’s launch of its 
widely lauded value-added service, M-PESA, a service to which I will return, which enables 
mobile-to-mobile money transfers. The generation of new markets that happened in these years 
demanded the expansion of infrastructures, as the increase in M-PESA users put pressure on the 
existing bandwidth, leading to overcrowding on the 2G spectrum. And so, the company 
purchased the country’s first Third Generation (3G) license from the industry regulator, the 
Communications Commission of Kenya, for $25 million USD in the same year.42  
M-PESA has generated widespread international attention, widely lauded for “including” 
populations heretofore “excluded” from financial markets—for “banking the unbanked.” The 
language of inclusion, from the beginning, situated M-PESA in an altruistic register, positioning 
it as having ‘democratized development’ by following the lead of the poor, rather than imposing 
top-down, centralized development initiatives. This ‘democratization of development’ was to be 
matched by the democratization of the company’s ownership structure in the form of the IPO.  
And so, in 2007, the company prepared to go public by extending the privatization of the 
corporation in the form of an Initial Public Offering (IPO). Under the agreement struck between 
Telkom Kenya as 60 percent shareholder of Safaricom and Vodafone as 40 percent shareholder, 
the Government of Kenya would transfer Telkom’s 60 percent to the Minister of Finance. 25 
percent of these shares would be sold to the public on the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE). 
Under the terms of this agreement, the majority of shares would be held by a combination of the 
Government of Kenya and the Kenyan populace. But the agreement allowed for a future wherein 
Vodafone would become majority shareholder.43  
This move would have shifted the geographic center of ownership beyond Kenya’s 
borders. But, on the face of things at least, Vodafone seemed more concerned that the company’s 
top leadership, not the majority of its shares, be the purview of various global elsewheres. 
Indeed, rumors held that Vodafone was willing to forego this majority stake in Safaricom if the 
Government of Kenya agreed to cede its right as majority shareholder to appoint the company’s 
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CEO.44 This clause in the agreement, which has led to the appointment of one South African and 
one Guyanese CEO in the succeeding years, is popularly held to have been a means by which the 
company sought to distance itself from the Kenyan state, both with regard to the protracted 
nature of Kenyan ethno-politics, and the politics of patronage that are widely held to be the 
animus for “corruption.” 
But revelations that came on the heels of the announced IPO called into question 
Safaricom’s desired separation between corporation and state. The 1999 law, which mandated 
that the majority of shares remain in Kenya had replaced an earlier, 1997, policy established to 
monitor the country’s Information Communication Technology (ICT) sectors. This law was in 
effect prior to the Information and Communication Technology (ICT) Act of 1998, which split 
KPTC into three entities: Telkom Kenya, Postal Corporation of Kenya, and the CCK. The initial 
policy stipulated that any new investor could hold no more than 30, rather than 40, percent equity 
in the company. These new numbers raised a series of questions. According to the second 
origin’s story the company had been established in 1999, meaning the original 1997 regulations 
were in place at its inception, rendering the altered proportion held by Telekom illegal. If this 
second narrative of origins was true how and when, Kenyan parliamentarians queried, did it 
come to pass that this policy was changed? More than timelines were in the crosshairs here. 
According to a parliamentary committee organized to investigate these irregularities:  
by the time of its inception … Telkom Kenya, on behalf of the Government of 
Kenya, owned 70 per cent of Safaricom. The remaining 30 per cent was owned 
by Vodafone Kenya Limited on behalf of Vodafone PLC. [The]...Committee 
found out that contrary to what is in the public domain, the company has more 
than two shareholders. The third shareholder is a shadow firm known as Mobitelea 
Ventures Limited…whose directors are also obscure.45  
Not only was this contrary to the 1997 stipulations governing the privatization of state assets, but 
it also contravened the shareholders’ agreement, which mandated that all shareholders be 
notified of a potential sale, and that the identity of new shareholders be made known. The real 
rub, however, returned to questions of value. Specifically, it was not clear that Telkom Kenya 
had received any capital in exchange for the 10 percent passed along to Vodafone Kenya.  As the 
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Committee report recounted: "Mr Sammy Kirui, Chief Executive, Telkom (K) Ltd informed the 
Committee that, while he is not sure what necessitated the reduction of TKL shares in Safaricom 
from 70% to 60%, available records are not explicit [regarding] whether TKL was paid for the 
reduction.”46  
By uncoupling 10 percent from the original 70 percent, the network was revalued, 
transformed into a gift to be freely given, a cessation of both sovereignty and a selling-out of 
citizens. As one parliamentarian argued: “the 10 per cent was given to the shadowy company for 
free. It was public funds!”47 By giving a proportion of Kenya’s natural resources away, the 
government had disrupted the terms of its fiduciary relationship with Kenyan citizens, an 
agreement wherein it held a proportion of state assets, but only “in trust” for the Kenyan public.48  
Requests of information from the relevant parties only deepened suspicions. Sammy 
Kirui, CEO of Telkom Kenya, argued that the reduction in shares may have been necessitated by 
the “need to raise funds for the expansion of Safaricom's network."49 Contrary to what advocates 
of privatization under the banner of “transparency” had been saying for years, here Kirui seemed 
to argue the politics of patronage were not an obstruction to infrastructural expansion. They were 
its condition of possibility.  
When pressed on this, Vodafone executives, Michael Joseph included, ostensibly chosen 
because his status as South African inured him from imbrication in Kenya’s complex politics of 
patronage, refused to disclose the status of Mobitelea, though no one denied that a deal had been 
struck. A letter written the Chief Executive of Vodafone Africa stated: "in 2002, Mobitelea 
Ventures…was offered an opportunity to acquire 25% of VKL by Vodafone Group. This was in 
in return for the advisory role it played as a local partner of Vodafone Group on local business 
practices and protocol challenges associated with investing in Kenya.” Safaricom 
representatives here tried to assuage fears. This new investor, though its identity remained 
obscure, was not “foreign” but was a “local partner.” And so, Darby seemed to suggest, the 5 
percent of the company held by Mobitelea did not shift the center of gravity outside of Kenya. 
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To the contrary, the deal had been struck in a bid to more firmly embed the company in Kenya’s 
social fabric. The deal was struck, in other words, to secure intimacy.  
The letter indicated that there was nothing unusual in this. “When Vodafone makes 
investments in new territories,” Darby told the committee, “it is not uncommon that it works 
alongside a partner, who typically gives advice on local business practices and protocols and 
various challenges associated with investing in a new market.”50 If, for Kirui, the deal with 
Mobitelea had provided value in the form of capital needed for “local” infrastructural expansion, 
Vodafone executives argued that the expansion of the company and its infrastructures turned on 
mobilizing “local” knowledge.  And that the value of this knowledge outstripped any 
irregularities that might have enabled the movement of shares among the contracted parties.  
These debates brought into relief an emergent developmentalist regime. “Local 
knowledge,” mediated by foreign expertise and capital was necessary for the generation of new 
infrastructures. This coupling of the infrastructural and the “para-ethnographic” has since 
become the modus operandi of Safaricom, a distributed vision of developmental agency that 
brings ever-larger swaths of the Kenyan population into the orbit of the company as sources of 
knowledge and sites of innovation.51  
Critics in Parliament were indignant:  
It is appalling that Vodafone Plc a Company registered in the United Kingdom 
involved itself in underhand activities of [a] corrupt nature aimed at depriving 
Kenyan citizens of billions of shillings through m/s. Mobitelea Ventures, despite 
the fact that the U.K. has been in the forefront of campaigning against corruption 
in developing countries.52 
This was hypocrisy at its worst. Under the guise of a foreign multinational corporation, the 
networks of patronage had, evidently, not disappeared. Instead, like infrastructural expansion, 
they too were outsourced, distributed amongst the island of Guernsey, the Nairobi offices of 
Safaricom, the State House, and the metropolitan headquarters of British-owned Vodafone.  
On the heels of these troubling revelations, critics called for an immediate cessation of the IPO. 
These critics challenged the government of Mwai Kibaki to make good on its promises to end 
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corruption. “If it was transparent as it claims to be,” it should have no problem getting to the 
bottom of this “murky” deal.53 These irregularities, they argued, ought to be resolved and “all 
those disclosures...made” before the IPO was allowed to go forward.54   This was not merely a 
matter of political wrangling. Many Kenyans firmly located the IPO within a longer genealogy 
of state corruption. The context of these revelations, however, coming as they did on the heels of 
the second round of privatization, offered Kenyans the opportunity to weigh in. As one blogger 
wrote: “if you are against corruption then it is a good idea…to stop corruption dead in its’ tracks 
and what better place to start than to cause the Safaricom IPO to fall flat on its’ face.”55 By 
withholding their hard-earned shillings and boycotting the IPO, Kenyans could actively work to 
remedy the misdeeds of the past. This, interestingly, marked a continuation of the logic of 
privatization that had animated parliamentary debates since the early 2000s. It was the very 
expansion of private ownership through the divisibility of state assets that seemed to offer a 
means of protecting the “public good.”    
If critics of the IPO centered on past irregularities, its supporters directed attention to how 
the IPO would usher in new futures, not least by ensuring the most “efficient” division of labor 
was effected amongst the contracting parties. This, they argued, was the surest path to achieving 
national development. As current President, Uhuru Kenyatta, professed in parliament in the 
period leading up to the IPO:  
the desired objectives of the privatization of State corporations...is not a question 
of just selling assets but [is a means]...to improve infrastructure, [the] delivery of 
services, [and to] reduce the demand on Government resources…[thereby] 
allowing business to do what it does best and the Government to regulate.56  
Here, Kenyatta presented parliament with an increasingly prevalent vision of the division of 
developmentalist labor: business, not government, was best positioned to provision the “public 
good.” By transferring the responsibility for infrastructural maintenance to the private sector in 
the form of privately owned utilities, problems of breakdown and infrastructural reach would be 
mitigated. The state, for its part, would be strengthened in regulatory terms as it was scaled back 
in infrastructural terms. And both the public good and the state would be revivified. This, then, 
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was not a retreat of the state but a recalibration of the relationship between private and public 
both within the state and, as we shall see, in the public imaginary (Chalfin 2010).  
Indeed, Safaricom and sympathetic voices in the government framed the IPO as an opportunity 
for Kenyans to repossess what was naturally theirs, Safaricom: an infrastructure, a network, a 
future, now imagined as constituting a divisible piece of the national patrimony. As Minister of 
Finance, Kimunya, was quick to remind his audience: “It is not Safaricom that is issuing shares. 
It is the Kenyan Government that is divesting part…of the 60 per cent that we own on behalf of 
the Kenyan people, 25 per cent is what we are saying that we do not have to own on behalf of 
Kenyans when they can own it directly.”57  
This was framed as a democratization of Safaricom’s ownership structure, but it had 
political entailments that fundamentally brought to bear questions of responsibilities and rights: 
namely, those framed through the categories of citizenship, development, and patriotism. As 
Kimunya stated, the IPO would enable “the Government...to...expand the opportunities available 
to Kenyans of all walks of life, so that they can participate in their own wealth creation, while at 
the same time, helping to build a new and better Kenya.”58 The national patrimony would be 
democratized, its ownership distributed across the Kenyan populace. People would be able to 
develop themselves as they developed the nation. 
This democratization of assets, of course, was a reframing of earlier discussions which 
positioned the Telecommunications infrastructure as a commons. The commodification of the 
asset had made it divisible. In this new framing, it was not Kenyans writ large that had a right to 
these resources, but those with the means to buy back what was rightfully theirs in the form of 
shares. But it was not only ownership that was being redistributed but the onus for development, 
which was now framed as being the responsibility of Kenyans, not only in their capacity as 
citizens, but in their capacity as a market of investors. 
*** 
If supporters of the IPO argued that it would conjure into being a new public of citizens cum 
investors, the timing of the planned IPO articulated with growing concerns regarding existing 
Kenyan publics. The IPO was set to take place in late 2007, just prior to the much-anticipated 
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presidential elections, which pit Raila Odinga of the Orange Democratic Movement (ODM) 
against hopeful incumbent, Mwai Kibaki of the Party of National Unity (PNU). For many, the 
de-ethnicized and “transparent” politics promised by Kibaki in 2002, had not been borne out. 
Key government positions were occupied by members of the Kikuyu old-guard (Branch 2013). 
The Kroll report, the contents of which circulated in the blogosphere, confirmed that business 
during Kibaki’s tenure had proceeded much as usual, as powerful political figures continued 
engaging in a range of irregular (though by no means uncommon) practices which “fleeced” the 
Kenyan public.59 
Led by Odinga, opponents voiced concerns that monies made from the sale would be 
used as a “campaign war chest.” And so, ODM sought to have the IPO halted through the courts. 
While ODM’s legal arguments were recognized as “frivolous,” court proceedings delayed the 
IPO.60  While the actual voting proceeded without incident, delays in releasing the results, 
widespread accusations of election rigging on both sides, and government and opposition 
sponsored aggression led to a cycle of violence and retribution through the first months of 2008. 
This violence led to the deaths of over 1100 Kenyans and the displacement of an estimated 
600,000.61 If, to date, Safaricom had labored to present itself as at once embedded and 
disembedded in the Kenyan state. As at once intimate with and estranged from its complicated 
politics of patronage, here it tried to weigh in as an ostensibly nonpartisan arbiter between ODM 
and PNU.  
People claimed that new communications technologies were largely to blame for the 
violence, citing in particular the virulent SMSs flying over the cellphone networks crisscrossing 
the country. Apparently at the behest of then Minister of Internal Security, John Michuki, 
Safaricom’s network was enrolled, and Safaricom sent the following message to all of its 
subscribers: "The Ministry of Internal Security urges you to please desist from sending or 
forwarding any sms that may cause public unrest. This may lead to your prosecution. From: 
SAFARICOM." While Safaricom directed its message to all subscribers, some interpreted this as 
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but further evidence that Safaricom was in the pocket of the PNU government, demonstrating the 
difficult line the company walks between intimacy and estrangement.  
One fails to understand how Safaricom, owned partly by Vodafone PLC and the 
Kenyan public through the Government of Kenya, can allow its network to be 
misused for political gain at this critical time while it failed to do absolutely 
nothing when fake propaganda was circulating within its network prior to the 
general elections. Perhaps the profits were too sweet to turn down, huh? The latest 
short text message is in fact tantamount to Safaricom turning into a state 
broadcaster and I dare add, [is] a direct infringement on the privacy of its 
subscribers.62  
Here, this blogger invoked a troubling past as he worked to interpret the volatile present. The 
media had operated as a mouthpiece for government under dictatorial president Moi. With 
political liberalization in 2002 had come the liberalization of the media, both of which ostensibly 
marked decisive break from the past. But that past loomed large. Any indication that Safaricom 
was working with the Kibaki government undermined its ostensible distance from Kenyan 
politics, conjuring up memories of Moi-era Kenya. While not noted by this blogger, Safaricom’s 
mobilization of its networks indicated that it was willing to operate like a state. In appealing to 
its clients not as customers but as Kenyan citizens it tried to leverage the attachments generated 
by its networks in a bid to refashion sentiments.  
By April of 2008, the violence had come to an end with a negotiated agreement between 
the two sides. For foreign observers, Safaricom’s ability to proceed with the IPO was “as much a 
symbol of political reconciliation as of economic common sense.” The power-sharing agreement 
between Kibaki and Odinga, with Odinga joining the government as Prime Minister:  
set the stage for political stability and reform….In this new context, [Minister of 
Finance,] Kimunya was able to have a private lunch with Odinga, an erstwhile 
bitter political enemy, just prior to his IPO announcement. In a well-
choreographed piece of political goodwill, Odinga expressed his support for the 
IPO, and Kimunya later commented that Odinga also expressed a personal interest 
in participating in the IPO as an investor.63 
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For this observer, here Odinga tacitly confirmed that the divisibility of state assets through their 
commodification opened up new possibilities for Kenyans, not as a bifurcated class of rights-
bearing citizens, but as citizen-shareholders.  
 Having so staunchly opposed the IPO, Raila’s newfound support demanded explanation. 
Irrespective of irregularities, he argued, the point remained that Kenyan people were the rightful 
heirs of the company. Given this, he continued, it was critical that “real efforts should be made to 
make these purchases more accessible by Kenyans in all the regions and in all walks of life.” In a 
thinly veiled accusation, here Odinga suggested that ethno-regional patterns of infrastructural 
stratification were alive and well. But timing is everything. And so, he concluded: “let me 
encourage as many Kenyans as possible to fully participate in this offering.”64 Both opponents 
and supporters of Odinga were flummoxed by this about-face. Indeed, on the Kenyan 
blogosphere lively debates were staged between ODM and PNU supporters, between Kenyans 
living abroad and those within the country. As one blogger succinctly wrote: “we’re torn.”65  
 Some  supporters argued that Odinga had done all he could, and that Kenyans had to 
respect the decision of the courts when they rejected his appeal to halt the IPO.66 Others were 
incensed. By supporting the IPO Odinga had, in effect, sanctioned the Kibaki government’s 
successful rigging of the election. As one blogger wrote: “The rigging of the 2007 elections was 
ALL ABOUT the Safaricom IPO.”67 The decision of the court was meaningless and, in any case, 
its ruling did not change these “matters of concern” into “matters of fact.”68 As another wrote: 
“ODM opposed safaricom IPO on principle and they OWE Kenyans a credible explanation on 
change of heart.”69  
In the run up to the election, Odinga had promised an end to the “corruption” with which 
the Kibaki administration had come to be associated. His about face called this commitment into 
question. But it was more than this. Odinga had cast his bid for election on the basis of a logic of 
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class that, in Kenya, articulates in complicated ways with popular perceptions that Kenya’s 
postcolonial past has been characterized by ethno-regional patterns of (infrastructural) 
stratification. His support for the IPO seemed to confirm that, at the end of the day he, like 
Kibaki, was simply another samaki wa kubwa (big fish). That his class based allegiances had 
overcome his capacity to act for a bloc of voters in a context where class and ethnicity overlap in 
ways that, in Kenya, are as common-sense as they are misleading.  
As one Kenyan living in the United States wrote:  
 
When we told you that there was nothing fundamentally different between PNU 
and ODM you called us all sorts of names. We told you over and over again it 
was all about eating, eating, eating and more eating and that ODM was simply a 
vehicle to get to the Kitchen where the goat was being roasted and the Ugali was 
being cooked. Now if you knock at the Statehouse, Raila himself will open the 
door wearing a Chef's uniform complete with top hat.70  
If roasted goat was the metaphor used to describe how the IPO would enrich Kenya’s political 
elite, sukuma wiki (lit. “push the week”), a green roughage, was the foodstuff used to describe 
the negligible value Kenyans cum would-be shareholders were poised to gain.  
For the price of Sukuma Wiki…you can own a piece of the country’s biggest 
company, for the price of a match-box, you can own a piece of a company that is 
currently being investigated by the British Serious Fraud Office in London. For 
the price, less than matatu fare from Kangemi to Safaricom headquarters on 
Waiyaki way, you can own a piece in a company.71 
As these debates roared on in the comments’ sections of the blogosphere, Kenya’s politicians 
worked to shore up an inclusive vision of the IPO. It was an opportunity, they argued, to put an 
end to ethno-politics by inviting everyone, irrespective of region, irrespective of class, 
irrespective of ethnicity, to take part in the patria. Sukuma wiki, in their hands, was reframed as 
the “family silver.” As Kenyatta stated:  
We are hoping … we will broaden the base of these enterprises and get Kenyans, 
through the Stock [E]xchange, to own shares and to participate in the family 
silver...These companies now have a broad shareholding…Kenyans from every 
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corner…are participating in the Stock Exchange as owners and receiving 
dividends from these entities.72  
Coming on the heels of the post-election violence, the message was clear. If Kenya was plagued 
by “political tribalism” the “family silver,” mediated by the market and under the ostensible 
bipartisan lime green of Safaricom, itself managed by a British multinational, was leveling.73 
This mode of corporate citizenship, Kenyatta argued, offered a solution to the problems of 
partisanship and ethno-politics that had led to the violence; shares to be freely bought by 
Kenyans on the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE). Kenyans would, as shareholders cum 
citizens, both engage in developing themselves and the nation.  
Corporate branding in the months leading up to the IPO confirmed Kenyatta’s framing. 
The slogan of the campaign, “Safaricom IPO. The future, let’s celebrate it together,” offered a 
forward-looking vision which was unencumbered by violence and the divisive politics of 
ethnicity. Here, Kenyans of all stripes, “Kenyans from every corner,” were invited buy into the 
lime green of the digital patria, unburdened by the politics of land that, arguably, formed and 
continues to form the material base for the divisive politics of ethnicity that shaped the election 
dynamics. This was, following Dinah Rajak, a branding that imagined the IPO as an opportunity 
to engage in a kind of “patriotic capitalism.”74  
Not all Kenyans were convinced by this message. As one blogger wrote of what was 
coming to be called “SafariCON: The Bitter Option:” 
[The] Safaricom IPO has...gone political and it follows that it will go tribal – if it 
hasn’t already. In the end, the Safaricom shareholding register will likely read 
more like a provincial rather than a national roll call....There are those...who will 
disregard the need for transparency and a clean fair market and [who will] go 
ahead to buy the shares based solely on where the leaders backing the IPO were 
born.75  
This blogger directly challenged the claim that by buying into the Safaricom IPO Kenyans “from 
every corner” would be able to direct the country’s future, all the while accruing profits in the 
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form of dividends. If divisibility had been framed as a means of democratizing Safaricom’s 
ownership structure, of allowing Kenyans access to what was rightfully theirs as heirs of the 
country’s resources, bloggers such as this one pointed to the problems of this vision. In 
reframing Kenya’s telecommunications sector not as a commons but as a divisible and 
commodifiable asset, the government had not only untethered one of the cords binding Kenyans 
to the central state but, concurrently, had created the conditions where some Kenyans, those 
defined by “tribe” and region, would have preferential access to the natural patria due to their 
connections with Kenya’s governing elite.  
Whether because people wanted a piece of the undifferentiated “family silver,” or as a 
defensive move to ensure that Kikuyus were not the majority shareholders, Kenyans turned out 
en masse to buy Safaricom shares when the company finally went public on June 9, 2008.  
Thousands of small investors trekked to the Nairobi Securities Exchange (NSE) that morning to 
witness as Kibaki rang the bell to start the day’s trading.76 The minimum buy-in was 2,000 
shares, translating to a cost of Ksh 10,000 or, today, approximately $100 USD, not an 
insignificant sum for many. The excitement generated by the IPO, the region’s largest, led to the 
company being oversubscribed by a shocking 532 percent.77  
Refunds following the oversubscription were issued slowly. Excitement over the IPO 
continued to wane as people discovered that returns on their investments would be low. As one 
Safaricom employee and shareholder explained, the period following the IPO was one of great 
frustration. Kenyans were well aware that the company was the largest and most profitable in the 
region and so the IPO, he explained, produced dissonance as shareholders sought to reconcile the 
“real value of Safaricom and the value of shares.” This left people feeling like Safaricom was not 
treating Kenyans “with the dignity we deserve[d].”78  
But, equally significant, the IPO signaled a transformation in how “development” was 
thought both by the corporation and within the apparatus of the state. Government officials 
began mobilizing Kenyans’ massive investment in the IPO as evidence of the “inherent fund 
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raising potential among ordinary Kenyans in rural and urban areas.”79 This involved the 
redistribution of developmental agency. “Why,” one parliamentarian asked, “must you look for 
money from the Treasury, when you can get it from Kenyans? So long as you float attractive 
road…bonds, people will buy them just the same way they did with Safaricom.”80 Here, Kenyans 
were being asked to subsidize development not through the contribution of taxes as 
undifferentiated citizens, but by buying into the capitalization of now private assets as investors. 
Then Minister of Finance, Oburu Odinga, agreed. The oversubscription of Safaricom shares had 
demonstrated: “that Kenyans have a lot of resources that can be tapped for development 
purposes.” From a vision of infrastructures as a natural resource, the naturally endowed purview 
of the albeit shifting category of ‘Kenyans,’ this new rationality saw Kenyans, not as having an 
inalienable right to infrastructures cum resources but as themselves the bearers of resources. 
From autochthons, to citizens, in this most recent iteration Kenyans were imagined as citizens-
cum-shareholders-cum-investors. A new market: a market of patriots.  
 
 
Value at the “Bottom of the Pyramid:” Infrastructures, Market-Making, and Reimagining 
the Commons  
 
At Safaricom we believe in investing in the future. Working hard towards the 
creation of technologies that positively impact the society and most importantly 
transform the lives of those around us is a core value that we hold dear. Milestones 
in the mobile money sector in the form of M-PESA...have put Safaricom on the 
global map. With more innovators and thinkers emerging daily, we endeavor to 
aid them in their road to discovery through interesting and encouraging platforms 
that enable them to reach their potential. This is because when they unlock their 
potential, they push us to ours and most importantly, the end result is solutions 
that better the lives of the human race.81  
As this suggests, Safaricom’s goal is not simply to produce value, but to create conditions 
amenable to the expression and visibility of existing value that is simply lying in wait. One way 
Safaricom seeks to “unlock” Kenyans’ “potential,” is through its commitment to “know its 
customers,” who are also, importantly, potential innovators. This corporate mantra hinges on 
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Safaricom’s ability to mobilize and render valuable the “local.” As we have seen, Safaricom 
invoked the value of the local in defending the irregular deal it had struck with Mobitelea. 
Indeed, the irregular movement of shares to Mobitelea in exchange for “local knowledge,” a 
relationship the company framed as being the precondition for capital gains, ought to be seen as 
a precursor of what would become its mantra for success—albeit in distributed form.  
The origins of this, too, are well storied. Sometime in the early 2000s, customers began 
complaining of network congestion on Friday evenings.82 By this time, the company had nearly 
700 000 subscribers. Though Michael Joseph claims he never uttered the statement, popular 
memory holds that, in response to queries regarding network congestion, he placed part of the 
blame on the shoulders of Kenyans. “Kenyans have peculiar calling habits,” he is rumored to 
have said. This led to a firestorm of critique. How dare this man, a foreign national no less, deign 
to make statements regarding what Kenyans ‘were like.’83   
While unbeknownst to him at the time, Joseph had hit on a key insight and guiding 
business strategy that is, today, cited as an explanation for the corporation’s unparalleled success. 
Kenyans’ “peculiarity” need not be a liability, Joseph learned, but could be transformed into an 
asset.  Locating and understanding this peculiarity, making it legible and capitalizing on the 
knowledge gained, was a means of more firmly embedding the company—foreign capital, 
technologies, expertise, management structures and all—in a particularly Kenyan milieu. 
Operationalizing this insight as a business model required developing a sensitive and malleable 
knowledge apparatus. One that was capable of understanding, abstracting and thus capitalizing 
on the “peculiarity” of a body of citizens. For Joseph, the question became one of discerning 
what kinds of value might be located in the everyday practices and “peculiarities” of Kenyans.  
This brand of “ethical capitalism” does not imagine itself as being extractive.84 Indeed, 
the logic of Markets for the Poor turns on a framing that does not hold the market in opposition 
to the social good.85 Instead, proponents of this new rationality argue that marketizing the 
strategies of the poor concurrently generates profits and ameliorates the lives of those at the 
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Bottom of the Pyramid. This is a win-win narrative. This is a narrative of “financial inclusion” 
via “deepening” the reach of the “financial sector.” It is to this deepening to which this section 
now turns.  
*** 
M-PESA, the company’s much lauded mobile-to-mobile money transfer service was, for 
Safaricom, the touchstone for this new mode of thinking, and it put Kenya and Kenyans, with all 
their “peculiarities,” on the map of both the corporate world and the development industry. The 
service was developed by Vodafone in collaboration with Faulu, a Kenya-based micro-credit 
organization. Designers imagined the service as one that would ease clients’ ability to repay 
loans issued by Faulu. But, during the early phases of the pilot’s launch, developers noticed 
“some queer behavior,” not least that participants were using the platform to send small amounts 
of value in the form of airtime among themselves. Designers ran with the insights they gleaned 
by being attentive to “local practices.” And so, M-PESA was born.86   
James is intimately familiar with the trajectory of Safaricom’s knowledge work. James 
works as a financial analyst for Safaricom, and he explained that M-PESA had been a harbinger 
for how the company, today, approaches the task of developing new products and services. Not 
least, M-PESA’s evolution led Safaricom to pursue an interesting business model: users’ patterns 
of use with one service could be used to guide the innovation of new services. Users, in this 
vision, have been reimagined as lay designers, albeit designers who are unaware of their role in 
generating new knowledge, and not cognizant that everyday life is being commuted into value. 
And yet, he insisted, this is a “collaborative way” of developing new services.87 This new form 
of knowledge work is undertaken in an altruistic register. The goal is to “build communities” and 
“transform lives.”88   
Transforming lives through the generation of new services requires work, as data is read 
for patterns, patterns for potential value, and discovered value used to develop new services. And 
“innovation” has beget “innovation.” The team of M-PESA observers tasked with locating and 
rendering visible this quiet and creeping value noticed, James told us, the “queer behavior” of 
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users. It was over the course of many months that a new pattern was discernible to these analysts 
as they poured over the numbers that result from the tens of thousands of transfers people make 
per day. These users, they learned, were depositing more money into the system than the value 
they subsequently transferred. No longer simply a means of transferring value, users had 
reconfigured M-PESA into a savings service.89 And so, designers set to work constructing M-
Shwari, a value added service that operates as a platform for savings and provides a gateway for 
customers wanting to access small loans.  
Upon its launch, Safaricom framed M-Shwari as a means of “deepening” the financial 
inclusion of the “unbanked.” In this, Safaricom built on a common though rarely articulated 
truism. Popular knowledge holds that Kenya’s banking infrastructure has long excluded people 
at the “bottom of the pyramid,” and that banks’ patterns of lending in the past were but another 
way of enforcing ethno-regional patterns of stratification, thereby shoring up the strength of the 
Kikuyu-dominated center.90 By contrast, the algorithmic regime devised by Safaricom is widely 
held as a means of flattening these historic inequalities. The disinterested work of algorithms 
undercutting the politics of both patronage and ethnicity that are popularly associated with brick 
and mortar banks. And yet, these altruistic algorithms had to mitigate the risk of issuing loans to 
persons without credit scores. Six months of Safaricom’s user data were transformed into user 
portfolios and ascribed with predictive potential. When they began, Simiyu said, risk modelers 
included 49 variables. Those variables that were highly correlated were eliminated. By the end of 
the trial, 11 variables remained. These included age, repayment of emergency credit, M-PESA 
transactions, and daily airtime usage. In explaining how this data mapped onto the relative risk 
for debtors, Simiyu explained using a simile: it was like “using consumption of bananas to tell 
you something about your consumption of oranges.” And it has worked. Rates of non-repayment 
among M-Shwari borrowers hovers around 3.8 percent this as against the average of 5.6 percent. 
Safaricom’s para-ethnographic work has, in other words, been used to generate new 
value-added services, not least through capitalizing and scaling up the lifeways, behaviors, and 
strategies of the poor. This involves work of re-valuation, as customers are identified as potential 
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designers. The poor themselves emerge in this new landscape not merely as generators of value, 
but as themselves—their knowledge, their strategies, their patterned behaviors—sources of 
value. Though, and as we shall see, this thinking does not apply to M-PESA agents, those tens of 
thousands essential to making the network operate. But discerning and capturing this value has 
led to unintended consequences for Safaricom. As Safaricom positions itself as having achieved 
what the Kenyan state has “failed” to achieve—the amelioration of the lives of huge swaths of 
the Kenyan population through provisioning for the ‘public good’—it increasingly occupies the 
ideal-typical space of the nation state, though in a digital register.  
But there are definite limits to this state-like behavior. Safaricom is in the business of 
transforming the lives of the Kenyan people, generically construed, “customers,” a more limited 
category of persons, and share-holders, who are also part owners of the entity. And it is precisely 
this tripartite vision that subjects Safaricom to forms of political claims-making from Kenyans as 
Kenyans. Indeed, many Kenyans expect Safaricom to step in to provide services that the Kenyan 
state is either unwilling or unable to provide. As one Safaricom employee stated, when 
something terrible happens, people ask “what is Safaricom doing” to help? In other words, it is 
because Safaricom engages in state-like actions it has had state-like effects.91  
*** 
People like James are but one node of knowledge work that makes the accumulation of data on 
usage possible. Moving away from the Safaricom towers toward Nairobi’s Central Business 
District, many afternoons I would hop on a matatu winding its way northeast on Thika 
Superhighway. My destination was Zimmerman Estate, a neighborhood that but 20 years ago, I 
was repeatedly told, was just “swamp.” Today it is a bustling lower-middle class neighborhood. 
And it is here that Nyawira works as an M-PESA agent in a small though permanent kiosk, 
painted Safaricom’s tell-tale green, with a mabati (or corrugated steel) roof.  
The money that Nyawira makes at the shop is the primary income for her household, 
which is composed of herself, her son, and his father, Maina. Despite her long hours at the kiosk, 
Nyawira’s access to money is uneven and periodic. On both the scale of the day, and the scale of 
the month, she is perpetually hedging her financial futures. Nyawira, and her family, are part of 
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the upper tier of the social category of persons forming “the bottom of the pyramid.” As a result, 
Nyawira is cautious about how she structures her thinking about the future.  
She has ambitions of ending up in the United Arab Emirates, a site associated with 
relative wealth and possibility for many young Kenyans. However, this would require a series of 
sacrifices. Not least she would be traveling alone, leaving her only child in the hands of Maina’s 
family, with whom she has an ambivalent relationship. Though this plan hovers in the 
background of conversation, in the present and on a day-to-day basis, her temporal horizons are 
rather more constrained.  
In the main, Nyawira purchases food to prepare for meals just prior to making them. This 
makes sense. The flow in and out of money into her shop means that she can take a little for 
lunch, knowing that it will be replenished before dinner. There is no refrigeration in her home, 
moreover, making bulk perishables impracticable. Nevertheless, these decisions come from as 
much a place of fiscal constraint and uncertainty as they come from a place of practicality. 
Unexpected expenses, such as in the instance of illness, and the perennial and vexing uncertainty 
regarding whether friends and family will contribute to her imagined future (in the form of 
bridewealth), or that of her son (in the form of school fees), upset the balance that Nyawira seeks 
to maintain.  
Hers is a position of risk and relative vulnerability, of which Safaricom’s payment 
structure plays no small part. As an agent, her commission at the end of the month is determined 
by the number of transactions that she completes in a ~30 day cycle. In 2014, customers were 
charged 15 Ksh to transfer 1000 Ksh to another mobile device and 27 Ksh to withdraw the same 
amount. The transaction fees associated with withdrawals are divided between herself and 
Safaricom, a 50/50 split, determined at the end of every month. However, rates of transaction are 
by no means guaranteed. And Nyawira’s ability to secure her commission maps onto the ebbs 
and flows of the movement of money within the Estate.  
One day, sitting with Nyawira in her shop, a number of customers streamed in wanting to 
make deposits: “Sina float” (I have no float), Nyawira responded. Nyawira’s float is the total 
electronic value stored in her agent account, which she accesses through her digital phone. Every 
time a deposit is made, her float goes down. As her float approaches 0, as it did on this day, she 
has to refuse people wanting to deposit, waiting until customers wanting to make withdrawals 




I asked Nyawira why so many people were depositing today. She speculated that it was 
because banks had closed early, it being a Saturday. But this was not the only reason. She 
continued, noting that times had been tough in the Estate. That people just didn’t have money to 
spend. Even those making deposits, she said, were using their money to pay bills. It is only when 
money is moving through the system, and generating interchange fees, that it generates value  
Other days, this precarious balance of deposits and withdrawals is achieved.  One 
afternoon, I joined Nyawira working at the shop. For nearly 3 hours there was barely a moment 
of pause. At any given moment, there were 2-4 customers waiting to be served. I doled out credit 
while Nyawira did deposits and withdrawals. She speculated that it was busy because it was 
Sunday, a day when families make small outings after attending morning service. But, she 
continued, it also mapped onto another financial rhythm. It was close to the end of the month. 
With people being paid “from the 25th,” this meant “a lot of business.” And to her good fortune 
today people themselves were doing the work of equalizing, deposits and withdrawals happening 
in balanced numbers and amounts.  
The uncertainty of Nyawira’s commission, in other words, is compounded by the uneven 
but semi-predictable financial lives of her customers. As Nyawira is fast to tell you, there are 
definite and observable rhythms that govern that rates at which people use the system. These 
rhythms are structured along different temporal scales: certain times of day are busier than 
others, as are certain times of month, and certain times of year. For example, whether making a 
salary or making wages on the day the end of the month is a tense time as people evaluate how 
much of a stretch it will be for them to make rent. Other times of acute yet predictable financial 
anxiety are the periods before the beginning of school terms when people go to great lengths to 
ensure they can assemble “school fees.” Nyawira’s life is also structured by these rhythms, but in 
a reduplicated way as her livelihood is also contingent on the fact that these rhythms structure the 
lives of her customers and thus their use of her services. As Nyawira succinctly put it, her 
livelihood: “depends on what the customers are doing.”  
Her commission as an M-PESA agent, however, constitutes but one source of income. 
Over the course of the time I spent with Nyawira (partly renting a room in her “Maina’s” 
apartment and partly visiting the shop in the afternoons) she drastically expanded her stock. 
These additions happened in a piecemeal way. One day, I would arrive and see that to her stock 




added “energy efficient” lightbulbs and the lines of wire required as Kenya’s television network 
went “digital.” And later, I arrived at her shop to see it had been adorned with thin, brightly 
colored ladies’ belts, and hair scrunchies, both of which were popular at the time. Nyawira’s 
shop is also an infrastructural node in an Estate characterized by the uneven delivery of services. 
While many in this area have access to electricity, blackouts are semi-regular, whether the result 
of the system going down or because people have not re-upped their pre-paid tokens. Nyawira’s 
shop, by contrast, is constantly glowing at night, boasting the constant hum of electricity or 
“stima.” This allows her to offer another service: the charging of cell phones, for which she 
demands a flat fee regardless of the duration of the charge. 
Those working in the mobile money industry refer to people in Nyawira’s position as 
“human ATMs.” This bridging of the human anatomy with the technological invokes images of a 
cyborg: half-human, half machine, better than either alone at completing the task at hand. When 
first learning of this moniker I reacted with a knee-jerk distaste. This, it seemed to me, was a 
dehumanizing term that indexed a stop-gap moment marching toward a future where 
technologies would displace Nyawira’s labor. The ideal-typical declension narrative of industrial 
capitalism. And yet, this knee-jerk response is more obscurantist than it is elucidating. It tells us 
little about how the work that Nyawira does (the human side of the cyborg) is connected to 
global flows of capital. It tells us even less about how Safaricom’s ever-expanding knowledge 
apparatus operates. Finally, it tells us nothing of the subjective experiences of work and life of 
Nyawira and the 8,000 people working in her capacity across the country.92 But it does disclose 
something about how the value generating work of people like Nyawira is under-valuated by 
Safaricom as generic labor.  
Nyawira’s day starts at 6 am at which point she prepares porridge for her son before he 
wakes up in preparation for his day at “baby class.” She opens the shop at around 8 am and 
closes, with breaks for lunch and dinner, between 11 pm and 1 am depending on the day. The 
increased activity in the evenings reflects the financial reality of many Kenyans today who do 
not make salaries but make money on the day working as market men and women, hawkers, and 
day laborers. Nyawira’s work is repetitive, often “boring” in her rendering. And it often is. There 
are spells of quiet where few people come into the shop and the labor of an M-PESA agent is 





largely rote. But her day-to-day labor is critical to securing “her customers.” Many of these 
people are not strangers, but intimates with whom she has developed relationships over the 
course of many months of work.   
These intimacies are as essential to her ability to enroll the broader networks within the 
neighborhood that are as essential to making Safaricom’s business work in this small corner of 
Nairobi as they are to securing “her customers.” Periodically, when short of cash, for example, 
she heads down the road to Safi Roho, one of the many butchers in the Estate. An agreement 
produced out of routine, she regularly borrows 10 000 Ksh, which she uses as her liquid capital 
until the end of the day. Tapping into these wider networks is part of Nyawira’s strategy to retain 
“her customers” because “if a customer comes and no [cash] float, they will just go somewhere 
else.”  
Consistency in services offered is not the only thing that Nyawira has to calibrate in 
ensuring the loyalty of her customers. These are interpersonal relationships borne of familiarity. 
One day, approaching the kiosk, I saw Nyawira sitting behind the grating. She looked tired and 
unhappy. I asked what was wrong. She told me that she had a lot of “stress” these days and that it 
was a problem for business. “The customers, they know if you’re stressed, it’s not good,” she 
told me. “If you’re not nice with them, they know. They have to come here and find you happy. 
Otherwise it’s bad for business.” This human ATM is, evidently, involved in a careful act of self-
curation, which she views as being critical to extending the social relationships essential for the 
smooth operations of this marketplace.93 This requires that she carefully calibrate the outward 
expressions of her moods. 
In other words, while Nyawira is a savvy business woman, her capacity as a shop-owner 
is contingent on maintaining and extending social relationships that are conventionally held to be 
outside the rationality of the market.94 And knowing “her customers,” is as much a part of 
Nyawira’s strategy as it is the corporate strategy of her employer, Safaricom. As she put it to me: 
it’s important that you know them, that you understand them, as “every customer has their own 
problems.”95  
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For example, one of her customers cannot see very well so sometimes he asks her to read 
the transaction text to him.96 Others of her customers are not hard of sight but are illiterate, and it 
is left to Nyawira to guide them through the service. Some know her son and buy him “smokies” 
(small sausages) being sold by another of “her customers” who has a small stand outside of her 
kiosk where he sells boiled eggs with kachumbari, and the small beef sausages Gacheru, her son, 
likes so much. She knows the family of a fourth, and so is willing to bend some of Safaricom’s 
regulations when carrying out their transactions. These relationships, despite their differences, 
are underwritten by a strong sense of trust.  
Nyawira’s work, in other words, is that of both sociologist and ethnographer. She knows 
the neighborhood and its rhythms. She, better than anyone, knows when people have been paid, 
and the temporality of money sent, money stored, and money withdrawn. In part, this is because 
the rhythms of their economic lives dictate her own. But her knowledge of “her customers” 
extends beyond the general patterns of financial life of the Estate. Indeed, she routinely indicates 
the importance of moving away from such generalizations to the particulars of each individual 
person as: “every customer has their own problems.”  
She asks few questions of her customers. And yet this work of “knowing” is critical to 
both her own future possibilities and that of the company and its expanding knowledge 
infrastructure of which Nyawira is a critical, though unremarked and woefully under-
remunerated component. Her commission, on average, is 10 000 Ksh per month. And the rent for 
the shop is 6000. “And we eat,” she said, with a sigh.97 This knowledge work, evidently, is 
differentially valuated when conducted by people like Nyawira, people at the upper tiers of the 
bottom of the pyramid.  
*** 
The category of the “human ATM” is both a boon and a potential liability to Safaricom. The 
company uses the data generated by Kenyans’ use of M-PESA as a baseline from which it 
develops new services. People like Nyawira play an important role in gathering these data. Every 
transaction is recorded both in her logbook and electronically. These data provide a map of 
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information regarding person-to-person transfers, rates and values of withdrawals and deposits, 
and the locations of parties to a given transaction.  
All of these data are tethered to individuals. This was mandated by Kenyan regulators 
under the terms of a regulation titled: “Know Your Customer” (KYC), of all things. This 
regulation requires each M-PESA account be linked to an individual, a connection secured when 
a new customer presents a valid ID upon registration. All of this requires work. It is Nyawira and 
others like her, that collect and verify people’s ID numbers. It is she who explains how the 
system works to those unfamiliar with mobiles, to the blind, to those unable to read. With these 
categories of persons, her intimates in becoming, it is critical that Nyawira demonstrate that she 
is trustworthy.  
But these relations of trust, which seem to fall outside of market relations as 
conventionally understood, are also a potential liability to the corporation. It is on the basis of the 
dynamics of trust that she and her customers routinely collude to evade some of Safaricom’s 
more cumbersome regulations. The term “direct deposit” refers to one such collusion. 
Transferring value via M-PESA incurs transaction fees such that if you want your receiver to 
have access to 1000 Ksh you need to send 1000 plus 15 Ksh for the transfer and another 27 Ksh 
for the cost of the withdrawal for a total of 1042 Ksh. These fees are borne either in part by the 
sender, or in full, in the event that they want to ensure the receiver does not incur the cost of 
withdrawal. If, however, the money is deposited directly into the account of the receiver, both 
the sender and the receiver avoid the secondary cost of withdrawal. This is expressly prohibited 
by Safaricom. As an agent, Nyawira can enable direct deposits, but if she is caught, she risks 
being penalized.  
For Safaricom to notice these transactions, they have to become visible to the system, 
which it achieves by virtue of the sensitivity of the network to the spatial coordinates of money 
moving in and money out of the network. If, for example, a deposit is made to an account at 
Nyawira’s kiosk in Zimmerman and within minutes the money is withdrawn in Kerugoya, some 
6 hours away, the system will detect that a direct deposit has been made. But there are 
workarounds. If the receiver holds off a half-day on withdrawing the money, Safaricom’s system 
will not be able to claim with any measure of certainty that a direct deposit has been made. If this 




Nyawira deploys this strategy herself when she sends money to her mother or father living in 
Kinangop. But she also does it for “her customers.”  
But there are other, more banal, evasions. Safaricom requires that its agents demand to 
see each customer’s ID every time every time a transaction is undertaken. Nyawira is uneven in 
how she applies this regulation. When I asked her about this she told me that it was a matter of 
“knowing.”  “When I know you, I can withdraw for you without [seeing your] ID. If I don’t 
know you, I can’t trust you.”98 Safaricom is well aware of the way that these relations of trust 
often supersede its regulations. For Safaricom, these are conceived of as moments of breakdown 
in the system. Moments where the human half of the human-ATM hybrid is a liability, 
undercutting its ability to secure either profits or standardized procedure.  
*** 
M-PESA is conceived of as a way to move money across distances, disembedding it from the 
everyday risks and social obligations that attend moving money by hand, through a process of 
formalizing and dematerializing the movement of capital. And it does this. It enables money—in 
the form of electronic value— to travel great distances, unencumbered by social relations, and 
yet satisfying some of the most pressing. And yet, relationships of proximity and intimacy are 
important for those at the bottom of the pyramid working the system to their advantage. These 
relationships, ones built over accreted encounters, are also critical to the para-ethnographic work 
Nyawira undertakes in consolidating relationships with “her customers.” And while these 
relationships can produce “failures” in Safaricom’s system, as this knowledge moves up the 
chain to Safaricom’s “centers of calculation,” it can also form the basis of the data Safaricom 
uses to generate new services and products.99  
While Safaricom works to police the boundaries of intimacy generated by its agents, 
hoping that discipline produces the machine-like estrangement of the ATM, in other domains it 
is likewise engaged in a complicated dance of proximity and distance with Kenya’s publics. This 
work of generating intimacy has taken myriad forms: from developing services that map onto 
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Kenyans’ existing financial practices to mobilizing the symbols of the nation. And to a 
significant degree, it has “worked.” But Safaricom expends a good deal of energy trying to 
modulate the registers of intimacy and distance that characterize its relationship with the Kenyan 
nation and the Kenyan state. And yet, because of its multiple domains of functioning, and its 
resultant state-like effects, this boundary between intimacy and estrangement requires the input 
of constant work and vigilant labor. And, as in the case of Nyawira, sometimes Safaricom has to 
contend with “breakdown” as it seeks to control how its state-like effects are mobilized by 
Kenya’s various citizen publics. To address these moments of breakdown, we return to where we 
began: The 2014 Annual Shareholders’ meeting staged at the newly rebranded “Safaricom 
Stadium.”  
     *** 
When Safaricom’s shareholders spoke at the Annual General Meeting (AGM), they began their 
comments in a manner that is telling of the seemingly contradictory space Safaricom occupies in 
the public imaginary. Half of the questioners began by following the globally circulating script 
of conventional practice at an AGM. These speakers began: “My name is James Ochieng. I am a 
shareholder.” The other half localized this globally circulating form, prefacing their comments 
with language evocative of a baraza. These speakers began: “Asante Sana, Bwana Chairman.” 
Holding these two modes of appeal in a single analytic frame allows us to see how these 
questioners sought to root their claims on the company in two contiguous registers. First in their 
capacity as shareholders and second in their capacity as citizen-clients. Like the twinning of 
“Safaricom green” with that of the national flag, these modes of address were not isomorphic. 
Speakers often switched between these two registers over the course of their questions.   
Many questioners began by congratulating the company for reforming its corporate 
practice in a manner that conformed to the expectations of the politics of patronage. “Mr. 
Chairman, we have been entertained today. We have had transport, we have had some lunch, we 
have had some give away. This meeting is a big improvement in the history of Safaricom,” he 




was the sense that the company had really “listened” to its shareholders, just as it really “listens” 
to the needs of customers.100  
But, if praise for Safaricom’s hospitality was premised on the politics of the gift, in other 
instances attendees called the company to account specifically in their capacity as shareholders. 
In these instances, shareholders contrasted their paltry dividends against the massive profits and 
operating costs of the company:  
Mr. Chairman, as you have said in your report…the company has done very 
well.... I want to remind you these shareholders have been holding this company 
when it was not showing any improvement...Mr. Chairman, while you make very 
good business, there is a point of heavy finance costs. Can this be explained 
because it’s…very heavy. It’s consuming our dividends. 
In statements such as these, the company was asked to account for the poor returns being offered 
to shareholders, constituent components of the company; indeed, its part-owners. Here, Kenyans 
asked that company spending be reformed and profits maximized, in order to ensure the greatest 
returns to shareholders. In so doing, they followed the economistic logic that supposedly typifies 
an AGM.101 
The line between shareholder and citizen-client became more blurred as people homed in 
on their frustration with the company. Interestingly, the moments when the tensions engendered 
by company’s state-like effects were most visible surfaced in discussions of the company’s 
projects operating under the banner of Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR), which were raised 
by the majority of the questioners. “Mr. Chairman I am pleased with your speech...and...that you 
are actually transforming the lives of Kenyans to be better but we…shareholders...I want to ask 
the other shareholders, are our lives better today than it was when we bought these shares?” Is it 
not the responsibility of the company, he continued, to focus equally on the shareholders, to 
“transform their lives” as “individuals” and “shareholders.” “Mr. Chairman,” he concluded, “as I 
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give you a credit…remember also I'm subtracting because our lives are suffering.” This algebra 
of praise and critique mapped onto the twin subject-positions questioners occupied as, on the one 
hand, shareholders and, on the other hand, Kenyan-nationals. One questioner was quite explicit 
in this doubling. “[Please] be kind,” he began, “go back to yourself, and support your people, 
Kenyans, and think about us, shareholders.” Here the line between the two subject-positions 
reached the apex of indistinction. The company, ostensibly a “Kenyan” corporation had failed its 
shareholders precisely in its capacity as a state-like patron. Its failure to provision for the 
wellbeing of Kenyans as client-citizens in this capacity was scandalous. “Don't you feel 





Attendees’ appeal to the company as both client-citizens and shareholders would be 
misunderstood if simply framed as shareholders’ naive misunderstanding of the nature of the 
relationship binding themselves to Safaricom. Indeed, this doubling of the shareholder and client 
at the AGM was borne out of a set of overlapping histories that rendered Safaricom’s 
relationship both to the state and to Kenya’s multiple publics ambiguous, a precarious 
relationship shaped, in no small measure, by a corporate strategy that tacks between embedding 
and disembedding, between intimacy and estrangement.  
As we will recall, the early debates surrounding privatization had positioned state 
infrastructures as a commons to which all had rights of access. While much has changed in the 
intervening years, a residue of this thinking persists into the present. This line of thinking 
certainly seems to have formed the backdrop of the IPO, as Safaricom and sympathetic voices in 
the government framed the public offering as a means for Kenyans to buy back what was 
rightfully theirs. When shareholders called Safaricom to account in this double register, then, 
they drew on this deeper genealogy of rights to access that were historically premised on their 
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status as Kenyans, not necessarily as undifferentiated citizens, but as citizen-clients. This logic 
they overlaid with the logic of obligation premised on a new set of relations brought into being 
as they moved into the position of shareholders. In other words, to turn to this deeper history, 
what first appears contradictory is revealed as being a historically rooted claim to access.  One 
located in a shifting reading of infrastructures— telecoms included—as a part of the national 
patria. Safaricom has capitalized on the shifting set of attachments binding its infrastructures to 
the state and the nation, even as it works to police these boundaries. Understanding shareholders’ 
modes of address requires addressing these longer histories of the company in Kenya and 
locating the dialectics of intimacy and estrangement that have become the company’s central 
business strategy, a strategy that is in turn both a source of potential profit and a potential 
liability.  
Indeed, these claims map onto the company’s own self-representation as being 
concerned, in the first instance, with securing the public good unencumbered by the bisecting 
affiliations of ethnicity or region. As Bob Collymore stated in closing the 2014 AGM:  
Our most singular collective aspiration in Safaricom is transforming lives. We not 
only transform lives through corporate responsibility initiatives, but also in our 
products and services. The Safaricom team of over 4000 employees do so, 
and...[do so] knowing full well that [we are]...only relevant if we transform the 
lives of our shareholders, our customers...and the communities in which we live. 
Asante sana. 
But Safaricom’s claim to flatten the terrain of service delivery ought to be treated with some 
circumspection. Safaricom’s stated goal is to “transform lives,” to be sure. In the main, this has 
taken the form of developing services that enable “financial inclusion.” But here is the rub. 
While in abstract terms, Safaricom is committed to “improving the lives” of an undifferentiated 
category of Kenyans, the very terms of its engagement truncate this possibility. As noted by 
Collymore, the company’s commitment is to a divisible and tiered Kenyan public: 
“shareholders,” “customers,” and “communities.”  
This is not to suggest that there is not a real commitment within the company to “improve 
lives,” because there is. This is simply to indicate that there are limits to how this “improvement” 
moves (or doesn’t) across Kenya’s social and geographic topography, shaped as it is by the 
returns-based logic of the company and framed, as it is, by the logic of a post-welfarist 




This is what is at stake as the impetus for infrastructural development and the delivery of 
services moves outside of the domains of the state. While customers and shareholders (and to a 
lesser degree communities), can work to leverage the indistinct line between the state and the 
corporation as they work to make claims on both, neither today appears to be under an obligation 
to respond. The company, in particular, holds no responsibility for provisioning for the lives of 
Kenyans as rights-bearing citizens. Instead, its attentions are drawn to sub-categories of persons 
within the Kenyan public, some of whom do not merely engage the company through their use of 
its products and services but who are, in the aggregate, also key generators of new value for 
Safaricom. And it is certainly not responsible for the lives of its workers, people like Nyawira 
whose affective labor and knowledge of her community generates the material baseline required 
for Safaricom’s ever-expanding knowledge apparatus to generate new value-added services.103   
Speakers at the AGM, people like Nyawira conspicuously absent, were well aware of the 
limits of Safaricom’s mandate. Indeed, these limitations framed the critique of the final speaker 
when he invoked the language of shame. Here, he called the company to account for its 
performance not in a register of economics, but in a register of ethics.  In other words, pace 
Laura Bear, this speaker sought to register his critique in a language that called into question the 
morality of a contemporary moment where the “public good” has been rendered a calculable 
object, generative of “limited social contracts and precarious intimacies.”104 In so doing, this 
speaker drew on an older language of expectations that situated the nature of Kenyans’ fiduciary 
relationships with Safaricom as, at base, guided by an ethics of patronage that, issues of 
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Lived Economies and the Productivity of “the Jam”: Rescaling Marginal Gains on 
Nairobi’s Streets and the Politics of Masculinity 
 
In April 2014, Kenya’s matatu—privately owned mini-bus—operators went on strike to protest a 
spate of new regulations that, among other things, mandated the migration of the industry’s 
payments to digital platforms.1 The new law, blandly titled legal notice 23, would have rendered 
it illegal for matatu and bus operators to accept cash fares. Instead, passengers were to pay for 
journeys in advance via e-money. The migration to digital platforms appeared, to many, to be a 
potential cash cow. And a number of systems were floated by would-be financial-cum-Kenyan 
transport mavericks: VISA backing one, MasterCard backing another. But in the end, the 
Government of Kenya decided to back the ‘Kenyan’ option, which had been developed by a 
Kenyan techno-entrepreneur. He called the system My 1963.  
These prospective reforms drew on the energy for all things “digital” that shapes the 
Kenyan landscape today. Addressing an audience gathered at a Nairobi golf club under the 
auspices of the African Forum on Inclusive Economies initiative in December 2014, Kenyan 
President Uhuru Kenyatta stated: “Africa is rapidly growing its digital footprint and Kenya has 
established itself as a leader in the field of IT innovation with groundbreaking inclusive products 
such as M-Pesa.” “My Government,” he concluded, is “committed to ensuring it reflects a digital 
DNA.”2 Kenyatta is not alone in celebrating the role of digital connectivity in ushering Kenya 
into a new and better future. Coming on the heels of the incredible uptake of M-PESA—the 
                                                
1 Cyrus Ombati, “Passengers Stranded as New Matatu Laws Take Effect,” Standard. Available online at:  
http://www.standardmedia.co.ke/article/2000108362/passengers-stranded-as-new-matatu-laws-take-
effect?articleID=2000108362&story_title=passengers-stranded-as-new-matatu-laws-take-effect&pageNo=2. Last 
accessed 10/06/2015.  





mobile money service with 15 million users—this energy is shared by citizens, state planners, 
foreign investors, and the aid world alike.  
The imaginary invoked by Kenyatta and the excitement of techno-enthusiasts turns on a 
faith in the transformative capacity of technological things, which is a hallmark of the current 
administration, but which, as I have argued, has a long history in this corner of Eastern Africa. 
Indeed, this discourse—blending the technological with the corporeal, the digital with the 
developmental, the infrastructural with emergent visions of inclusivity—has been a central tenet 
of the Kenyatta government, which has self-consciously fashioned itself as a “digital” 
administration, reflecting the new, “digital” generation. And the administration is not alone in 
mobilizing the digital. Obbie, a matatu industry worker joined Kenyatta when he described his 
hopes of becoming “digital.” The uptake of the “digital” in such varied settings relies upon 
people’s ability to incorporate it into polyvalent projects of aspiration and valuation, yet these are 
not always in accordance. Such is the case with the push to digitize the matatu industry. 
Proponents of the new regulation celebrate its capacity to rationalize a “chaotic industry;” 
by “streamlining” payments the law will ensure passengers are protected from extortionate 
pricing based on the vagaries of weather and traffic, while enabling the government to tax the 
$2-billion-a-year industry, easing “the jam”—a popular Kenyan shorthand for the extreme traffic 
that characterizes Nairobi’s streets—and sealing everyday sites of porosity, those “leakages” 
through which owners lose profit at the hands of drivers and conductors, touts and police.3 
Mobile money, in other words, will dematerialize the movement of capital, thereby eliminating 
the vagaries that attend the money form. For industry workers, by contrast, the prospect of “the 
jam” is critical to their ability to make those “marginal gains” essential to their future-making 
capacities.4 
In what follows, I argue that the contests over the push to digitization in the matutu 
industry in 2014 were, at base, contests over valuation—that is, contests over who gets to define 
what counts as value-generating work. But they were also contests over who and what authorizes 
the generation, storage, and circulation of value. A focus on how the legislation and the 
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technologies underwriting it are poised to redistribute the means of value production and 
acquisition reveals how the space-scaling affordances of the new technology are poised to scale 
up everyday practices of industry workers in a bid to create new markets, all the while dictating 
new temporalities of labor, which affect the rhythm, location, and storage of gain in the short 
term and are poised to reconfigure popular practices of futurity in the longer term. Designers of 
this new payment infrastructure seek not only to redistribute sites of marginal gain and generate 
new markets, but, conforming to particularly Kenyan preoccupations, seek to use the new 
platform to enact a specifically Kenyan brand of technopolitics, rescripting the subjectivities of 
users by transforming travelers into new sorts of fiscal subjects, and unruly matatu ‘youth’ into 
respectable middle-class men.5  
  
 
Infrastructural Attachments and Digital Intimacies  
 
Safaricom’s My 1963 is a cash-free payment infrastructure that relies on Near Field 
Communication (NFC) technology.6 The system, though one among many, was the only to have 
been formally endorsed by the Kenyan President. His support for My 1963 was borne of a series 
of overlapping intimacies, which brought together Safaricom, the current administration, matatu 
owners, and a group of Kenya’s young techno-entrepreneurs.   
David Kirungu, head of an industry group representing matatu owners, views himself as 
being at the forefront of this push to digitize payments in the matatu industry. He had done his 
research before throwing his weight behind My 1963, traveling around the world to learn how 
other countries manage their transport systems. The task, he explained, was to find a “country 
that was similar to us so we could copy [their system] without reinventing the wheel.”7 He 
settled on Turkey, which had implemented regulations to ‘tame’ its own industry.   
By the time that we spoke, though, Kirungu was convinced that for a cash-free payment 
system to work in Kenya, NFC, a globally circulating platform, would have to be reformatted as 
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it was rescaled to accommodate itself to this particularly and “peculiarly” Kenyan milieu. And he 
was confident that My 1963 would succeed, because, as he told me, he had the government on 
his side. Smiling as he spoke, Kirungu turned around a large, framed photo that takes up a good 
deal of real estate on his desk. There he was, shaking hands with the sitting president. The two 
are good friends, he told me. I asked if they were age mates. He laughed and told me they were 
born the same year. Kirungu intimated that that theirs was more than simply a friendship, 
claiming that he had allowed Kenyatta to “use his platform to penetrate the country” in the run-
up to the 2013 elections. From Kirungu’s perspective, this generosity had been essential; 
Kirungu had “helped” Kenyatta “become president.” Kirungu also has a close relationship with 
Collymore, the CEO of Safaricom and Guyanese national, whose foreignness, so popular 
wisdom goes, was a key reason he was appointed by British managers of Vodafone, Safaricom’s 
parent company—this a means of ensuring he would not be subject to the pressures of patronage 
that are widely held to dictate how services are provisioned in Kenya (see Chapter 6). But the 
two are close, Kirungu serving as Trustee for a body concerned with road safety, with Collymore 
acting as Chairman.  
Mwangi headed up the start-up that had adapted the technology backing My 1963.8 As 
Mwangi explained, he had been introduced to Kirungu by Jane Kangemi, the managing Director 
of the East African branch of a large American firm, who he referred to as “auntie.” From the 
perspective of these men, these relations of intimacy were the condition of possibility for the new 
infrastructure—one guaranteed to put an end to “corruption”—to move forward. 
Many, though, saw in this alliance something more sinister. These men were so eager to push 
through the digitization of the matatu industry because this new technology was poised to enrich 
those backing it. The technology had been single-sourced, so rumor went. As one industry 
insider, and an opponent of My 1963 told me, those supporting My 1963 had been promised a 
cut of the interchange fees Safaricom and Mwangi’s start-up would demand. This completely 
undermined their purported motivations, as “you can’t both be service provider and represent the 
interests of stakeholders.”9  
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Mwangi seemed like a good fit, capable of executing Kirungu’s vision of making the 
technology “peculiarly” Kenyan. As Mwangi explained, in trying to get the regulators at the 
Central Bank of Kenya (CBK) on board, he had offered the group a compelling presentation. 
When he pitched the system to them, he recalled fondly, his first slide read: "This is a Kenya 
Product." This, he acknowledged, was a strategy to generate attachments between regulators and 
the new, patriotic infrastructure.  
Kenyatta, Collymore, and Kirungu were conspicuous in their attendance at the inaugural 
launch of the system, joining Mwangi’s technology, which, designers claimed, would 
concurrently generate a wholesale rupture, while acting as a kind of a return, though in a digital 
register. Indeed, advertisers positioned My 1963 as a kind of secular second coming. “1963KE: 
Join the Revolution and Lets [sic] Walk Together” was the system’s tagline.10 Of course, 1963 
was the year of Kenyan independence. Here the realization of the digital future was linked to the 
founding moment of the Kenyan republic. Freedom, reframed in a digital register, was linked to 
a second independence, heralded by the rise to power of the son of the first post-independence 
president, Uhuru Kenyatta, whose first name, incidentally, means “freedom.” Mwangi was clear 
that there was nothing incidental about this. Branding the system “1963,” he told me, seemed 
like the obvious choice, it being both "symbolic and intuitive." But branding would not be 
enough to embed the technology in this “peculiarly” Kenyan milieu. To design a good product, 
Mwangi insisted, you had to know the context, you had to “know it deeply.”  
These connections were explicit across advertisements. “Our Cards are designed with a 
patriotic theme in mind: 1963 Means Independence, Progress, Freedom, and Movement,” reads 
the company website. This is a unifying and future-driven technology. This is patriotism via use; 
the consumption of an ostensibly Kenyan brand standing as the metric of both patriotism and 
inclusion in the future of the body politic. But what kind of patriotism was being advocated here?  
While the government had backed the ‘Kenyan’ option, the capital underwriting the new 
system was provided by Safaricom, as was the system upon which My 1963 would operate. As 
Chapter 6 elucidated, while Safaricom is, on the face of things, a publicly traded multinational 
corporation, the company’s history, and its relationship to the Kenyan state and the Kenyan 





nation, is much more complicated than this designation suggests. Reframing Safaricom’s 
services and brands as Kenyan, though, as we saw, is today a central corporate strategy pursued 
by the company, a scalar move designed to domesticate and embed foreign capital and expertise 
in this peculiarly Kenyan milieu, all the while creating new markets.  
The synergies between this logic and that underwriting the IBEA are striking. Like the 
epistemology underwriting the dual mandate of “commerce and civilisation,” this emergent 
developmentalist thinking links the creation of new markets to the amelioration of the lives of 
the poor. Now, like then, this is capitalism in an altruistic register. Now, like then, this would 
require cultivating new temporal sensibilities in communities now imagined as markets. Now, 
like then, this would be no easy feat.  
 
 
Infrastructural Attachments and Kenyans’ “Digital DNA”  
 
When I asked Kirungu what demographic of passengers were most resistant to the cash-free 
system, he said that it was: “based on income.” This, he admitted, was going to be a difficult 
transition for those making money on the day; but even so, those would-be users would gain 
something: “they would be able to feel, they would be able to say: ‘I’m digital.’” 
I follow Antina von Schnitzler here in arguing that this prospective payment 
infrastructure indexes a move away from large state projects and towards “more micro-logical 
forms of intervention,” which, she suggests, define neoliberal projects. Micro-logical 
interventions, von Schnitzler suggests, “work on existing realities rather than aiming to build 
them from the ground up.”11 We can see this rationality playing out in the case of My 1963 in 
three ways. First, My 1963 did not seek to address the infrastructural thinness that has shaped 
Kenya’s urban transport sector. Instead, it built on Safaricom’s digital money-transfer 
infrastructure, M-PESA, which had been conceived of by designers as a mode of infrastructural 
“leap frogging,” a workaround that, so the argument went, obviated the need for investments in 
brick-and-mortar banks. Second, Safaricom hoped to use the new user-data generated by the 
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system to expand its powerful data-collecting apparatus, these data becoming the basis from 
which it develops new services. Finally, My 1963 will allow industry partners to capitalize on 
the existing and patterned behaviors of industry workers, formalizing and scaling up their daily 
activities while relocating where gains are made. And yet, while the aspirations here may have 
been “micro-logical,” efforts to scale up and appropriate existing systems of knowledge have a 
long history in Kenya, where the developmentalist state has always also been an austere state. It 
is within this context that appropriating existing behaviors and forms of knowledge work and 
expertise has emerged as a durable strategy for executing development on the cheap.  
This aspired-for digital future was not, then, simply a feat of rhetoric alone. It would take 
work to cultivate a population in possession of this “digital DNA,” a population guided by a new 
habitus underwritten by a new rationality, all of which turned on efforts to extend the 
financialization of everyday life. In the process, not only would new fiscal subjects emerge, but 
new markets as well. Designers’ efforts to cultivate these transformations were inbuilt to the 
system itself.  
My 1963, unlike the other cash-free payment options floated, does not offer financial 
inclusion through brick-and-mortar banks. It does not have to, M-PESA having “leap-frogged” 
over the harder infrastructure of banks when it got its start in the late aughts. Instead, Safaricom 
would rely on its “payment rail,” M-PESA, in its bid to use My 1963 to extend new modalities of 
inclusion. Prospectively, coordinating these systems would allow Safaricom to include patterns 
of mobility in its already impressive roster of user data (Chapter 6); these new systems promising 
to enable increased legibility. As names and ID numbers are linked to patterns of spending on 
transport (and otherwise), this initiative promises not simply to rationalize the industry but to 
render visible the mobilities of the Kenyan population.  
As in the case of M-Shwari, the financialization of everyday life turns on generating new 
regimes of indebtedness. One service offered is KOPA (Kiswahili for “borrow”). By simply 
dialing *100#, users can access between 50–300/= Ksh worth of travel credit. As Safaricom links 
its services, new modalities of rationalization are being discursively and materially linked to new 
modalities of financialization. As discussed in chapter 6, M-Shwari’s credit ratings are based on 
patterns of use of other Safaricom services. Here, indebtedness in transport credit might, as in the 
case of rates of airtime purchases, be integrated into Safaricom’s algorithmic credit-scoring 




allow Safaricom to extend into new domains, deepening its capacity to capture the everyday 
strategies of those living at “the bottom of the pyramid,” which might, as in the case of M-PESA, 
allow it to locate new patterns of use that can be transformed into new and value-generating 
services. But passengers had resisted the company’s labors to generate new attachments between 
themselves and Safaricom through My 1963.  
As Jane, who works for Moa Obedient, one of the many Savings and Credit Cooperative 
Organizations (SACCOs) structuring the matatu industry, noted: “Passengers are the problem. 
They are simply not willing to use the machines.”12 Initially they said they did not have “float” 
(balance) in their M-PESA accounts, so they could not move value onto their My 1963 cards. 
And so, My 1963 planted people on the bus who were able to transform cash into electronic 
value. Even with this provision in place, she noted, “still people are resisting to go cashless.” 
Jane suggested that people were skeptical of the transparency on offer through the new system, 
fearful that their cash, now in digital form, would disappear into the wilderness of 0s and 1s. 
Evidently, not all are convinced that “the digital” is poised to end everyday forms of 
“corruption.” But people’s resistance to the service also turns on the types of users My 1963 
imagined, and the types of futurity such a user pre-supposed.  
The technology of cash-free payment requires customers to transform cash into e-money-
cum-future fares stored on a card. Inbuilt to the technology, thus, is an imagined customer; the 
fiscal subject of the formal economy who uses their salaried wages to buy future trips in bulk. 
Embedded in the rhetoric surrounding a cash-lite society, then, is one logic of futurity. This 
logic, however, is a fantasy in Kenya, where 61 percent of those working are engaged in the so-
called “informal sector.”13 The temporal horizons of these people, matatu men among them, 
speaks to a different set of rhythms that produce different senses of futurity; ones often marked 
by precarity today and uncertainty about prospects tomorrow. The temporality of this form of 
gains-making makes it difficult to assemble cash in advance. These people, people making 
money on the day, set aside the shillings required to get them home. This money, often 
assembled over the course of the day, is protectively guarded, otherwise people have to “foot,” a 
popular shorthand for the embarrassing form of travel that marks you as poor.  
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The “Matatu Menace”: Speedy Masculinities and Contestations Over Value   
 
For Safaricom, My 1963 promises to generate new data by capturing the strategies of those 
living “at the bottom of the pyramid.” This, in turn, can be transformed into new services, firmly 
attaching the poor in the aggregate to new capital markets. For men like Kirungu, by contrast, the 
demographic to be disciplined into new modes of being are matatu men themselves.  
Indeed, while these conflicts were happening in a digital register, the 2014 strike was not the first 
time that industry workers had responded to regulators’ efforts to discipline the industry with 
protest. At periodic intervals since Jomo Kenyatta deregulated the industry in the early 1970s, 
industry workers have struck.14 Nor is it the first time that regulators have enrolled technologies 
to reign in the “runaway” industry. 
In 1996, the Minister of Transport had tried to enforce the use of “speed limiters.” As 
with the case of My 1963, the contract was single-sourced. And so, while framed as a means of 
taming this ‘undisciplined’ industry, opponents held that this legislation was pushed through as a 
means of enriching then-president Daniel arap Moi’s “tycoons” who “wanted to sell this 
particular gadget.”15 In the early 2000s, these labors were repeated when the government 
mandated the use of  “speed governors,” small “gadgets” that place mechanical limits on 
vehicles, stopping them from exceeding 80 kph.16 
However, in each instance, these technologies have been designed to enact moral as 
much as mechanical reform, something missed if we disembed the technology from the 
micropolitical contests out of which it emerged.17 Speaking in the Kenya National Assembly one 
MP noted: “the biggest problem...we have found...was the driver[‘s] attitude. The high speed 
tends to thrill [them]...the youthful drivers we have in the country do enjoy the speed...we need 
equipment that will work on the driver attitude.” To this end, he suggested the use of a device 
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that would aurally discipline drivers. The MP described the technology, which would “tell you if 
you want to go beyond 80 KPH...‘enda pole pole,’ or “go slowly!”18 These admonishments 
would play on repeat, moving between Kiswahili and English, until the driver reformed their 
behavior. What was required, in other words, was a technology that would not only rework the 
driver’s practices, but that would also transform the subjectivity of the conspicuously “youthful” 
driver. These efforts were matched by other reforms, such as mandatory uniforms for crews and 
prohibitions on the decoration of vehicles.19  
At stake in these regulations, in other words, were not simply concerns about speeding, 
but more enduring anxieties surrounding young men in the city and the speedy technologies they 
use to generate fast money (Chapters 1 and 2). This is not to suggest that the speeding is not a 
legitimate concern. Indeed, Kenya has among the highest rates of road-related fatalities on the 
continent.20 However, brightly painted vehicles, loud hip hop, baggy pants, and the consumption 
of alcohol and meat, as much as speeding vehicles, index the ‘problem’ that regulators sought to 
address. In other words, these are anxieties about a particularly ‘disruptive’ form of specifically 
‘youthful’ urban masculinity. There is, moreover, nothing new about these anxieties. As we have 
seen, since the colonial period, male “youth” in the city have been a perennial concern for both 
government administrators and “elders.”21 
For critics, the matatu man’s desire for flashy clothes mirrors his inability to invest in 
more durable stores of value. The ‘problem’ of matatu men, in other words, is that they live the 
way that they drive. As Mwangi stated in a telling moment: matatu men “spend at pubs, on 
clothes, fake chains, cologne, movies, and women. This is what they do! No bank account 
opened…[And yet,] they get the cutest girls in Nairobi who go with them because their cash flow 
is good!”22 Gesturing effusively as he spoke, I could not help but note the conspicuous gleaming 
of his oversized gold watch. Competitions over adult masculinity, and who is authorized to claim 
it, are, in other words, part of what is at stake here.  
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Crews offered a different evaluation of their consumption. Driving around in a taxi that 
he owns, my friend Robert disclosed that he got his start in the transport industry working as a 
matatu driver. This is a period he recalled fondly as a time when he was liquid, a “big man,” 
wearing shoes “costing maybe 6000/=, pants 1000/=, shirts 2000/=”  and “bling” around his 
neck. According to Robert his sartorial self-fashioning was part and parcel of his ability to secure 
future gains. Smiling, he recalled his notoriety during the period. How he charged, and people 
paid, more to sit in the matatu next to Robert, in “his seats.” Not only did people willingly pay 
these premiums for service, he told me, but they would wait for the opportunity to do so, 
allowing other matatus to bypass them, preferring to linger until the most “pimped” vehicle, 
Robert’s, arrived. This premium of 20 bob, which he charged passengers at the front, he told me, 
were his.23 As a friend and conductor, Faysal, explained over Facebook chat, if you look “smart,” 
customers “tend 2 trust n follow u same goes 2 the matatus.”24 As this suggests, transportation is 
not the only thing on offer when one boards a matatu. Indeed, people working in the matatu 
industry are often purveyors of the circulating signs and sounds of global youth culture. Tapping 
into this milieu is part of what is on offer to would-be passengers. And in their self-framings, 
industry workers imagine self-presentation as being future-oriented, expenditures today that may 
translate into gain tomorrow.  
 
 
“The Jam” and The Pragmatics and Sociality of Cash 
 
These divergent readings of valuation on Nairobi’s streets turn on the particular structure of the 
industry. Both owners and workers make money on the day. In general, owners demand a daily 
base pay from the crew for their use of a vehicle—an average of 3000–5000/= for 15-seater 
Nissans and 10 000/= for 52-seater minibuses. Within this general breakdown, there are shades 
of difference, however, which are accounted for when owners calculate the daily cost. Old 
“Nissans” are rented for a base of 2,500/=, those in better shape between 3,500/= and 4,000/=, 
and “Executives,” such as the vehicle Richard drove, and that boast music and brightly colored 
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interiors, 5,000/=. Temporality is part of this calculation. “Executives” are the most popular 
vehicles on the road, and thus are the easiest to fill in the shortest amount of time. The base cost 
of the vehicle generally remains stable, impervious to the interventions of traffic or weather. The 
temporal horizon of owners, in other words, is relatively secure day-to-day. Laborers’ wages, for 
their part, are derived from money made over and above this threshold. On average, drivers make 
1000–1200/= per day and conductors 800–1000/= per day. The labor of industry workers, then, 
is best characterized as a kind of piecework. Wages are calculated not according to time but on 
the basis of units: customers secured, vehicles filled, return journeys completed.  
In theory, “the jam,” whether caused by bad weather or traffic, intervenes in the 
temporality of this piecework regime by reducing the total number of times a route can be 
completed. Overloaded colonial road networks mean that blockage is the norm in Nairobi today. 
It is in a bid to mitigate against the precarity of this overburdened infrastructure that industry 
workers engage in everyday and popularly sanctioned (though often resented) forms of 
appropriation.25 In so doing, they transform the negative value of “the jam” into a productive 
space of acquisition. Crucially, this turns on the pragmatics of cash and its ubiquity.  
Boarding a matatu, savvy passengers examine the state of a vehicle and its crew and 
confirm the cost of the journey. It is the responsibility of conductors, for their part, to remember 
the itineraries of passengers, to calculate fares, and to tabulate change. Once on the road, money 
is demanded. Conductors expertly weave notes through their fingers. When they have collected 
1000 KSh, these vertical notes are carefully bound with one horizontal bill.26 The material and 
embodied practices surrounding money in the matatu enables vigilance in counting—the 
conductor constantly re-tabulating total profits, and considering their own gains in light of cash 
received.27 If they are coming up short, they might quietly take a little extra. This takes subtle 
forms. Customers might find that have not received the 10 bob they are owed as change.  
Not everyone, though, is charged these premiums for service. Purposive decisions are 
made as to who should be charged at what increment of increase. As noted by Sara Berry, parties 
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to a transaction draw on past experiences in determining the “performative strategies they 
employ as the transaction unfolds.”28 This is equally true of the exchange within the matatu. 
Conductors engage in a semiotic analysis of passengers: quality of clothes, shoes, cell phones, 
destination are all considered before premiums are established.29 These are not announced, but 
quietly shillings disappear and change is not offered. But crews can never be certain that this 
tactic of appropriation will generate returns. As often happens, change will be demanded by 
passengers and the conductor’s feigned ignorance dismissed as a performative act of deception.  
While by no means uncommon, in general securing marginal gains is more routinized and 
turns on the prospect of “the jam.” When it rains, drivers and conductors raise what are, 
theoretically, set prices. While crews justify this enforced inflation as a means of ensuring they 
can generate the base fee charged by vehicle owners, and compensate for fuel wasted “idling,” 
sometimes the gains of inflated fares outstrip the stickiness of movement produced by “the jam.” 
A key interlocutor, James, provided an example. A trip from town to K-West costs 60 KSh. It is 
on the assumption of smoothly moving traffic that owners determine the base fee they charge, 
and subsequently upon which laborers determine their wages. Unforeseen blockages upset this 
arrangement. But, as he explained, if people are willing to pay you can charge more. “Let’s say 
you charge 100 instead of 60 that’s a 40 bob increase per customer,” multiply that by 12 
passengers for 2 trips, and you have a profit of 960, which “is split between conductor and 
driver.”30 Crucially, the increase in fares is not, in and of itself, popularly understood to be an act 
of deception. And the presence of “the jam” is critical to these evaluations because “Everyone 
can see there’s a jam. Everyone can see there’s rain.”31  
Far and away the most lucrative times of year, however, are the holiday seasons, during 
which many of Nairobi’s residents travel ‘up country,’ creating congestion on the major arteries 
fanning out from the city center. During these periods, rates of inflation hover around 80 
percent.32 Matatu men describe this period as kahawa ni keru, or the coffee is ripe, thereby 
firmly situating the gains of their harvest within a moral economy shaped by a predominantly 
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rural labor theory of value. And, as we will see, matatu men match this discursive framing in 
practice by parlaying their work in the city—marginal gains included—into social reproduction 
in the countryside.  
As Jane Guyer notes, marginal gains are generated out of dynamic performances that turn 
on “the definition of here, there, and the pathway between them.”33 In this case, it is the prospect 
of “the jam,” of obstruction and blockage, that enables matatu men to charge premiums for 
service; the negative value of the jam transformed into a positive space of acquisition and gain. 
Collecting fares in physical currencies is critical to these strategies. Paper money and coins, 
unlike electronic value, leave no trace, with gains quietly pocketed and divided at the end of a 
shift. Matatu men’s acts of appropriation, while resented and periodically resisted, are not 
outright condemned.34 Both industry workers and passengers refer to these increases using the 
same verb—kuongeza, which means “to increase,” or “to add,” but importantly also “to 
augment.” What proponents name “theft,” in sum, industry workers firmly locate within the 
realm of the licit, even the moral.35 “That,” some friends of mine told me, “we consider our 
salary.”36   
Digital enthusiasts know that unrolling the new system is going to generate frictions with 
crews who “want to handle cash.” However, they also expect resistance from passengers. As one 
industry insider explained: today, “perhaps the fare is 30 and you only have 20, you can ask the 
conductor to do the journey at a reduced rate.”37 With the new system, he continued, these 
people “can’t ask for favors.” Contests over value are always constituted relationally, argues 
Guyer, with “cross cutting scales of social valuation” compared and considered. In this instance, 
a sense of social obligation—whether due to familiarity, feelings of indebtedness, or those of 
affinity based on class—are generative of other methods of establishing value, or “true” price. 
Indeed, industry workers never pay for their journeys on matatus, irrespective of whether or not 
they board a vehicle that is a member of their fleet. And sometimes crews are sympathetic in 
light of prospective customers’ requests for a flexible fare scale. As this suggests, it is not simply 
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pragmatics of cash but the socialities embedded in a cash-based system that presents a problem 
for reformers, and for which “the digital” seems to offer a solution.38 
 
 
Re-Constituting ‘the Social’: New Regimes of Visibility and the Temporality of Work  
 
I met with a representative of matatu owners in June of 2015. He sat behind a shiny wood desk 
in a tall office building boasting highly reflective glass, which he shares with iHub, one of 
Nairobi’s centers of “digital innovation.” This cohabitation is fitting given the Chairman’s 
enthusiasm for all things “digital.” “Digital payment,” he told me with a smile, “is my baby.” It 
was a Friday afternoon and the Chairman, like many Nairobians, would be leaving for “up 
country” later in the day, where, he told me, he has a large shamba and “many projects” on the 
go. The Chairman was understandably proud of how he has been able to parlay urban gains into 
rural investments. But he, importantly, would not be traveling via matatu, but in the large SUV 
with darkly tinted windows that he generously drove me to town in following our meeting. 
“The problem” with the industry, the Chairman told me, is that it is a “system...based on 
trust.”39 In practical terms, he explained, this means that at the end of the day, crews hand over 
what they claim to be total gains (often the requisite cost of the vehicle), withholding margins 
over and above that threshold for themselves. This results in a situation where the owners are “at 
the mercy of the conductor or driver.”40 The Chairman is confident that the new technology will 
eliminate the problem of trust and the tactics of “pilferage” that characterizes the industry, 
because unlike crews, “the machine will always give you its [correct] history.”41 This will 
relocate sites of gains-making, bypassing the conductor who will no longer act as an “obligatory 
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passage point.”42 This turns on creating new modes of visibility, which will transform the 
temporality of gains for industry workers.43  
If Speed Governors were designed to put mechanical limits on a driver’s acceleration, the 
cash-free payment console is also concerned with putting limits on number, in this case it is 
designed to determine “fair” price. Fare schedules will be programmed into the system and 
locked in place, thereby ensuring that “crafty” crew members are not able to dictate premiums.44 
The digital platform, however, does not stand in simple opposition to existing repertoires of 
price. Indeed, designers hope to scale up and routinize the flexibility of the fare structure that 
crews have informally established over the course of many years. As Mwangi told me, prices 
will still be subject to variation, and “the jam” will still be the main variable of account. This is 
critical to the success of the system in Kenya, Mwangi continued, because Kenyans have come 
to expect variation—they “like to bargain.”  
To satisfy what Mwangi positioned as a fundamental Kenyan trait, the system’s fare 
structures will not be fixed; however, there will be limits on what increments of increase are 
possible. Thus, while variation will remain, the possibility of “the bargain” will not. For 
proponents of the new system the issue is not the charging of premiums, per se, but how the 
premiums are established, to whom the margins generated are distributed, and by what means. 
Platform designers are very clear on this point. As Mwangi said with a sigh: “Sadly,” these days 
when it rains, “even when [people are] charged 300 KSh, only 100 KSh goes to the owner.”   
Rhythms and strategies accreted over years of experience—experiences managing the 
interruptions of rain, the perennial breakdown of vehicles, and the overloading of colonial-era 
road networks—have made the tactics of these men valuable. The goal here was, in sum, to scale 
up that value generating work and relocate where the gains so secured end up.  
Owners will be able to marshal these new modes of visibility at a distance. Not only will 
the machine generate a “correct history,” but owners will have real-time access to the vehicle. As 
Mwangi excitedly explained, the system will be equipped with a “fleet management platform,” 
which will allow the owner to tap into the system, see the location of the vehicle, and the rates of 
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collection. In the past, the conductor had done this work of embodied calculation. Now these 
labors would be delegated to a machine. All of this, Mwangi said with great satisfaction, could 
be done remotely, once invisible practices made transparent and accessible from owners’ 
smartphones. Rescaling and reframing the work of matatu men will have discursive as well as 
material effects. As designers embed the everyday practices of industry workers in the digital 
platform, the practices themselves will be rebranded—no longer “theft,” these premiums for 
service will be formalized and rehabilitated as licit increases in price, and transparent, digital 
efficiency will have ‘succeeded.’  
 
 
From Boys to Men: New Temporalities of Work and Future-Making   
 
To a person, reformers acknowledged that the changed labor regime that will come on the heels 
of the digitization of payments will produce frictions between owners and crews. But in true 
paternalist form, reformers of various stripes are convinced this is in the best interest of industry 
workers. Like the Speed Governor before it, in other words, the digitization of payments is 
designed to enact moral as much as technical reforms. And, like the Speed Governor, this new 
legislation is accompanied by a bundle of other reforms, not least the enforced transition of the 
industry from one based on a logic of piecework to one of salaried wages. For the government, 
this move will create a salaried workforce, this the first step in generating a taxable base. For 
owners, this move works in tandem with new regimes of visibility in ensuring the end of 
“pilferage,” through enforcing the “death of cash” in the industry. 
While the size of salaries remained unsettled, all conceded that crews would be making 
less than they do under the conditions of the piecework regime—a minimum of 10,000/month 
less. But, reformers insist, the whole of the salary is greater than the sum of its units. The value 
of the salary, they argue, does not inhere in the number amount but in its discursive framing and 
the redistribution of agency it will enable. As Mwangi put it, salaries will change the definition 
of industry workers’ labor, which will now “actually be a job.”45 Going a step further, the 
Chairman argued that salaried wages are going to change crews’ subjectivities, for they will 
                                                




“recognize themselves like any other employee.”46 Jane thinks this will be for the benefit of these 
young men, because it will “instill discipline, which [these youth] sometimes lack.” But most 
importantly, it will enable new forms of futurity. Specifically, salaries will generate the 
paperwork required for matatu men to access loans. This will be a game-changer because, and 
seemingly for the first time, “they will be able to plan.” The reforms, as this suggests, promise to 
do more than reshape the meaning of work, but aim towards generating more thoroughgoing 
transformations in the subjectivities of workers. Transforming them from ‘youth’ who “eat well, 
drink well, sleep with beautiful women,”47 “drink[ing] Guinness and tak[ing] Choma” everyday 
into men with new “life standards” and a new “lifestyle.”48   
The vision of inclusion that frames these debates is part and parcel of a wider discourse 
on poverty alleviation that characterizes the new developmentalism of the present. States, in this 
framework, are no longer responsible for remedying widespread social inequality through 
investments in large-scale infrastructural projects, or reforms aimed at a politics of 
redistribution.49 According to this new thinking, the lives of the poor will be ameliorated as they 
are included in new markets.50 
These men, now included in the formal sector, will be transformed from an unproductive 
“menace” into a pool of new borrowers. Now able to “access loans because of the papers they 
will receive with records of earnings,” these men will be reconstituted as a new market for 
financial service providers, Safaricom among them, to tap. This, then, is the vision of 
responsibilized futurity that reformers have in mind. Now able to “plan,” the short-sighted 
investments of matatu men will be replaced by longer-term visions of futurity, visions backed by 
credit. But what of matatu men’s existing practices of future-making? It is to some of these 
strategies to which I now turn in this section, where following Richard Waller, I give these 
‘youth,’ men often my age-mates if not my seniors, some “room to dance.” In this case, on a 32-
seater matatu rented to undertake an important journey through Kenya’s Rift Valley Province.  
*** 
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Early one April morning I met Faysal, a friend and conductor, in Kenya’s Central Business 
District (CBD). Faysal had invited me to accompany him and his colleagues to visit a small 
community outside of Nakuru. This was an important occasion, as these matatu men were 
accompanying one among their number to initiate mahari or bridewealth payments. This was the 
first visit, called the kũhanda ithĩgĩ, or planting the branch of a tree. When we arrived at the 
assigned meeting place, we joined a group of some thirty matatu men. Reflecting on the scene, I 
wrote: “Everyone was dressed nicely, though no one over the top. There was one man in a suit 
called ‘Senior.’ Faysal told me this was because he talks a lot and is older than the others. There 
were a few guys with shukas draped over their shoulders but, in the main, these guys were 
dressed in ‘international’ youth style—football jerseys, button-down plaid shirts, baggy pants, t-
shirts bearing brands, and so on.”51  
After no-small measure of negotiating, seating was finally agreed upon, and we were on 
the road. The bus got lively as we moved, the music—mainly reggae, and then Kikuyu music—
blasting. The aisle was full of fellow travelers. ‘Senior’ smoked joints with practiced expertise as 
we drove into the countryside. Faysal strolled towards our seats. In his hand was a plastic Fanta 
bottle full of a liquid, which was a wan light yellow in color. “Muratina,” he told me. He pointed 
to the front of the matatu, where there were three jerry cans of the stuff, which, he explained, the 
travelers had commissioned especially for this trip. Muratina—a slightly sour, slightly chalky 
alcohol made of fermented fruits of the same name—was historically the preserve of Gikuyu 
elders, sipped while seated following important negotiations. On this day, it was the preserve of 
these men, gulped down while dancing on the road; its consumption a preemptive celebration of 
the negotiations to come.  
We continued drinking muratina as the caravan wended its way through Rift Valley. The 
journey, however, was not simply an excuse for a party. Amongst Gikuyu, having friends 
accompany you for kũhanda ithĩgĩ is critical. It demonstrates to the family of the would-be bride 
that the husband-to-be is respected and well connected with the people making up the 
communities of which he is a part.  
                                                




In this instance, this symbolic support was matched by material investment—shillings 
made in the city converted into other forms of value. As Faysal and I drank, he explained to me 
that everyone there had contributed 1000/= to their colleague’s dowry. I did some math; between 
our 32-seater and the two other 15-seater matatus, that was around 60 people. “60,000/=,” I 
remarked, “not bad.” Faysal corrected me, it’s more like 150,000/= he told me, 150 being the 
number of people who work at his matatu stage, not all of whom were able to join the group on 
that April day.   
While it is true that the piecework regime of which industry workers are a part does not, 
perhaps, enable the individual to, as an individual, secure futurities with extended temporal 
horizons, the piecework regime does, in a piecemeal way, enable forms of collective pooling that 
can be invested in in the future. In this case, these men were ensuring their colleague’s capacity 
to achieve adult masculinity through marriage.  
The matatu stopped close to Nakuru, pulling over at the side of the highway. I looked at 
Faysal, confused. "Every time we go for one of these things,” he said, “we stop at the houses of 
people whose parents live along the way. Now we're stopping at the house of the father of the 
driver.” He continued, informing me that everyone had contributed 100/= to the driver, so that he 
could bestow it upon his father. The group crowded around the slightly bent but strong-looking 
older man. The money was handed over, as were a cluster of jerry cans, which had been affixed 
to the roof of the vehicle. The driver’s father made a speech wishing us well on our journey, and 
thanking us for stopping to greet him. When he concluded, the group began singing, praising the 
man, celebrating his successes as a man, as a father.  
As we approached the gate of the bride-to-be’s compound, the women representing the 
husband’s side beseeched the women on the other side of the compound gate to let us in, singing 
and clapping. Those driving honked their horns. The women refused until they were satisfied 
with the solicitations being sung by their counterparts on the other side of the gate, and finally 
the doors were opened. Following a short prayer, people immediately got in line for food, which 
was being served in large sufurias—mukimo, pilau, stew, chapati. We ate quickly, and before I 
knew it we were moving back towards the vehicle.  
Our time at the bride-to-be’s homestead had to be truncated, Faysal explained. There was 
another stop we had to make before embarking on the 4–5 hour journey back to Nairobi. The 




time, contributed to help pay his medical bills. The father wanted to thank them, and so, we 
drove deeper into the interior and entered into a small rift, a beautiful valley flanked on both 
sides by steep inclines. Again, collections were made, 50 KSh per person this time, which they 
would offer to the father and mother of another colleague. We arrived at the house, and the group 
danced around the older couple as they sat in their small, dimly lit living room. Sentiments of 
gratitude were exchanged, and we continued on our journey back to Nairobi.  
In other words, periods of urban gain described as kahawa ni keru here, on this day in 
early April, were matched in practice as these matatu men collectively parlayed their work in the 
city—marginal gains included—into social reproduction in the countryside. If, as Guyer notes 
“the struggle for the gains embedded in [new regimes of rationalization are at base struggles] to 
define time, money, and their mutual implications,” to this we might add that they are struggles 
over value. They are disputations over who and what authorizes the generation, storage, and 





Descriptions of these conflicts as evidencing a neoliberal tendency towards financialization 
would miss much of the granularity of the politics at play in the push to digitize payments in the 
matatu industry that were on display in 2014. In keeping with the Chairman’s insights regarding 
Near Field Communications technology, such a reading would miss the ways in which ideologies 
regarding development, and the technologies and infrastructures designed in their name, are 
firmly rooted in this particularly and “peculiarly” Kenyan milieu. To gloss over the processes by 
which globally circulating technologies are reformatted as they are rescaled would, furthermore, 
render invisible the ways in which the tacit, embodied, and everyday knowledge practices and 
forms of expertise of matatu industry workers are poised to become the basis for the generation 
of new value-generating services. If ‘successful,’ this will involve both material and discursive 
shifts. Indeed, as historically salient practices are tethered to new digital networks and 
                                                




formalized, the illicit will be rebranded as the licit, the informal will be reformatted as the 
formal, and theft will be reframed as development in a digital register.  
As in the past, while the discourse of the digital and its technologies tap into globally 
circulating ideas and material networks, the technopolitics embedded in the new system are in no 
way generic. Indeed, the debates surrounding the migration of payment structures in transport 
articulated with long-standing cultural politics that frames young men in the city as a problem. 
Indeed, as we saw (Chapters 1 and 2), for elders in the countryside, unsanctioned movement to 
the city, and the new forms of value-generation it enabled, threatened to unseat an existing moral 
economy framed by the concept of wiathi or “self-mastery.” Through the lens of value we can 
situate the new modes of formalization being unrolled in Kenya under the sign of the digital 
today as disclosing anxieties of a much older vintage. These are struggles over where value is 
accumulating, yes, but they are framed through enduring anxieties over the place of young men 
and their work in the city. These were struggles over who gets to define what counts, pace 
Waller, as “socially productive ways.”53  
 
                                                









“Infrastructural Attachments” began with a political street preacher who argued that the 
presidency of Uhuru Kenyatta’s de facto monopoly over the means of communication and the 
means of exchange, as well as the infrastructures undergirding them, had undermined the ‘public 
good.’ I want to end with a position that on first glance takes much the opposite perspective. In 
2016, Nairobi Law Monthly began publishing a series of articles regarding the outsized role that 
communications giant Safaricom plays in everyday life. These articles turned on the perception 
that the company holds a monopoly over the country’s financial, security, and media 
infrastructures—as well as the services they offer. It is Safaricom, these articles argue, that is 
undermining ‘public good.’ In a 2017 article, ArKan Yasin wrote: 
Safaricom is the primary arbiter of all social and economic relations for the 
population of the entire territory… Safaricom is unique not just in the fact that it 
straddles commerce, banking, voice and data communications, security 
surveillance and entertainment, but in the depth of its dominance in terms of reach 
in numbers, brand and socio-political power.1 
Here rather than the state dominating corporations—the argument of the political preacher with 
whom we began—we have the corporation taking the place of the state.  
At the center of Yasin’s critique is the perception that Safaricom’s outsized role across 
the domains of its operations has rendered it state-like. For Yasin, this has presented a 
fundamental conundrum. As he continued: “Safaricom wields all the societal scale tools of 
arbitration, power and oversight without societal scale authority and culpability, and here in [sic] 
lies the problem.” Despite Safaricom’s state-like power, its status as a corporation ensures that it 
has none of the obligations of a state. It is not, in other words, responsible to the Kenyan public, 
writ large, but to a more discrete set of social categories: shareholders, customers, and 
                                                




management structures located in the United Kingdom, Kenya, and, recently, South Africa. This 
truncated vision of ‘the public’ has dire social consequences, Yasin argued. While the 
corporation has taken on state-like functions, it has eschewed its social responsibilities to 
Kenyans in their status as both citizens and, crucially, as generators of value. To remedy this 
state of affairs, Yasin offered a solution:  
Given the sheer scale of Safaricom’s dominance over the social entity, political 
theory dictates it should bear the burden and weight of the entity’s social and 
economic challenges proportionately. The M-PESA transaction fee by virtue of 
its ubiquity and inescapability (given it is extracted from over 88% of the adult 
population), is a society-wide economic rent and de-facto tax. 
In reframing Safaricom’s fees as first rent, then as a form of taxation, Yasin gained critical 
analytic and political traction over the problem Safaricom presents. Conceived of as rent, Yasin 
argued that Safaricom’s fees for service are best conceived of as uncompensated value that it 
extracts from the public without making any contribution to productivity. Yasin’s next analytic 
move was crucial. Yasin argued that Safaricom’s extraction, given its reach into the lives of 
“over 88% of the adult population,” should be reframed as a form of taxation. This final turn of 
the wheel brought him to his conclusion: “Safaricom…has a social and economic obligation to 
this 88%, which transcends public relations false wealth re-distribution ‘photo-op’ exercises like 
Corporate Social Responsibility.” By reframing Safaricom’s fees as a kind of a tax, Yasin argued 
the company has an obligation to provision for the ‘public’ not as a divisible category, but as an 
undifferentiated and generic one. The company, he here claimed, is on the line for reinvesting its 
profits and ameliorating the lives of Kenyans as Kenyans.  
 What are we to make of these two perspectives? We would miss much if we saw in this 
an example of the weakening of the state, with the incremental ceding of its authority to a 
multinational corporation; this is one of the typical narratives of neoliberalism, which sees an 
inverse relationship between state authority and “neoliberalism’s varied global dispensations” 
(Chalfin 2010: 37).  It is true that on the face of things Safaricom is a publicly traded 
multinational corporation. However, and as I have argued (Chapter 6), this designation obscures 
more than it reveals regarding the relationship between the company—which is both partially 
held by Kenyan shareholders and by the government “in trust” for the Kenyan people—and the 




in Kenya today holds a monopoly over the fields of finance, communications, and exchange, the 
claims of the street preacher notwithstanding.  
Today, both the corporation and the state are poised to profit from these relations of 
intimacy; both are poised to benefit from these infrastructural attachments. Safaricom is not only 
the single largest tax payer in the country, thereby generating revenues that line state coffers. But 
given that the government of Kenya is also a shareholder, when Safaricom profits, so too does 
the treasury. The new “security” system, which the state single-sourced when it quietly granted 
Safaricom the tender in 2014, is another site where historically consolidated infrastructural 
attachments are poised to benefit both the corporation and the state. Not only will the corporation 
be footing the bill in the initial instance, but as it links up new data with those gleaned through its 
financial and telephonic services, the prospective surveillance apparatus will be more robust than 
anything the government could have assembled without foreign capital and expertise.2 Finally, 
the massive cache of user data that Safaricom has amassed is not only entering new capital 
markets as Safaricom sells the particulars and preferences of users to new companies in a bid to 
generate new markets. But the state, too, is rumored to access this data in its rhetorically 
powerful, but predictably misguided, “war on terror.”3 Drawing a line between the state and the 
corporation, between public and private interests, is evidently no easy task in Kenya today.  
Rather than reading these two infrastructural tales as indicating confusion, then, I think 
we are better served holding them together and asking what, as pieces of a single puzzle, these 
stories reveal about the relationship between private capital, state power, developmental 
responsibility, and the politics of belonging in Kenya today. The crux of both critiques turns on 
boundary crossing—the indistinct lines between the state and the corporation, the public and the 
private, these Kenyan cultural critics argue, has undercut a generic notion of ‘the public.’ As ‘the 
public’ is disaggregated, the meaning of the infrastructures constructed in its name is also called 
into question. Not least, these critics suggest that this routine blurring of lines has undermined a 
vision of infrastructures as public goods to which all should have equal access. This has 
consequences for Kenya society; the routine transgression of these borders attenuating the 
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relationship between the Kenyan state and its citizens. These claims have empirical legs. In the 
1990s, when the state began incrementally privatizing what was once a state-held entity—Kenya 
Posts and Telecommunications Corporation—it was, among other things, a means of outsourcing 
the risk and costs of the development of telecommunications infrastructures and services from 
which the state nevertheless stood to profit. This distribution of infrastructural and 
developmentalist authority has led to a viable set of concerns regarding who, ultimately, is 
responsible for provisioning for the Kenyan people.  
Analytically, reading these narratives together suggests that attention must be directed to 
understanding how shifts in the balance of public and private within the state and within the 
corporation, as well as along their edges, has mediated social, political, and material dynamics 
over the longer term. Indeed, Kenya’s postcolonial technopolitics do not begin in 1963 on the 
eve of independence. As it has been the task of the preceding chapters to demonstrate, 
contemporary infrastructural technopolitics build on colonial inheritances. Specifically, 
contemporary infrastructural politics are the outgrowth of the lumpy technopolitical assemblages 
of the past as they were shaped by administrative practices that produced a divisible public. This, 
then, is a particularly Kenyan story with a “peculiarly” Kenyan history. 
Indeed, the entangled relations among state-formation and capital, read through the 
infrastructures that often brought them together under the mantle of the “common good,” were at 
the core of the British presence in the region. In 1888, unwilling to outlay the capital required to 
administer the territory, the Crown granted a Charter to the Imperial British East Africa 
Company (IBEA) to assert British authority over the region under the dual mandate of 
“commerce and civilisation.” The Charter gave the IBEA wide discretion, not only granting it a 
commercial monopoly in the region, but bequeathing to it the right and responsibility to act as 
the de facto administrator of the territory. This distribution of developmentalist authority was not 
unusual in the nineteenth century. Indeed, when the IBEA first cut its teeth, Britons would not 
have apprehended the corporation as a private entity, per se, the very existence of such an entity 
turning on the receipt of a government charter. But, of course, infrastructures were not public 
entities either. Indeed, while the corporation was responsible to the sovereign as a representative 
of the public, it was not responsible to the public itself.4  
                                                




Discursively, these tensions were, in part, remedied by the fact that the IBEA received 
sanction from the sovereign as representative of the people. In a roundabout way, then, the 
sovereign’s Charter ensured that the corporation did remain accountable to the public writ large. 
Materially, these contradictions were ‘resolved,’ such as they were, in the form of 
infrastructures, which administrators conceived of as the foundation both subtending a new 
economic order, and the basis for social betterment. 
But this resolution, such as it was, articulated in peculiar ways in the colonies. In Eastern 
Africa public works projects such as road networks were of value to shareholders in the form of 
dividends, the Crown in the form of extended territorial control, and Britons in the form of 
monies partially relocated to state coffers through the taxation of commodities.5 And 
incrementally in these years this British public was expanding as the government extended the 
franchise.6 And this produced contradictions. Just as ‘the public’ was expanding across much of 
Europe, in the colonies it was taken for granted that would-be colonized communities would not 
be fully folded in to this growing public. Securing the commonweal in the UK, then, depended 
on mobilizing new forms of coercion in Eastern Africa, while bringing to these same 
communities “commerce and civilisation.”  
How, then, were would-be colonial subjects to benefit from the developmental side of the 
dual mandate? The answer was as odd as it was convenient. Africans living in the region were to 
benefit from the existence of new infrastructures and the new regimes of labor and taxation 
required to build them, both of which were held to have a civilizing effect on both persons and 
the landscapes they called home. While not a conceptually dissonant marriage in these years, the 
dual mandate of “commerce and civilisation” was bound to produce contradictions. Not least, the 
bottom line of capital gains, in tandem with a bifurcated vision of the public, undermined 
infrastructures’ purported function as ‘public goods.’ These contradictions would not end when 
the Foreign Office took over the administration of the region, but instead became the 
foundational logic of the early colonial state. Conquest “on a shoestring,” undertaken at the 
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behest of a public-private partnership to invoke a financial anachronism, set the stage for the 
emergence of the austere state in Kenya.7 
This tension persisted throughout the colonial period. Indeed, in this corner of Eastern 
Africa, the developmentalist aspirations underwriting projects of infrastructural expansion, and 
undertaken under durable conditions of austerity, have always depended on the mobilization of 
private capital and the construction of new markets—“development” and marketization in this 
austere geography have been but two sides of the same coin. But this marriage, while routine, 
has generated unexpected consequences. 
Indeed, as I have argued, state efforts to leverage private capital as infrastructural 
prosthetics designed to extend administrative control have not always ‘succeeded.’ By the 1940s, 
for example, it was widely acknowledged that Cable and Wireless’ monopoly in the region had 
unduly affected the state’s ability to develop an infrastructure of broadcasting for African 
listeners. The corporation, in that instance, weakened the technopolitical aspirations of the state. 
In other instances, people pointed to these contradictions as new regimes of extraction, 
ostensibly seized to finance the construction of infrastructures as ‘public goods,’ became key 
nodes of conflict between subjects and the state. As people observed the uneven provisioning of 
infrastructures that broke down along the lines of race (Chapter 1), ethnicity (Chapters 2 and 4), 
and class (Chapter 6), they routinely called the state, in its various iterations, to account. The 
state’s ‘failure’ to smooth out these contradictions in both material and ideological terms, in 
other words, led to a redistribution of agency, opening up possibilities for people to claim their 
inclusion within the infrastructural state.  
Indeed, when the Foreign Office took over administration of the region, it not only built 
on these practices but augmented them, though the sub-categories of ‘publics’ that this new 
bureaucratic apparatus worked to enact had different coordinates. No longer shareholders and 
financiers, but “natives” and “settlers,” “tribes” and ethno-linguistic groups. As a result, it was 
along the lines of these striated categories that people calculated whether or not they were being 
included in the infrastructural state, whether they were the beneficiaries of the commonweal that 
                                                





was one of the state’s proffered dispensations. Indeed, the technopolitical history of 
infrastructures in Eastern Africa has routinely turned not on technical intervention but its inverse: 
popular perceptions of infrastructural absence. As people debated how the state was provisioning 
for themselves and their communities, they engaged in comparative work, contrasting how the 
state was provisioning for them as against various ‘Others.’ In Eastern Africa, in other words, the 
contradictory vision of the public initiated under the dual mandate was compounded by the 
highly stratified racial and economic order that guided colonial administrative practices and 
shaped everyday life. 
Tracing out these dynamics has been the task of this dissertation, which conjoins an 
ethnographically informed analysis of state-building and market-making with a close reading of 
the cultural politics of Kenyan communities. Working across these domains I have tried to parse 
out the contradictions of colonial rule on the ground by tracing the popular debates and practices 
that assembled around the state and its allies’ most concrete and visible interventions—
infrastructures. When and where they existed, these networks were the everyday materialization 
of state power. Their absence, too, was politicized by colonial communities as they demanded 
that the state make good on its promise as an entity tasked with provisioning for the 
commonweal.  
But, as I argued, people did not experience state networks in terms of the generic colonial 
subject that theoretically sat at the heart of the colonial project. Nor in the present do people 
experience these networks in terms of the unmarked political subject that sits at the heart of 
liberal democracy. Instead, Kenya’s infrastructural politics have been shaped in critical ways by 
colonial administrative practices that produced a divisible public. Specifically, people’s 
experiences of infrastructures—both as infrastructural workers and as users—have been filtered 
through the racialized hierarchies and ethnic categories that have structured social, political, and 
economic inclusion and exclusion in Kenya more broadly. 
Confining this story to the contradictory dynamics of state building and market-making 
would only enable partial understanding of the complex politics of infrastructures in Kenya, 
however. As I have shown, infrastructures were never merely materializations of abstract state 
power. By tracking Kenya’s infrastructural technopolitics as they moved out of the hands of 
designers and into the quotidian lives and everyday conflicts of African communities, I have 




new social and political subjectivities. Telescoping into the micropolitics of infrastructures, I 
have argued, reveals how people mobilized new networks and their technologies in domains that 
far exceeded the reach of the state. At this scale, infrastructures have featured in battles over the 
parameters of community, debates over the ethics of new forms of accumulation, and 
disputations regarding the means and metrics of becoming a social adult.  
If understanding how people leveraged infrastructures as objects of political and social 
dispute has been one core concern of this dissertation, exploring how these networks were 
enacted in material terms under conditions of austerity has been the other. Policies of austerity 
routinely meant that designers were asked to do more with less as they planned projects of 
infrastructural expansion. Over the course of each of the infrastructural tales narrated in these 
pages, technologists and engineers, and their plans for social transformation, have been stymied. 
Novel material, social, and cultural conditions have forced these men and their plans to confront 
the limits of their expertise. Against these material constraints, African knowledge workers and 
experts have been called upon to do prosthetic infrastructural work, to fill the breach between the 
state’s aspirations and material conditions.  
These men and women, over the longer term, have been responsible not only for 
mobilizing their “cultural” and linguistic expertise. But their labor, their skill, and their acumen 
have been mobilized to close the gap between the developmentalist ambitions of the state and its 
proxies and the material realities that were borne both of Kenya’s unique geography and of long-
standing policies of colonial austerity. Indeed, just as men like Ambrose Wakaria were essential 
to making radio broadcasting ‘work’ in the context of an infrastructurally thin state, so too have 
the tacit arrangements and everyday tactics of Nairobi’s matatu men emerged out of 
infrastructural absence.  
The retention of colonial road networks and the absence of the development of a large-
scale transportation system in Kenya’s capital city in the independence period set the stage for 
the emergence of the matatu industry. These material constraints have formed the basis for the 
forms of marginal gains-making by which matatu men ‘get by’ in the context of a largely 
informal economy, where the possibilities for formal work are unlikely for the majority. And 
these tales have a kinship with that of Nyawira and the tens of thousands of men and women that 
take charge of the M-PESA kiosks dotting Kenya’s urban and rural landscapes. As in the case of 




infrastructures—here a banking infrastructure—which has required these workers to jump into 
the “breach.” And yet historical experts, like matatu men, like Nyawira, have not been 
recognized as knowledge workers nor as experts. Instead, systems’ builders refer to people like 
Nyawira as “Human ATMs,” and we can well imagine those interested in the digitization of 
transport referring to Faysal as a Human-NFC (Near Field Communications) console; one to be 
replaced at that. 
This effacement of expertise is pernicious and it is political. Indeed, technologists and 
administrators have routinely appropriated this knowledge and expertise even as they sidelined 
the importance of this work. This is a scalar move in at least two ways. First, as I have argued 
across the histories narrated in this dissertation, as the value-generating work of African experts 
and knowledge workers is appropriated, their authorship is obscured. And yet, as we saw in the 
case of Nyawira and Faysal, systems’ designers do recognize this work as value generating. 
Indeed, they hope to use the patterned exchanges of the poor and the norms that they reveal as 
the baseline from which to reform globally circulating technologies (for Mwangi), and as a 
means of generating new data and from it new services (for Safaricom). Second, as this value-
generating work is appropriated and scaled up, the infrastructures themselves are transformed, 
rendered “peculiarly” Kenyan. Indeed, as designers such as Mwangi and the Chairman are well 
aware in the case of the digitization of the matatu industry, the peculiarly Kenyan arrangements 
that shape dynamics in the transport industry need to be accommodated if this digital system, 
NFC, is to take hold. In an earlier iteration, technologists and administrators referred to this work 
of embedding as “tropicalisation.” Claims to the contrary notwithstanding, infrastructures are not 
eminently flexible but require ‘localization,’ translation, and transformation to take hold in new 
material, cultural, and social zones.  
In each of these infrastructural tales, however, designers and technologists have reframed 
the work of these innovators and experts of both technics and culture as banal. Both in the past 
and in the present, the underwriting presupposition is that African knowledge workers and 
technical experts simply act like infrastructures, that they simply act infrastructurally.  
*** 
Narratives of austerity as a feature of contemporary organizations of technology and capital 
markets have a durable history in this one postcolonial space. This is a space where incomplete 




has been mobilized to close the gap between an ideologically dense but materially austere 
infrastructural state. To frame this work as mere labor is to accept the representational practices 
of designers and technologists, both past and present. Rather, what I have argued in these pages 
is that people have not only acted as laborers, but as critical knowledge workers, as experts. A 
human ATM, in other words, is a value-generating knowledge worker and expert of both the 
technics and culture. Absent this expertise, these technologies, both past and present, simply 
would not work.  
If we are to write histories of capital’s present and the types of inequalities that it shores 
up, particularly in the face of claims to ethical capitalism—of which Safaricom, Nyawira’s 
company and the company backing the migration to the digital in the transport sector is a key 
proponent—we must dig in different directions. We must see Nyawira—the human ATM—and 
Faysal—the Human-NFC—not simply as an effect of these forms, but as, in fact, constituent to 
making these forms work; not simply as laboring bodies, but as sites of knowledge production. 
Their work, like that of radio experts such as Katele and Wakaria, and the unnamed experts of 
topography whose knowledge shaped early road infrastructures, forms of expertise. 
But it has not only been at the hands of technologists and designers that this work has 
been devalued as mere labor. As I have argued, African communities have routinely brought 
their own ideas regarding the social good and work to bear as they have evaluated the extension 
of new markets, and the technologies and infrastructures with which they were associated. In the 
1920s and again in the 1940s, elders castigated young people’s attempts to rescale their work on 
the road in a bid to enter new markets and leverage themselves into positions of social maturity. 
Similar patterns are evident in the postcolonial state’s bid to digitize payments in the matatu 
industry. Here the state and technologists hope to rescale foreign expertise and capital in a bid to 
reform the behaviors and futures of unruly matatu youth in the city. These young people, they 
argue, are an unproductive “menace.”  
There are critical political reasons to take this expertise and its routine devaluation 
seriously, critical reasons to push against arguments of “unproductivity.” James Ferguson has 
recently suggested that we need to reframe our understandings of ethics and politics if we are to 
take stock of a new but ever more ubiquitous condition. He writes: 
It is common to suppose that people make their livelihoods by being “productive” 
– that is, by producing, via their labor, goods and services that either meet their 




be marketed…or their labor can be sold…In fact that has never been an adequate 
account…[But] recent developments in the spatial and social organization of 
production…[mean] that [the] commonsense linkage of livelihood with 
production [is] under considerable strain.8 
The bulk of the population living on the African continent, he argues, is today “simply left out of 
the global production regime.” In response to these new conditions, Ferguson argues, we must 
come up with a new politics of distribution, one that accepts that we are living in conditions of 
“surplus labor.” He proposes the universal income grant as one solution. 
The conditions obtaining in South Africa are not altogether different from those obtaining 
in Kenya. Except that in Kenya, as across much of the continent, it is unlikely that the state will 
intervene and “give a man a fish,” in Ferguson’s formulation. And these differences matter to the 
types of politics, the types of ethics, and the genre of redistribution for which we advocate. 
Indeed, as the example of Safaricom suggests, while people are not necessarily included 
in today’s formal wage labor economies, their data is generating value. As people’s everyday 
strategies, along with the daily practices and expertise of infrastructural workers, are captured, 
they become the foundations upon which new products are designed and new markets are 
assembled. This value-generating work is being mobilized by companies such as Safaricom (but 
in earlier iterations the IBEA), and new modes of accumulation are sometimes the result. The 
labor of these people, like the labor of Nyawira, while generating value is not recognized as 
value-generating activity. If we are to generate new critiques of contemporary capitalism on the 
continent, we need to attend to these new modes of capture and their histories. We need to move 
away from a frame that naturalizes “people as infrastructure” to consider the particular 
arrangements of capital and work that have demanded that people act infrastructurally.  
This perspective is, I think, critical not only for doing justice to the histories of this work 
and these experts, and to reckoning with durable inequalities. But it is also critical to 
understanding our global present, one wherein innovation often looks like waste, when promised 
prosperity often looks like prolonged precarity, and when both informalization and formalization 
threaten to devalue work as simply labor all the while capitalizing on human expertise. 
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